Iman Sharif v. Nathan Picone

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 12-4468

_____________

IMAN SHARIF,

Appellant

v.

C.O. NATHAN PICONE; C.O. BRIAN POTANCE;

C.O. THOMAS PINTO; LIEUTENANT JOSEPH

KOSPIAH;

JOHN DOE C.O. NOS 1-10

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(District Court No.: 5-09-cv-02501)

District Judge: Honorable Robert F. Kelly

Argued October 18, 2013

Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and LIPEZ*, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: January 21, 2014)

Stephen D. Brown, Esquire

Donald C. Le Gower, Esquire (Argued)

Dechert, LLP

Cira Centre

2929 Arch Street

Philadelphia, PA 19104-2808

Counsel for Appellant

David J. MacMain, Esquire (Argued)

Brian H. Leinhauser, Esquire

The MacMain Law Group

101 Lindenwood Drive

Suite 160

Malvern, PA 19355

Counsel for Appellees

*Honorable Kermit V. Lipez, Senior United States

Circuit Judge for the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,

sitting by designation.

2

OPINION

RENDELL, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff, Iman Sharif, appeals from a jury verdict in

favor of Defendants - several Northampton County Prison

officers - on Sharif’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force claim.

On appeal, Sharif argues that the District Court erred in

admitting evidence of Sharif’s prior plea of nolo contendere

and resulting conviction for assault in connection with the

incident that is at the heart of his § 1983 claim. He notes that

Federal Rule of Evidence 410 prohibits the admission of his

nolo plea. He also urges that the Court abused its discretion

under Federal Rule of Evidence 609 in admitting evidence of

the conviction as relevant to his credibility.

I.

A. Factual Background

On March 11, 2009, Iman Sharif was an inmate at the

Northampton County Prison. He was housed in the

Restrictive Housing Unit (“RHU”) where Defendant-

Appellees Corrections Officers Nathan Picone (“C.O.

Picone”), Thomas Pinto (“C.O. Pinto”), and Brian Potance

(“C.O. Potance”) were all on duty. While C.O. Picone was

collecting dinner trays, he claims that Sharif “sucker

punched” him. (J.A. 369.) In contrast, Sharif claims that

C.O. Picone initiated the altercation by punching Sharif first.

C.O. Picone testified that once he was struck, he

attempted to protect himself from additional punches and

3

kicks. He further testified that C.O. Potance, who was

assigned to help C.O. Picone retrieve dinner trays, entered

Sharif’s cell and attempted to restrain Sharif. At this point,

C.O. Picone hit Sharif in the head with an open hand in an

effort to “get him to the ground.” (J.A. 371.) Conversely,

Sharif asserted that once C.O. Picone began to hit him, C.O.

Potance and C.O. Pinto entered his cell and joined in the

attack by choking him.

Following the altercation, Sharif was handcuffed and

moved to a “suicide cell.” (J.A. 446.) According to

Appellees, this was for his own safety; however, he continued

to cause commotion so he was moved to a restraint chair.

Sharif contends that while he was in the restraint chair, he

was punched repeatedly by unnamed corrections officers, all

of which was observed and permitted by Appellee-Defendant

Lieutenant Joseph Kospiah (“Lt. Kospiah”).

Sharif was charged with aggravated assault pursuant to

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2702(a)(3) (2012) as a result of the

altercation with C.O. Picone, C.O. Potance and C.O. Pinto.

Sharif entered a plea of nolo contendere and was convicted

under the statute as charged.1 Sharif’s excessive force claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is based on this incident.

B. Procedural History

1

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2702(a)(3) reads, “(a) Offense defined.

– A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he . . . (3)

attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily

injury to any of the officers, agents, employees, or other

persons enumerated in subsection (c), in the performance of

duty.” Subsection (c) includes corrections officers.

4

Sharif brought this § 1983 action alleging that C.O.

