Makowski v. Mayor and City of Baltimore

Makowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, No. 81, Sept. Term 2013, Opinion by

Battaglia, J.

PROPERTY – CONDEMNATION – “QUICK-TAKE” CONDEMNATION –

IMMEDIATE NECESSITY – “HOLD-OUT”

Pursuant to Section 21-16 of the Code of Public Local Laws of Baltimore City, the City

may condemn property via “quick-take” proceedings to address a “hold-out” situation,

wherein the City seeks to acquire multiple properties for a single project and one or more

property owners are unyielding, wanting to be the last owner of a parcel or among the last,

in order to be able to demand higher prices for their property because they are holding up a

large project.

EVIDENCE – AUTHENTICATION – AUTHENTICATION BY WITNESS

TESTIMONY

Trial court did not err in excluding map purporting to show areas of Baltimore City

designated as historic when the only attempt to authenticate the document was through a

witness who testified he was not familiar with the document.

CIVIL PROCEDURE – APPEALS – SCOPE OF APPELLATE REVIEW – ISSUES

RAISED AFTER NOTICE OF APPEAL IS FILED

Ordinarily, an appellate court will not consider issues decided by the trial court after a

notice of appeal is filed.

CIVIL PROCEDURE – APPEALS – SCOPE OF APPELLATE REVIEW -

PRESERVATION OF ISSUES – ADEQUACY OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES

A party who fails to file a motion to compel discovery pursuant to Rule 2-432 may not

challenge, on appeal, the adequacy of the responses it received to its discovery requests.

Circuit Court for Baltimore City

Civil No. 24-C-12-002245

Argued: April 29, 2014 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF

MARYLAND

No. 81

September Term, 2013

EDWARD J. MAKOWSKI

v.

MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF

BALTIMORE

Barbera, C.J.

Harrell

Battaglia

Greene

Adkins

McDonald

McAuliffe, John F.

(Retired, Specially

Assigned),

JJ.

Opinion by Battaglia, J.

Filed: June 24, 2014

This case involves a “quick-take” condemnation 1 of a property located at 900-902

1

In Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City v. Valsamaki, 397 Md. 222, 226 n.1, 916

A.2d 324, 326 n.1 (2007), we described a “quick-take” condemnation:

A quick-take condemnation involves “[t]he immediate taking of

possession of private property for public use, whereby the estimated

compensation is deposited in court or paid to the condemnee until the actual

amount of compensation can be established.” Black’s Law Dictionary 310

(8th ed.2004). See Bern-Shaw Ltd. P’ship v. Mayor and City Council of

Baltimore, 377 Md. 277, 281 n. 1, 833 A.2d 502, 504 n. 1 (2003); King v.

State Roads Comm'n, 298 Md. 80, 85-86, 467 A.2d 1032, 1035 (1983)

(Quick-take condemnation occurs where “the condemning authority takes

possession of the property prior to trial upon payment into court of its

estimate of the value of the property taken.”).

(alterations in original). Pursuant to Section 21-16 of the Code of Public Local Laws of

Baltimore City (2012), the parties involved in a quick-take proceeding have a direct right

of appeal to this Court. Section 21-16 provides in relevant part:

In cases where the City files a Petition for Immediate Taking of title and

possession to the said property in fee simple absolute or such lesser estate or

interest as is specified in the Petition, title thereto shall irrevocably vest in the

Mayor and City Council of Baltimore ten days after personal service of the

Petition upon each and every Defendant or, if the Defendants or any of them

shall file an answer to the Petition within the said ten day period alleging that

the City does not have the right or power to condemn title to the property,

then on the date of the trial court’s decision or on the date of decision in any

appeal from the trial court.

In the event the Defendants or any of them should file an answer, the court

shall schedule a hearing within fifteen days of the date of the filing of an

answer, which hearing shall be only for the purpose of contesting the right or

power of the City to condemn title to the property. The trial court shall render

its decision within fifteen days from the final day of said hearing. The City or

the Defendants or any of them shall have an immediate right of appeal to the

Court of Appeals of Maryland from the decision of the trial court.

N. Chester Street, comprised of a building that had formerly housed a church and contained

various offices. The Appellant, Edward Makowski, raises ten issues for our review, 2

(emphasis added); see also Maryland Rule 8–301(a) (“Appellate review by the Court of

Appeals may be obtained only: (1) by direct appeal or application for leave to appeal,

where allowed by law . . . .”).

2

Mr. Makowski presents the following questions for our review:

1. Would it be useful to provide some guidance to the courts below as to

what constitutes a “hold out”?

2. Should the trial court have considered or allowed consideration of

whether development in accordance with the urban renewal ordinance

could have occurred without acquiring the subject property?

3. What burden of proof should be required of the Petitioner when taking

property via quick take? Preponderance of the Evidence?, Clear and

Convincing Evidence?, Undisputed Evidence?, or readily apparent and

irrefutable evidence?

4. Did Appellee prove an immediate need for the property, when the

testimony was contradicted by the only witness, who stated his

information was based solely on what he reads in the newspaper and who

conceded that the time frame he asserted in his affidavit may not be

correct?

5. Whether the appellee acted in good faith in the valuing of the property,

when it was aware that smaller commercial properties in the immediate

vicinity were sold for more than double the amount the appellee was

offering for the subject property?

6. Can a Defendant be labeled a hold out for the purpose of a quick take

when the Condemning authority has not negotiated in good faith or made

good faith offers of Fair Market Value and when there is no clear

immediate need to obtain the property because other property in the same

acquisition area had not been acquired on the date of filing for Quick

Take?

7. Were the eleventh hour cursory, superficial evasive and incomplete

discovery responses provided by the Appellee sufficient to provide

defendant with information that could be used in defending the

condemnation case or in preparation to defend the quick take action?

8. Can an assertion, without supporting authority, that discovery has been

provided form a sufficient basis for Plaintiff/Appellee to disregard

subpoenas or to instruct City employees to disregard subpoenas?

2

some of which are not properly before us, and the rest of which can be addressed as a single

question:

Did the Circuit Court for Baltimore City err in granting the City’s

“Petition for Immediate Possession and Title” to 900-902 N. Chester Street?

We shall answer no, affirm, and explain.

We derive the following facts from the memorandum opinion issued by Judge

Audrey J.S. Carrion of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City: beginning in the 1950s,

Baltimore City, and particularly, the East Baltimore neighborhood, began losing

manufacturing jobs. The City continued to hemorrhage jobs through the 1990s, causing

significant urban decay marked by high crime, high unemployment, population loss, and a

general deterioration in the Middle East neighborhood. 3 Consequently, property values

9. Did the court below continue to have jurisdiction under Md. Rule 2-404

with regard to subpoenaed information after the appeal was filed. ?

10. Was the opinion of the court below, which was based on belief that the

facts of this case were identical to facts in “Segall” contrary to the

evidence?

The City, in its Brief, has consolidated Mr. Makowski’s ten questions into a single issue,

phrased as follows:

Should the Circuit Court of Baltimore City’s Order of Possession and Title to

900-902 N. Chester Street be sustained?

