Tyrone Chalmers v. State of Tennessee

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

June 3, 2014 Session

TYRONE CHALMERS v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. P24965 Don R. Ash, Special Judge

No. W2013-02317-CCA-R3-PD - Filed June 30, 2014

The petitioner, Tyrone Chalmers, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial

of his petition for writ of error coram nobis in which he challenged his death sentence

resulting from his 1997 conviction for first degree felony murder. On appeal, the petitioner

contends that he is entitled to coram nobis relief because he is intellectually disabled and,

therefore, ineligible for the death penalty. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

A LAN E. G LENN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which C AMILLE R. M CM ULLEN and

R OGER A. P AGE, JJ., joined.

Paul J. Bruno, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Tyrone Chalmers.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General & Reporter; James E. Gaylord, Assistant Attorney

General; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; and Muriel Malone, Assistant District

Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTS

In 1997, the petitioner was convicted of first degree felony murder and especially

aggravated robbery. The jury sentenced him to death after finding that the evidence of an

aggravating circumstance – that the petitioner was previously convicted of one or more

felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involved the use of violence

of the person, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2) (Supp. 1994) – outweighed evidence

of any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court sentenced the

petitioner to twenty years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, to run

concurrently with the death sentence but consecutively to sentences previously imposed in

another case. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the petitioner’s convictions and

sentences on direct appeal. See State v. Chalmers, 28 S.W.3d 913, 915 (Tenn. 2000).

The evidence presented at trial was summarized by the Tennessee Supreme Court on

direct appeal as follows:

At approximately 5:00 a.m. on August 20, 1994, the body of the

African-American victim, 28-year-old Randy Allen, was discovered lying face

down on the sidewalk next to Netherwood Street in Memphis. His pants and

underwear had been pulled down around his ankles, and he had been shot five

times. Two of the wounds, one to the head and another to the back, were fatal.

Ten days after the shooting, the 21-year-old African-American

defendant admitted to Memphis police that he had killed the victim during a

robbery. The defendant stated:

I met up with “Dre” and “Black” on Orleans and So. Parkway

near the park. “Black” was driving something like a [sic]

Oldsmobile, “Dre” was in the front passenger seat and I got in

the back seat. We were just riding around looking for somebody

to rob. I had some kind of automatic rifle, it had a clip in it,

black and brown color. “Dre” had a .380 automatic or

something, look [sic] black to me. I think “Black” had a

shotgun. “Black” was driving down Netherwood, and me and

“Dre” jumped out on two boys.1 We tried to rob them. We

made them strip, then I had hit the one that was killed with the

rifle and it went off, and I couldn’t let the rifle go. Then me and

“Dre” jumped in the car and left, with “Black” driving. Then

“Black” dropped me and “Dre” off near a house, close to

Southside School.

The defendant, who robbed Murphy and the victim of $ 3.00, estimated

that he had fired six times. The defendant concluded his statement by

remarking, “I’m sorry it ever happened. If I could go through it again, I

1

These “two boys” were the victim and his cousin, Marlon Murphy. The defendant was also indicted

for the aggravated robbery of Murphy, but the charge was dismissed due to Murphy’s unavailability as a

witness for the prosecution.

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wouldn’t.”

....

During the sentencing phase, the State introduced evidence of the

defendant’s previous convictions for attempted especially aggravated robbery

and attempted first degree murder for a criminal episode occurring on the same

date as the present offenses. The Deputy Clerk for the Shelby County

Criminal Court Clerk’s Office testified that, according to the court records,

Tyrone Chalmers was convicted of attempted especially aggravated robbery

and attempted first degree murder on July 8, 1996, for offenses committed

against Joseph Hunter on August 20, 1994. During cross-examination, defense

counsel contested the clerk’s identification of the defendant, asking, “You

have no way of knowing whether or not those documents that you have are in

fact, belong to [sic] Tyrone Chalmers, do you? You have no personal

knowledge yourself, do you?” Hunter, the victim of those prior crimes, then

testified that he was driving home at approximately 2:55 a.m. on August 20,

1994, when the defendant stepped in front of his car, pointed a rifle at him, and

told him to “give it up.” According to Hunter, the defendant fired

approximately fifteen rounds at him as he drove away, striking Hunter in the

leg and arm.

