Medical Bd. of Calif. v. Chiarottino

Filed 4/15/14

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

A138420

v.

MICHAEL CHIAROTTINO, (Contra Costa County

Super. Ct. No. MSN121932)

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Michael Chiarottino, a physician licensed to practice in California,

appeals from the trial court’s order to comply with investigative subpoenas issued by

plaintiff Medical Board of California (Board). The Board issued the subpoenas in

connection with an investigation into defendant’s prescribing activities as they pertain to

controlled substances. On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in rejecting his

argument that the Board violated his patients’ right to privacy by accessing a

computerized database of controlled substance prescription records prior to issuing the

subpoenas. We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In August 2011, the Board obtained information that defendant was possibly

prescribing excessive medications to patients in violation of the Medical Practice Act.

(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2000 et seq.) A Board investigator obtained a Controlled

Substance Utilization Review and Evaluation System (CURES)1 report of defendant’s

prescribing history between August 22, 2009 and February 22, 2012. The investigator

1

The Controlled Substance Utilization Review and Evaluation System was

established pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11165. This section was made

operative on January 1, 2005.

also obtained CURES reports of the prescription histories for five of defendant’s patients

over a 12-month period between 2011 and 2012, and the corresponding pharmacy records

for these same patients.

The Board’s medical expert Rick Chavez, M.D., conducted an independent review

of the CURES reports and the patients’ pharmacy records. He identified significant

concerns and irregularities in defendant’s prescribing of controlled substances to these

patients, including prescribing large quantities of highly addictive and dangerous

narcotics, prescribing highly unusual combinations of drugs, prescribing buprenorphine

(a drug used to resolve opiate addiction) to patients who were concurrently receiving

opioids from several other physicians, prescribing at irregular time intervals, and

prescribing highly addictive drugs for lengthy periods of time. Chavez concluded

defendant’s conduct was alarming and difficult to justify.

On February 7, 2012, the Board’s investigator sent letters to the five patients

requesting authorization for the release of their medical records with respect to the

treatment they received from defendant. Defendant was subsequently served with

subpoenas directing him to produce the patients’ medical records. After the patients were

notified of the subpoenas, they informed the investigator that they objected. Defendant’s

counsel indicated to the investigator that defendant would not produce the requested

information because the patients had objected to the release of their medical records.

On December 26, 2012, the Board filed a petition for an order compelling

compliance with the investigative subpoenas. (Gov. Code, § 11180 et seq.)2 In its

supporting papers, it argued that the five patients’ medical records were needed to

properly assess whether the narcotics and controlled substances defendant had prescribed

were or were not warranted, and whether he was in compliance with standards of care

2

Trial courts are authorized to enforce investigative subpoenas that are “regularly

issued.” (Gov. Code, § 11188.) “The term ‘regularly issued’ means in accordance with

the provisions of sections 11180, 11181, 11182, 11184 and 11185 of the Government

Code providing for the matters which may be investigated, the acts authorized in

connection with investigations, and the service of process.” (Fielder v. Berkeley

Properties Co. (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 30, 39.)

2

and practice. The Board asserted these records were necessary to allow it to “fulfill its

monitoring responsibilities of public protection as mandated by California law.” It

claimed the subpoenas were “reasonably tailored to seek only the records that are

necessary and material to the Board’s investigation.”

On January 2, 2013, the trial court issued an order to show cause regarding the

Board’s petition.

On January 31, 2013, defendant filed his opposition to the Board’s petition. He

claimed his refusal was based on protecting the privacy rights of his patients, as well as

their rights not to be subjected to unwarranted search and seizure.

On April 18, 2013, the trial court granted the Board’s petition to compel

defendant’s compliance with the subpoenas. The court found the Board had set forth

sufficient facts to support a finding of good cause. The court limited the disclosure to

records that “are relevant and material to the pending investigation,” by setting forth

certain substantive and time-based limitations. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard Of Review

The standard of review generally applicable to review of a trial court’s order

involving discovery matters or other matters where the trial court has discretionary power

is abuse of discretion. (See Britts v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1123.)

An abuse of discretion is found where a court exceeds the bounds of reason in light of the

circumstances under consideration. (Loomis v. Loomis (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 345, 348.)