3

According to Baltimore City Ordinance Number 11-453, which authorized the

revitalization efforts leading to the condemnation in this case, the “Middle East”

neighborhood of Baltimore City targeted for redevelopment is identified specifically, by:

Beginning for the same at the intersection of the north side of Gay Street with

the north side of Biddle Street; thence binding on the north side of Biddle

Street easterly to intersect the east side of Patterson Park Avenue; thence

binding on the east side of Patterson Park Avenue southerly to intersect the

3

were in steep decline and the neighborhood became a proverbial ghost town. In an early

attempt to combat these problems, the City attempted “piecemeal” revitalization efforts,

involving the rehabilitation of individual buildings one by one. The piecemeal efforts,

division line between Lots 48 and 49, Ward 7, Section 2, Block 1623; thence

binding on the division line between said Lots 48 and 49 easterly to intersect

the west side of the first 10-foot alley; thence binding on said alley notherly

to intersect the division line between Lots 42 and 43, Ward 7, Section 2,

Block 1623; thence binding on the division line between said Lots 42 and 43

easterly to intersect the north side of the second 10-foot alley; thence binding

on the north side of said alley easterly to intersect the east side of N. Bradford

Street; thence binding on the east side of N. Bradford Street southerly to

intersect the north side of the third 10-foot alley; thence binding on the north

side of said alley easterly to intersect the west side of Milton Avenue; thence

binding on the west side of Milton Avenue southerly to intersect the south

side of a 6’-9” alley south of East Monument Street; thence binding on the

south side of said alley westerly to intersect the west side of a 4’-4” alley;

thence binding on the west side of said alley northerly to intersect the south

side of a 10-foot alley; thence binding on the south side of said alley westerly

to intersect the west side of N. Port Street; thence binding on the west side of

N. Port Street northerly to intersect the south side of a 3-foot alley; thence

binding on the south side of said alley westerly to intersect the east side of N.

Montford Ave; thence binding on the east side of N. Montford Avenue

southerly to intersect the south side of Fayette Street; thence binding on the

south side of Fayette Street westerly to intersect the west side of Collington

Avenue; thence binding on the west side of Collington Avenue northerly to

intersect the north side of Orleans Street; thence binding on the north side of

Orleans Street westerly to intersect the east side of Wolfe Street; thence

binding on the east side of Wolfe Street northerly to intersect the north side

of Jefferson Street; thence binding on the north side of Jefferson Street

easterly to intersect the west side of Washington Street; thence binding on

the west side of Washington Street northerly to intersect the north side of

Monument Street; thence binding on the north side of Monument Street

easterly to intersect the west side of Castle Street; thence binding on the west

side of Castle Street northerly to intersect the south side of Madison Street;

thence binding on the south side of Madison Street westerly to intersect the

east side of Broadway; thence binding on the East side of Broadway

northerly to the point of beginning.

4

however, had proven to be futile, 4 and the continued struggle with urban decay was readily

apparent; Judge Carrion described the neighborhood as depicted in various photographs

that had been admitted into evidence as a “scene more akin to the deserted, urban setting of

a post-disaster film than a thriving, livable community.”

The City, then, turned to more comprehensive redevelopment and revitalization

efforts, including a “non-profit partnership between government, philanthropists,

institutions, and the community” 5 to undertake a massive revitalization of property in the

East Baltimore community, called the Eastern Baltimore Development Initiative

(“EBDI”). EBDI was intended to “address, for the first time, on a comprehensive basis

the blight and disinvestment in the neighborhood” through the redevelopment of an area

4

Judge Carrion described an example of the failed piecemeal revitalization efforts:

For example, the Historic East Baltimore Community Action

Coalition (HEBCAC) program previously made efforts to “arrest the decay

[in East Baltimore] through heterogeneous, and ultimately desultory,

rehabilitation of existing structures.” . . . Sadly, once one building was

rehabilitated and transformed into a functioning, presentable property,

nearby properties frequently became vacant, encouraging further decline.

With dim prospects for financial success, private investors had little to no

incentive to put money into businesses, residences, institutions, or other

amenities in Middle East, or much of East Baltimore in general.

5

According to the Eastern Baltimore Development Initiative’s website, EBDI is

“supported by public and private partners, including the U.S. Government, the State of

Maryland, the City of Baltimore, the Annie E. Casey Foundation, Johns Hopkins

Institutions, The Harry and Jeanette Weinberg Foundation, the Atlantic Philanthropies and

others.” East Baltimore Development Inc., Financial Information,

http://www.ebdi.org/financial_information (last visited June 23, 2014).

5

encompassing 88 acres in proximity to the Johns Hopkins University Medical Campus 6;

specifically, it would involve the construction of “biotechnology, research, and life

sciences buildings, a new community school . . . senior housing . . . , mixed income

residential homes and rental units, commercial and retail property, green/open spaces, a

new park, and fresh food stores.” To acquire the properties necessary for the EBDI

project, the City was authorized, pursuant to the Baltimore City Ordinance No. 11-453

entitled the “Middle East Urban Renewal Plan”, to acquire, via voluntary conveyance or

condemnation, properties in the project area. 7

Mr. Makowski’s property, 900-902 N. Chester Street (“the Property”), located on

Block 1587 8 at the intersection of Chester Street and Ashland Avenue, lies within the heart

of EBDI’s planned development. 9 The Property is located within the footprint of a

planned biotechnology and life sciences facility in the EBDI project, which will “‘house

laboratories and offices, . . . employ hundreds of scientists and support personnel, and . . .

6

The area, specifically, stretches “from N. Patterson Park Avenue in the east, to S.

Broadway in the west, to E. Madison Street in the south, and is bounded on the north by the

Penn Central (AMTRAK/MARC) Railroad line, which curves diagonally in a

southeasterly direction.”

7

The Middle East Urban Renewal Plan was originally enacted in 1979 under Baltimore

City Ordinance No. 79-1202. The ordinance was most recently amended by Ordinance

No. 11-453 in 2011 to, inter alia, reauthorize the City to acquire properties within the

project area, including Mr. Makowski’s property, until December 31, 2014.

8

The Block number refers to the designation provided by the Maryland Department of

Assessments and Taxation.

9

The Property, specifically, is located in Ward 07, Section 03, Block 1587, Lot 081.

6

provide a range of public health services” and will be developed by the Forest City Science

and Technology Group. 10 Due east of the Property, or directly across the street, is a site

where EBDI is currently constructing a new school. 11

The City attempted initially to acquire the Property in April of 2011, when it sent

Mr. Makowski a “Notice of Interest to Acquire.” Approximately nine months later, the

City provided Mr. Makowski with an “Offer of Just Compensation.” After receiving the

City’s offer, Mr. Makowski’s then-tenant, The Answer Inc., moved out of the building; to

compensate Mr. Makowski for any loss he suffered as a result of the lost rent, EBDI and

the City offered to give Mr. Makowski $2,000 monthly, in exchange for which Mr.

Makowski would provide the City a “Right-of-Entry”, permitting the City’s agents to enter

10

According to EBDI’s website:

For over 20 years, Forest City Science + Technology Group has successfully

delivered real estate solutions for science.

