Mississippi Ex Rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2013 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MISSISSIPPI EX REL. HOOD, ATTORNEY GENERAL v.

AU OPTRONICS CORP. ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 12–1036. Argued November 6, 2013—Decided January 14, 2014

Congress enacted the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) to low-

er diversity jurisdiction requirements in class actions and, as rele-

vant here, in mass actions, i.e., civil actions “in which monetary relief

claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the

ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or

fact,” 28 U. S. C. §1332(d)(11)(B)(i). Petitioner Mississippi sued re-

spondent liquid crystal display (LCD) manufacturers in state court,

alleging violations of state law and seeking, inter alia, restitution for

LCD purchases made by itself and its citizens. Respondents sought

to remove the case to federal court. The District Court held that the

suit qualified as a mass action under §1332(d)(11)(B)(i), but remand-

ed the suit to state court on the ground that it fell within CAFA’s

“general public” exception, §1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(III). The Fifth Circuit

reversed, agreeing with the District Court that the suit was a mass

action but finding the general public exception inapplicable.

Held: Because Mississippi is the only named plaintiff, this suit does not

constitute a mass action under CAFA. Pp. 5–14.

(a) Contrary to respondents’ argument, CAFA’s “100 or more per-

sons” phrase does not encompass unnamed persons who are real par-

ties in interest to claims brought by named plaintiffs. Congress knew

how to draft language to that effect when it intended such a meaning,

see, e.g., §§1332(d)(5)(B), 1332(d)(1)(D). That it did not do so in the

mass action provision indicates that Congress did not want the provi-

sion’s numerosity requirement to be satisfied by counting unnamed

individuals who possess an interest in the suit.

Respondents’ understanding also cannot be reconciled with the fact

that the “100 or more persons” are not unspecified individuals with

2 MISSISSIPPI EX REL. HOOD v. AU OPTRONICS CORP.

Syllabus

no participation in the suit but are the “plaintiffs” subsequently re-

ferred to in the provision, i.e., the very parties proposing to join their

claims in a single trial. This is evident in two key ways. First, CAFA

uses “persons” and “plaintiffs” the same way they are used in Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 20, which refers to “persons” as individuals

who are proposing to join as “plaintiffs” in a single action. Second, it

is difficult to imagine how the “claims of 100 or more” unnamed indi-

viduals could be “proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the

. . . claims” of some completely different group of named plaintiffs

“involve common questions of law or fact.”

Construing “plaintiffs” to include both named and unnamed real

parties in interest would stretch the meaning of “plaintiff” beyond

recognition. A “plaintiff” is commonly understood to be a party who

brings a civil suit in a court of law, not anyone, named or unnamed,

whom a suit may benefit. Moreover, respondents’ definition would

also have to apply to the mass action provision’s subsequent refer-

ence to “plaintiffs” in the phrase “jurisdiction shall exist only over

those plaintiffs whose claims [exceed $75,000],” §1332(d)(11)(B)(i).

See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U. S. 115, 118. This would result in an

administrative nightmare that Congress could not possibly have in-

tended, see Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U. S. 564, 575,

where district courts would have to identify hundreds (or in this case,

hundreds of thousands) of unnamed parties whose claims are for less

than $75,000 and then decide how to dispose of their claims. Pp. 5–

10.

(b) Statutory context reinforces this Court’s reading of the mass ac-

tion provision. CAFA provides that once removal occurs, a case shall

not be transferred to another court “unless a majority of the plaintiffs

in the action request transfer.” §1332(d)(11)(C)(i). If “plaintiffs” in-

cluded unnamed parties, it would be surpassingly difficult for a court

to poll the enormous number of real parties in interest to decide

whether an action may be transferred. Moreover, respondents’ posi-

tion that the action here should be removed because it is similar to a

class action fails to recognize that the mass action provision functions

largely as a backstop to ensure that CAFA’s relaxed class action ju-

risdictional rules cannot be evaded by a suit that names a host of

plaintiffs rather than using the class device. Had Congress wanted

CAFA to authorize removal of representative actions brought by

States as sole plaintiffs on respondents’ theory, it would have done so

through the class action provision, not the mass action provision.