Unless there has been a clear miscarriage of justice, a reviewing court will not substitute

its opinion for that of the trial court so as to avoid divesting the trial court of its

discretionary power. (Id. at p. 349.)

Issues of law are reviewed de novo. (Szold v. Medical Bd. of California (2005)

127 Cal.App.4th 591, 596.) Construction of a statute is a question of law and, as such, is

subject to de novo review. (Ibid.)

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II. Contentions On Appeal

As noted above, the trial court found the Board had established good cause to

support the issuance of the subpoenas. Defendant’s sole basis for challenging the trial

court’s good cause finding is his claim that the CURES reports themselves were obtained

in violation of his patients’ rights to privacy under article I, section 1, of the California

Constitution. More specifically, he contends their rights were violated when the Board

was given “unfettered and extensive access to two-and-a-half years’ worth of all of his

patients’ CURES prescription information.” As will be demonstrated, the Board’s

actions were entirely authorized under Health and Safety Code section 11165 (the

CURES statute). Thus, defendant is implicitly attacking the constitutionality of the

statute itself. The weight of authority supports the Board’s position that the statute, and

its actions taken pursuant thereto, pass constitutional muster.

III. The CURES Statute

The prescribing and dispensing of controlled substances in California are strictly

regulated and are monitored by the Department of Justice (DOJ). (See Health & Saf.

Code, § 11150 et seq.) The CURES statute provides for the reporting of prescription

records to the DOJ, and specifically authorizes the DOJ to disclose such records to state

enforcement and regulatory agencies. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11165, subd. (c).) The

DOJ maintains a database for the electronic monitoring of, and Internet access to,

information regarding the prescribing and dispensing of Schedule II, Schedule III, and

Schedule IV controlled substances by all practitioners authorized to prescribe or dispense

these controlled substances. The primary purpose of the CURES statute is to “assist . . .

law enforcement and regulatory agencies in their efforts to control the diversion and

resultant abuse of . . . controlled substances.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 11165, subd. (a).)

It is undisputed that the Board qualifies for authorization under the CURES statute to

access and review prescription records for controlled substances that pharmacists and

other dispensing providers are required to report.

The CURES statute does not require the Board to obtain either patient consent or

judicial approval prior to accessing CURES data. The statute does, however, contain its

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own confidentiality requirements. Specifically, it provides that the database system

“shall operate under existing provision of law to safeguard the privacy and confidentiality

of patients.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 11165, subd. (c).) The statute further prohibits the

disclosure, sale, or transfer of patient data to any third party. (Ibid.)

IV. The Medical Board of California

In Arnett v. Dal Cielo (1996) 14 Cal.4th 4 (Arnett), our Supreme Court provided a

useful overview of the Board’s role in protecting the health and safety of the public. As

the court observed, California has long regulated the practice of medicine as an exercise

of the State’s police power. (Id. at p. 7.) “A key instrument of that regulation has been

the statewide agency authorized to license and discipline medical practitioners,” now

known as the Medical Board of California. (Ibid.; see Bus. & Prof. Code, § 101, subd.

(b).) “A primary power exercised by the Board in carrying out its enforcement

responsibilities is the power to investigate: the statute broadly vests the Board with the

power of ‘Investigating complaints from the public, from other licensees, from health

care facilities, or from a division of the board that a physician and surgeon may be guilty

of unprofessional conduct.’ [Citation.]” (Arnett, supra, at pp. 7-8.)

“The Board’s investigators have the status of peace officers [citation], and possess

a wide range of investigative powers. In addition to interviewing and taking statements

from witnesses, the Board’s investigators are authorized to exercise delegated powers

[citation] to ‘Inspect books and records’ and to ‘Issue subpoenas for the attendance of

witnesses and the production of papers, books, accounts, documents and testimony in any

inquiry [or] investigation . . . in any part of the state.’ [Citations.]” (Arnett, supra, at

p. 8.) Further, because the Board is authorized “to issue a subpoena ‘in any inquiry [or]

investigation’ [citation], the Board may do so for purely investigative purposes; it is not

necessary that a formal accusation be on file or a formal adjudicative hearing be pending.