Forest City Science + Technology Group is recognized as one of the

country’s leading developers & owners of life science campuses working

with the nation’s leading universities, corporations and research institutions.

Forest City’s research parks bring the worlds of technology & real estate

together serving as a catalyst through which scientific commercialization can

grow & thrive.

East Baltimore Development Inc., Forest City, http://www.ebdi.org/ about_forest_city

(last visited June 23, 2014).

11

Because the new school was under construction at the time the Petition for

Condemnation was filed, the record is unclear as to what had existed on the property

before.

7

the property for purposes of boarding up the building in preparation for demolition. 12 Mr.

Makowski accepted the offer and executed a rental agreement and a Right-of-Entry

agreement, both of which contemplated that the City would ultimately acquire the Property

in terms such as that contained in the rental agreement that stated:

EBDI offers to fairly compensate you for the loss of rental income that you

will experience for 900-902 N. Chester Street. This will be accomplished

by paying The Answer Inc.’s rent obligation of $2,000.00 per month to you

beginning April 1, 2012 and continue until the City’s Condemnation Action

with you is resolved.

(emphasis in original). The Right-of-Entry agreement, likewise, stated:

WHEREAS, It is the City’s Intention to acquire title to the Property at the

earliest possible time as part of the Urban Renewal Plan provided for under

Ordinance No. 1202.

At the time the Circuit Court issued its decision, Mr. Makowski continued to be

compensated at a rate of $2,000 per month.

While the rental agreement was in force and after the City was “unable to negotiate

with and/or agree with” Mr. Makowski “upon a price to be paid for” the Property, the City,

in April of 2012, filed a Petition for Condemnation in the Circuit Court pursuant to

Baltimore City Ordinance Nos. 1202 and 11-453, which stated in pertinent part:

2. It is necessary for the Petitioner to acquire the Fee Simple interest

in and to the property known as 900-902 N. CHESTER STREET in

Baltimore City, State of Maryland (hereinafter called the “property”), Ward

07, Section 03, Block 1587, Lot 081, and more particularly described and

attached hereto in Schedule A, together with improvements thereupon, and

12

The agreement also required Mr. Makowski to release his tenant, The Answer Inc.,

from any existing obligation under the lease agreement.

8

all the rights, ways, waters, easements, privileges, advantages and

appurtenances thereto belonging or in anywise appertaining. The two

properties 900 N. Chester Street and 902 N. Chester Street, having been

consolidated on the tax sale records are now known on the City tax rolls as

the single unit, 900-902 N. Chester Street.

3.This property will be used for redevelopment purposes; namely it is

one of the properties in the East Baltimore Development Initiative, Phase II.

Mr. Makowski challenged the City’s authority to condemn the property, in his response to

the Petition, contending, inter alia, that the City had failed to demonstrate why the

acquisition of the Property was necessary, because, he asserted, the City failed to allege

what it intended to do with the Property. Mr. Makowski also later filed a Motion to

Dismiss Petition for Condemnation, stating in its entirety:

The Petition as filed by Mayor and City Council fails to allege facts

sufficient to support the Petition.

The Petition fails to state sufficient specific facts to support it.

That as filed the Petition does not satisfy the requirements of the U.S.

Constitution and Amendments thereto. [sic] to justify the taking of private

property.

After holding a hearing on the motion, the Circuit Court denied the Motion to Dismiss

Petition for Condemnation; the condemnation case was then scheduled for trial.

Prior to trial, Mr. Makowski became the sole owner on Block 1587 who had not yet

conveyed or agreed to convey his property on Block 1587 to the City. The City filed a

“Petition for Immediate Possession and Title”, pursuant to Section 21-16 of the Code of

Public Local Laws of Baltimore City (2012) 13 (“the quick-take action”), which alleged

13

Section 21-16 of the Code of Public Local Laws of Baltimore City (2012) provides, in

relevant part:

9

that immediate possession of the subject property was necessary::14

1. That previously hereto your Petitioner filed a Petition for

Condemnation as against the fee simple interests in that lot of ground and

premises known as 900-902 N. Chester Street in Baltimore, Maryland.

2. That it is necessary for Petitioner to acquire immediate possession and

title to the said property interest as appears from the affidavit of William N.

Burgee, Director of the Office of Property Acquisition and Relocation,

Department of Housing and Community Development, attached hereto and

prayed to be taken as a part hereof.

(a) Petition for Immediate Taking.

Whenever any proceedings are instituted under Title 12 of the Real

Property Article of Public General Laws of the State of Maryland by

the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore for the acquisition of any

property for any public purpose whatsoever, the Mayor and City

Council of Baltimore, simultaneously with the filing of said

proceedings or at any time thereafter, may file a Petition under oath

stating that it is necessary for the City to have immediate possession

of, or immediate title to and possession of, said property, and the

reasons therefore.

The City shall also set forth in said Petition for Immediate Taking of

possession or immediate taking of title the amount it estimates to be

the fair value of the said property and/or title to be acquired, and of the

respective interest of each of the owners thereof if more than one,

which shall be substantiated by the affidavits of two qualified

appraisers, attached to said Petition. The City shall deposit into Court

simultaneously with the filing of said Petition the amount of said

estimate of the fair value of the property to be acquired.

14

Pursuant to Section 21-16 of the Code of Public Local Laws of Baltimore City (2012),

“[t]he City shall also set forth in said Petition for Immediate Taking of possession or

immediate taking of title the amount it estimates to be the fair value of the said property

and/or title to be acquired” and “deposit into Court simultaneously with the filing of said

Petition the amount of said estimate of the fair value of the property to be acquired.” The

City estimated the fair market value of the property to be $92,000 and deposited that

amount into the Court.

10

3. That the necessity for the taking of such immediate possession of and

title to said property is not due to any substantial fault or neglect on the part

of the Petitioner.

Mr. William Burgee, Director of the Office of Property Acquisition and Relocation, did

file an affidavit in which he asserted that immediate possession of the Property was

necessary because the City had effectively acquired title to all other properties on Block

1587. He also stated that there was a school scheduled to open in August of 2013 to the

east of the Property, prior to which all demolition on Block 1587, including that of the

Property, needed to be completed to “safeguard” the health and safety of the children,

guests, and staff of the school:

4. There is an immediate necessity for the Mayor and City Council to

acquire title to the subject property because it is the lone hold-out among

nearly 150 individual properties in Block 1587, which is bounded on the

north by Eager Street, on the east by Chester Street, on the south by Ashland

Avenue and on the west by Washington Street. The City plans to close

Castle Street in this block and all interior alleys in furtherance of the

development plan. The City has effectively acquired title to all other

properties in the block, and demolition must proceed as soon as possible.

To the east of the subject property, on Block 1588, lies the footprint of a new

school, currently under construction, and to be opened to students in August,

2013. All demolition in Block 1587 must be completed before the school

opens, in order to safeguard the health and safety of the children, faculty and

staff of the new school. All structures in Block 1587 are currently vacant.

The vast majority of them are abandoned, dilapidated boarded structures.

The existence of such structures opposite a new community school for

children as young as five is untenable. These buildings, with their attendant

risk of vagrancy, vermin, disease and criminal activity, cannot be allowed to

menace the school children’s health and well-being. Such buildings are also

fire hazards and structural time-bombs, and as such represent a serious and

growing menace to the public health, safety and welfare.

