noting where an IRS settlement officer reduced taxpayers' reasonable collection potential because their monthly expenses exceeded their monthly income
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- noting where an IRS settlement officer reduced taxpayers' reasonable collection potential because their monthly expenses exceeded their monthly income
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The opinion
T.C. Memo. 2014-81
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
ALFRED A. PORRO, JR. AND JOAN ATKINS PORRO, Petitioners v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket No. 14531-10L. Filed May 6, 2014.
Joseph A. DiRuzzo, III, Sanpreet K. Dhaliwal, and Jennifer Correa Riera,
for petitioners.
Derek P. Richman and William Lee Blagg, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
JACOBS, Judge: The parties submitted this case fully stipulated pursuant
to Rule 122. The issue for decision is whether respondent’s settlement officer
abused her discretion in rejecting petitioners’ offer-in-compromise as an
alternative to collection of petitioners’ unpaid Federal income tax liabilities for
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[*2] years 1990 and 1991 by way of levy. For the reasons set forth infra, we find
that respondent’s settlement officer did not abuse her discretion.
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal
Revenue Code, as amended and in effect at all relevant times, and all Rule
references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. At the time they
filed their petition, petitioners resided in Florida.
Background
On May 6, 2005, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued a notice of
deficiency to petitioners for years 1989 through 1992 inclusive. On July 20, 2005,
petitioners filed the petition in this Court at docket No. 13398-05 for
redetermination of the determinations set forth in the notice of deficiency. On
May 2, 2007, a stipulated decision was entered pursuant to which it was agreed
that petitioners were not liable for any deficiencies or penalties for years 1989 or
1992 but were liable for deficiencies and penalties for years 1990 and 1991 as
follows:
Fraud penalty
Year Deficiency sec. 6663(a)
1990 $49,761 $18,660
1991 78,946 29,605
-3-
[*3] As of June 12, 2013, the assessed balances due for years 1990 and 1991 were
$229,152.43 and $340,128.71, respectively.
On August 24, 2009, the IRS sent petitioners a Final Notice of Intent to
Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing, advising them that the IRS intended
to proceed by levy to collect petitioners’ unpaid 1990 and 1991 Federal tax
liabilities. That notice informed petitioners that if they so desired, they could have
a hearing (section 6330 hearing) on the matter by contacting the IRS Office of
Appeals. On September 12, 2009, petitioners sent the IRS a Form 12153, Request
for a Collection Due Process or Equivalent Hearing, in which they stated they
wished to propose a collection alternative to the proposed levy.
On April 19, 2010, Settlement Officer Laverne Burks conducted a face-to-
face hearing with petitioners’ representative, David Berman. They discussed
collection alternatives but were unable to reach an agreement. On June 2, 2010,
the IRS Office of Appeals mailed petitioners a Notice of Determination
Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330 (notice of
determination) informing them that the IRS’ determination to levy on petitioners’
assets was sustained. On June 25, 2010, petitioners petitioned the Court under
section 6330(d) to review the determination of the IRS Office of Appeals. In their
petition, petitioners stated that the IRS failed to pursue a less intrusive collection
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[*4] alternative, inasmuch as petitioners had “agreed to immediately liquidate all
assets, INCLUDING RESIDENCE [i.e., their Miami home] and pay all proceeds
to IRS for [the] tax claimed due”.
On August 25, 2011, the IRS requested petitioners’ case be remanded to the
IRS Appeals Office in order to afford petitioners another section 6330 hearing.
The Court granted this request on August 26, 2011.
On November 7, 2011, Settlement Officer Burks renewed working on
petitioners’ case. She attempted to reach Mr. Berman by phone but was
unsuccessful. She then wrote him a letter with regard to scheduling another
section 6330 hearing.
On November 17, 2011,1 petitioners mailed a letter to the IRS in which they
offered to settle their unpaid Federal income tax liabilities for $40,000. Settlement
Officer Burks spoke with petitioners by telephone on November 21, 2011. She
informed petitioners that they had to file Form 656, Offer in Compromise, and
Form 433-A, Collection Information Statement for Wage Earners and Self-
Employed Individuals, in order to make an offer-in-compromise. In point of fact,
petitioners had submitted Forms 656 and 433-A, but the forms were mailed to the
1
By this time it appears Mr. Berman had ceased representing petitioners.
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[*5] wrong IRS department. Eventually, the forms made their way to Settlement
Officer Burks.