[Citation.]” (Ibid.) The Court in Arnett further observed “ ‘the power to make

administrative inquiry is not derived from a judicial function but is more analogous to the

power of a grand jury, which does not depend on a case or controversy to get evidence

5

but can investigate “merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just

because it wants assurance that it is not.” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

The Board is specifically charged with enforcement of the Medical Practices Act,

and many of the Act’s provisions focus particularly on the use and misuse of prescription

drugs, as illustrated by the following statutes: Business and Professions Code section

2238 (violation of state or federal statute regulating dangerous drugs and controlled

substances), sections 2241 and 2241.5 (furnishing prescription drugs to an addict), and

section 2242 (furnishing prescription drugs without an appropriate prior examination and

medical indication).

In the present case, defendant does not challenge Board’s investigative powers

directly. Instead, he repeatedly asserts the Board violated his patients’ privacy rights

when it obtained “unfettered access” to the CURES data, data the Board subsequently

relied on to justify the issuance of the five subpoenas.3

IV. The Board’s Actions Taken Pursuant to the CURES Statute Did Not Violate

Patients’ Privacy Rights

A. The State Constitutional Right to Privacy

“In 1972, Californians, by initiative, added an explicit right to privacy in the

state’s Constitution: ‘All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable

rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing,

and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.’

(Cal. Const., art. I, § 1, italics added.)” (County of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County

Employee Relations Com. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 905, 926 (County of Los Angeles).)

In Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1 (Hill), our Supreme

Court “established a framework for analyzing constitutional invasion of privacy claims.

An actionable claim requires three essential elements: (1) the claimant must possess a

legally protected privacy interest [citation]; (2) the claimant’s expectation of privacy

3

A physician has the right to assert the privacy interests of his patients who have

not consented to the disclosure of their medical records. (Wood v. Superior Court (1985)

166 Cal.App.3d 1138, 1145.)

6

must be objectively reasonable[4] [citation]; and (3) the invasion of privacy complained of

must be serious in both its nature and scope [citation]. If the claimant establishes all

three required elements, the strength of that privacy interest is balanced against

countervailing interests. [Citation.] In general, the court should not proceed to balancing

unless a satisfactory threshold showing is made. A defendant is entitled to prevail if it

negates any of the three required elements. [Citations.] A defendant can also prevail at

the balancing stage. An otherwise actionable invasion of privacy may be legally justified

if it substantively furthers one or more legitimate competing interests. [Citation.]

Conversely, the invasion may be unjustified if the claimant can point to ‘feasible and

effective alternatives’ with ‘a lesser impact on privacy interests.’ [Citation.]” (County of

Los Angeles, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 926, fn. added.)

It is established that patients do have a right to privacy in their medical

information under our state Constitution.5 (See, e.g., Gross v. Recabaren (1988) 206

Cal.App.3d 771, 782-783 [substantial privacy concerns are raised whenever there is an

intrusion into a patient’s confidential relationship with a physician.]; Ruiz v. Podolsky

(2010) 50 Cal.4th 838, 851 [the same with respect to disclosure of confidential medical

information regarding the condition a patient seeks to treat].) This right would appear to

extend to prescription records.6 However, it is also well settled that an individual’s

constitutional right to privacy is not absolute. (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 37.)

4

“A ‘reasonable’ expectation of privacy is an objective entitlement founded on

broadly based and widely accepted community norms.” (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 37.)

The reasonableness of a privacy expectation depends on the surrounding context. The

Supreme Court has “stressed that ‘customs, practices, and physical settings surrounding

particular activities may create or inhibit reasonable expectations of privacy.’

[Citation.])” (County of Los Angeles, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 927.)

5

“Legally recognized privacy interests include ‘interests in precluding the

dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information,’ which Hill described

under the umbrella term ‘ “informational privacy.” ’ [Citation.]” (County of Los

Angeles, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 927.)

6

The Connecticut Supreme Court has noted that a person may reasonably expect

his or her prescription records or information contained therein will not be disseminated

publicly “[b]ecause prescription records may contain information of a private nature

7

Even assuming defendant has satisfied the three-prong prima facie elements under

Hill, we conclude any invasion of his patients’ privacy rights with respect to the Board’s

review of information obtained from the CURES database is justified by a compelling

competing interest: “Invasion of a privacy interest is not a violation of the state

constitutional right to privacy if the invasion is justified by a competing interest.