Likewise, the demolition cannot occur after the school has opened

because of the noise, odor, rat displacement and toxic dust that such

demolition will generate.

11

Mr. Makowski filed a “Response to Petition for Immediate Possession and Title”,

contesting the City’s right to obtain immediate possession of the Property, asserting, once

again, that the City had failed to demonstrate why acquisition of the Property was

necessary. Mr. Makowski also challenged the City’s contention that there was an

immediate need to condemn the property, attaching his own affidavit in which he asserted,

inter alia, that the Property was not the only property that the City had not acquired on

Block 1587:

A check of the location on corner of Chester St and Ashland Ave.

immediately across the street from 900-902 N. Chester St., revealed a

massive incomplete construction site.

The internet information about the school states that the main

entrance is on Chase St., and the school has a Wolfe St. address.

Paragraph 4 of William N. Burgee’s Affidavit incorrectly states that

900-902 is the sole “hold out” in block 1587 and that the City has

“effectively” acquired title to all other properties in the block. It further

mistakenly states that all structures are currently vacant.

On Sunday, June 9, 2013, I went to the area check progress of the

construction site and noted that 2030 Ashland Ave., which is within block

1587 was occupied and still functioning as a church. Services were being

held at the time I was there.

I was informed by one of the Pastors of the Church that they had not

yet found a new location and they seemed to be unaware of any pending

demolition of the block.

The Burgee Affidavit also states that the existence of abandoned,

dilapidated boarded structures cannot continue opposite a new community

school. However properties on Ashland Ave. across the school and streets

intersecting Ashland Ave across from school also fit that description and no

efforts to demolish any of those [] buildings is apparent as of this time.

Likewise the odd side of the 2000 blk of Ashland Ave., and the even side of

the 800 Blk of N. Chester St which are all in view and close proximity to the

school [] do not appear to be in any stage of demolition or preparation for

demolition.

12

Mr. Makowski later filed a “Defendant’s Points and Authorities in Opposition to

Plaintiff’s Petition for Immediate Possession”, in which he also asserted, because the City

intended to convey title to his property to Forest City Enterprises, a private entity, as part of

the EBDI development, that the City was taking private property “to be transferred to

another party”, which, he alleged did not serve a public purpose, thereby violating the

strictures of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 15 He also argued,

pursuant to our decision in Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City v. Valsamaki, 397

Md. 222, 916 A.2d 324 (2007), that the City had failed to meet its burden of proving an

immediate need for the Property.

Judge Carrion held a hearing on the City’s right to take the Property. Mr. Burgee

was the City’s only witness, testifying, consistent with his affidavit, that the City had an

immediate need for the Property, because the structures on Block 1587 had to be

demolished prior to the opening of the school in August “to mitigate the possible effects of

dust and other elements that would result from having to do the demolition if the school

15

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous

crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases

arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in

time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same

offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in

any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property

be taken for public use, without just compensation.

U.S. Const. Amend. V (emphasis added).

13

were, in fact, in session.” He also testified that there were only two properties that had not

yet been acquired on Block 1587 within two weeks of the hearing—the Property and a

church located at 2028-2030 Ashland Avenue, which the City had acquired in the

intervening period of time between filing of the quick-take petition and the hearing date:

[MR. BURGEE]: Acquisition-wise specifically until two weeks ago there

were two properties that are not owned, one of which is improved and is

necessary to have been acquired and was, in fact, acquired two weeks ago.

. . . That was the church. That’s in addition, of course, to the subject

property.

***

[COUNSEL FOR THE CITY]: Okay, but in the City’s, as it were, quiver of

properties to be assembled for this project are there anymore, save the

subject we’re here for today, to be acquired?

***

[MR. BURGEE]: No.

Mr. Burgee then explained on cross-examination that, at the time the City filed its

quick-take petition, the owners of the church at 2028-2030 Ashland Avenue had agreed to

convey their property to the City, but title insurance issues delayed its formal conveyance:

[MR. MAKOWSKI]: And at the time when you filed your affidavit saying

you had acquired all the other parties in block 1587, that was not correct, was

it?

[MR. BURGEE]: The affidavit was in support of the acquisition of this

property in which we had under contract and established equitable interest.

***

[MR. MAKOWSKI]: Within [Block 1587], is the property 2028-2030.

Ashland Avenue located?

[MR. BURGEE]: Yes.

[MR. MAKOWSKI]: Is it still occupied to this date?

[MR. BURGEE]: Yes.

[MR. MAKOWSKI]: So when you say that you had acquired all - - that I was

the lone holdout; that was not correct?

[MR. BURGEE]: We had acquired it.

14

[MR. MAKOWSKI]: But you didn’t have it at the time you filed the - -

[MR. BURGEE]: We had an auction contract, which the title insurance

company said was insufficient to go forward. . . . A defect in the title at the

level of underwriting the title to go to settlement emerged and the title

insurance company requested to have the vestry of the church or the

appropriate body that governs the business decisions of the church to meet

and to perform what they needed to do to satisfy a title insurance company.

They did that and it went to settlement.

After Mr. Burgee concluded his testimony, Mr. Makowski testified on his own

behalf and offered into evidence photographs of the school construction site, purporting to

show that construction would not be completed by the August 2013 date. Mr. Makowski,

additionally, sought to offer into evidence a map that he proffered would show that the

Property was located within a historical district 16 and that the planned development plan

would, therefore, be in contravention of the Urban Renewal Ordinance (“Ordinance”),

which he testified, “speaks of the historic character of the properties and maintaining the

historic character of the properties.” 17 Counsel for the City objected, however, asserting

that the map was not admissible because it had not been authenticated; Judge Carrion

16

A Baltimore City Historic District is “an area in Baltimore City wherein, there are

located buildings and structures which have demonstrated special architectural, historical,

cultural, economic, social, or community significance. This program is overseen by the

Commission for Historical and Architectural Preservation.” City of Baltimore, Historical

and Architectural Preservation, http://www.baltimorecity.gov/Government/Boardsand

Commissions/HistoricalArchitecturalPreservation/HistoricDistricts.aspx (last visited June

23, 2014).

17

The Ordinance makes a number of references to preserving the historic character of the

East Baltimore neighborhood. For example, the Ordinance provides, with respect to

rehabilitation, that “[c]leaning of masonry facades by means of sandblasting shall not be

permitted, except where sandblasting is determined by the Commissioner of the

Department of Housing and Community Development . . . not [to] cause damage to historic

building materials.”

15

sustained the objection.