Picone, C.O. Potance and C.O. Pinto are liable for attacking

him in his cell in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to

be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Further, he

contends that Lt. Kospiah is liable for allowing the physical

abuse to proceed while Sharif was restrained. Sharif sought

relief of “nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages” for

Appellees’ actions against him. (J.A. 20.)

Pre-trial, Sharif filed a motion in limine to exclude

evidence of his nolo contendere plea under Rule 410. The

Court noted that Sharif planned to take the stand and deny

any wrongdoing in connection with the altercation. The

Court stated that if that were to happen, then evidence of his

plea “may end up being relevant” and would thus be

admitted. (J.A. 123-24.) During a hearing on the motion, the

Court accepted Appellees’ counsel’s argument that “it would

be inconsistent to allow [Sharif] to have taken the position in

a prior court proceeding that he wasn’t going to contest the

charges.” (J.A. 123.) In other words, the plea would be

admitted as inconsistent with his assertion at trial that he had

done nothing wrong and, therefore, as relevant to the issue of

his credibility.

Pursuant to the Court’s ruling, during cross-

examination of Sharif, Appellees’ counsel twice referred to

Sharif’s plea of nolo contendere to suggest that the plea was

inconsistent with his statement at trial that he had done

nothing wrong. We quote directly from the trial transcript:

Q: You stand before this jury and you have

testified that you did absolutely nothing wrong,

correct?

A: Yes, sir.

5

Q: The officers just came in and struck you for

no reason?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Yet, in another court at another time you had

an opportunity to say the same thing, correct?

A: No, sir.

Q: You were criminally charged with assaulting

Officer Picone, correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And you didn’t contest those charges?

A: No, sir.

Q: You pled no contest?

A: Yes, sir.

(J.A. 216-17.)

Q: Sure. Now, I want to get back to the first

incident. It’s your testimony as to the first part,

the incident with Picone, that he came in, struck

you, you had absolutely done nothing wrong,

correct?

A: Wrong morally, like I did, I tried to get

under his skin, I did talk about him.

Q: Right, but you did nothing physical?

A: Exactly.

Q: You did not strike him first?

A: Exactly.

Q: Okay. But, that’s what you were charged

with, correct, striking him first, that’s what you

were criminally charged with?

A: That's what -- [Objection]

…

6

Q: Sure. You were charged with striking Officer

Picone, correct?

A: I was charged with assaulting him, yes.

Q: Assaulting him. Okay. But, your testimony

here today is you did not assault him in any

way, shape, or form?

A: And that’s [Objection regarding the

definition of assault under this statute,

i.e.,assault of an employee of the state]

…

A: You asked me if I assaulted him?

Q: Correct.

A: The same thing that I said before, I did not

hit Officer Picone.

Q: But, you did not contest in the criminal case

that you assaulted him, correct?

(J.A. 241 - 44.)

In his closing, counsel again referenced Sharif’s nolo

plea, stating:

He says he didn’t do a darn thing that day…yet

when he had an opportunity in another court

proceeding to contest that he didn’t do what he

was accused of doing, he didn't contest it…yet

he comes in here in another court proceeding

and takes a different position. That should speak

volumes about his credibility.

(J.A. at 577.)

7

During trial, the District Court allowed Appellees to

introduce evidence of Sharif’s five prior convictions,

including the conviction for assault resulting from his nolo

plea, pursuant to the Court’s denial of Sharif’s motion in

limine in which Sharif urged that the minimal probative value

of these convictions was outweighed by their prejudicial

effect. The other convictions were for simple assault and for

false reporting to a police officer. The convictions were all

admitted for the purpose of assessing Sharif’s character for

truthfulness.

The Court instructed the jury as to the purpose for

which past convictions were admitted into evidence: “You

may wish to consider those convictions as you weigh his

credibility as a witness.” (J.A. 605.) The Court explained

that one of the convictions was the result of a nolo contendere

plea which, according to the Court, could be used only to

evaluate Sharif’s credibility. (J.A. 605-06; 222-23 (“[T]hose

incidents of prior convictions are admitted for the sole

purpose for you[, the jury,] to use if you so desire to consider

the credibility of the witness.”)). The jury returned a verdict

against Sharif, and this timely appeal followed.

