“[B]ecause the USPC already has conducted both [probable cause and revocation] hearings, petitioner is not entitled to . . . relief.”
How later courts described this case
- “[B]ecause the USPC already has conducted both [probable cause and revocation] hearings, petitioner is not entitled to . . . relief.”
- “[T]hroughout the litigation, the plaintiff ‘must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury . . . likely to be redressed by a favorable court decision.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_______________________________________
)
DUJUAN MORGAN, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 13-0816 (KBJ)
)
MR. FUTCH, WARDEN, D.C. JAIL, et al., )
)
Respondents. )
)
______________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Pending before the Court is Petitioner DuJuan Morgan’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus to compel Respondents—specifically, the United States Parole
Commission (“Commission”) and Greg Futch, Warden of the D.C. Central Detention
Facility (“CDF”)—to hold a parole revocation hearing. Petitioner initiated this action
on May 29, 2013, after Petitioner had been held at CDF for over 90 days (since
February 11, 2013) without a hearing. (Pet., ECF No. 1, at 2.) 1 By letter of July 19,
2013, nearly two months after the petition was filed, Petitioner informed the Court that
the Commission did, in fact, hold a parole revocation hearing on July 18, 2013, and that
during that hearing Petitioner’s parole was revoked. (Pet’r’s Ltr. of July 19, 2013
(“Pet’r’s Ltr.”), ECF No. 12 at 1.)
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The petition, which is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, argues that the Commission failed to
hold a timely revocation hearing in violation of its own rules such that Petitioner’s immediate release is
warranted. (Pet., ECF No. 1, at 2, 4.) Notably, the appropriate remedy for a delayed revocation
hearing is a writ of mandamus to compel such a hearing, not a writ of habeas corpus to compel the
petitioner’s release. Vactor v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 815 F. Supp. 2d 81, 84 (D.D.C. 2011).
“[A] case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties
lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486, 496 (1969); see also Spencer v. Kenma, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (“[T]hroughout the
litigation, the plaintiff ‘must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury . . .
likely to be redressed by a favorable court decision.”). In his petition, Petitioner
specifically requests that the Court order the Commission to hold a parole revocation
hearing. (Pet. ¶ 33.) Because the relief that Petitioner seeks apparently has already
been provided (see Pet’r’s Ltr. at 1), this action must be dismissed as moot. See Colts
v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 531 F. Supp. 2d 8, 11 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[B]ecause the USPC
already has conducted both [probable cause and revocation] hearings, petitioner is not
entitled to . . . relief.”); Thomas v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, Civ. A. No. 92-590(CRR),
1992 WL 193695, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 4, 1992) (case moot where petitioner, who
complained of delayed revocation hearing, had since received it).
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is dismissed.
Date: July 29, 2013 Ketanji Brown Jackson
KETANJI BROWN JACKSON
United States District Judge
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