Judge Carrion, thereafter, issued a memorandum opinion and order, in which she

ordered that the City “be vested with possession of and title in the fee simple interest in that

property known as 900-902 N. Chester Street, Baltimore, Maryland . . . together with the

buildings thereupon, and the rights, alleys, ways, waters, privileges, appurtenances, and

advantages thereupon . . . .” She found, with respect to the City’s authority to take the

property, that:

[A] long-standing Urban Renew Plan for the Middle East

neighborhood expressly permits the acquisition of properties within the

project area, “by purchase or by condemnation either for clearance and

redevelopment, for rehabilitation, or for public facilities.” . . . Appendix D of

the Urban Renewal Plan for the Middle East neighborhood lists the subject

property as one of the properties “being acquired and disposed of for

rehabilitation or redevelopment.” . . . The purpose of the massive EBDI

project at issue is the redevelopment and renewal, through a master plan

years in the making and a colossal influx of investment, of an East Baltimore

neighborhood that has suffered from urban decay for decades. By

endeavoring to improve Middle East and dramatically reduce blight through

a massive redevelopment and revitalization project of an 88-acre sector,

Baltimore City is condemning the subject property for a public purpose.

She opined, then, that, “[t]he Court of Appeals has long held that municipalities possess

power under the Maryland Constitution to condemn property for redevelopment

purposes”, and concluded, therefore, that “there is no question that Plaintiff has the lawful

power to condemn the subject property.”

With respect to the “quick-take”, Judge Carrion credited the City’s evidence that

Mr. Makowski was the lone “hold-out”, thereby inhibiting further development of the

EBDI project:

16

Currently, the subject property is the only hold-out – in other words, the only

property out of nearly 150 individual properties found in Block 1587 to

which Baltimore City had not acquired title. . . . Demolition and the

corresponding redevelopment/renewal for the EBDI project’s Phase II on

Block 1587 and the surrounding area cannot proceed until the City

consolidates title to all properties located there, including the subject

property.

Applying our decisions in Valsamaki, 397 Md. 222, 916 A.2d 324 and Sapero v. Mayor

and City Council of Baltimore, 398 Md. 317, 920 A.2d 1061 (2007), she concluded that the

City had met the “high threshold for situations to qualify as ‘necessary’ for Baltimore City

to have ‘immediate’ possession and/or title to real property”, because Mr. Makowski was a

“hold-out”:

A hold out occurs where, “[d]uring property assemblages, whether private or

public, one or more property owners resist selling, wanting to be the last

owner of a parcel or among the last, in order to be able to demand higher

prices for their property because they are holding up a larger project.”

Valsamaki, 397 Md. at 257 n.18. To counter such action, the Court of

Appeals explained, “[i]n public acquisitions, the condemnation process –

even quick-take actions – are available.”

***

In the case at bar, this Court is presented with facts identical to those

in Segall. The hold-out occurring here, to be sure, is a perfect example of

the circumstances Valsamaki and Sapero highlighted as potentially offering

sufficient immediacy and necessity to validate the use of quick-take

condemnation.

Because Judge Carrion concluded that Mr. Makowski being a “hold-out” was sufficient to

justify a quick-take condemnation, she expressly declined to address the City’s contention

that “safety concerns over the future demolition of Block 1587 occurring directly across

from the new school provide[d] the necessity, immediacy, or exigency needed for a

quick-take condemnation of the subject property.”

17

Mr. Makowski, thereafter, filed a “Motion for Reconsideration Order Granting

City’s Petition for Immediate Possession and Title to Vacate, Alter or Amend Order Dated

June 28, 2013”, in which he challenged the Circuit Court’s finding that he was the “sole

hold-out”:

The hold out assertion was simply not true at the time the City filed Petition

for Quick Take. The property located at 2028-2030 Ashland Ave. did not

belong to the City at the time it filed for Quick Take of Defendant’s property.

The City at that time had not reached any agreement with owners of 2028

Ashland Ave. and that property was still actively being used after City served

Defendant with Quick Take Petition.

He also asserted that the condemnation violated Constitutional principles, because the City

failed to demonstrate why acquiring the Property was necessary for the development. His

motion was denied.

Mr. Makowski then noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals from “the

Circuit Court’s determinations in a QUICK TAKE PROCEEDING”; because quick-take

proceedings proceed directly to this Court, his appeal was transferred to this Court. We

confront, then, essentially the same issue faced by Judge Carrion—whether the facts as

found justify a “quick-take” condemnation action.

The State’s power of eminent domain or “[t]he inherent power of a governmental

entity to take privately owned property, esp[ecially] land, and convert it to public use,

subject to reasonable compensation”, Valsamaki, 397 Md. at 241, 916 A.2d at 335,

quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 562 (8th ed. 2004), is a power inherent in sovereign

authority. Riden v. Phila., Balt. &Wash. R.R. Co., 182 Md. 336, 339, 35 A.2d 99, 100

18

(1943). It is also a power limited by the Federal and Maryland Constitutions, 18 both of

which require that private property only be taken for “public use” and that the property

owner receive “just compensation” for any taking. See Kelo v. City of New London,

Connecticut, 545 U.S. 469, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 162 L.Ed.2d 439 (2005); Prince George’s

County v. Collington Crossroads, Inc., 275 Md. 171, 188, 339 A.2d 278, 287 (1975). The

Maryland Constitution specifically authorizes condemnation actions by Baltimore City for

the purposes of “comprehensive renovation or rehabilitation” and declares such use to be a

“public use”:

The General Assembly of Maryland, by public local law, may authorize and

empower the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore:

(a) To acquire, within the boundary lines of Baltimore City, land and

property of every kind, and any right, interest, franchise, easement or

privilege therein, by purchase, lease, gift, condemnation or any other legal

means, for development or redevelopment, including, but not limited to, the

comprehensive renovation or rehabilitation Thereof and;

***

All land or property needed, or taken by the exercise of the power of eminent

domain, by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore for any of the

aforementioned purposes or in connection with the exercise of any of the

powers which may be granted to the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore

pursuant to this Article is hereby declared to be needed or taken for a public

use.

18

Specifically, the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to

the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides, “No person shall . . . be deprived

of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken

for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. Amend. V. Likewise, Article

III, Section 40 of the Maryland Constitution provides, “The General Assembly shall enact

no Law authorizing private property, to be taken for public use, without just compensation,

as agreed upon by the parties, or awarded by a Jury, being first paid or tendered to the party

entitled to such compensation.”

19

Maryland Constitution Article XI-B, Section 1. The Maryland Constitution also

authorizes certain local and state entities, including Baltimore City, to engage in

“immediate” takings, under which “the General Assembly may provide that . . . property

may be taken immediately upon payment therefor to the owner or owners thereof by the

State or by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, or into court, such amount as the

State or the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, as the case may be, shall estimate to be

the fair value of said property.” Maryland Constitution Article III, Section 40A. When

the sovereign engages in “immediate” takings or “quick-takes”, “the condemning authority

takes possession of the property prior to trial upon payment into court of its estimate of the

value of the property taken.” King v. State Roads Comm’n of the State Highway

Admin., 298 Md. 80, 85-86, 467 A.2d 1032, 1035 (1983). The parties litigate the issue of

compensation only after the sovereign has acquired title and possession of the property. 19

Baltimore City’s quick-take authority is governed by Section 21-16 of the Code of

Public Local Laws, which provides in relevant part:

(a) Petition for Immediate Taking.