Petitioners’ $40,000 settlement offer reflected a change in their finances.
Petitioners had retired and liquidated their interests in a business called Terra
Firma, Inc., in February 2011, receiving $70,000. Further, petitioners sold their
Miami home on June 6, 2011, receiving net proceeds of $153,778.26. Petitioners
informed the IRS that the proceeds from both transactions would be used to settle
their tax liabilities.
Petitioners’ case was transferred to Settlement Officer Shari Gropack on
June 1, 2012. Settlement Officer Gropack reviewed petitioners’ offer-in-
compromise and associated financial documentation. She determined that
petitioners’ monthly living expenses exceeded their monthly income by
approximately $561. Settlement Officer Gropack did not have sufficient
information to determine precisely the amount of petitioners’ assets, but on the
basis of the documentation available, she determined petitioners’ equity value in
various assets totaled almost $400,000.
Settlement Officer Gropack held a face-to-face section 6330 hearing with
petitioners on July 12, 2012. At the meeting, petitioners informed Settlement
Officer Gropack that their monthly expenses exceeded their monthly income and
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[*6] that they were using the proceeds from both the sale of the Miami home and
the liquidation of their interests in Terra Firma, Inc., to help pay their living
expenses. Petitioners’ other assets were also discussed. Settlement Officer
Gropack determined that a house in Rutherford, New Jersey (New Jersey house),
was owned by petitioners. Petitioners disputed that determination, claiming they
had no interest in the New Jersey house because it had been transferred to their
son by way of a quitclaim deed dated May 21, 2006.2 After discussing their case
with Settlement Officer Gropack, petitioners increased the amount of their offer-
in-compromise from $40,000 to $50,000.
Settlement Officer Gropack calculated petitioners’ reasonable collection
potential to be $334,125. In reaching her conclusion, she included in her
calculations (1) cash and bank accounts totaling $45,507; (2) furniture and
personal effects valued at $430; (3) an interest in an Oppenheimer Investment
Fund totaling $1,845; (4) the loan value of life insurance of $44,892; and (5)
pensions /IRA/401(k) assets of $10,660.
2
In reviewing the quitclaim deed, we note that the legal description of the
property is incomplete. The deed states: “Also know as Lot ___, Block ___, on
the tax map for the Borough of Rutherford, County of Bergen, State of New
Jersey.” We also note that each place a date appears, the date is altered, including
the expiration date of the notary public’s commission. Petitioners did not offer an
explanation for these omissions or alterations.
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[*7] Also included in the calculation of petitioners’ reasonable collection
potential were amounts for the following dissipated assets: (1) $153,778.26
received by petitioners from the sale of the Miami home; (2) $70,000 received
from the liquidation of petitioners’ interests in Terra Firma, Inc.; and (3) $7,0133
as the equity in the New Jersey house. Settlement Officer Gropack included the
proceeds from the sales of the Miami home and petitioners’ interest in Terra
Firma, Inc., “because the taxpayers did not show where the money went.” She
included the equity value of the New Jersey house because of numerous
inconsistencies in petitioners’ statements as to the ownership of the New Jersey
house. In this regard, petitioners initially claimed that they had purchased the
New Jersey house on behalf of their son because at the time he was a minor, but
they later acknowledged that their son had reached the age of majority several
years before the house was purchased. Settlement Officer Gropack noted in the
IRS case activity file that (1) the New Jersey property assessment records reflected
Mr. Porro as the owner of the New Jersey house in 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, and
2011, and (2) an Internet search of property title records indicated petitioners
owned the property.
3
See infra pp. *8-*9 for a discussion with respect to the methodology
respondent used in determining petitioners’ equity in the New Jersey house.
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[*8] Settlement Officer Gropack was mindful of Mr. Porro’s criminal conviction
in 1999 and that the U.S. Department of Justice had a restitution lien lasting until
2024 against all property he owned.4 She noted in the IRS case activity file that
the Department of Justice had been garnishing approximately $220 of Mr. Porro’s
monthly Social Security payments and that Mr. Porro owed more than $202,000 in
restitution to the Bank of New York.