Pp. 10–11.

(c) This Court has interpreted the diversity jurisdiction statute to

require courts in certain contexts to look behind the pleadings to en-

sure that parties are not improperly creating or destroying diversity

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 3

Syllabus

jurisdiction, see, e.g., Wecker v. National Enameling & Stamping Co.,

204 U. S. 176, 185–186, but Congress did not intend this background

inquiry to apply to the mass action provision. First, it could make

sense to incorporate the background inquiry into the mass action

provision if the inquiry had previously been applied in a similar

manner. That is not the case here, however, and so any presumption

that Congress wanted to incorporate the inquiry, if it exists at all,

would be comparatively weak. Second, even if the background prin-

ciple had previously been applied in this manner, Congress expressly

indicated that it did not want the principle to apply to the mass ac-

tion provision both through the textual indicators described above

and by prohibiting defendants from joining unnamed individuals to a

lawsuit in order to turn it into a mass action, §1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(II).

Requiring district courts to identify unnamed persons interested in

the suit would run afoul of that intent. Pp. 11–13.

701 F. 3d 796, reversed and remanded.

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 12–1036

_________________

MISSISSIPPI EX REL. JIM HOOD, ATTORNEY

GENERAL, PETITIONER v. AU OPTRONICS

CORPORATION ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[January 14, 2014]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA or

Act), defendants in civil suits may remove “mass actions”

from state to federal court. CAFA defines a “mass action”

as “any civil action . . . in which monetary relief claims of

100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the

ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common ques-

tions of law or fact.” 28 U. S. C. §1332(d)(11)(B)(i). The

question presented is whether a suit filed by a State as the

sole plaintiff constitutes a “mass action” under CAFA

where it includes a claim for restitution based on injuries

suffered by the State’s citizens. We hold that it does not.

According to CAFA’s plain text, a “mass action” must

involve monetary claims brought by 100 or more persons

who propose to try those claims jointly as named plain-

tiffs. Because the State of Mississippi is the only named

plaintiff in the instant action, the case must be remanded

to state court.

2 MISSISSIPPI EX REL. HOOD v. AU OPTRONICS CORP.

Opinion of the Court

I

A

Congress enacted CAFA in order to “amend the proce-

dures that apply to consideration of interstate class ac-

tions.” 119 Stat. 4. In doing so, Congress recognized that

“[c]lass action lawsuits are an important and valuable part

of the legal system.” CAFA §2. It was concerned, however,

that certain requirements of federal diversity jurisdic-

tion, 28 U. S. C. §1332, had functioned to “kee[p] cases of

national importance” in state courts rather than federal

courts. CAFA §2.

CAFA accordingly loosened the requirements for diver-

sity jurisdiction for two types of cases—“class actions” and

“mass actions.” The Act defines “class action” to mean

“any civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial

procedure.” 28 U. S. C. §1332(d)(1)(B). And it defines

“mass action” to mean “any civil action . . . in which mone-

tary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed

to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’

claims involve common questions of law or fact.”

§1332(d)(11)(B)(i).

For class and mass actions, CAFA expanded diversity

jurisdiction in two key ways. First, it replaced the ordi-

nary requirement of complete diversity of citizenship

among all plaintiffs and defendants, see State Farm Fire

& Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U. S. 523, 530–531 (1967),

with a requirement of minimal diversity. Under that re-

quirement, a federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a

class action if “any member of a class of plaintiffs is

a citizen of a State different from any defendant.”

§1332(d)(2)(A). The same rule applies to mass actions.