Whenever any proceedings are instituted under Title 12 of the Real Property

Article[20] of Public General Laws of the State of Maryland by the Mayor and

City Council of Baltimore for the acquisition of any property for any public

purpose whatsoever, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,

simultaneously with the filing of said proceedings or at any time thereafter,

19

Quick-take actions are distinct from traditional condemnation proceedings, in which the

sovereign does not take possession of the property until after the issue of just compensation

is fully litigated. See Rule 12-210.

20

Title 12 of the Real Property Article applies to “Eminent Domain.”

20

may file a Petition under oath stating that it is necessary for the City to have

immediate possession of, or immediate title to and possession of, said

property, and the reasons therefore.

The City shall also set forth in said Petition for Immediate Taking of

possession or immediate taking of title the amount it estimates to be the fair

value of the said property and/or title to be acquired, and of the respective

interest of each of the owners thereof if more than one, which shall be

substantiated by the affidavits of two qualified appraisers, attached to said

Petition. The City shall deposit into Court simultaneously with the filing of

said Petition the amount of said estimate of the fair value of the property to

be acquired.

In Valsamaki, 397 Md. 222, 916 A.2d 324, we had occasion to interpret Section 21-16.

The City had filed a “quick-take” petition, seeking to condemn Valsamaki’s property,

asserting, only, that immediate possession was necessary to “assist in business expansion.”

The Circuit Court, after a hearing, denied the City’s petition and we affirmed. In so doing,

we reasoned that, in enacting Section 21-16, the City Council had required “the City to

establish under oath the immediacy of the need for quick-take condemnation”, and

therefore, imposed a “burden of proof on the City to establish that immediate need.” Id. at

246, 916 A.2d at 338. We concluded, then, that to prevail in a quick-take condemnation,

the City must prove that the property is being condemned for a public use and that it has an

immediate need to acquire the property, which it had not done. 21

21

In Valsamaki, we distinguished between the City’s burden in a quick-take

condemnation, as opposed to a traditional condemnation:

In the case of regular condemnation, once the City establishes at least

a minimal level of public use or purpose, judicial review may be thereafter

limited to determining that the agency’s decision is not so oppressive,

arbitrary or unreasonable as to suggest bad faith; that, however, is not the

case in assessing immediacy in a quick-take condemnation action in

21

Less than two months after issuing our decision in Valsamaki, we decided Sapero,

398 Md. 317, 920 A.2d 1061, in which we reversed the Circuit Court’s decision to grant

Baltimore City’s quick-take petition after the City had, again, asserted only that acquisition

of the subject property was necessary at “the earliest possible time in order to assist in

business expansion.” Id. at 327, 920 A.2d at 1066-67 (quotations omitted). We

concluded that the City had failed to meet its burden of proving an immediate need for the

property, emphasizing that the City must provide specific evidence of an immediate need,

not merely a bald assertion that one exists. We did acknowledge, however, in both

Valsamaki and Sapero, that there were cases in which the immediacy requirement had been

satisfied under Section 21-16—when the subject property posed a health risk to the public,

Free State Realty Co., Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 279 Md. 550, 369 A.2d

1030 (1977), and in “hold out situations”. Segall v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,

273 Md. 647, 331 A.2d 298 (1975).

A “hold-out” occurs in projects involving property assemblages, i.e., when multiple

properties are assembled for a single project, where “one or more property owners resist

selling, wanting to be the last owner of a parcel or among the last, in order to be able to

Baltimore City under § 21–16. Rather, the court must also determine

whether there is a necessity to justify an immediate taking and, in that

determination, must be able to assess the reasons for the immediacy. Section

21–16 expressly requires the City to state reasons relating to immediacy,

thus the City has the burden not only to present a prima facie case of public

use, but, additionally, in a quick-take action, the burden to establish the

necessity for an immediate taking.

Id. at 254, 916 A.2d at 343.

22

demand higher prices for their property because they are holding up a large project.”

Valsamaki, 397 Md. at 257 n.18, 916 A.2d at 344-45 n.18. Segall was our seminal

hold-out case, in which, in a per curiam opinion, we concluded that an affidavit by the City

alleging “‘[t]hat all other property interests in the ten disposition lot areas aforesaid ha[d]

been acquired, and demolition and sale of the entire site areas [could] not be completed

until possession and title of the subject property interests [were] granted to the City” was

adequate to justify a quick-take under Section 21-16. Segall, 273 Md. at 648, 331 A.2d at

298-99 (alterations in original). In both Valsamaki and Sapero we iterated that the facts of

Segall presented a “hold-out” situation under which a “quick-take” is warranted. See

Valsamaki, 397 Md. at 256, 916 A.2d at 344 (noting that “[t]he City needs a more concrete,

immediate necessity for an exercise of such power” and citing Segall as such an example);

Sapero, 398 Md. at 347, 920 A.2d at 1079 (“These quick-take condemnations deal with the

fundamental right to property, and any resulting deprivation of process—that which is

normally provided under regular condemnation proceedings—should not occur unless

warranted by extreme circumstances. Such extreme circumstances can arise . . . possibly in

extreme cases of ‘hold-outs,’ Segall, 273 Md. at 648, 331 A.2d at 298-99.”).

Hold-outs pose a significant problem in public projects; when the government seeks

to address a problem such as community blight on a comprehensive basis, it, necessarily,

needs to acquire multiple properties. Because of the democratic process and “the nature

of public scrutiny”, the need to acquire properties within a given area becomes public

knowledge. Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A

23

Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 5

(2006). Because the public, and particularly, the owners of the properties the government

seeks to acquire, have knowledge of the government’s plans, the sovereign is placed at a

“severe disadvantage” when it attempts to negotiate for the property’s acquisition. Steve

P. Calandrillo, Eminent Domain Economics: Should “Just Compensation” Be Abolished,

and Would “Takings Insurance” Work Instead?, 64 Ohio St. L. J. 451, 468-69 (2003).

The problem is exacerbated when the government acquires a significant portion of the

needed properties and the remaining owners are unwilling to sell. These owners, or

“hold-outs”, become “monopoly suppliers of the assembled land”, and thus, obtain a

significant bargaining advantage, as they may seek to sell the property to the government

for an inflated price, because they know about the government’s need. Michael Heller &

Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1465, 1472-75 (2008).

Accordingly, “quick-take actions . . . are available to address the situation.” Valsamaki,

397 Md. at 257 n.18, 916 A.2d at 345 n.18; cf. also Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress

Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1231 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“Eminent domain

can even be an effective tool against free-riders who hold-out for exorbitant prices when

private developers are attempting to assemble parcels for public places . . . .”). 22

22

Private developers often avoid the “hold-out” problem by utilizing “buying agents” to

conceal the fact that they are seeking to acquire multiple properties to avoid paying a

higher price. As one commentator has explained:

Private companies frequently deal with the potential holdout problem by

creating various facades behind which they can hide. Rather than disclose

24

In Segall, Baltimore City had filed a Petition for Immediate Possession and Title,

pursuant to Section 21-16, and sought to condemn Segall’s property for “urban renewal

purposes” as part of an urban renewal plan entitled the “Upton Project”. In support of its

Petition, the City had attached an affidavit of Mr. Jerome M. Katz, the City’s Land

Acquisition Officer of the Department of Housing and Community Development, alleging

that it was necessary to acquire title and possession to ten separate lots as part of the urban

renewal plan and that Segall’s property was the only property to which it had not yet

acquired, thereby preventing demolition:

1. That it is necessary for the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore to acquire

title to and possession of the following listed property interests which form

portions of ten separate disposition lots in accordance with the master plan

for the Upton Redevelopment area.