Settlement Officer Gropack confirmed that petitioners’ monthly expenses
continued to exceed their monthly income and the monthly deficit at the time was
$1,733. She noted in the IRS case activity file that
[i]f I were to use this deficit and muttiple [sic] by 10 years,
approximately what we have to collect on, then the taxpayers would
need to use $207,960 to live on for the next 10 years to meet basic
living expenses. Therefore, I would have to reduce the taxpayers’
RCP by this amount. Additionally, with the restitution lien having
priority, that’s an additional $200,000. I will have to reach out to the
DOJ [Justice Department] to see exactly what remains, if anything. I
also have to see if interest is applicable.
This would reduce the taxpayers’ ability to pay to about $100,000.
4
Mr. Porro was found guilty of mail fraud and of supplying banks with false
information and other statements in connection with his attempts to secure lines of
credit and business loans. On October 14, 1999, the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey sentenced him to 70 months imprisonment and five years of
supervised release. Mr. Porro’s sentence also included a judgment ordering him to
pay restitution to the Bank of New York because he fraudulently obtained a loan
from that bank which ultimately resulted in a net loss of $208,661.
-9-
[*9] Settlement Officer Gropack spoke with a Department of Justice official on
July 17, 2012. She learned that as of July 13, 2012, Mr. Porro owed $199,978.22
in restitution to the Bank of New York. She subtracted the amount of the
restitution debt from the amount she determined as the value of petitioners’ equity
in the New Jersey house because at the section 6330 hearing petitioners “did
mention a federal restitution lien on the property.”5
On July 17, 2012, Settlement Officer Gropack spoke with Mr. Porro by
telephone. She informed him that she would recommend acceptance of a
$100,000 offer-in-compromise of petitioners’ unpaid Federal tax liabilities. Mr.
Porro replied that the largest amount petitioners could pay without borrowing
additional funds was $50,000, the same amount petitioners had offered.
The next day, Settlement Officer Gropack completed a final review of
petitioners’ finances. She confirmed her previous determination that petitioners’
reasonable collection potential was $334,125.
On July 23, 2012, the IRS Appeals Office issued a Supplemental Notice of
Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330
(supplemental notice of determination). In the supplemental notice of
5
Settlement Officer Gropack also reduced the amount of petitioners’ equity
in the New Jersey house to take into account a $25,000 mortgage on the property.
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[*10] determination, the IRS rejected petitioners’ $50,000 offer-in-compromise,
stating that on the basis of an analysis of their financial circumstances, petitioners
could afford to pay more than the amount offered.
Discussion
I. Standard of Review
This case involves a review of the IRS’ determination to proceed with
collection of petitioners’ unpaid Federal income tax liabilities for 1990 and 1991
by way of levy. Section 6330 hearings concerning levies are conducted in
accordance with section 6330(c). At the section 6330 hearing a taxpayer may
raise any relevant issues relating to the unpaid tax, including spousal defenses,
challenges to the appropriateness of the collection action, and offers of collection
alternatives. A taxpayer may challenge the existence or amount of the underlying
tax liability only if he/she did not receive a notice of deficiency or otherwise have
an opportunity to dispute the liability. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B); sec. 301.6330-1(e)(3),
Q&A-E2, Proced. & Admin. Regs. Petitioners had received a notice of deficiency
and litigated the deficiencies in this Court. Thus, they may not challenge the
existence or amounts of the deficiencies for years 1990 and 1991.
After the Commissioner issues a notice of determination, a taxpayer may
petition this Court for review thereof. Sec. 6330(d)(1). The Court’s review of the
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[*11] Commissioner’s determination is subject to the provisions of section 6330.
Because petitioners do not dispute the underlying tax liabilities for 1990 and 1991,
we review the IRS’ determination for abuse of discretion. See Sego v.
Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000); Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176,
181-182 (2000). An abuse of discretion is defined as any action that is
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, clearly unlawful, or lacking a sound basis in
fact or law. Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 532-533
(1979); Woodral v. Commissioner, 112 T.C. 19, 23 (1999).
II. Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioners first argue that Settlement Officer Gropack’s rejection of their
$50,000 offer-in-compromise constituted an abuse of discretion because her
calculation of their reasonable collection potential was flawed in that (1)
Settlement Officer Gropack failed to fully and properly account for Mr. Porro’s
restitution obligations and the effect of those obligations on petitioners’ assets; (2)
Settlement Officer Gropack erroneously included the proceeds from the sale of
petitioner’s Miami home and the liquidation of petitioners’ interests in Terra
Firma, Inc., as dissipated assets; and (3) Settlement Officer Gropack erred by
including the New Jersey house as one of petitioners’ assets.