The defendant presented the testimony of his mother and sister. His

mother testified that the defendant was one of seven children, had graduated

from high school, and had never given her any trouble. At the time of these

offenses, the defendant was employed and was caring for his mother who

suffered from diabetes. The defendant’s sister described the defendant as “a

very caring person” and her best friend. She conceded that he had been in

juvenile court once but claimed that the victim of that offense had “actually

committed a crime” against the defendant.

The last witness was the defendant, who testified that only hours before

he committed these offenses he had been drinking alcohol and had smoked

crack cocaine for the first time. He claimed that he could not remember what

happened but did recall that the gun he used belonged to one of the

accomplices. He admitted having been in juvenile court but asserted that the

only criminal charges he had ever faced were those arising from the events of

the early morning hours of August 20, 1994. The defendant told the victim’s

family that he was sorry and expressed his desire to take the victim’s place if

he could. On cross-examination, the defendant admitted that he tried to rob

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Hunter before he ever met up with Dre and Black.

Id. at 915-17.

Post-Conviction Proceedings

On April 19, 2001, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief

claiming that his counsel were ineffective. The petitioner, through counsel, filed an amended

petition in September 2003 claiming that he was intellectually disabled and, therefore,

ineligible for the death penalty.

During the August 2005 evidentiary hearing, the petitioner presented the testimony

of Dr. Keith Caruso as an expert in general and forensic psychiatry. Dr. Caruso testified that

the petitioner had a verbal I.Q. score of 73, a performance I.Q. score of 85, and a full-scale

I.Q. score of 77. Dr. Caruso further testified that the petitioner fell within the borderline

range of intellectual functioning.

The petitioner appeared to have abandoned his claim of intellectual disability during

the post-conviction hearing. The post-conviction court did not address the intellectual

disability issue in denying the petitioner post-conviction relief. The petitioner did not raise

the issue in his appeal of the denial of post-conviction relief in this court. On appeal, this

court affirmed the post-conviction court’s judgment. See Tyrone Chalmers v. State, No.

W2006-00424-CCA-R3-PD, 2008 WL 2521224, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 25, 2008),

perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 22, 2008).

Intellectual Disability Proceedings

On April 10, 2012, the petitioner filed a motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings

in which he alleged that he is intellectually disabled and, therefore, ineligible for the death

penalty. He argued that the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Coleman v. State, 341

S.W.3d 221 (Tenn. 2011), established a new constitutional right that was not recognized at

the time of his trial. He also argued that he has new scientific evidence that he is

intellectually disabled and, therefore, actually innocent of capital murder and the death

penalty.

The petitioner attached to his motion the April 9, 2012 affidavit of Dr. Daniel Reschly,

a professor of education and psychology at Vanderbilt University. According to Dr. Reschly,

the petitioner was administered the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised

(WISC-R) in 1985, and he received a full-scale I.Q. score of 78. Dr. Reschly applied the

Flynn Effect to adjust the petitioner’s I.Q. score to 73.7. On October 20, 2009, Dr. Reschly

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administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Test-IV (WAIS-IV) to the petitioner, and the

petitioner’s full-scale I.Q. score was 76. Dr. Reschly applied the Flynn Effect to adjust the

petitioner’s I.Q. score of 75.

Dr. Reschly noted issues with the accuracy of the Wechsler Scales norms for both the

children and adult scores at the very high and very low levels of intellectual functioning. As

a result, Dr. Reschly administered the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales, Fifth Edition (SB-

V) on March 16, 2012, and the petitioner’s full-scale I.Q. score was 70. Dr. Reschly adjusted

the petitioner’s I.Q. score to 66.4 based upon the Flynn Effect. He concluded that based

upon his clinical judgment and consideration of the Flynn Effect, estimation of error in the

test, practice effect, and cultural differences, the petitioner’s “functional intelligence clearly

is at or below 70.”

Dr. Reschly concluded that the petitioner has significant deficits in adaptive behavior

due to substantial limitations in the conceptual skills, social skills, and practical skills

domains. He further concluded that the petitioner’s functional intelligence and significant

deficits in adaptive behavior were present prior to the age of eighteen. Dr. Reschly opined

that the petitioner is intellectually disabled.