See §1332(d)(11)(A) (“[A] mass action shall be deemed . . .

removable under [§§1332(d)(2) through (d)(10)]”). Second,

whereas §1332(a) ordinarily requires each plaintiff’s claim

to exceed the sum or value of $75,000, see Exxon Mobil

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 3

Opinion of the Court

Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U. S. 546, 554–555

(2005), CAFA grants federal jurisdiction over class and

mass actions in which the aggregate amount in contro-

versy exceeds $5 million. §§1332(d)(2), (d)(6), (d)(11)(A).

Class and mass actions filed in state court that satisfy

CAFA’s requirements may be removed to federal court, 28

U. S. C. §1453, but federal jurisdiction in a mass action,

unlike a class action, “shall exist only over those plaintiffs”

whose claims individually satisfy the $75,000 amount in

controversy requirement, §1332(d)(11)(B)(i).1

B

Respondents manufacture liquid crystal displays, or

LCDs. In March 2011, the State of Mississippi sued them

in state court, alleging that they had formed an interna-

tional cartel to restrict competition and raise prices in

the LCD market. The State claimed that these actions vio-

lated two Mississippi statutes: the Mississippi Antitrust Act,

Miss. Code Ann. §75–21–1 et seq. (2009), and the Missis-

sippi Consumer Protection Act, §75–24–1 et seq. (2009 and

Cum. Supp. 2013). The State sought injunctive relief and

civil penalties under both statutes, along with punitive

damages, costs, and attorney’s fees. It also sought restitu-

tion for its own purchases “of LCD products and the pur-

chases of its citizens.” App. to Brief in Opposition 65a;

§75–24–11.

Respondents filed a notice to remove the case from state

to federal court, arguing that the case was removable

under CAFA as either a “class action” or a “mass action.”

The District Court ruled that the suit did not qualify as

a “class action” because it was “not brought pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 or a ‘similar State

statute or rule of judicial procedure.’ ” 876 F. Supp. 2d

——————

1 CAFA provides certain exceptions for class actions that involve mat-

ters of principally local or state concern. See 28 U. S. C. §§1332(d)(3)–

(5). None of them are at issue in this case.

4 MISSISSIPPI EX REL. HOOD v. AU OPTRONICS CORP.

Opinion of the Court

758, 769 (SD Miss. 2012). But it held that the suit did

qualify as a “mass action,” because “[i]t is a civil action ‘in

which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are

proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plain-

tiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or fact.’ ” Id.,

at 771. The District Court reached that conclusion on the

basis of Fifth Circuit precedent in Louisiana ex rel. Cald-

well v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F. 3d 418 (CA5 2008), which it

understood to “stan[d] for the proposition that the words

‘persons’ and ‘plaintiffs’ in [the mass action definition] are

to be defined as ‘real parties in interest.’ ” 876 F. Supp. 2d,

at 771. Applying that rule, the court found that 100 or

more unidentified Mississippi consumers had purchased

LCD screens and were therefore real parties in interest to

the State’s restitution claim. Ibid. The court noted the

“possibility that a ‘mass action’ should be thought of as a

‘mass joinder,’ ”—that is, as a suit involving 100 or more

“named plaintiffs.” Ibid., n. 9. But it deemed that inter-

pretation to be foreclosed by Caldwell.

The District Court nonetheless remanded the case to

state court on the basis of CAFA’s “general public excep-

tion,” which excludes from the “mass action” definition

“any civil action in which . . . all of the claims in the action

are asserted on behalf of the general public (and not on

behalf of individual claimants or members of a purported

class) pursuant to a State statute specifically authorizing

such action.” 28 U. S. C. §1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(III).

The Court of Appeals reversed. 701 F. 3d 796 (CA5

2012). It agreed with the District Court’s determination

that Mississippi’s suit is not a “class action” under CAFA.2

Id., at 799. It also agreed that, under Caldwell, the suit

qualifies as a “mass action” because “[t]he real parties in

interest in Mississippi’s suit are those more than 100 . . .

individual citizens who purchased the [LCD] products

——————

2 Respondents do not challenge this ruling before this Court.

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 5

Opinion of the Court

within Mississippi.” 701 F. 3d, at 800. It disagreed, how-

ever, with the District Court’s ruling that the suit falls

within the general public exception. Id., at 802–803.3

Judge Elrod concurred in the judgment, noting that after

the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Caldwell, three Courts of

Appeals had deemed similar lawsuits not to be mass ac-

tions removable under CAFA.4 We granted certiorari to

resolve this split of authority, 569 U. S. ___ (2013), and

now reverse.

