stating the requirements for application of claim preclusion and noting that claim preclusion bars litigation in a subsequent action of “any claims that were raised or could have been raised in a prior action” (emphasis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- stating the requirements for application of claim preclusion and noting that claim preclusion bars litigation in a subsequent action of “any claims that were raised or could have been raised in a prior action” (emphasis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 18 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAMES MARTIN HOUSTON, No. 13-15807
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:11-cv-01974-SRB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ARIZONA STATE BOARD OF
EDUCATION; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 12, 2014**
Before: McKEOWN, WARDLAW, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
James Martin Houston appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims arising
from the revocation of his substitute teaching license. We have jurisdiction under
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal of an action as barred by the
doctrine of claim preclusion. Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir.
2002). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Houston’s action as barred by the
doctrine of claim preclusion because Houston raised, or could have raised, his
claims in his prior federal action that was decided on the merits. See Stewart, 297
F.3d at 956 (stating the requirements for application of claim preclusion and noting
that claim preclusion bars litigation in a subsequent action of “any claims that were
raised or could have been raised in a prior action” (emphasis, citation, and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Houston’s
claims against defendant Mamaluy because Houston failed to have the summons
and complaint served on Mamaluy within 120 days after his complaint was filed,
and failed to show good cause for not doing so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m)
(requiring service within 120 days after the complaint is filed); Oyama v. Sheehan
(In re Sheehan), 253 F.3d 507, 511-13 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth standard of
review and discussing good cause).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Houston leave to
file an amended complaint. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656
2 13-15807
F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining
that “[a]lthough leave to amend should be given freely, a district court may dismiss
without leave where a plaintiff’s proposed amendments would fail to cure the
pleading deficiencies and amendment would be futile”).
Houston’s request for consolidation of his appeals, set forth in his opening
brief, is denied. Appellees’ request for judicial notice, set forth in their answering
brief, is granted.
AFFIRMED.
3 13-15807