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction over

Sharif’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

8

A district court’s interpretation of the Federal Rules of

Evidence is reviewed de novo. United States v. Furst, 886

F.2d 558, 571 (3d Cir. 1989). The application of a particular

rule by a district court is reviewed under an abuse of

discretion standard. United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 437

(3d Cir. 1996).

III.

A. Rule 410: Admissibility of the Nolo Contendere Plea

Sharif urges that the District Court erred in allowing

evidence of his plea of nolo contendere to be admitted

because Rule 410 bars such admission. Rule 410 states, in

relevant part, “[i]n a civil or criminal case, evidence of [a

nolo contendere plea] is not admissible against the defendant

who made the plea.” Fed. R. Evid. 410(a)(2); see also Fed.

R. Crim. P. 11(f) (“The admissibility or inadmissibility of a

plea . . . is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 410.”); Fed.

R. Evid. 803(22) (plea of nolo contendere excluded from

exceptions to hearsay rule). This prohibition is based on the

fact that “a nolo plea is not a factual admission that the

pleader committed a crime. Rather, it is a statement of

unwillingness to contest the government’s charges and an

acceptance of the punishment that would be meted out to a

guilty person.” Olsen v. Correiro, 189 F.3d 52, 59 (1st Cir.

1999); see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 35 n.8

(1970) (“Throughout its history…the plea of nolo contendere

has been viewed not as an express admission of guilt but as a

consent by the defendant that he may be punished as if he

were guilty and a prayer for leniency.”). An important policy

consideration animating Rule 410 is that it encourages

9

compromise in criminal cases, which, in turn, lessens the

burden on courts, defendants and prosecutors, producing a

more efficient criminal justice system. See Olsen, at 60 (“A

second reason behind Rule 410’s exclusion of nolo pleas is a

desire to encourage compromise resolution of criminal

cases.”); see also 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 675 (2013)

(“A plea of nolo contendere is used by the accused in criminal

cases to save face and avoid exacting an admission that could

be used as an admission in other potential litigation, to avoid

trial with its attendant expense and adverse publicity in the

event of a conviction.”). Thus, the use of a nolo plea as

tantamount to an admission of guilt would defeat one of its

primary purposes.

Despite Rule 410’s apparent clear command, there is

caselaw supporting the admission of a defendant’s nolo plea

in certain circumstances. 2 In Walker v. Schaeffer, 854 F.2d

138 (6th Cir. 1988), two African-American men were

threatened and harassed by a mob of several hundred white

high school students in a McDonald’s parking lot. Id. at 139.

As they attempted to flee the parking lot, they were arrested

for disorderly conduct and reckless driving. Id. at 140. After

pleading no contest to these charges, the defendants sued the

arresting police officers for false arrest and wrongful

imprisonment. Id. The police officers asserted a qualified

immunity defense. To determine whether they were entitled

to this defense, the court examined whether the officers had

violated the plaintiffs’ clearly established rights. Id. at 141.

2

We note that, at oral argument, Appellees urged the

applicability of caselaw allowing the admission of such a

plea, but they failed to even mention Rule 410, or the relevant

caselaw, in their brief.

10

The court found that the plaintiffs were “estopped” from

arguing that their rights had been violated because, by

pleading nolo contendere, they had “in effect, admitted facts

in open court evidencing [their] guilt.” Id. at 141-42.

The Walker court went beyond the issue of collateral

estoppel when it stated that its decision was not barred by

Rule 410:

Rule 410 was intended to protect a criminal

defendant’s use of the nolo contendere plea to

defend himself from future civil liability. We

decline to interpret the rule so as to allow the

former defendants to use the plea offensively, in

order to obtain damages, after having admitted

facts which would indicate no civil liability on

the part of the arresting police.

Id. at 143.