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[*12] Second, petitioners argue that even if Settlement Officer Gropack’s
reasonable collection potential calculation was correct petitioners were entitled to
avail themselves of a “special circumstances” exception that permits the
acceptance of offers less than a taxpayer’s reasonable collection potential. We
now review each of petitioners’ arguments in turn.
III. The Settlement Officer’s Reasonable Collection Potential Calculation
A. Mr. Porro’s Restitution Obligations
As of July 13, 2012, Mr. Porro was required to pay $199,978.22 as
restitution arising out of his 1999 criminal conviction. Petitioners point out that
when criminal restitution obligations are imposed under 18 U.S.C. sec. 3663A
(2006), 18 U.S.C. sec. 3613 (2006) provides that a lien automatically arises on all
of the assets and property interests of the restitution debtor. Petitioners assert that
Settlement Officer Gropack failed to conduct a “thorough investigation” to
determine the “true equity available to Petitioners for inclusion in their RCP”.
Continuing, petitioners assert: “Settlement Officer Gropack should have
undertaken a more through analysis, as mandated by the statute, to determine how
much a sale of Petitioners’ assets would have actually yielded in light of Alfred
Porro’s restitution obligations.”
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[*13] Petitioners assertions are not persuasive. Contrary to petitioners’ assertions,
the record demonstrates that Settlement Officer Gropack did investigate the true
equity value of petitioners’ assets available for inclusion in their reasonable
collection potential before the issuance of the supplemental notice of
determination. Settlement Officer Gropack accounted for petitioners’ negative
monthly income and the monthly $220 garnishment from Mr. Porro’s Social
Security payments and reduced the equity value of the assets available to
petitioners by the $199,978.52 restitution obligation outstanding as of July 13,
2012.
Petitioners additionally assert that Settlement Officer Gropack erred by
applying the entire restitution obligation against the equity in the New Jersey
house. Petitioners maintain the restitution obligation should have been applied
against the equity in all of their assets.
These assertions are also unpersuasive. Settlement Officer Gropack noted
in the IRS case activity file that during the face-to-face section 6330 hearing,
petitioners did “mention a federal restitution lien on the property”. Consequently,
we cannot say that Settlement Officer Gropack abused her discretion in applying
the full amount of Mr. Porro’s restitution obligation against the New Jersey house.
In any case, money is fungible. See, e.g., United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S.
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[*14] 52, 62 n.9 (1989); Bobrow v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-21; O’Neil
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-339. Applying the restitution obligation
against any single asset reduces petitioners’ total equity value in all their assets
and, therefore, reduces the amount of petitioners’ reasonable collection potential.6
In sum, we find that Settlement Officer Gropack properly accounted for Mr.
Porro’s restitution obligation and that she properly reduced petitioners’ reasonable
collection potential to reflect that obligation.
B. Dissipated Assets
Petitioners assert that Settlement Officer Gropack erred by including the
$153,778.26 of net proceeds they received from the 2011 sale of their Miami home
and the $70,000 in proceeds arising from the 2011 liquidation of their interests in
Terra Firma, Inc., a total of $223,778.26, as dissipated assets. Petitioners maintain
these moneys were used to pay their necessary living expenses.
Dissipated assets are those assets that have been sold, transferred, or spent
on nonpriority items or debts in disregard of an outstanding tax liability. Taggart
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-113; see Johnson v. Commissioner, 136 T.C.
6
Petitioners’ argument that the New Jersey house should not have been
included in the list of their assets is a separate argument and is discussed infra pp.
*16-*19.
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[*15] 475, 487 (2011), aff’d, 502 Fed. Appx. 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013). The Internal
Revenue Manual (IRM) provides that settlement officers are to determine whether
such dissipated assets exist and are no longer available to pay a tax liability. See
IRM pt. 5.8.5.16(2) (Oct. 22, 2010). The determination as to the inclusion of the
value of a taxpayer’s dissipated assets in his/her reasonable collection potential is
based on all facts and circumstances of the case, i.e., each case must be evaluated
on its own merit. Id. pt. 5.8.5.16(1). Settlement officers are counseled that “[i]f
the taxpayer does not provide information showing the disposition of funds from
transferred assets, consider all of these amounts in an acceptable offer amount.”
Id. pt. 5.8.5.16(5). The taxpayer is to be contacted (preferably by telephone) and
afforded the opportunity to explain or verify the disposition of the asset. Id. pt.