2. That owner-occupants or tenants of the affected leasehold and fee simple

areas will have the right to 90 days of continued occupancy under federal

regulations dating from the time that possession of the subject property

interests is granted to the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.

3. That all other property interests in the ten disposition lot areas

aforesaid have been acquired, and demolition and sale of the entire site

areas cannot be completed until possession and title of the subject

property interests are granted to the City.

(emphasis added). Segall answered, alleging that the City did not have an immediate need

their large commercial construction plans and negotiate with all the

landowners openly, they hire many different individuals or property

management companies to approach each landowner separately. The

property owners never become suspicious that a large scale project is in the

works, and therefore, do not attempt to exact an artificially inflated price

from the buyers.

Steve P. Calandrillo, Eminent Domain Economics: Should “Just Compensation” Be

Abolished, and Would “Takings Insurance” Work Instead?, 64 Ohio St. L. J. 451, 469 n.78

(2003).

25

to acquire the property. The Circuit Court granted the Petition for Immediate Possession

and Segall moved to set aside the order, which was denied; we affirmed.

As in Segall, the City’s inability in the present case to acquire the Property

prevented it from engaging in demolition in furtherance of an urban renewal plan. Indeed,

Mr. Makowski’s property, one of almost 150 other properties in totality, inhibited further

development to a greater degree than did any one of the Segall properties, because his was

the only property on Block 1587 that was left. Mr. Makowksi, thus, retained leverage to

hold a hammer over the City in order to gain financial advantage, and accordingly, was a

“hold-out” within the meaning of Segall.

Mr. Makowski’s attempt to distinguish Segall is unavailing. He asserts that, unlike

Segall, the City, in the present case, had not acquired all of the properties on Block 1587,

based, primarily, on Mr. Burgee’s testimony that, at the time of filing the Petition, the City

had not acquired the church property. 23 Judge Carrion, however, concluded otherwise,

finding that, “the subject property is the only hold-out—in other words, the only property

out of nearly 150 individual properties found in Block 1587 to which Baltimore City has

23

Mr. Makowski also challenges the propriety of the quick-take on the basis that the City

failed to act in good faith in valuing the property, referring us to his motion for

reconsideration in which he attached deeds indicating that two nearby properties had been

conveyed to the City for a higher price than was offered for Mr. Makowski’s property. He

asserts, first, that he could not be considered a “hold-out” because the City never extended

a good-faith offer for the property, and second, that the offer of compensation failed to

comply with the Constitutional requirement that he be awarded “just compensation.” The

right-to-take hearing, however, is “only for the purpose of contesting the right or power of

the City to condemn title to the property.” Section 21-16(c). Issues with regard to

compensation, therefore, are not before us.

26

not acquired title” and the evidence adduced at trial clearly supports Judge Carrion’s

finding. Mr. Burgee testified that, despite formal conveyance having not been completed

due to title insurance issues, the owners of the church were under contract to convey

2028-2030 Ashland Avenue to the City and had indeed done so two weeks prior to the

hearing. He, likewise, testified that demolition of the Property and the “whole square

block” needed to occur, and that the City could not do so until acquiring the Property. Mr.

Makowski relies solely on the fact that formal conveyance of the church had not been

effectuated at the time the quick-take petition was filed. A “hold-out” occurs, however,

when the remaining property-owners are unwilling to sell; because the owners of the

church were willing to sell, as indicated by the auction contract Mr. Burgee testified the

church owners had executed, Judge Carrion correctly recognized that Mr. Makowski was

the sole “hold-out” on Block 1587. 24 We conclude, therefore, that the quick-take action

was warranted. 25

24

Mr. Makowski also argues that Judge Carrion’s finding was erroneous because of a

vague reference by Mr. Burgee to an “outlier” property:

[MR. BURGEE]: And then the other outlier, if you will, property is not as

compelling to acquire because it’s already been demolished and its vacant

land so there is no demolition activity associated with a vacant property.

Aside from this one reference there was no evidence adduced with respect to an alleged

“outlier” that inhibited development.

25

In his Brief, Mr. Makowski raises the issue of, “[w]hat burden of proof should be

required of the Petitioner when taking property via quick take proceeding?” Although

Mr. Makowski does not contend that Judge Carrion applied the wrong burden, he asserts

that “the burden of proof should be that the necessity for immediate taking be shown by at

27

We address, now, a number of other issues raised by Mr. Makowski. The first

issue is an alleged evidentiary error pertaining to Judge Carrion’s decision to exclude

evidence regarding whether the demolition of the Property was consistent with the Urban

Renewal Ordinance’s references to preserving the historic character of East Baltimore.

Specifically, Mr. Makowski sought to question Mr. Burgee on the stand regarding a map

the very least: Clear and Convincing evidence,” which, he argues was not met, relying on

language from Sapero in which we stated:

Concerning the immediate necessity for quick-take condemnation,

Mr. Sapero asserts that § 21–16 “specifically require[s] that some justifiable,

readily apparent and irrefutable evidence [must] exist that a taking is

necessary, not just a bald assertion that a necessary reason exists.” And

furthermore, that “[t]he quick-take law’s plain language initially places the

burden of proof upon the Petitioner requesting immediate possession, that is,

[the City], to provide reasons for the necessity for immediate possession, not

just some general assertions that a reason exists.” We agree with the gist

of Mr. Sapero’s contentions. They are in accord with our decision

in Valsamaki, 397 Md. 222, 916 A.2d 324.

Sapero v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 398 Md. 317, 335-36, 920 A.2d 1061,

1072 (2007). The language quoted above from Sapero merely iterates that the City must

offer evidence of an immediate need, rather than a bald assertion that one exists. In the

instant case, as we have explained, the City provided undisputed testimony that Mr.

Makowski was the only property owner on Block 1587 who had not yet agreed to convey

his property to the City, thereby satisfying the dictates of Sapero.

Nothing from Valsamaki or Sapero, however, requires that the City bear a burden

higher than what is traditionally required in civil cases—a preponderance of the evidence.

See generally Coleman v. Anne Arundel Cnty. Police Dep’t, 369 Md. 108, 134, 797 A.2d

770, 786 (2002) (“The most widely applied measure of the ultimate burden of persuasion

in civil cases is by a preponderance of the evidence . . . .”). As one oft-quoted

commentator on the Maryland Rules of Evidence has observed, the clear and convincing

standard “is applied when a particular claim or defense is disfavored for policy reasons, or

the act alleged is one of moral turpitude or that would otherwise have stigmatic impact.”

Lynn McLain, Maryland Evidence State and Federal § 300:4 (Vol. 5, 2013 Supp.), neither

of which is applicable to quick-take condemnations.