This language has been cited by district courts within our

Circuit, as well as by the Tenth Circuit, for the proposition

that nolo contendere pleas are not always precluded by Rule

410, particularly when a pleader attempts to bring a § 1983

claim against officials for false arrest, false imprisonment or

malicious prosecution.3 See Rose v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire

3

The underlying principle is that courts will not allow

someone who has consented to be convicted, and therefore

punished, pursuant to a nolo plea to claim that he was

wrongfully arrested, wrongfully imprisoned or prosecuted

maliciously, because the conviction that results from a nolo

plea validates the government action.

11

Co., 219 F.3d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (reasoning that the

nolo contendere plea was “not being admitted ‘against the

defendant’” in the civil action); 4 Douglas v. Public Safety

Comm’n, 1:01cv00419, 2002 WL 31050863, at *8 (D. Del.

Sept. 13, 2002) (finding Walker to be “instructive and

persuasive”); Domitrovich v. Monaca, 2:08cv1094, 2010 WL

3489137, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2010) (relying on Walker to

hold that prior nolo plea barred claims for malicious

prosecution and false arrest).

We view Walker as imprecise, and in any event,

distinguishable. First, Walker’s reference to a defendant

“having admitted facts” through a nolo plea, 854 F.2d at 143,

misconstrues the nature of the plea. Indeed, we held in

United States v. Adedoyin, 369 F.3d 337, 344 (3d Cir. 2004),

that a nolo plea is not an admission. See also United States v.

Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562, 566 (3d Cir. 2004) (“While a nolo

plea is indisputably tantamount to a conviction, it is not

4

In Rose the court allowed a plea of nolo contendere to be

admitted in the narrow circumstance where a plaintiff was

fired under the company’s no tolerance drug policy based on

the plaintiff’s plea of nolo contendere to a drug possession

charge. Rose, 219 F.3d at 1219. The plaintiff asserted

wrongful discharge and argued that his plea of nolo

contendere was inadmissible under Rule 410. Id. The court

ultimately held that Rule 410 could not be construed “to

affirmatively prevent an employer from presenting the very

evidence used as a basis for its termination decision.” Id. at

1220. Even though the court in Rose allowed the nolo plea to

be admitted, it nonetheless noted that, “although a plea of

nolo contendere has the same legal effect as a guilty plea, it is

not a factual admission to the underlying crime.” Id.

(emphasis in original).

12

necessarily tantamount to an admission of factual guilt.”).

Second, the logic of Walker seems to flow from the Supreme

Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487

(1994), where the Court held that when a § 1983 claim

amounts to a collateral attack on a criminal conviction, the

conviction or sentence must be reversed, or invalidated by

other means, before a court can entertain the claim.5

Similarly, the collateral attack in Walker would not be

permitted, presumably, as a matter of fairness, outweighing

the dictates of the Federal Rules of Evidence. But we need

not decide whether Rule 410 stands as a bar to the admission

of a nolo plea when a defendant levels a collateral attack on

his prior conviction.

We need not decide that question because even

Appellees concede that Sharif’s claim of excessive force does

not amount to a collateral attack on his aggravated assault

conviction. They further concede that he did not admit any

“facts which would indicate no civil liability on the part of”

the corrections officers. Walker, 854 F.2d at 143. Indeed, we

held in Nelson v. Jashurek, that Heck does not bar an

excessive force claim because the claim can stand without

5

District courts in our Circuit have relied upon Heck and

Walker in tandem for the proposition that nolo contendere

pleas, and the resulting convictions, bar pleaders from

bringing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims in certain instances. See

Domitrovich, 2010 WL 3489137, at *7-8 (Heck bars § 1983

false arrest and malicious prosecution claims because they

would necessarily implicate the convictions, but an excessive

force claim is not barred) (internal quotation marks omitted);

Douglas, 2002 WL 31050863, at *8 (§ 1983 excessive force

claim barred because Walker found to be “instructive and

persuasive” and Heck controlling).