5.8.5.16(8).
At the section 6330 hearing, petitioners informed Settlement Officer
Gropack that they were using the proceeds from the sale of their Miami home and
liquidation of their interests in Terra Firma, Inc., to pay their living expenses.
Previously, petitioners had stated that they would use those proceeds to settle their
unpaid Federal income tax liabilities. Although petitioners claimed to have used
the $223,778.26 ($153,778.26 from the sale of the Miami home and $70,000 from
the liquidation of petitioners’ interests in Terra Firma, Inc.) in proceeds to pay
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[*16] their living expenses, Settlement Officer Gropack noted in the IRS case
activity file that petitioners did not document where the payments went. We
reviewed petitioners’ bank records, but we were unable to identify how the
proceeds from the sale of the Miami home and the liquidation of the Terra Firma,
Inc. interests were used. It appeared that the proceeds from the sale of the Miami
home were quickly spent, despite petitioners’ statements to the IRS that the
proceeds would be held to settle their unpaid Federal income tax liabilities. As
respondent’s counsel notes in brief, between March and December 2011,
petitioners dissipated more than $162,000. Petitioners have the burden to
establish that the proceeds from the sale of the Miami home and the liquidation of
petitioners’ interests in Terra Firma, Inc., were expended for their necessary and
reasonable living expenses. To conclude, we cannot say that Settlement Officer
Gropack abused her discretion in characterizing the sale proceeds as dissipated
assets in the calculation of petitioners’ reasonable collection potential.
C. Ownership of the New Jersey House
Petitioners contend that they do not own the New Jersey house and that
Settlement Officer Gropack erred in including the value of the New Jersey house
in petitioners’ reasonable collection potential. Petitioners correctly note that the
Court initially looks to State law to determine what rights a taxpayer has in
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[*17] property the Government seeks to reach, and then to Federal law to
determine whether the taxpayer’s State-delineated rights qualify as “property” or
“rights to property” within the compass of Federal tax law. See Drye v. United
States, 528 U.S. 49, 58 (1999). Under that analysis, petitioners assert they were
not the owners of the property.
Before addressing petitioners’ specific arguments, we are constrained to
note that even if we agreed with petitioners and disregarded the value of the New
Jersey house, it would not affect the outcome of this case. Petitioners’ reasonable
collection potential, as determined by Settlement Officer Gropack, after taking
into account Mr. Porro’s restitution obligation and without considering the value
of the New Jersey house, is $127,134, which is greater than the $50,000
petitioners offered as well as the $100,000 amount Settlement Officer Gropack
suggested as an acceptable offer-in-compromise. And as respondent’s counsel
notes, IRM pt. 5.8.5.5.2(5) (Oct. 22, 2010) states that if the value of a taxpayer’s
assets other than the transferred property at issue is greater than the taxpayer’s
offer-in-compromise amount, that offer should be rejected.
Petitioners purchased the New Jersey house in 1986. Petitioners provided
Settlement Officer Gropack with a quitclaim deed, dated May 21, 2006, which
recites that petitioners granted Kevin Porro, their son, the New Jersey house for
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[*18] $100. But as respondent’s counsel notes, the quitclaim deed is incomplete,
in that part of the legal description of the property was not filled out and all of the
dates were altered, including the expiration date of the notary public’s
commission. Further, New Jersey property assessment records list Mr. Porro as
the owner of the New Jersey house from 2007 through 2011. As respondent’s
counsel notes, this indicates that the deed was not recorded. Petitioners claim that
the State “record is not conclusive, especially in light of a fully executed deed
indicating that Petitioners transferred the property.” Thus, petitioners argue that
Settlement Officer Gropack should have undertaken a more substantial analysis of
the ownership of the New Jersey house. This argument, though, undermines
petitioners’ position that Settlement Officer Gropack ignored New Jersey State
law in determining what rights petitioners had in the New Jersey house. In any
case, Settlement Officer Gropack was not required to conduct a further
investigation. See Dalton v. Commissioner, 682 F.3d 149 (1st Cir. 2012), rev’g
T.C. Memo. 2011-136 and 135 T.C. 393 (2010). Moreover, we are mindful that
transfers between related parties are examined with special scrutiny, see Estate of
Rosen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-115, and it is petitioners who are
obliged to resolve any contradictions in the record as to the ownership of the New
Jersey house. Settlement Officer Gropack documented in the IRS case activity file
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[*19] her thought process in determining that petitioners were the owners of the
New Jersey house. We cannot say that her determination is unreasonable or
arbitrary.