Legitimate interests derive from the legally authorized and socially beneficial activities of

government and private entities. Their relative importance is determined by their

proximity to the central functions of a particular public or private enterprise. Conduct

alleged to be an invasion of privacy is to be evaluated based on the extent to which it

furthers legitimate and important competing interests.” (Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 38.)

Here, the balance favors disclosure.

B. Defendant Does Not Challenge the CURES Statute on Its Face

As the Board correctly notes, to the extent defendant is contending on appeal that

the CURES statute is facially unconstitutional, he did not raise this argument in the

proceeding below; thus, this argument may be deemed waived. (Ochoa v. Pacific Gas &

Electric Co. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1488, fn. 3 [“arguments not asserted below are

waived and will not be considered for the first time on appeal”].) We also observe he has

not cited to any legal authority to support an argument that the CURES statute is facially

unconstitutional. Accordingly, we deem the argument waived and abandoned.7 (Ibid.)

regarding a person’s physical or mental health.” (State of Connecticut v. Russo (2002)

259 Conn. 436, 460.)

7

Amicus curiae the California Medical Association (CMA) asserts the CURES

statute fails to comply with privacy statutes requiring heightened protection of highly

sensitive medical information. Specifically, the CMA asserts that access to the

prescription information contained in the CURES database can lead to the disclosure of

information as to an individual’s HIV status, treatment for drug and alcohol abuse, or

participation in outpatient psychotherapy. The CMA finds fault with the provision in the

statute that allows the DOJ to unilaterally determine whether “to share private

prescription information with any third party as determined by the DOJ.” Notably, the

CMA does not argue that the DOJ abused its discretion in sharing CURES database

information concerning defendant’s patients with the Board. The CMA further asserts

that while CURES “can serve a needed purpose to help control drug diversion in the state

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C. The Board Did Not Violate Defendant’s Patients’ Right to Privacy

Defendant concedes that the CURES statute “appears to authorize the [Board] to

obtain CURES data in its investigation of doctors for potential disciplinary purposes, as

in the instant case.” Our research has not disclosed a California case directly addressing

an invasion of privacy claim with respect to activities undertaken pursuant to the CURES

statute. However, a recent case lends support for the proposition that the Board’s conduct

can be justified by a compelling governmental interest. In 420 Caregivers, LLC v. City of

Los Angeles (2012) 219 Cal.App.4th 1316 (420 Caregivers), the Court of Appeal

reversed an order granting a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of an

ordinance regulating the number and geographic distribution of medical marijuana

collectives and requiring their registration. Among its conclusions, the appellate court

found the collectives did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the limited

information sought by the ordinance. (Id. at p. 1350.) Alternatively, it found any

invasion of a reasonable expectation of privacy to be justified by a legitimate and

competing state interest. (Id. at p. 1349.) Because the collectives did not demonstrate a

likelihood of prevailing on the merits at trial, the appellate panel concluded the trial court

had erred in granting the request for a preliminary injunction. (Id. at p. 1350.)

In arriving at its holding, the appellate court observed “statutes already allow the

disclosure of patient contact information by traditional health care providers upon

demand. . . . Insofar as schedules II, III, and IV controlled substances (drugs which may

be legally prescribed) are concerned, pharmacies are already required weekly to provide

the state Department of Justice with the names, addresses, and phone numbers of

prescribed users. [Citation.] This information, in turn, may be given to state, local, or

federal agencies for purposes of criminal or disciplinary investigations. [Citation.]” (420

Caregivers, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350, italics added.) The reviewing court

and assist physicians in making informed prescribing decisions,” the privacy protections

of the system “are outdated and unregulated.” In light of the fact that defendant has not

raised a direct challenge the CURES statute, such concerns are more properly addressed

to the Legislature.

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concluded: “In short, even where the privacy rights of individual collective members are

concerned, the information sought is extremely limited and nonintimate in nature and the

information—plus more—is typically already subject to disclosure in the context of more

traditional health care treatments and providers. . . . [W]e see no reason to give medical

marijuana users greater privacy rights than patients utilizing more traditional health care

providers and more traditional prescription drugs. Indeed, given the continued illegal

nature of marijuana under most circumstances, even more substantial invasions of

privacy would likely be justified under the current state of the law. Whether analyzed as

an unreasonable expectation of privacy or a reasonably justified invasion of a reasonable

expectation of privacy, we find no violation of the Collectives’ members’ individual

privacy rights.” (Ibid., italics added.)