13

challenging any element of the conviction. 109 F.3d 142,

145-46 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[T]here undoubtedly could be

substantial force which is objectively reasonable and

substantial force which is excessive and unreasonable.”)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Thomas v. Roach,

165 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 1999) (plaintiff’s § 1983 claim

predicated on excessive force during his arrest is not barred

by his nolo contendere plea to the offense for which he was

arrested). Regardless of whether he engaged in assaultive

conduct, Sharif remains free to contend that the reaction of

the corrections officers was such that it constituted excessive

force in comparison to the threat he posed. Thus, Walker is

distinguishable from this case.

District courts within the Third Circuit that have

chosen to consider or admit past nolo pleas, have done so

largely on the basis of collateral estoppel principles discussed

in Heck. As explained above, those principles are not

applicable in this case, particularly given our holding in

Nelson that Heck does not bar an excessive force claim

because such a claim would not negate any element of the

conviction. Nelson, 109 F.3d at 145-46. Given these

considerations, we hold that Rule 410 barred the admission of

Sharif’s plea of nolo contendere.

The admission of Sharif’s plea of nolo contendere was

not harmless error. See Glass v. Phila. Elec. Co., 34 F.3d

188, 191 (3d Cir. 1994) (“In reviewing evidentiary rulings, if

we find nonconstitutional error in a civil suit, such error is

harmless only ‘if it is highly probable that the error did not

affect the outcome of the case.’”) (quoting Lockhart v.

Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 53 (3d Cir. 1989)).

First and foremost, the District Court clearly ruled that the

nolo plea should be admitted, and used by the jury, to assess

14

Sharif’s credibility because his trial statement was

inconsistent with his previous nolo plea. (J.A. 223, 606.) But

this is incorrect. Indeed, a significant basis for prohibiting the

evidence of the plea is the fear that it could be improperly

viewed as an admission, and, unfortunately, that is how the

District Court viewed it. This was reversible error.

In Adedoyin, which was controlling authority at the

time of the District Court decision, we unmistakably held

that, with respect to a criminal charge, a nolo plea does not

admit underlying facts or guilt. 369 F.3d at 344 (“[A] plea of

nolo contendere is not an admission of guilt and thus the fact

that a defendant made such a plea cannot be used to

demonstrate that he was guilty of the crime in question.”); see

also Poellnitz, 372 F.3d at 566 (“While a nolo plea is

indisputably tantamount to a conviction, it is not necessarily

tantamount to an admission of factual guilt.”). Consequently,

Sharif’s claim that he did nothing wrong was not inconsistent

with his previous plea of nolo contendere, and, thus, would

not be relevant in assessing his character for truthfulness.

Moreover, insofar as it went to credibility, the

Appellees’ line of questioning was very damaging. Sharif

was the only witness who testified on his behalf. His

credibility was of the utmost importance to his case. By

admitting his prior nolo plea, in violation of Rule 410, the

District Court allowed Appellees to severely undermine

Sharif’s credibility. This damage was particularly acute given

the method by which counsel strategically used the nolo plea

to make Sharif appear untruthful as to the incident at issue.6

6

As quoted supra, Appellees’ counsel closed with the

following statement: “[Y]et when he had an opportunity in

15

As Sharif points out, “[Appellees] argued that Mr. Sharif’s

statements in this case should not be believed because they

were contrary to his decision to plead nolo in his criminal

case.” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 3. For these reasons, we

cannot say that the error did not affect the outcome of the

case.

Finally, Appellees urge that it would be unfair to

exclude Sharif’s nolo plea. Appellees’ Br. at 20 (“To ignore

his nolo contendere plea and attempt to keep from the jury

that he, in a previous legal proceeding, and under oath, took a

contrary position, would be inconsistent and dishonest on the

part of the Plaintiff.”). But this argument regarding

inconsistency demonstrates how Appellees misconstrue the

very meaning of a nolo plea and one of the purposes of

excluding such pleas from evidence. A nolo plea reflects a

prosecutorial choice to permit a defendant to persist in not

admitting the crime for the sake of obtaining the conviction.

