Antonio Jackson v. State of Missouri

In the Missouri Court of Appeals

Eastern District

DIVISION III

ANTONIO JACKSON, ) No. ED99651

)

Appellant, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court

) of the City of St. Louis

vs. )

) Honorable Mark H. Neill

STATE OF MISSOURI, )

)

Respondent. ) FILED: February 25, 2014

Introduction

Appellant Antonio Jackson (“Jackson”) appeals the judgment of the motion court

denying his amended Rule 24.035 1 motion for post-conviction relief (“amended motion”)

without an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, Jackson claims the motion court clearly erred in

denying his amended motion and request for an evidentiary hearing because he alleged facts not

refuted by the record indicating that plea counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Specifically,

Jackson contends that plea counsel misled him into pleading guilty by falsely assuring him he

would be sentenced to 10 years concurrent on all counts if he entered a blind plea. Jackson

asserts that plea counsel’s false assurances rendered his guilty pleas unknowing and involuntary

and denied him of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Because the record

refutes Jackson’s claim that he was guaranteed a sentence of not more than 10 years, the trial

1

All rule references are to Mo. R. Crim. P. (2011).

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court did not clearly err in denying Jackson’s motion for post-conviction relief without an

evidentiary hearing. We affirm the judgment of the motion court.

Factual and Procedural History

In August 2009, Jackson and two others used firearms to unlawfully enter a home

occupied by the female homeowner, her friend, and a child. The female homeowner was struck

in the head with a firearm, and both women were ordered to strip naked and lay on the ground.

One of the women had a gun stuck in her mouth. Jackson and the others ransacked the home and

took purses, phones, money, and pills from the women. On September 29, 2009, Jackson was

charged in a four-count indictment with robbery in the first degree, Section 569.020 2 (Count I),

armed criminal action, Section 571.015 (Count II), burglary in the first degree, Section 569.160

(Count III), and assault in the second degree, Section 565.060 (Count IV).

At Jackson’s plea hearing, the plea court informed Jackson of the punishment ranges for

each charge: 10 to 30 years, or life imprisonment for Count I; three years to life imprisonment

for Count II; five to 15 years imprisonment for Count III; and a day in jail to seven years

imprisonment for Count IV. The plea court also explained that because the State charged

Jackson as a prior and persistent offender, the maximum punishment ranges for Counts III and

IV were enhanced to life and 15 years imprisonment, respectively. Jackson stated that he

understood the punishment ranges for his charges and that he still wished to enter pleas of guilty.

Jackson said he had no questions about the punishment ranges. Jackson further testified that he

had enough time to discuss the charges with his attorney and that no threats or promises had been

made to induce his guilty pleas. The plea court accepted Jackson’s guilty pleas and ordered a

sentencing assessment report to be prepared.

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All statutory references are to RSMo. 2000.

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At Jackson’s sentencing hearing on October 13, 2010, Jackson was sentenced to

concurrent sentences of 20 years on Count I, 10 years on Count II, 20 years on Count III, and

seven years on Count IV. The sentencing court then questioned Jackson regarding his

satisfaction with his counsel. When asked whether he had enough time to talk to his attorney

before pleading guilty, Jackson responded that he did not, having met with his attorney two or

three times. Jackson also said he told his attorney he did not want to take a blind plea and to

“find me something better than the blind plea.” Jackson stated that plea counsel said he would

try to get the plea hearing in front of Jackson’s probation judge and that he would “try to get me

the minimum ten, or you know, work some type of deal like that.” Jackson indicated that he was

unaware he was going to plead guilty until five minutes before the hearing, when his attorney

told him his only options were to take a blind plea, go to trial, or accept the State’s offer of 25

years’ imprisonment.

The sentencing court recognized Jackson’s complaints regarding plea counsel but found

there was no probable cause to believe Jackson received constitutionally ineffective assistance of

counsel. The sentencing court found that Jackson was advised of the range of punishment at the

time of his plea and knew he could have been sentenced to life imprisonment. In light of those

circumstances, the sentencing court found that the sentence imposed was appropriate.