28

that he proffered would have shown that the Property was in an area of Baltimore

designated as “historic.” The City objected on the grounds that Mr. Burgee testified that

he did not recognize the map, and asserted, therefore, that Mr. Makowski had failed to

properly authenticate it:

[COUNSEL FOR THE CITY]: Well, Mr. Burgee first testified that he

doesn’t know, that he’s not familiar with the document. He doesn’t know

what it is. Mr. Makowski has instructed him that there are certain

nomenclature at the bottom of the document - - document seeming to

indicate what it is but there’s nothing to verify what it is. It’s a one-page

printed document. I’m not sure how it’s pertinent or relevant or - - and

certainly not authenticated.

Mr. Makowski responded that he had received the map from the City:

[MR. MAKOWSKI]: Your Honor, I got that from the City of Baltimore in

the same building that [the Assistant City Solicitor] works in on the eighth

floor. I sent copies of it to [the Assistant City Solicitor]. I attached it to my

response in a colored copy I attached to the response I filed to their motion

for quick take.

So it’s not that it’s coming here also for the first time. It’s a

document that has the City of Baltimore’s logo at the bottom where it was

issued from.

Judge Carrion sustained the objection.

Authentication of a document is governed by Rule 5-901, which states, “[t]he

requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is

satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its

proponent claims.” The Rule further elucidates a myriad of ways to authenticate

evidence; the most pertinent to the instant matter is Rule 5-901(b)(1), which provides that

evidence may be authenticated through “[t]estimony of a witness with knowledge that the

29

offered evidence is what it is claimed to be.” Mr. Burgee, however, testified that he had

never seen the document before nor recognized it. Accordingly, Mr. Makowski failed to

authenticate the document.

Mr. Makowski argues, next, that the Circuit Court erred in denying his “Motion for

Leave to Perpetuate Evidence and Motion for Order to Compel Plaintiff to Produce

Documents that were Subpoenaed” pursuant to Rule 2-404, 26 as well as in granting the

City’s “Motion to Quash Subpoenas.” These orders were issued after Mr. Makowski

noted his appeal in this case and are not appropriate for our review. See, e.g., Lazenby v.

Asher, Jr. & Sons, Inc., 266 Md. 679, 688, 296 A.2d 699, 704 (1972); Silverberg v.

26

Rule 2-404 provides, in relevant part:

(b) Pending Appeal. After an appeal has been taken or before an appeal is

taken if the appeal period has not expired, the circuit court in which the

judgment or appealable order was entered may allow perpetuation of

evidence for use in the event of further proceedings in that court. A motion

for leave to perpetuate evidence shall be filed and served as if the action were

pending in the circuit court. The motion shall identify (1) the reasons for

perpetuating evidence, (2) the persons to be examined and the substance of

the testimony expected from each, and (3) the documents or things to be

inspected and preserved, if any. If the court finds that perpetuation of the

evidence is proper to avoid a failure or delay of justice, it may enter an order

allowing depositions to be taken, permitting documents and tangible things

to be inspected or copied as provided by Rule 2-422, or requiring submission

to a mental or physical examination as provided by Rule 2-423. The court's

order may include any provision which justice requires to protect a party or

person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or

expense. Testimony perpetuated in accordance with this section may be used

to the extent permitted by Rule 2-419. Use of evidence perpetuated in

accordance with this section shall be subject to the court's order permitting it

to be perpetuated.

30

Silverberg, 148 Md. 682, 687-89,130 A. 325, 327 (1925), disapproved of on other grounds

by Lewis v. Lewis, 219 Md. 313, 149 A.2d 403 (1959); Baltimore Skate Mfg. Co. v.

Randall, 112 Md. 411, 414, 76 A. 491, 493 (1910). 27

Mr. Makowski, finally, argues that the City provided him with “eleventh hour

cursory, superficial evasive and incomplete discovery responses”, contending, generally,

that “[d]ocuments requested were not produced”, the City did not “provide any specific

response as to each of the document requests”, and that “the [i]nterrogatory [a]nswers were

deficient, evasive and non responsive”. Mr. Makowski did not file a motion to compel

discovery pursuant to Rule 2-432(b), which permits “[a] discovering party, upon

reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected” to “move for an order

compelling discovery if”, inter alia, “a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted

under Rule 2-421” or “a party fails to comply with a request for production or inspection

under Rule 2-422,” Rule 2-432(b), 28 so that the trial court did not decide the discovery

27

Even were Mr. Makowski’s arguments with respect to his Motion For Leave to

Perpetuate properly before us, they would be unavailing, because the motion itself was

insufficient. Although we have not yet had occasion to interpret Rule 2-404, Judge Glenn

Harrell, then-writing for the Court of Special Appeals, has explained, “the very function of

a rule permitting perpetuation of evidence is to preserve evidence that would otherwise be

in danger of later becoming unavailable”, and therefore, a motion to perpetuate the

evidence should not be granted without a showing that “a person seeking to perpetuate

testimony or other evidence pursuant to Rule 2-404 [has] set forth sufficient facts to

demonstrate that the immediate taking of testimony is made necessary because there exists

some actual risk that the evidence sought might be lost by delay.” Allen v. Allen, 105 Md.

App. 359, 373, 659 A.2d 411, 417 (1995) (footnoted omitted).

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Rule 2-432(b), provides, in its entirety, that:

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issue. The issue, therefore, is not properly before us, pursuant to Rule 8-131(a), providing

that, “[o]rdinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly

appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court”. Rule 8-131(a).

We have explained that the purpose of Rule 8-131 is to allow “trial courts to

explicate, to some degree, just what they are deciding or finding so that we may perform

our tasks.” Wilkerson v. State, 420 Md. 573, 597, 24 A.3d 703, 717 (2011). Rule 8-131,

likewise, serves the “interests of fairness . . . by ‘requir[ing] counsel to bring the position of

(b) For Order Compelling Discovery.

(1) When Available. A discovering party, upon reasonable notice to other

parties and all persons affected, may move for an order compelling discovery

if

(A) there is a failure of discovery as described in section (a) of this Rule,

(B) a deponent fails to answer a question asked in an oral or written

deposition,

(C) a corporation or other entity fails to make a designation under Rule 2-412

(d),

(D) a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 2-421,

(E) a party fails to comply with a request for production or inspection

under Rule 2-422,

(F) a party fails to supplement a response under Rule 2-401 (e), or

(G) a nonparty deponent fails to produce tangible evidence without having

filed written objection under Rule 2-510 (f).

(2) Contents of Motion. A motion for an order compelling discovery shall set

forth: the question, interrogatory, or request; and the answer or objection;

and the reasons why discovery should be compelled. Instead of setting forth

the questions and the answers or objections from a deposition, the relevant

part of the transcript may be attached to the motion. The motion need not set

forth the set of interrogatories or requests when no response has been served.

If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may enter any protective

order it could have entered on a motion pursuant to Rule 2-403. For purposes

of this section, an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to

answer.

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their client to the attention of the lower court at the trial so that the trial court can pass upon,

and possibly correct any errors in the proceedings.’” Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132, 149,

729 A.2d 910, 918-19 (1999) (alterations in original). In this case, the trial court never

had an opportunity to address the alleged omissions; we do not, therefore, address the

adequacy of the City’s discovery responses.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the Circuit Court.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT

COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY

AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID

BY APPELLANT.

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