Petitioners next argue that Settlement Officer Gropack failed to follow the
guidelines of IRM pt. 5.8.5.5.2(2) (Oct. 22, 2010) regarding the treatment of assets
held by a nominee or alter ego. In making this argument, it appears that
petitioners are asserting that they held the New Jersey house as a nominee for their
son. But petitioners provided no documentation to indicate that the New Jersey
house was ever held for the benefit of their son. And we are mindful that although
initially petitioners claimed that the house was purchased in Mr. Porro’s name
because their son was a minor at the time, they eventually abandoned this claim
when it became clear it was untrue.
IV. Special Circumstances
In some cases, the IRS may accept an offer-in-compromise of less than the
amount of a taxpayer’s reasonable collection potential if there are “special
circumstances.” See Rev. Proc. 2003-71, sec. 4.02(2), 2003-2 C.B. 517, 517.
Special circumstances are: (1) circumstances demonstrating that the taxpayer
would suffer economic hardship if the IRS were to collect from him/her an amount
equal to the reasonable collection potential and (2) compelling public policy or
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[*20] equity considerations that provide a sufficient basis for compromise. Leago
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-39; see Murphy v. Commissioner, 125 T.C.
301, 309 (2005), aff’d, 469 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2006). The IRM instructs settlement
officers to give consideration to economic hardship and public policy or equity
when investigating any offer-in-compromise. IRM pt. 5.8.4.2(1) (June 1, 2010).
Settlement officers are directed to IRM pt. 5.8.11 (Sept. 23, 2008), which
discusses factors to consider when a taxpayer raises the issue of economic
hardship, including age, employment status, dependents, cost of living in the area,
and extraordinary circumstances such as medical catastrophe or natural disaster.
Id. pt. 5.8.11.2.1(5).
Petitioners assert that Settlement Officer Gropack ignored the guidance of
the IRM and failed to take into account the fact that Mr. Porro was retired, that
petitioners’ only income was from Social Security, and that petitioners had to draw
on their savings to pay their living expenses. Petitioners’ assertion is incorrect.
After Settlement Officer Gropack accounted for Mr. Porro’s restitution
obligation, she acknowledged that Mr. Porro was retired, that petitioners’ income
came from their Social Security benefits, and that their monthly income was
$1,733 less than their monthly expenses. Extrapolating these amounts over a 10-
year period, Settlement Officer Gropack determined that petitioners would expend
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[*21] more than $200,000 from savings on their basic living expenses. She
reduced petitioners’ reasonable collection potential by that amount. Thus, even
though Settlement Officer Gropack determined that petitioners’ reasonable
collection potential was $334,125, she was willing to accept only $100,000 in
satisfaction of petitioners’ unpaid Federal income tax liabilities.7
V. Other Matters Considered at the Section 6330 Hearing
Section 6330(c)(1) and (3) provides that the settlement officer must verify
that the requirements of applicable law and administrative procedure have been
met and must consider whether the proposed collection action balances the need
for the efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of the taxpayer that
any collection action be no more intrusive than necessary. In the supplemental
notice of determination, Settlement Officer Gropack stated that she verified that
7
Petitioners also refer to sec. 301.7122-1(b)(3), Proced. & Admin. Regs.,
arguing that an offer-in-compromise may be entered into to promote effective tax
administration (which constitutes a special circumstance) when it is determined
that, although collection in full could be achieved, collection of the full liability
could cause the taxpayer economic hardship. Both parties agree that petitioners’
unpaid Federal income tax liabilities cannot be collected in full. Consequently,
petitioners were not entitled to an offer-in-compromise based on effective tax
administration. In any case, the factors supporting such an offer-in-compromise,
as provided in sec. 301.7122-1(c)(3), Proced. & Admin. Regs., are broadly similar
to those discussed throughout the remainder of this opinion and were used by
Settlement Officer Gropack.
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[*22] the requirements of all applicable law and administrative procedure were
met and that she determined that the levy appropriately balanced the need for
efficient collection of taxes with petitioners’ concern that the collection action be
no more intrusive than necessary. We have no reason to doubt the truthfulness of
these statements. In sum, we are satisfied that the mandates of section 6330(c)(1)
and (3) have been met.
To reflect the foregoing,
Decision will be entered
for respondent.