“For purposes of statute 8 of limitations, claims under Title II [of the ADA] are treated like the personal injury claims 9 of § 1983 and are thereby subject to Arizona’s two year statute of limitations under A.R.S. 10 § 12-542.”
How later courts described this case
- “For purposes of statute 8 of limitations, claims under Title II [of the ADA] are treated like the personal injury claims 9 of § 1983 and are thereby subject to Arizona’s two year statute of limitations under A.R.S. 10 § 12-542.”
- “For purposes of 3 statute of limitations, claims under Title II [of the ADA] are treated like the personal 4 injury claims of § 1983 and are thereby subject to Arizona’s two year statute of 5 limitations under A.R.S. § 12-542.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 18 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAMES MARTIN HOUSTON, No. 12-15547
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:10-cv-08160-GMS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ARIZONA STATE BOARD OF
EDUCATION, a political sub-division of
the State of Arizona; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 12, 2014**
Before: McKEOWN, WARDLAW, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
James Martin Houston appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims arising
from the denial of a reciprocal teaching certification. We have jurisdiction under
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Lukovsky v. City & County of San
Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008) (dismissal as barred by the
applicable statute of limitations); Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697, 699 (9th Cir.
2007) (dismissal for failure to state a claim). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Houston’s § 1983 claims as barred by
the applicable two-year statute of limitations. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542(1)
(two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Knox v. Davis, 260
F.3d 1009, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2001) (for § 1983 claims, federal courts apply the
forum state’s personal injury statute of limitations and federal law for determining
accrual; a § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of
the injury that forms the basis of the action).
Contrary to Houston’s contention, Houston is not entitled to equitable
tolling. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394 (2007) (federal courts look to state
law provisions for tolling the limitations period); Little v. State, 240 P.3d 861, 867
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (“Equitable tolling applies only in extraordinary
circumstances and not to a garden variety claim of excusable neglect.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496,
516 (1982) (exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to
bringing a § 1983 action).
2 12-15547
The district court properly dismissed Houston’s state law abuse of process
claim because Houston failed to allege any judicial process. See Crackel v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 92 P.3d 882, 887 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (abuse of process requires a
specific, judicially sanctioned process).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
3 12-15547