The opinion
FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 18 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DANNY LEE MONTS, No. 12-16930
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:10-cv-00532-FJM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JOSEPH M. ARPAIO,
Defendant,
And
CHAPLAIN GREGORY MILLARD, #
A4930; CANTOR HOWARD
TABAKNEK, # R0670,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Frederick J. Martone, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 9, 2014
San Francisco, California
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Cir. R. 36-3.
Before: TALLMAN and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges, and DUFFY, District Judge.**
Danny Lee Monts sued Maricopa County, Arizona, jail chaplains Howard
Tabaknek and Gregory Millard under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for denying him a Kosher
diet. Monts appeals summary judgment against him on that claim. Jurisdiction
lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Suzuki Motor Corp. v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 330 F.3d 1110, 1131 (9th Cir. 2003), and
reverse and remand for trial.
There are four issues: substantial burden, sincerity, qualified immunity, and
the chaplains’ individual liability.1 Tabaknek and Millard do not contest that
denying Monts a Kosher diet substantially burdened his religious exercise. As to
sincerity, a reasonable jury could conclude that Monts was sincere. Every fact
relied on below to hold otherwise was disputed. As to qualified immunity, the
right at issue here was clearly established before the relevant time, McElyea v.
Babbit, 833 F.2d 196, 198–99 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam), and Monts has raised,
**
The Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
1
The briefing refers to this issue as individual liability. We note that it is
more often referred to as causation, and relates to the requirement, under § 1983,
that each defendant be individually shown to have “subject[ed], or cause[ed] to be
subjected . . . [the plaintiff] to the deprivation” of a constitutional right. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
2
to the extent necessary on summary judgment, factual disputes as to the alleged
constitutional violation. Finally, as to individual liability, both chaplains admit to
personal involvement in denying Monts’s requests for a Kosher diet. That is
enough under § 1983. E.g., Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trustees, 479
F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007).
We note that the trial record may differ significantly from that on summary
judgment. Accordingly, our disposition should not be read as taking a position on
whether Monts will ultimately prevail on the merits or whether the chaplains will
ultimately prevail on qualified immunity.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
3