“This Court has held that a prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement[;] [h]e must seek federal habeas corpus relief (or appropriate state relief) instead.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
How later courts described this case
- “This Court has held that a prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement[;] [h]e must seek federal habeas corpus relief (or appropriate state relief) instead.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
- holding that payment of the filing fee “is required in every case in which a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis brings a civil action.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
RONALD WORTHAM, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 13-1385 (KBJ)
)
UNITED STATES PAROLE )
COMMISSION, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, who is serving a 24-year prison term, brings this action pro se under 42
U.S.C § 1983 against the Commissioner of the United States Parole Commission and
four current and former Parole Hearing Examiners (collectively, “Defendants”), in both
their individual and official capacities. (See A Civil Action (pursuant to § 1983), ECF
No. 1, at 1-2.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “collusively denied and deprived
Plaintiff his substantive rights to liberty, due process, and equal protection to the
United States Constitution” by denying to release him from prison on parole. (Id. at
11.) He seeks both monetary damages and an injunction requiring his immediate
release from prison. (Id. at 9, 11.)
In response to Plaintiff’s complaint, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss or for
Summary Judgment. (See Mem. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss or for Summ. J.,
ECF No. 10-1 (“Defs.’ Mem.”).) In their motion, Defendants argue that because
Plaintiff “challeng[es] the fact or duration of his confinement,” he must litigate his
claims through a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 rather
than through an action under Section 1983. (Id. at 10.) See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544
U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (“This Court has held that a prisoner in state custody cannot use a
§ 1983 action to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement[;] [h]e must seek
federal habeas corpus relief (or appropriate state relief) instead.” (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted)). In response to the motion, Plaintiff concedes that he
cannot maintain a claim under Section 1983 for denial of parole, stating that he “now
understands [that] the judicial process and vehicle for challenging the duration and
lawfulness of confinement [is] a [Petition for] a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241.” (Pl.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 11 (“Pl.’s Mot.”), at 1.) He moves for
dismissal of his own complaint, presumably under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(a)(2), because Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment, which
precludes voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i). (Id.)
Because there is no dispute that Plaintiff cannot bring a claim for damages and
injunctive relief under Section 1983 based on the facts he pleads in his complaint and
must instead file a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, the Court will grant this aspect
of Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss. Moreover, in light of this dismissal, the Court will
also deny as moot Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 4) and Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss.
In his motion, Plaintiff also asks that this Court “dismiss the filing fee” (Pl.’s
Mot. at 1), which the Court construes as a request to vacate the assessment order filed
on September 12, 2013, in accordance with the filing fee provisions of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). (See Order, ECF No. 5.)
Through the PLRA, Congress has mandated that a prisoner who brings a civil action
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“pay the full amount of a filing fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The Court has no
authority to excuse any prisoner from fully satisfying this financial obligation. See In
re Smith, 114 F.3d 1247, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that payment of the filing fee
“is required in every case in which a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis brings a
civil action.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)-(2)
(establishing formula under which prisoner who cannot prepay the filing fee is
obligated to pay a partial initial filing fee and then make monthly payments); Goins v.
Decaro, 241 F.3d 260, 260-61 (2d Cir. 2001) (denying inmates’ requests for refund of
partially-paid filing fees and cancellation of remain amounts due following withdrawal
of their appeals because excusing inmates from their obligation to pay filing fees would
be “inconsistent with Congress’s objectives in enacting the PLRA.”). Accordingly, the
Court will deny this aspect of Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss.
A separate, final order accompanies the Memorandum Opinion.
DATE: May 1, 2014 Ketanji Brown Jackson
KETANJI BROWN JACKSON
United States District Judge
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