On December 20, 2012, the Tennessee Supreme Court released its opinion in Keen

v. State, 398 S.W.3d 594 (Tenn. 2012), in which the court rejected the bases upon which the

petitioner sought to reopen his post-conviction proceedings. According to the trial court’s

order, on February 1, 2013, the petitioner amended his motion to include a petition for writ

of error coram nobis and directly invoked the intellectual disability provisions in Tennessee

Code Annotated section 39-13-203. The trial court’s order states that the State filed a

response seeking summary dismissal and that the petitioner filed a reply brief.2

On September 19, 2013, the trial court entered an order denying relief. The trial court

found that the grounds asserted by the petitioner in his motion to reopen were precluded by

Keen. The trial court noted that in support of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis, the

petitioner alleged that his 2012 evaluation constituted new evidence that he is ineligible for

the death penalty. The trial court found that information regarding the potential issue of

intellectual disability had been available to the petitioner for many years but that the writ was

not filed until February of 2013, more than fifteen years after the judgment became final and

almost ten years after the petitioner first raised the issue in post-conviction proceedings. The

trial court further found that “[m]erely having an expert perform yet another evaluation like

others [had] done in the past does not satisfy the criteria for tolling the statute.” The trial

2

The petitioner’s amended motion, the State’s response, and the petitioner’s reply brief are not

included in the record on appeal.

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court concluded that the petitioner’s petition for a writ of error coram nobis was barred by

the one-year statute of limitations and that the petitioner failed to establish a sufficient basis

to justify tolling of the limitations period. The trial court also denied the petitioner’s claim

that he should be allowed to directly invoke the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated

section 39-13-203.

The petitioner filed in this court an application for permission to appeal the trial

court’s denial of his motion to reopen pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 28. On January 14,

2014, this court entered an order denying the petitioner’s application for permission to appeal

and holding that in Keen, the Tennessee Supreme Court rejected the bases upon which the

petitioner sought to reopen post-conviction proceedings. See Tyrone Chalmers v. State, No.

W2013-02329-CCA-R28-PD (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2014), perm. app. filed (Tenn. Mar.

14, 2014). The petitioner also filed a notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 3, Tennessee Rules

of Appellate Procedure, regarding his claims of coram nobis relief and relief pursuant to

Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203.

ANALYSIS

The petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition for

writ of error coram nobis in which he claimed that he is intellectually disabled and, therefore,

ineligible for the death penalty. He also contends that he should be allowed to directly

invoke the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203 to establish that he

is intellectually disabled.

A. Intellectual Disability and the Death Penalty

In 1990, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203 was enacted prohibiting the

execution of defendants who were intellectually disabled at the time that they committed first

degree murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203(b); State v. Howell, 151 S.W.3d 450, 455

(Tenn. 2004); State v. Van Tran, 66 S.W.3d 790 (Tenn. 2001). Although the statute is not

to be applied retroactively, the execution of intellectually disabled individuals violates

constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. Howell, 151 S.W.3d at 455

(citing Van Tran, 66 S.W.3d at 798-99); see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).

In Tennessee, “intellectual disability” rendering a defendant ineligible for the death

penalty requires:

(1) Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning as evidenced by

a functional intelligent quotient (I.Q.) of seventy (70) or below;

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(2) Deficits in adaptive behavior; and

(3) The intellectual disability must have manifested during the developmental period,

or by eighteen (18) years of age.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203(a). All three prongs must be satisfied to establish intellectual

disability.

The defendant has the burden of establishing intellectual disability by a preponderance

of the evidence. See Tenn Code Ann. § 39-13-203(c); Howell, 151 S.W.3d at 465. The issue

of whether a defendant is intellectually disabled and, thus, ineligible for the death penalty is

a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Strode, 232 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tenn. 2007). A trial

court’s findings of fact are binding on this court unless the evidence preponderates against

those findings. Id. The trial court’s application of the law to those facts is reviewed de novo.

Id.