II

A

Our analysis begins with the statutory text. Sebelius v.

Cloer, 569 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 6). The statute

provides:

“[T]he term mass action means any civil action (except

a [class action]) in which monetary relief claims of 100

or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on

the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common

questions of law or fact, except that jurisdiction shall

exist only over those plaintiffs whose claims in a mass

action satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirements

under subsection (a).” §1332(d)(11)(B)(i).

The parties do not dispute that this provision encom-

passes suits that are brought jointly by 100 or more

named plaintiffs who propose to try their claims together.

The question is whether the provision also includes suits

——————

3 The Court of Appeals did so on the rationale that because individual

Mississippi consumers are real parties in interest to the State’s restitu-

tion claim, the general public exception’s requirement that “all of

the claims” must be “asserted on behalf of the general public (and not

on behalf of individual claimants)” was not satisfied. 28 U. S. C.

§1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(III).

4 See AU Optronics Corp. v. South Carolina, 699 F. 3d 385 (CA4

2012); Nevada v. Bank of Am. Corp., 672 F. 3d 661 (CA9 2012); LG

Display Co. v. Madigan, 665 F. 3d 768 (CA7 2011).

6 MISSISSIPPI EX REL. HOOD v. AU OPTRONICS CORP.

Opinion of the Court

brought by fewer than 100 named plaintiffs on the theory

that there may be 100 or more unnamed persons who are

real parties in interest as beneficiaries to any of the plain-

tiffs’ claims. Respondents argue that the provision covers

such suits because “claims of 100 or more persons” refers

to “the persons to whom the claim belongs, i.e., the real

parties in interest to the claims,” regardless of whether

those persons are named or unnamed. Brief for Respond-

ents 19 (emphasis in original). We disagree.

To start, the statute says “100 or more persons,” not

“100 or more named or unnamed real parties in interest.”

Had Congress intended the latter, it easily could have

drafted language to that effect. Indeed, when Congress

wanted a numerosity requirement in CAFA to be satisfied

by counting unnamed parties in interest in addition to

named plaintiffs, it explicitly said so: CAFA provides that

in order for a class action to be removable, “the number

of members of all proposed plaintiff classes” must be 100

or greater, §1332(d)(5)(B), and it defines “class members”

to mean “the persons (named or unnamed) who fall within

the definition of the proposed or certified class,”

§1332(d)(1)(D). Congress chose not to use the phrase

“named or unnamed” in CAFA’s mass action provision, a

decision we understand to be intentional. See Dean v.

United States, 556 U. S. 568, 573 (2009) (“ ‘[W]here Con-

gress includes particular language in one section of a

statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it

is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally

and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion’ ”).

More fundamentally, respondents’ interpretation cannot

be reconciled with the fact that the “100 or more persons”

referred to in the statute are not unspecified individuals

who have no actual participation in the suit, but instead

the very “plaintiffs” referred to later in the sentence—the

parties who are proposing to join their claims in a single

trial. Congress made this understanding evident in two

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 7

Opinion of the Court

key ways.

First, we presume that “ ‘Congress is aware of existing

law when it passes legislation.’ ” Hall v. United States,

566 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 9). Here, Congress

used the terms “persons” and “plaintiffs” just as they are

used in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20, governing

party joinder. Where §1332(d)(11)(B)(i) requires that the

“claims of 100 or more persons [must be] proposed to be

tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims in-

volve common questions of law or fact,” Rule 20 provides

that “[p]ersons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they

assert any right to relief jointly . . . and any question of

law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the ac-

tion.” Thus, just as it is used in Rule 20, the term “per-

sons” in §1332(d)(11)(B)(i) refers to the individuals who

are proposing to join as plaintiffs in a single action.