In rejecting defendant’s unreasonable search and seizure claim, the trial court in

the present case specifically rejected his right-to-privacy arguments, concluding that,

under the circumstances of this case, neither defendant nor his patients have a reasonable

expectation of privacy in the records maintained in the CURES database. Several other

jurisdictions have addressed this issue more directly and have found that a state law

enforcement official’s access to controlled substance prescription records does not violate

the patient’s right of privacy under federal law or under applicable local privacy statutes.

We find those opinions to be persuasive.

Significantly, in Whalen v. Roe (1977) 429 U.S. 589 (Whalen), the United States

Supreme Court addressed a statute similar to the CURES statute. In Whalen, a group of

patients and physicians, among others, challenged the constitutionality of a New York

statutory scheme requiring physicians to forward records of prescriptions for Schedule II

drugs, which contained detailed patient information, to a centralized database maintained

by that state’s department of health. (Id. at pp. 593-595.) Although, like the CURES

statute at issue here, public disclosure of the identity of the patient was prohibited under

New York law, certain state regulatory employees and personnel responsible for

investigating violations of that state’s controlled substance statutes were afforded access

to that information. (Id. at pp. 594-595.) After finding that the statute furthered the

10

state’s “vital interest in controlling the distribution of dangerous drugs,” the Court

concluded that the challenged statutory scheme, by mandating the disclosure of the

prescription information to representatives of the state having responsibility for the health

and welfare of the community, did not create an impermissible invasion of privacy. (Id.

at pp. 603-604.) As more recent cases demonstrate, other jurisdictions are in accord.

In State of Nebraska v. Wiedeman (2013) 286 Neb. 193, a criminal defendant

argued that state law enforcement officers violated her due process privacy rights through

their warrantless, investigatory access to her prescription records. As in the present case,

she did not challenge the statute that authorized the access. (Id. at p. 203.) The state’s

high court found Whalen to be dispositive of her privacy arguments under the federal

Constitution. (Id. at pp. 204-205.) The Nebraska Court observed “there is a long history

of governmental scrutiny in the area of narcotics and other controlled substances. All

states highly regulate prescription narcotics, and many state statutes specifically allow for

law enforcement investigatory access to those records without a warrant. This well-

known and long-established regulatory history significantly diminishes any societal

expectation of privacy against governmental investigation of narcotics prescriptions.”

(Id. at p. 209, fn. omitted.) The Court concluded the defendant had no legitimate

expectation that governmental inquiries would not occur with respect to a pharmacy’s

prescription records. (Id. at p. 212.)

In State of Connecticut v. Russo (2002) 259 Conn. 436 (Russo), the Supreme Court

of Connecticut held a patient’s privacy rights were not violated under a state statute that

allowed government officials with the duty to enforce state and federal controlled

substance statutes to inspect prescription records. (Id. at p. 457.) The local police

department was investigating a defendant accused of multiple counts of forgery and

obtaining controlled substances by forging a prescription. Pursuant to the challenged

statute, an authorized law enforcement agent had obtained, with the pharmacists’ consent,

records of the defendant’s prescriptions for controlled substances. The Court, largely

relying on Whalen, found the defendant’s privacy rights had not been violated. (Id. at

pp. 471-472.)

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The Court in Russo noted that the Connecticut statutory scheme was

indistinguishable from the statutes at issue in Whalen. (Russo, supra, 259 Conn. at

p. 464.) Specifically, both schemes safeguarded the privacy interest of the affected

patients by restricting access to those records to a limited class of persons, and by

prohibiting the dissemination of such information to the general public. (Id. at pp. 464-

465.) The Court further observed that nothing in the court records in either case

suggested that the law enforcement officials involved had failed to abide by the

nondisclosure provisions, or that they would likely flout those provisions in the future.

(Id. at p. 465.)