The first prong of intellectual disability under section 39-13-203(a)(1) requires

“[s]ignificantly subaverage general intellectual functioning as evidenced by a functional

intelligent quotient (I.Q.) of seventy (70) or below.” In applying this provision, the

Tennessee Supreme Court held in Howell that the demarcation of an I.Q. of 70 was a

“bright-line” rule that must be met. Howell, 151 S.W.3d at 456-59. Following Howell,

Tennessee Supreme Court released its opinion in Coleman v. State, 341 S.W.3d 221, 241

(Tenn. 2011), holding that although an individual’s I.Q. is generally obtained through

standardized intelligence tests, section 39-13-203 does not provide clear direction regarding

how an I.Q. should be determined and does not specify any particular test or testing method

that should be utilized. The court noted that section 39-13-203(a)(1) requires a “functional

intelligence quotient of seventy (70) or below” and does not require a “functional intelligence

quotient test score of seventy (70) or below.” Coleman, 341 S.W.3d at 241 (emphasis in

original). Therefore, “the trial courts may receive and consider any relevant and admissible

evidence regarding whether the defendant’s functional I.Q. at the time of the offense was

seventy (70) or below.” Id.

The supreme court noted that section 39-13-203(a)(1) differs with clinical practice in

one material respect. Id. at 247. In diagnosing intellectual disability, clinicians generally

report their conclusions regarding an individual’s I.Q. within a range, and section

39-13-201(a)(1) requires more definite testimony. Id. As a result, “an expert’s opinion

regarding a criminal defendant’s I.Q. cannot be expressed within a range (i.e., that the

defendant’s I.Q. falls somewhere between 65 to 75) but must be expressed specifically (i.e.,

that the defendant’s I.Q. is 75 or is ‘seventy (70) or below’ or is above 70).” Id. at 242.

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In determining whether a defendant’s functional I.Q. is 70 or below, “a trial court

should consider all evidence that is admissible under the rules for expert testimony.” Keen

v. State, 398 S.W.3d 594, 605 (Tenn. 2012). Experts may use relevant and reliable practices,

methods, standards, and data in formulating their opinions. Coleman, 341 S.W.3d at 242.

Moreover,

if the trial court determines that professionals who assess a person’s I.Q.

customarily consider a particular test’s standard error of measurement, the

Flynn Effect, the practice effect, or other factors affecting the accuracy,

reliability, or fairness of the instrument or instruments used to assess or

measure the defendant’s I.Q., an expert should be permitted to base his or her

assessment of the defendant’s “functional intelligence quotient” on a

consideration of those factors.

Id. at n.55. The emphasis to be placed upon clinical judgment varies depending upon “the

type and amount of information available, the complexity of the issue, and the presence of

ore or more challenging conditions or situations.” Id. at 246. The trial court is not required

to follow any particular expert’s opinion but must fully and fairly consider all evidence

presented, including the results of all I.Q. tests administered to the defendant. Id. at 242.

Following Coleman, the Tennessee Supreme Court released its opinion in Keen v.

State, 398 S.W.3d 594 (Tenn. 2012), addressing the issue of whether a capital petitioner may

allege intellectual disability as a basis for reopening post-conviction proceedings. The

petitioner in Keen sought to reopen post-conviction proceedings on the ground that he

possessed new scientific evidence of actual innocence. Keen, 398 S.W.3d at 598. The

evidence consisted of a newly-obtained I.Q. score of 67, which the petitioner claimed

established that he was intellectually disabled and, therefore, “actually innocent” of the death

penalty. Id. The petitioner also asserted that Coleman established a new rule of

constitutional criminal law that required retroactive application. Id. at 599. The Tennessee

Supreme Court rejected both of the bases upon which the petitioner sought to reopen post-

conviction proceedings. The court specifically held that Coleman addressed the

interpretation and application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203 and was not

a constitutional ruling. Id. at 609. The court further held that “a claim alleging ineligibility

for the death penalty does not qualify as an actual innocence claim.” Id. at 613. While

remaining “committed to the principle that Tennessee has no business executing persons who

are intellectually disabled,” the court held that the petitioner failed to meet the requirements

for reopening post-conviction proceedings. Id.