Thus, there is no inconsistency or “contrary position” at all.

B. Rule 609: Admissibility of the Conviction

Sharif’s second argument on appeal is that the District

Court erred in admitting his conviction for aggravated assault

in connection with the altercation in prison, which he

contends should have been excluded pursuant to Rule 609.

As noted supra, we, along with other courts of appeals, have

held that Rule 410 does not bar the admission of a conviction

another court proceeding to contest that he didn't do what he

was accused of doing, he didn't contest it . . . yet he comes in

here in another court proceeding and takes a different

position. That should speak volumes about his credibility.”

(J.A. at 577.)

16

resulting from a nolo plea, but rather prohibits only the

admission of the plea itself. See Adedoyin, 369 F.3d at 344-

45; Olsen, 189 F.3d at 58-62.

In Olsen, for example, the defendant was tried and

convicted of first-degree murder. After five years in prison

his conviction was overturned and he was released pending a

new trial. Olsen, 189 F.3d at 55. Rather than go through a

new trial, Olsen pled nolo contendere to the charge of

manslaughter. Id. He was sentenced to time already served

and released. Following his release, he brought a § 1983

claim against the city and two police officers, seeking

damages for his imprisonment. Id. On appeal, Olsen argued

that Rule 410 barred admission of not only his nolo plea, but

also of the resulting conviction and sentence. The Olsen

court held that Rule 410 clearly barred the admission of the

plea itself, but declined to hold that the resulting conviction

and sentence were barred under Rule 410.7 Id. at 62.

While the nolo plea is not a factual admission of guilt,

and is to be excluded in light of the policy reasons we have

discussed, the conviction resulting from the nolo plea is a

legal finding of guilt, and there are no similar policy reasons

that would support its exclusion. See Poellnitz, 372 F.3d at

566 (“While a nolo plea is indisputably tantamount to a

7

To illustrate the policy behind Rule 410’s prohibition on

admitting pleas of nolo contendere, the court in Olsen noted

the distinction between nolo pleas and guilty pleas: “[A] nolo

plea is not a factual admission that the pleader committed a

crime.” 189 F.3d at 59. Conversely, a “guilty plea is an

admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge.”

Id. at 60 (internal quotation marks omitted).

17

conviction, it is not necessarily tantamount to an admission of

factual guilt.” (citing Adedoyin, 369 F.3d. at 344)). Indeed, it

is well-established that Rule 410 does not apply to the

conviction itself, which is admissible subject to the

limitations of the other Rules of Evidence. See Brewer v. City

of Napa, 210 F.3d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Rule 410 by

its terms prohibits only evidence of pleas (including no

contest pleas), insofar as pleas constitute statements or

admissions. Rule 609, by contrast, permits admission for

impeachment purposes of evidence of convictions.”)

(emphasis in original); United States v. Williams, 642 F.2d

136, 139 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[T]here is a distinct and

meaningful difference between the evidentiary use of a plea

to a criminal charge and a conviction of a criminal charge.”).

Rule 609 governs when prior convictions can be

admitted to attack a witness’s character for truthfulness. Rule

609 reads in pertinent part:

(a) In General. The following rules apply to

attacking a witness’s character for truthfulness

by evidence of a criminal conviction: (1) for a

crime that . . . was punishable by death or by

imprisonment for more than one year, the

evidence: (A) must be admitted, subject to Rule

403, in a civil case or in a criminal case in

which the witness is not a defendant.

Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).

Since Rule 609 is subject to Rule 403, courts must consider

whether the probative value of a prior conviction is

substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect of admitting

18

the conviction. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.8 In doing so, we have

directed that four factors should be weighed against the

potential for prejudice in admitting a conviction: (1) the

nature of the conviction; (2) the time elapsed since the

conviction; (3) the importance of the witness’s testimony to

the case; and (4) the importance of credibility to the claim at

hand. United States v. Greenidge, 495 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir.