In State of Vermont v. Welch (1992) 160 Vt. 70, the Supreme Court of Vermont

held that a criminal defendant had a privacy interest in her pharmaceutical records, based

on a reasonable expectation that those records would not be arbitrarily disclosed. (Id. at

p. 78.) The court concluded, however, that the “pervasively regulated industry”

exception to the warrant requirement allowed for the warrantless inspection of her

records in furtherance of the enforcement of statutes pertaining to closely regulated

businesses such as pharmacies. (Id. at pp. 79-81.) The court specifically noted the state

interest in the regulation of dangerous drugs (id. at p. 81), and concluded the warrantless

inspection of pharmacy records undertaken in compliance with statutory procedures was

reasonable. (Id. at pp. 83-84.)

Finally, in Stone v. City of Stow (1992) 64 Ohio St.3d 156, a contingent of doctors,

patients, and a pharmacist sued several municipalities contending that Ohio statutes

providing for the inspection of pharmacy prescription records without a warrant violated

the right of privacy and the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures found

in the United States and Ohio Constitutions. (Id. at pp. 159-160.) The Court found

Whalen dispositive of the privacy issue, declining to apply a balancing test that would

weigh the need for access to prescription records against the deprivation of privacy

caused by the regulatory provisions. The Court noted that, on the state of the record

before it, there was no basis for speculating that any unauthorized disclosure of the

prescription records would occur. (Id. at pp. 162-163.)

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In the present case, defendant argues that the Board violated the privacy rights of

all of his patients by, essentially, conducting a fishing expedition into records of his

prescribing activities as reflected in the CURES database. However, there is no evidence

that the Board acted outside the scope of its investigative mandate. For example,

defendant does not contend the Board used its authority to investigate the records of

individuals who were not his patients, or that the Board improperly disclosed any CURES

information to third parties. Nor does he contend that the Board had any improper

motive in deciding to investigate his own prescribing activities. Thus, it is undisputed

that the Board acted within the scope of its authority and in compliance with all relevant

statutory law.

Further, the cases defendant relies on are inapposite in that they concern subpoena

requests for medical records made by the Board in the absence of good cause. For

example, in Bearman v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 463, the appellate court

held that the Board “must demonstrate through competent evidence that the particular

records it seeks are relevant and material to its inquiry sufficient for a trial court to

independently make a finding of good cause to order the materials disclosed.” (Id. at

p. 469.) The appellate court concluded the Board had failed to set forth facts suggesting

that the prescribing physician had engaged in any unethical conduct with respect to his

prescribing medical marijuana to a patient. Further, the court found the request was

overbroad. (Id. at pp. 471-472.) Here, defendant does not challenge the adequacy of the

Board’s good cause showing to the trial court. Instead, he challenges the legitimacy of

the Board’s conduct in compiling the factual justification that enabled the court to make

an independent assessment of good cause.

For purposes of our decision here, we assume patients have a reasonable

expectation that their prescription records will not be disclosed to persons who are not

actively involved in their care. Balancing society’s substantial interest in reducing the

illegitimate use of dangerously addictive prescription drugs against the relatively minor

intrusion upon a patient’s reasonable expectations of privacy when he or she is given a

prescription by a treating physician, we conclude that, as applied to such patients, the

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Board’s actions here in accessing and compiling data from the CURES database did not

violate article I, section 1 of the state Constitution. This is particularly so in light of the

fact that the Board is prohibited by law from disclosing this data to third parties. Further,

even a reasonable expectation of privacy is somewhat diminished as it is widely known

that such investigative actions are possible with respect to controlled substances. In this

setting, we conclude that the limited incremental intrusion upon a patient’s privacy is

justified by the state’s countervailing interest in preventing the abuse of controlled

substances. Accordingly, we hold the trial court correctly found there was good cause to

enforce the subpoenas of the five patients’ medical records.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

_________________________

Dondero, J.

We concur:

_________________________

Margulies, Acting P.J.

_________________________

Banke, J.

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Trial Court: Contra Costa County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Steven K. Austin

Counsel for Defendant and Appellant: Pacific West Law Group LLP:

Brock Phillips

and

Gregory Abrams

Counsel for California Medical

Association

as Amicus Curiae on behalf of

Defendant and Appellant: Francisco J. Silva

Long X. Do

Lisa Matsubara

and

Melanie S. Neumeyer

of Center for Legal Affairs,

California Medical Association

Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent: Esther H. La

Deputy Attorney General

Kamala D. Harris

Attorney General of California

Gloria Castro

Senior Assistant Attorney General

Jose R. Guerrero

Supervising Deputy Attorney General