In addressing its holdings in Howell and Coleman, the court noted:

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Regrettably, several courts misconstrued our holding in Howell that

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203(a)(1) established a “bright line rule” for

determining intellectual disability. They understood this language to mean that

courts could consider only raw I.Q. scores. Accordingly, these courts tended

to disregard any evidence suggesting that raw scores could paint an inaccurate

picture of a defendant’s actual intellectual functioning. This was an inaccurate

reading of Howell, in which we took pains to say that the trial court should

“giv[e] full and fair consideration to all tests administered to the petitioner”

and should “fully analyz[e] and consider[] all evidence presented” concerning

the petitioner’s I.Q.

Id. at 603 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The petitioner requested that the court

remand his case for a new hearing on the issue of intellectual disability, just as the court had

done in Coleman and in Smith v. State. See Smith v. State, 357 S.W.3d 322, 354-55 (Tenn.

2011); Coleman, 341 S.W.3d at 252-53. The court in Keen, however, rejected the

petitioner’s contention noting that Coleman and Smith took advantage of the one-year

window for reopening their petitions following the recognition of the constitutional

prohibition against executing intellectually disabled defendants in Van Tran and Atkins.

Keen, 398 S.W.3d at 613. The petitioner in Keen failed to avail himself of that opportunity.

Id.

B. Writ of Error Coram Nobis

A writ of error coram nobis is an “extraordinary procedural remedy,” filling only a

“slight gap into which few cases fall.” State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 672 (Tenn. 1999)

(citation omitted). Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-26-105(b) provides that coram

nobis relief is available in criminal cases as follows:

The relief obtainable by this proceeding shall be confined to errors dehors the

record and to matters that were not or could not have been litigated on the trial

of the case, on a motion for a new trial, on appeal in the nature of a writ of

error, on writ of error, or in a habeas corpus proceeding. Upon a showing by

the defendant that the defendant was without fault in failing to present certain

evidence at the proper time, a writ of error coram nobis will lie for

subsequently or newly discovered evidence relating to matters which were

litigated at the trial if the judge determines that such evidence may have

resulted in a different judgment, had it been presented at the trial.

Our supreme court has stated the stand of review as “whether a reasonable basis exists for

concluding that had the evidence been presented at trial, the result of the proceedings might

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have been different.” State v. Vazques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 525-28 (Tenn. 2007) (citation

omitted).

Unlike the grounds for reopening a post-conviction petition, the grounds for seeking

a petition for writ of error coram nobis are not limited to specific categories. Harris v. State,

102 S.W.3d 587, 592 (Tenn. 2003). Coram nobis claims may be based upon any “newly

discovered evidence relating to matters litigated at the trial” so long as the petitioner

establishes that he or she was “without fault” in failing to present the evidence at the proper

time. Id. Coram nobis claims are “singularly fact-intensive,” are not easily resolved on the

face of the petition, and often require a hearing. Id. at 592-93. The decision to grant or deny

coram nobis relief rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Vazques, 221 S.W.3d

at 527-28.

The State asserts that the petitioner’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

Coram nobis claims are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-7-

103. The statute of limitations is computed “from the date the judgment of the trial court

becomes final, either thirty days after its entry in the trial court if no post-trial motions are

filed or upon entry of an order disposing of a timely filed, post-trial motion.” Harris v. State,

301 S.W.3d 141, 144 (Tenn. 2010). The issue of whether a claim is barred by an applicable

statute of limitations is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. See id. We

must construe the coram nobis statute of limitations “consistent with the longstanding rule

that persons seeking relief under the writ must exercise due diligence in presenting the

claim.” Id.

The one-year statute of limitations may be tolled on due process grounds if the

petitioner seeks relief based upon newly discovered evidence of actual innocence. Wilson,

367 S.W.3d at 234. In determining whether tolling is proper, the court must balance the

petitioner’s interest in having a hearing with the State’s interest in preventing a claim that is

stale and groundless. Harris, 301 S.W.3d at 145 (citing Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100,

102 (Tenn. 2001)). Generally, “before a state may terminate a claim for failure to comply

with . . . statutes of limitations, due process requires that potential litigants be provided an

opportunity for the presentation of claims at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”

Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Tenn. 1992). The Burford rule consists of three

steps:

(1) determine when the limitations period would normally have begun to run;

(2) determine whether the ground for relief actually arose after the limitations

period would normally have commenced; and (3) if the grounds are “later-

arising,” determine if, under the facts of the case, a strict application of the

limitations period would effectively deny the petitioner a reasonable

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opportunity to present the claim.

Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297, 301 (Tenn. 1995).

The limitations period normally would have begun to run following the petitioner’s

trial in 1997. The petitioner filed his petition for writ of error coram nobis on February 1,

2013, approximately fifteen years after the one-year statute of limitations expired.

In 1990, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203, prohibiting the execution of

intellectually disabled defendants, was enacted. The petitioner, however, did not raise the

issue of intellectual disability during his 1997 trial. In 2001, our supreme court recognized

that the execution of intellectually disabled defendants is constitutionally prohibited. See

Van Tran, 66 S.W.3d at 798-99. The petitioner raised a claim of intellectual disability in his

amended petition for post-conviction relief. However, he abandoned the issue after his

expert, Dr. Caruso, testified during the evidentiary hearing that the petitioner fell within the

borderline range of intellectual functioning.

The petitioner contends that Dr. Reschly’s report is “newly available” evidence or

evidence that did not become available for presentation until after the trial concluded. While

the petitioner acknowledges that his intellectual disability existed before trial, he argues that

circumstances beyond his control prevented him from presenting such evidence. He submits

that his intellectual disability first became available for presentation following our supreme

court’s opinion in Coleman.

Generally, to qualify as newly discovered evidence, the evidence must not have been

known to the defendant at the time of trial. Wlodarz v. State, 361 S.W.3d 490, 506 (Tenn.

2012). A narrow exception, however, exists where “‘although not newly discovered

evidence, in the usual sense of the term,’” the “‘availability’” of the evidence “‘is newly

discovered.’” Harris v. State, 301 S.W.3d at 160-61 (Koch, J., concurring) (quoting Taylor

v. State, 171 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Tenn. 1943)); see David G. Housler, Jr. v. State, No. M2010-

02183-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 WL 5232344, at *44 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2013).

Courts have applied this narrow exception where previously unavailable evidence

became available following a change in factual circumstances. See, e.g., Taylor, 171 S.W.2d

at 405 (applying the exception when at the time of trial, one witness was hospitalized and one

witness was working outside the state and they later became available to testify); Misty Jane

Brunelle v. State, No. E2010-00662-CCA-R3-PC, 2011 WL 2436545, at *10 (Tenn. Crim.

App. June 16, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 18, 2011) (noting that the petitioner

should have sought coram nobis relief when a DCS report that was known to the petitioner

but sealed at the time of trial later became available). Many of these cases involve testimony

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of a co-defendant or a witness who previously refused to testify by asserting the

constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. See, e.g., David G. Housler, Jr., 2013 WL

5232344, at *44; United States v. Guillette, 404 F. Supp. 1360, 1372-74 (D. Conn. 1975);

Brantley v. State, 912 So. 2d 342, 343 (Fla. App. 2005); State v. Williams, 246 So. 2d 4, 6

(La. 1971); Commonwealth v. Brown, 431 A.2d 343, 344 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981); State v.

Gerdes, 258 N.W.2d 839, 843 (S.D. 1977).

The petitioner has failed to cite to any authority applying this narrow unavailability

exception based upon a change in the law. Issues regarding whether a change in the law

should apply post-trial relate to retroactivity and are more properly addressed in post-

conviction proceedings or a motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. Even if the

unavailability exception applies to a change in law, the petitioner is not entitled to relief.

The petitioner argues that prior to Coleman, courts only could consider raw I.Q. scores

in determining intellectual disability pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-

203(a)(1). The Tennessee Supreme Court in Keen, however, stated that Howell did not

provide for such a limitation. Keen, 398 S.W.3d at 603. Rather, the court in Howell

instructed trial courts to “‘giv[e] full and fair consideration to all tests administered to the

petitioner’” and to “‘fully analyz[e] and consider[] all evidence presented’” concerning the

petitioner’s I.Q. Id. (quoting Howell, 151 S.W.3d at 459).