On August 22, 2011, Jackson filed an amended motion for post-conviction relief pursuant

to Rule 24.035 alleging that plea counsel was ineffective. In his amended motion, Jackson

claimed that his guilty pleas were not voluntarily entered because he was pressured into entering

a guilty plea as a result of plea counsel’s lack of preparation and “guarantee” that a blind plea

would result in a sentence of no more than 10 years, concurrent on all counts. Jackson also

alleged that plea counsel conducted no investigation and only visited Jackson two or three times

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before the plea hearing. As a result, Jackson pleaded guilty out of fear of losing at trial with

unprepared counsel and under the belief that he would serve no more than 10 years. Jackson

asserted that this rendered his pleas unknowing and involuntary. 3 Jackson alleged that had he

“understood his sentence truly was ‘open’ for the Court to decide, [Jackson] would not have pled

guilty but would have insisted on a trial.”

In its findings of fact, the motion court found that Jackson understood the charges against

him and was aware of their respective ranges of punishment. The motion court also found that

Jackson understood that if his pleas were accepted, a sentencing assessment report would be

ordered and he would be able to review the report with his attorney prior to sentencing. The

motion court further found that no promises had been made to Jackson to induce him to plead

guilty and plea counsel only told Jackson he would “try” to get him 10 years. At no time did

Jackson state that he had been guaranteed a 10-year sentence. As a result, the motion court

concluded that Jackson’s claim that his guilty pleas were involuntarily entered because counsel

“guaranteed” a 10-year sentence was without merit. Because Jackson failed to allege facts not

refuted by the record that would entitle him to relief, Jackson was not entitled to an evidentiary

hearing and his amended motion was denied. This appeal follows.

Point on Appeal

In his only point on appeal, Jackson claims the motion court clearly erred in denying his

amended motion for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing because his amended

motion alleged facts, not refuted by the record, demonstrating that plea counsel was

constitutionally ineffective. Specifically, Jackson alleges that he would not have pleaded guilty

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In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the motion court found that Jackson’s guilty pleas waived any

complaints about counsel’s lack of preparation, and, moreover, Jackson admitted during the plea hearing that his

attorney discussed the case with him and answered his questions. Jackson does not appeal the motion court’s

judgment on this issue.

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but for plea counsel’s false assurance that he would be sentenced to only 10 years imprisonment,

concurrent on all counts. Jackson asserts that this false assurance rendered his guilty pleas

unknowing and involuntary.

Standard of Review

We review the denial of a post-conviction motion under Rule 24.035 to determine

whether the motion court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous. Rule

24.035; Carter v. State, 215 S.W.3d 206, 208 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006). The motion court’s

findings are presumed correct and will only be overturned if the ruling leaves the appellate court

with a “definite and firm belief that a mistake has been made.” Bryant v. State, 316 S.W.3d 503,

507 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010). “After a guilty plea, our review is limited to a determination as to

whether the underlying plea was knowing and voluntary.” Id.

To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a claim brought for post-conviction relief, a

movant must (1) allege facts, not conclusions, that, if true, would warrant relief; (2) the facts

alleged must raise matters not refuted by the record and files in the case; and (3) the matters

complained of must have resulted in prejudice to the movant. Barnett v. State, 103 S.W.3d 765,

769 (Mo. banc 2003). An evidentiary hearing is not required if the files and records of the case

conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief. Id.

Discussion

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must meet the two-

prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Rush v. State, 366

S.W.3d 663, 666 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012). The movant must first prove that counsel failed to

exercise the customary skill and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform

under similar circumstances. Id.; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Second, a movant must show that

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counsel’s deficient conduct prejudiced him in that it is reasonably certain that, but for counsel’s

deficient conduct, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Rush, 366 S.W.3d

at 666.

After a plea of guilty, however, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is immaterial

except to the extent the conduct affects the knowing and voluntary nature of the guilty plea.

Short v. State, 771 S.W.2d 859, 864 (Mo. App. E.D. 1989). “On a guilty plea, the movant

claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must establish a serious dereliction of duty which

materially affected his substantial rights and show that his guilty plea was not an intelligent or

knowing act.” Id.

When a defendant claims to have pleaded guilty based on a mistaken belief about his

sentence, the test is whether a reasonable basis exists in the record for such a belief. Robinson v.