2007) (citing Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Bedford, 671 F.2d

758, 761 n.4 (3d Cir. 1982)).

We review a district court’s application of a particular

rule of evidence for abuse of discretion. Balter, 91 F.3d at

437. In denying Sharif’s motion in limine and admitting his

four assault convictions, including the 2009 conviction

underlying his § 1983 claim that is the focus of his appeal, the

District Court failed to conduct the required Rule 403

analysis. While that might normally prevent us from being

able to review the Court’s exercise of discretion, here, we can

easily conclude from our evaluation of the four Greenidge

factors that the admission of the 2009 conviction was not a

proper exercise of discretion.

Regarding the nature of the conviction, in pre-trial

proceedings Sharif contended that, while his false reporting

8

Rule 403 states: “The court may exclude relevant evidence

if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger

of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing

the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or

needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid.

403.

19

conviction9 was probative, the probative value of his other

convictions – all for assault – was minimal. See Mot. In

Limine To Exclude Certain Irrelevant And/Or Prejudicial

Evidence at 5. At trial, without explanation or mention of

Rules 609 or 403, the District Court permitted all four of his

assault convictions to be introduced for impeachment

purposes and gave a limiting instruction as to the jury’s

consideration of them:

You[, the jury,] have also heard that [Sharif]

had been convicted of various crimes, and the

only purpose for the admission of those crimes

was as they affect his credibility. You may

wish to consider those convictions as you weigh

his credibility as a witness.

One of those convictions involved the assault

and battery that was testified to at the beginning

of this case. That evidence may be considered

by you in determining credibility. If you think

that it does that is your decision.

(J.A. 605-06.)

On appeal, Sharif focuses specifically on the

admission of his March 2009 assault conviction as error.

Because the District Court allowed all three of his prior

assault convictions to be admitted, we agree that the

additional probative value of the March 2009 conviction

regarding Sharif’s truthfulness was minimal, if not nil.

9

This specific conviction was under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §

4914.

20

Moreover, often, crimes of violence are less probative of

honesty than are crimes involving deceit or fraud.10

This does not mean that convictions for acts of

violence should be excluded, but it does require a district

court to be diligent in considering the nature of the conviction

and its relationship to the issues at trial, and in explaining its

reasons for admission under Rule 403. This is particularly

true in a case where the nature of the conviction is so closely

related to the issue at trial. Not only was the trial about

violent conduct, Sharif’s 2009 aggravated assault conviction

was for the very incident at the center of his civil claim. It

was not simply similar to the issue at hand, it was the issue at

hand. Thus, the first factor, “nature of the conviction,”

weighs heavily in Sharif’s favor.

Examining the probative value under the remaining

three prongs of the Greenidge test yields a balance in Sharif’s

favor, and against the probative value of the 2009 assault

conviction. This conclusion is bolstered by the District

Court’s decision to admit all three of Sharif’s other prior

assault convictions, thereby further lowering the probative

value of the conviction for aggravated assault at the center of

this dispute.

10

As noted by the Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia in Gordon v. United States, “[i]n common human

experience acts of deceit, fraud, cheating, or stealing, for

example, are universally regarded as conduct which reflects

adversely on a man’s honesty and integrity. Acts of violence .

. . generally have little or no direct bearing on honesty and

veracity.” 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967).

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The second Greenidge factor, time elapsed between

the conviction and the defendant’s testimony at trial, does not

weigh in favor of either side. When a prior conviction is not

“remote in time” from the time of trial, it is more relevant to

the case at hand than when it is an older conviction.

Greenidge, 495 F.3d at 96; see also Fed. R. Evid. 609(b)

(limit on using prior convictions that are more than 10 years

old). For example, compare United States v. Causey, 9 F.3d

1341, 1344 (7th Cir. 1993) (conviction within the last six

months was highly probative) with United States v. Paige,

464 F. Supp. 99, 100 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (eight year old

conviction was deemed to have diminished probative value).