Second, respondents’ interpretation of “persons” cannot

square with the statute’s requirement that the claims of

the “100 or more persons” must be proposed for joint trial

“on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common

questions of law or fact.” §1332(d)(11)(B)(i). It is difficult

to imagine how the claims of one set of unnamed individ-

uals could be proposed for joint trial on the ground that the

claims of some completely different group of named plain-

tiffs share common questions. The better understanding

is that Congress meant for the “100 or more persons” and

the proposed “plaintiffs” to be one and the same.

Recognizing that the statute’s use of the term “persons”

could be a reference to proposed plaintiffs, respondents

assert that “plaintiffs,” like “persons,” should be construed

to “includ[e] both named and unnamed real parties in in-

terest.” Brief for Respondents 24. But that stretches

the meaning of “plaintiff” beyond recognition. The term

“plaintiff” is among the most commonly understood of

legal terms of art: It means a “party who brings a civil suit

in a court of law.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1267 (9th ed.

8 MISSISSIPPI EX REL. HOOD v. AU OPTRONICS CORP.

Opinion of the Court

2009); see also Webster’s Third New International Dic-

tionary 1729 (1961) (defining “plaintiff” to mean “one who

commences a personal action or lawsuit,” or “the complain-

ing party in any litigation”). It certainly does not mean

“anyone, named or unnamed, whom a suit may benefit,” as

respondents suggest.5

Moreover, Congress used the term “plaintiffs” twice in

the mass action provision. The provision encompasses

actions in which monetary “claims of 100 or more persons

are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the

plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions,” and it then

provides that “jurisdiction shall exist only over those

plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action satisfy the juris-

dictional amount requiremen[t]” of $75,000. §1332(d)

(11)(B)(i). If respondents are correct that “plaintiffs”

means unnamed parties in interest where it is used the

first time, then so too the second. After all, the “pre-

sumption that a given term is used to mean the same

thing throughout a statute” is “at its most vigorous when a

term is repeated within a given sentence.” Brown v.

Gardner, 513 U. S. 115, 118 (1994).

Yet if the term “plaintiffs” is stretched to include all

unnamed individuals with an interest in the suit, then

§1332(d)(11)(B)(i)’s requirement that “jurisdiction shall

exist only over those plaintiffs whose claims [exceed

$75,000]” becomes an administrative nightmare that

Congress could not possibly have intended, see Griffin v.

Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U. S. 564, 575 (1982). How

is a district court to identify the unnamed parties whose

claims in a given case are for less than $75,000? Would

the court in this case, for instance, have to hold an eviden-

tiary hearing to determine the identity of each of the

——————

5 Congress could of course require a real party in interest inquiry in a

statute that uses the term “plaintiff” simply by saying so. But it has

not done that here.

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 9

Opinion of the Court

hundreds of thousands of unnamed Mississippi citizens

who purchased one of respondents’ LCD products between

1996 and 2006 (the period alleged in the complaint)? Even

if it could identify every such person, how would it ascer-

tain the amount in controversy for each individual claim?

Respondents suggest that “[i]n some circumstances, de-

fendants may be able to identify from their payment rec-

ords any persons who may have claims for overpayments,”

but they stop notably short of claiming to possess such

decades-old records themselves. Brief for Respondents 25.

Furthermore, what would happen with individuals

whose claims were valued at less than $75,000? The

District Court in this case suggested that if the suit were

deemed a mass action, it would sever the claim for “resti-

tution for losses incurred by individuals claiming less than

or equal to $75,000 each” and remand that claim back to

state court, while allowing the other claims (including the

restitution claims exceeding $75,000) to proceed in federal

court. 876 F. Supp. 2d, at 775. Even respondents do not

defend that outcome, presumably because it would mean

that much of the State’s lawsuit could proceed in state

court after all, simultaneously with the newly severed

parallel federal action.6

We think it unlikely that Congress intended that federal

district courts engage in these unwieldy inquiries. By

contrast, interpreting “plaintiffs” in accordance with its

usual meaning—to refer to the actual named parties who

——————

6 Respondents suggest that a district court might be able to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the claims that fall beneath $75,000,

thereby avoiding the problem of identifying and remanding such claims

to the state court. We need not decide the issue here, but we note that

at least one Court of Appeals has rejected that view. See Lowery v.