State, 952 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Mo. App. E.D. 1997). “An expectation of a lighter sentence ‘than

that actually received does not make a plea involuntary.’” Loudermilk v. State, 973 S.W.2d 551,

554 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998) (quoting Minner v. State, 887 S.W.2d 758, 760 (Mo. App. S.D.

1994)). “Only when it appears that a movant’s belief is based upon positive representations on

which he is entitled to rely will we conclude a movant’s mistaken belief is reasonable.”

Robinson, 952 S.W.2d at 318.

Here, Jackson asserts that plea counsel misled him into pleading guilty by guaranteeing a

10-year sentence if Jackson entered a blind plea. Jackson claims that his reliance on plea

counsel’s promise that he would be sentenced to 10 years if he pleaded guilty rendered his pleas

unknowing and involuntary in that he would have not pleaded guilty but for plea counsel’s false

assurance. As a result, plea counsel was constitutionally ineffective, and Jackson was entitled to

relief.

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After reviewing the entire record, we conclude that no reasonable basis exists for

Jackson’s alleged belief that he would be sentenced to only 10 years. Although Jackson claims

he pleaded guilty because plea counsel “guaranteed” he would receive only a 10-year sentence,

the record shows only that plea counsel said he would “try” to get him 10 years concurrent on all

counts or “work some type of deal like that.” These words do not constitute a promise that

Jackson would receive a 10-year sentence. At best, plea counsel’s statement was merely a

prediction as to the sentence Jackson would receive. Reliance on such a prediction does not

render a guilty plea involuntary. See Loudermilk, 973 S.W.2d at 554 (“A mere prediction or

advice of counsel will not lead to [a] finding of legal coercion rendering a guilty plea

involuntary.”). More logically, plea counsel’s statements constituted no more than a

representation that he would use his best efforts to obtain a 10-year sentence, which is hardly a

prediction and even less of a guarantee.

The record shows that the sentencing court explained the range of punishment for each

charge, and that Jackson expressly stated that he understood the ranges of punishment. Although

Jackson claimed in his amended motion that the plea court did not explain its discretion to

sentence him to any sentence within the range permitted by law, the lack of such a statement

does not render Jackson’s guilty plea involuntary. Rule 24.02(b)(1) only requires that the plea

court inform the defendant of and determine that defendant understands the nature of the charge

to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the

maximum possible penalty provided by law. There is no requirement that the plea court

expressly inform the defendant that it can sentence him or her to any sentence within the

applicable range. See Rule 24.02(b)(1).

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Moreover, Jackson’s own testimony refutes the allegations in his amended motion. At

the plea hearing, Jackson testified that at the time he pleaded guilty, no promises had been made

to induce his pleas. Jackson relies on Brown v. State, 343 S.W.3d 760, 761 (Mo. App. E.D.

2011) for the proposition that it is clearly erroneous to deny an evidentiary hearing based on the

defendant’s testimony that no promises had been made to induce a guilty plea. In Brown, the

movant claimed trial counsel was ineffective because counsel told Brown he would serve no

more than three to five years of any sentence imposed. Brown, 343 S.W.3d at 761. The only

evidence refuting the movant’s claim was his response at his plea hearing that no promises had

been made in exchange for his guilty plea. Id. This Court found the movant’s statement

insufficient to clearly refute the claim in his motion for post-conviction relief that counsel had

promised him a lesser sentence. Id. As a result, the case was remanded for an evidentiary

hearing to determine whether counsel promised movant that he would serve no more than three

to five years if he pleaded guilty. Id. at 762.

Jackson’s reliance on Brown is inapposite. Unlike the movant in Brown, Jackson not

only testified that no promises were made to induce his guilty pleas, but also stated at his

sentencing hearing that plea counsel said he would “try” to get Jackson 10 years. Jackson’s

admission that plea counsel said he would try to get Jackson a 10-year sentence directly refutes

his allegation that plea counsel promised or guaranteed him a lesser sentence.

Because Jackson’s allegations in his amended motion are clearly refuted by the record, he

is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Furthermore, the record indicates that Jackson’s guilty

pleas were knowing and voluntary. Therefore, the motion court did not clearly err in denying his

amended motion for post-conviction relief.

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