Mr. Sharif’s three year old 2009 conviction was not so far

remote in time as to be irrelevant.

The final two Greenidge factors, the importance of the

witness’s testimony and the importance of credibility to the

claim at hand, overlap. Sharif’s testimony was very

important as he was his only witness, and for that very reason,

his credibility was also crucial to his claim. Sharif concedes

that his credibility was “paramount to his case” as he was the

only person to testify on his behalf about the events that led to

this suit. Appellant’s Br. at 24. In assessing all of these

factors we cannot help but conclude that the probative value

of Sharif’s 2009 assault conviction was minimal. Even

though his credibility was the key factor in the case, this

fourth assault conviction added little on top of the three the

jury were already made aware of.

Balancing the limited probative value against the

potential for prejudice, we conclude that the 2009 assault

conviction should not have been admitted. The primary

concern regarding prejudice is that the jury may believe that

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the defendant has a propensity towards acting in conformity

with a prior bad act. See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d

936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“[T]here is inevitable pressure on

lay jurors to believe that if he did it before he probably did it

this time.”). Accordingly, we ask whether the admission of

this conviction “ha[d] the potential to so prejudice the jury

that its weighing of all the factual issues in the entire case

may be impaired.” Tabron v. Grace, 898 F. Supp. 293, 296

(M.D. Pa. 1995). The fact that the 2009 conviction stems

from the same incident at issue here makes this type of

prejudice a particular danger, and given its limited probative

value, the balance clearly favors not admitting the conviction

pursuant to Rule 403.

In some situations, a limiting instruction, such as that

given by the District Court, can minimize the prejudice.

Here, however, we cannot imagine the jury being able to

compartmentalize the most recent assault conviction – already

having evidence of the other three – as relevant only to

Sharif’s character for truthfulness. Such mental gymnastics

may well be beyond the ability of the common man, and may

be more confusing than helpful to the jury in light of the

circumstances, as Sharif urges. Appellant’s Br. at 25. Jurors

would be left wondering what the assault that relates to this §

1983 action has to do with honesty.

Sharif’s credibility was sufficiently suspect given the

falsification conviction, the three other assault convictions,

and his status as a prisoner. See Tabron, 898 F. Supp. at 296

(“[T]he mere fact of incarceration in a state institution . . . is a

significant tool for undermining the credibility of the

witness.”). Thus, the probative value of any conviction is

diminished by virtue of the fact that the witness’s credibility

is already tarnished. The admission of the 2009 assault

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conviction added nothing to the notion that Sharif’s

credibility was suspect. But it put the proverbial nail in the

coffin as to the merits of his substantive claims in a way that

we will not sanction. Accordingly, we hold that in the new

trial of Sharif’s case, the evidence of his 2009 assault

conviction should not be permitted.

As with the admission of the nolo plea itself, the

admission of the conviction was not harmless error. As we

said previously, Sharif’s testimony was critical to his claim.

It was his account against the accounts of those accused of the

wrongdoing. The other convictions that were admitted, along

with the fact that Sharif was incarcerated, already diminished

his credibility. Adding this additional conviction did not

serve any purpose beyond making it nearly impossible for any

juror to believe Sharif’s version of events. Thus, we cannot

say that the admission of this conviction did not affect the

outcome of the trial.

C. Punitive Damages Claim

Insofar as we will vacate the judgment of the District

Court and remand this case for a new trial, we find it

unnecessary to reach Sharif’s argument that the District Court

improperly granted judgment against Sharif on his punitive

damages claim, based upon the insufficiency of the evidence

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50. We expect that

Sharif will again pursue punitive damages in his new trial and

put forth evidence to support it. The District Court will have

the opportunity to assess the evidence presented at that trial;

consequently, our ruling regarding what was presented at this

trial, would be little more than an advisory opinion.

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IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s

judgment in favor of Appellees is vacated and the case is

remanded for a new trial.

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