Alabama Power Co., 483 F. 3d 1184, 1206, n. 51 (CA11 2007) (holding

that because supplemental jurisdiction does not apply where a federal

statute “ ‘expressly provide[s] otherwise,’ ” 28 U. S. C. §1367(a), the

mass action provision’s explicit exclusion of jurisdiction over claims

beneath $75,000 negates supplemental jurisdiction over such claims).

10 MISSISSIPPI EX REL. HOOD v. AU OPTRONICS CORP.

Opinion of the Court

bring an action—leads to a straightforward, easy to ad-

minister rule under which a court would examine whether

the plaintiffs have pleaded in good faith the requisite

amount. See Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U. S.

348, 353 (1961). Our decision thus comports with the

commonsense observation that “when judges must decide

jurisdictional matters, simplicity is a virtue.” See Stand-

ard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip

op., at 6).

B

Our reading of the mass action provision’s text is rein-

forced by the statutory context. See Mohamad v. Palestin-

ian Authority, 566 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 5–6).

First, the provision of CAFA governing transfer motions

confirms our view that the term “plaintiffs” refers to actual

named parties as opposed to unnamed real parties in

interest. That provision, §1332(d)(11)(C)(i), provides that

once a mass action has been removed to federal court, it

“shall not thereafter be transferred to any other court . . .

unless a majority of the plaintiffs in the action request

transfer.” If respondents are correct that “plaintiffs”

means “unnamed parties in interest,” it will be surpass-

ingly difficult for a court to decide in a case like this one

whether an action may be transferred. The District Court

itself acknowledged this problem, noting that it would

have to identify and communicate with “hundreds of thou-

sands if not millions of real parties in interest” to “pol[l]

[them] about their preferred forum” if respondents’ inter-

pretation were correct. 876 F. Supp. 2d, at 777.

The context in which the mass action provision was

enacted lends further support to our conclusion. Congress’

overriding concern in enacting CAFA was with class ac-

tions. See Preamble, 119 Stat. 4 (describing CAFA as an

“[a]ct to amend the procedures that apply to consideration

of interstate class actions”); CAFA §2 (Congress’ findings

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 11

Opinion of the Court

with respect to class actions). The mass action provision

thus functions largely as a backstop to ensure that CAFA’s

relaxed jurisdictional rules for class actions cannot be

evaded by a suit that names a host of plaintiffs rather

than using the class device. Respondents’ argument fails

to recognize this key distinction. Their position is ulti-

mately that “[t]his action is similar to a class action,” such

that it should be removed. Brief for Respondents 27. But

if Congress had wanted representative actions brought by

States as sole plaintiffs to be removable under CAFA on

the theory that they are in substance no different from

class actions, it would have done so through the class

action provision, not the one governing mass actions.7

III

Rather than relying on the text of CAFA as the source of

its real party in interest inquiry, the Court of Appeals

appeared to find such an inquiry necessary on the basis of

what it understood to be a background principle: that

“federal courts look to the substance of the action and not

only at the labels that the parties may attach.” Caldwell,

536 F. 3d, at 424. This was error.

We have interpreted the diversity jurisdiction statute to

require courts in certain contexts to look behind the plead-

ings to ensure that parties are not improperly creating or

destroying diversity jurisdiction. We have held, for exam-

ple, that a plaintiff may not keep a case out of federal

court by fraudulently naming a nondiverse defendant.

Wecker v. National Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U. S.