Moreover, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted in Coleman that its review of all cases

involving the application of section 39-13-203 reflected that “the parties and the courts have

not been limiting their consideration of whether a criminal defendant has a ‘functional

intelligence quotient of seventy (70) of below’ to the defendant’s raw I.Q. test scores.”

Coleman, 341 S.W.3d at 247. The court explained:

For example, in Cribbs v. State, both the State and Mr. Cribbs presented

evidence that his raw I.Q. test scores did not accurately reflect his actual I.Q.

On behalf of the State, Dr. Wyatt Nichols stated that Mr. Cribbs’s intellectual

level was actually higher than the I.Q. test score of 73 and was “[m]ore like the

mid to high 80s.” Cribbs v. State, 2009 WL 1905454, at *22, 32. Dr. Pamela

Auble, appearing for Mr. Cribbs, stated in her initial report that his I.Q. was

between 71 and 84. Cribbs v. State, 2009 WL 1905454, at *17. However, Dr.

Auble later revised her opinion based on information obtained after her first

report and concluded that Mr. Cribbs’s I.Q. was below seventy. Cribbs v.

State, 2009 WL 1905454, at *17. Based on all the evidence, the trial court

concluded that the I.Q. test that produced the score of 73 was the most reliable.

The trial court found that Dr. Auble’s explanation for the change in her

opinion was not credible and that Dr. Nichols’s testimony was persuasive.

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Cribbs v. State, 2009 WL 1905454, at *32.

The consideration of I.Q. test scores in Cribbs v. State is but one

example of cases in which the State has argued and presented evidence that

scores on I.Q. tests should not be considered on their face value. See also

State v. Strode, 232 S.W.3d at 5 (the State presented evidence challenging the

score on the basis that the defendant had been malingering); Smith v. State,

2010 WL 3638033, at *30 (the State presented evidence that the defendant’s

I.Q. test score should be discounted because of malingering); Van Tran v.

State, 2006 WL 3327828, at 4-6 (the State argued that the Vietnamese-born

defendant’s low I.Q. test score reflected cultural and linguistic bias).

Id. The Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that these cases reflected “the parties’ and the

courts’ existing awareness that, as a practical matter, a criminal defendant’s ‘functional

intelligence quotient’ cannot be ascertained based only on raw I.Q. scores.” Id. The court

further concluded that the cases also reflected “the parties’ conclusion that Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 39-13-203(a) does not prevent them from presenting relevant and competent evidence,

other than the defendant’s raw I.Q. test scores, either to prove or to disprove that the

defendant’s ‘functional intelligence quotient’ when the crime was committed was ‘seventy

(70) or below.’” Id. at 247-48.

We note that recently in Hall v. Florida, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014), the

United States Supreme Court held that Florida courts’ interpretation of the significantly

subaverage intellectual functioning provision in Florida’s intellectual disability statute is

unconstitutional. Florida courts interpreted the statute as requiring a strict I.Q. raw test score

of 70 without consideration of the standard error of measurement. Hall, __ U.S. at __, 134

S. Ct. at 1995-2000. The Supreme Court agreed “with medical experts that when a

defendant’s I.Q. test score falls within the test’s acknowledged and inherent margin of error,

the defendant must be able to present additional evidence of intellectual disability, including

testimony regarding adaptive deficits.” Id. Unlike the defendant in Hall, however, the

petitioner has not been precluded during his original trial or during post-conviction

proceedings from presenting evidence, other than his raw I.Q. test scores, to establish that

his “functional intelligence quotient” when he committed the murder was 70 or below.

Accordingly, contrary to the petitioner’s claims, the information in Dr. Reschly’s

report regarding the issue of intellectual disability was available for presentation prior to

Coleman. Dr. Caruso testified during post-conviction proceedings on August 16, 2005,

following the Tennessee Supreme Court’s release of Howell on November 16, 2004.

Nothing prevented the petitioner from presenting during post-conviction proceedings

relevant and competent evidence, other than his raw I.Q. test scores, to prove that his

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“functional intelligence quotient” when the crime was committed was “seventy (70) or

below.”

