“[B]ecause viewing the video in Eggleston’s favor could reasonably lead to a finding of excessive force, this case does not fall within the limited exception under which the plaintiffs account may be disregarded because it is ‘so utterly discredited by the record as to be rendered a visible fiction.’ ”
How later courts described this case
- “[B]ecause viewing the video in Eggleston’s favor could reasonably lead to a finding of excessive force, this case does not fall within the limited exception under which the plaintiffs account may be disregarded because it is ‘so utterly discredited by the record as to be rendered a visible fiction.’ ”
- dismissing an appeal for lack of jurisdiction
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 14a0237n.06
No. 12-6269
FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Mar 28, 2014
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
DAVID EGGLESTON, :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
: ON APPEAL FROM THE
v. : UNITED STATES DISTRICT
: COURT FOR THE MIDDLE
: DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
JAKE SHORT, :
:
Defendant-Appellant. :
BEFORE: COLE and CLAY, Circuit Judges; BERTELSMAN, District Judge.
OPINION
BERTELSMAN, District Judge:
Plaintiff-Appellee David Eggleston brought this 42 U.S.C. §
1983 action against Defendant-Appellant Officer Jake Short,
alleging that Short used excessive force against Eggleston in the
course of making an arrest. The district court denied Short’s
motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, and he
appeals.
Because there is an issue of fact as to whether the force used
was excessive, this court does not have jurisdiction to entertain
*
The Honorable William O. Bertelsman, United States District
Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.
No. 12-6269, Eggleston v. Short
the appeal. Therefore, we must DISMISS the appeal and remand the
case to the district court.
I.
No question is raised concerning the validity of the arrest.
The arrest followed a high-speed chase in which Eggleston initially
failed to stop and was endangering the public. When he finally did
stop, he left his motor running, and Officer Short forcefully
removed him from his truck and took him to the ground in order to
obtain access to the truck and turn off the ignition. Eggleston’s
blood alcohol level was later found to be well above the legal
limit.
It is the degree of force used by Short in performing this
“takedown” maneuver that gives rise to this action. During the
takedown, Eggleston landed on his face and was severely injured,
suffering a broken jaw, receding gums requiring skin grafts to
repair, two chipped teeth, three dead teeth, and a broken hand.
The takedown procedure, which took only seconds, was recorded on
the cruiser’s video camera. The video is in evidence and has been
reviewed by both the district court and this court.
In a succinct but clear order, the district court held that
“[g]iven the varying interpretations of the video . . . where
[there is] an issue of material fact as to whether the force
applied was objectively reasonable . . . [an award of] summary
2
No. 12-6269, Eggleston v. Short
judgment is inappropriate.” It seems apparent that the district
court’s holding was based on its opinion that the video is not
clear as to the amount of force used or whether Short could have
employed some measure to prevent Eggleston from landing on his
face.
Having carefully considered the matter, we hold that the video
does indeed raise issues of fact to the extent that we lack
jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
II.
In analyzing a qualified immunity case, courts must proceed as
follows.
A. The Trial Court
The evidence must be interpreted in the light most favorable
to the party asserting the injury. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 201 (2001).
The court then looks to two factors: (1) whether the action
violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether that
constitutional right was clearly established such that a reasonable
officer would understand that what he is doing would violate that
right. Eldridge v. City of Warren, 533 F. App’x 529, 532 (6th Cir.
2013) (citations omitted). The court has the discretion to conduct
this analysis in any order. Id. (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 236 (2009)).
3
No. 12-6269, Eggleston v. Short
In considering whether a constitutional violation occurred, if
the defendant challenges the plaintiff’s version of the facts, an
issue of fact is created, and qualified immunity must be denied.
See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995) (officer’s claim he did
not participate in beating of plaintiff raised a non-appealable
issue of fact). However, a court may grant qualified immunity if
one of the parties’ accounts is “blatantly contradicted by the
record, so that no reasonable jury cold believe it.” Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
The “clearly established” inquiry, it is vital to note, must
be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as
a broad general proposition . . . .” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201
(emphasis added); see also Campbell v. City of Springboro, 700 F.3d
779, 788–89 (6th Cir. 2012). That is, “[t]he relevant, dispositive
inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is
whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct
was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at
202; see also Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 473 (6th Cir.
2013). If the constitutional right was not clearly established,
the motion for qualified immunity should be granted.
If the court finds that the constitutional right was clearly
established, it may proceed to rule on the question of qualified
immunity on the basis of the record. The court may deny qualified
4
No. 12-6269, Eggleston v. Short
immunity if the facts disclose a violation of a well-established
right, or grant qualified immunity if the facts, even when
interpreted in favor of the plaintiff, do not support a finding
that it would have been obvious to a reasonable person in
defendant’s position that his actions violated a constitutional
right.
B. The Appellate Court
“The collateral order doctrine provides this court with
jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal of a denial of
qualified immunity.” Younes v. Pellerito, 739 F.3d 885, 888 (6th
Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). However, it “applies only to the
extent that the denial was based on ‘pure questions of law.’” Id.
“A defendant challenging a denial of qualified immunity must be
willing to concede the most favorable view of the facts to the
plaintiff for purposes of the appeal.” Id. “Where a defendant
relies instead on [his] own disputed view of the facts, ‘the appeal
boils down to issues of fact and credibility determinations that we
cannot make.’” Id. However, if “the issue appealed concerns not
which facts the parties might be able to prove, but whether certain
alleged facts reflect a violation of clearly established law,” this
inquiry is a legal question, and the appellate court does have
jurisdiction. Hoover v. Radabaugh, 307 F.3d 460, 465 (6th Cir.
2002).
5
No. 12-6269, Eggleston v. Short
III.
The constitutional issue in this case is whether Short used
excessive force against Eggleston in the course of arresting him.
Such claims are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s objective
“reasonableness” standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395
(1989). “Determining whether the force used to effect a particular
seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires a
careful balancing of ‘“the nature and quality of the intrusion on
the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests”’ against
countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id. at 396
(citation omitted). This analysis “requires careful attention to
the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the
severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest by flight.” Id.
This “reasonableness” inquiry “is an objective one: the
question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively
reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting
them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.”
Id. at 397 (citation omitted).
In the case now before us, the trial judge, albeit succinctly,
found that the video relied on by both parties was ambiguous.
6
No. 12-6269, Eggleston v. Short
Interpreted most favorably to Eggleston, the video could support a
reasonable conclusion that the force employed was excessive. Short
challenges that interpretation on appeal. His proffered
interpretation is that the force used was reasonable considering
all the surrounding circumstances, including the seriousness of the
offense, the necessity of getting the vehicle under control for
protection of the public, and the fact that Short had no backup.
See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); Burgess, 735 F.3d
at 472–73; Campbell, 700 F.3d at 787.
We have reviewed the video and, like the district court,
conclude that it is ambiguous and does not allow us to determine as
a matter of law whether Short’s use of force was reasonable under
the circumstances. Accordingly, this court lacks jurisdiction.
Younes, 739 F.3d at 888–89. Moreover, because viewing the video in
Eggleston’s favor could reasonably lead to a finding of excessive
force, this case does not fall within the limited exception under
which the plaintiff’s account may be disregarded because it is “so
utterly discredited by the record as to be rendered a visible
fiction.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
IV.
Therefore, it is ordered that the appeal is DISMISSED for lack
of appellate jurisdiction.
7