176, 185–186 (1907). Nor may a plaintiff create diversity

by collusively assigning his interest in an action. Kramer

v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U. S. 823, 825–830 (1969);

——————

7 The parties both point to the “general public exception,”

§1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(III), in support of their respective positions. But

because the foregoing arguments resolve this case, we need not con-

strue that provision here.

12 MISSISSIPPI EX REL. HOOD v. AU OPTRONICS CORP.

Opinion of the Court

see also 28 U. S. C. §1359. And in cases involving a State

or state official, we have inquired into the real party in

interest because a State’s presence as a party will destroy

complete diversity. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Missouri

Railroad and Warehouse Comm’rs, 183 U. S. 53, 58–59

(1901).

But the question in this case is not simply whether

there exists some background principle of analyzing the

real parties in interest to a suit; the question is whether

Congress intended that courts engage in that analysis

when deciding whether a suit is a mass action. Recogniz-

ing this fact, respondents do not argue that the real party

in interest inquiry employed in the above cases somehow

supersedes the text of CAFA; they instead argue that we

should read CAFA in light of those cases because “ ‘Con-

gress expects its statutes to be read in conformity with

this Court’s precedents.’ ” Brief for Respondents 19 (quot-

ing United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 495 (1997)). For

two reasons, however, we conclude that Congress did not

intend the background inquiry to apply to the mass action

provision.

First, it makes sense to infer Congress’ intent to incor-

porate a background principle into a new statute where

the principle has previously been applied in a similar

manner. But that is not the case here. The background

real party in interest inquiry identifies what party’s (or

parties’) citizenship should be considered in determining

diversity. The inquiry that respondents urge is quite dif-

ferent: It is an attempt to count up additional unnamed

parties in order to satisfy the mass action provision’s

numerosity requirement. Respondents offer no reason to

believe that Congress intended to extend the real party

inquiry to this new circumstance, and so any presumption

that Congress wanted to incorporate the inquiry, if it

exists in this case at all, would be comparatively weak. Cf.

Meyer v. Holley, 537 U. S. 280, 286 (2003) (“Congress’

Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2014) 13

Opinion of the Court

silence, while permitting an inference that Congress in-

tended to apply ordinary background tort principles,

cannot show that it intended to apply an unusual modifi-

cation of those rules”).8

Second, even if the background principle had previously

been applied in the manner sought by respondents, Con-

gress provided express indications that it did not want the

principle to apply to the mass action provision. It speci-

fied that “the term ‘mass action’ shall not include any civil

action in which . . . the claims are joined upon motion of a

defendant.” §1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(II). By prohibiting de-

fendants from joining unnamed individuals to a lawsuit in

order to turn it into a mass action, Congress demonstrated

its focus on the persons who are actually proposing to join

together as named plaintiffs in the suit. Requiring district

courts to pierce the pleadings to identify unnamed persons

interested in the suit would run afoul of that intent.

Moreover, as already discussed, Congress repeatedly used

the word “plaintiffs” to describe the 100 or more persons

whose claims must be proposed for a joint trial. That word

refers to actual, named parties—a concept inherently at

odds with the background inquiry into unnamed real

parties in interest, who by definition are never plaintiffs.

Congress thus clearly displaced a background real party in

interest inquiry, even assuming one might otherwise

apply. Cf. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U. S. 438,

459, n. 16 (2002).

——————

8 We have also applied a real party in interest inquiry in contexts

other than that of determining citizenship for purposes of diversity

jurisdiction. See North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U. S. 365, 374–376

(1923) (state sovereign immunity); Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook,

304 U. S. 387, 392–393 (1938) (original jurisdiction). But even if we

were to indulge in a presumption that Congress somehow intended to

import the inquiry applied in those particular contexts into the mass

action provision’s distinct numerosity requirement, we would find any

such presumption overridden by CAFA’s text.

14 MISSISSIPPI EX REL. HOOD v. AU OPTRONICS CORP.

Opinion of the Court

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reversed,

and the case is remanded for further proceedings con-

sistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.