During the post-conviction hearing, Dr. Caruso testified regarding the petitioner’s

poor grades in school and his enrollment in special education classes. Dr. Caruso noted that

the petitioner had a verbal I.Q. score of 73, a performance I.Q. score of 85, and a full-scale

I.Q. score of 77. Dr. Caruso further noted that the petitioner was very limited in his verbal

ability. Neuropsychological testing was conducted, and Dr. Caruso found evidence of “a

mixed receptive and expressive language disorder” and attention deficit hyperactivity

disorder. Dr. Caruso referred to the petitioner’s “intellectual deficits” throughout his

testimony. Dr. Caruso, however, concluded that the petitioner’s intellectual functioning was

borderline.

More than seven years after Dr. Caruso testified, the petitioner filed his petition

seeking to present testimony from a mental health expert who reached a conclusion that

differed from the conclusion reached by Dr. Caruso during post-conviction proceedings. The

information upon which Dr. Reschly relied was available to the petitioner at the time of the

trial and the post-conviction hearing. Nothing prevented the petitioner from undergoing

additional I.Q. testing prior to the trial or post-conviction proceedings. The new I.Q. testing

in 2009 and 2012 is merely cumulative to the evidence previously available to the petitioner.

See Wlodarz, 361 S.W.3d at 499 (noting that newly discovered evidence that is merely

cumulative does not warrant the issuance of a writ). Because the petitioner’s claim could

have been litigated at trial or during post-conviction proceedings, the grounds are not “later-

arising,” justifying the tolling of the one-year statute of limitations. See Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 40-26-105(b) (confining coram nobis relief to “matters that were not or could not have

been litigated on the trial of the case, on a motion for a new trial, on appeal in the nature of

a writ of error, on writ of error, or in a habeas corpus proceeding” and requiring the

defendant to show that he was without fault in failing to present the evidence at the proper

time).

Even if Coleman provides new grounds for relief, the petitioner did not file his

petition for writ of error coram nobis until February 2013, almost twenty-two months

following the issuance of Coleman. The petitioner asserts that the coram nobis petition

should relate back to his motion to reopen his post-conviction petition filed in April 2012.

“No statute in Tennessee nor tolling rule developed at common law provides that the time

for filing a cause of action is tolled during the period in which a litigant pursues a related but

independent cause of action.” Harris, 301 S.W.3d at 146. When the petitioner filed his

motion to reopen, he chose not to file a petition for writ of error coram nobis. It was not until

after our supreme court released its opinion in Keen rejecting the bases upon which the

petitioner relied in filing his motion to reopen that the petitioner filed a petition for writ of

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error coram nobis. A petitioner may not delay presenting a coram nobis claim until “every

other avenue of relief ha[s] been exhausted.” Billy Ray Irick v. State, No. E2010-02385-

CCA-R3-PD, 2011 WL 1991671, at *18 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, May 23, 2011),

perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2011). Therefore, we conclude that under the

circumstances of this case, the delay in seeking coram nobis relief is unreasonable.

We conclude that the trial court properly found that the petitioner’s petition was

barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Accordingly, the petitioner is not entitled to

coram nobis relief.

C. Intellectual Disability Statute

The petitioner asserts that the intellectual disability provisions in Tennessee Code

Annotated section 39-13-203 provide an independent cause of action allowing him to

challenge his eligibility for the death penalty. In construing a statute, we must ascertain and

give effect to the legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding a statute’s

coverage beyond its intended scope. State v. Strode, 232 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tenn. 2007). We

must give the words in the statute their natural and ordinary meaning in light of their

statutory context. Keen, 398 S.W.3d at 610. We must avoid any “forced or subtle

construction that would limit or extend the meaning of the language.” Id. (citation omitted).

“If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we apply the statute’s plain language

in its normal and accepted use.” Id.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203 lists the requirements of intellectual

disability, the burden of proof, and the procedure when the issue is raised at trial. The plain

language of the statute does not create an independent cause of action allowing a defendant

to challenge his or her eligibility for the death penalty. Had the General Assembly intended

to create a separate and independent cause of action in which to allege intellectual disability,

they would have stated so in the statute. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-301, et seq.

(creating a cause of action to allow certain defendants to request DNA testing of evidence).

The petitioner is not entitled to relief with regard to this issue.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

________________________________________

ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE

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