Karen Deonne Stamps v. Roy Denton Stamps, Jr.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs September 26, 2013

KAREN DEONNE STAMPS v. ROY DENTON STAMPS, JR.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Williamson County

No. 37591 Timothy L. Easter, Judge

No. M2012-02512-COA-R3-CV - Filed December 19, 2013

In this divorce action, Wife appeals the denial of her Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59 motion to alter or

amend the final decree of divorce. We vacate the order denying the motion and remand the

case for the court to enter a supplemental order stating its basis for denying the motion.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Vacated;

Case Remanded

R ICHARD H. D INKINS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which P ATRICIA J. C OTTRELL,

M. S., P. J., joined. F RANK G. C LEMENT, J R., J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Connie Reguli, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the appellant, Karen D. Stamps.

Rose Palermo, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Roy Denton Stamps.

MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

Karen Stamps (“Wife”) and Roy Denton Stamps, Jr. (“Husband”) were married on

June 7, 1986, and are the parents of one minor child, born in 1992; Wife filed a complaint

for divorce on February 5, 2010. The parties attended a mediation conference on September

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Tenn. R. Ct. App. 10 states:

This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse

or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion

would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall

be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION,” shall not be published, and shall not be cited

or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.

5, 2012, and as a result, they entered into a Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”), which

was incorporated into a Final Decree of Divorce entered September 11, 2012.

Over the course of the marriage the parties accumulated numerous pieces of

residential and commercial property and land for investment purposes; the MDA identified

two properties as jointly owned, two properties as separately owned by Husband, and

nineteen properties in which Husband held a one-half interest in his own name.2 The

property at issue in this appeal is rental property located at 411 Douglas Bend Road, Gallatin,

Tennessee, which was titled in Husband’s name at the time of the divorce and awarded to

Wife.

On October 10, 2012, Wife filed her Motion to Alter or Amend and/or For A New

Trial, asserting that Husband had misrepresented in various respects the condition and status

of the Douglas Bend Road property. Specifically, Wife stated:

Grounds for this Motion to Alter or Amend and/or for a New Trial are:

(1) that Defendant testified at his deposition of August 24, 2012, that the

Douglas Bend Road rental property was solely owned by Defendant and rented

to a current tenant by lease-purchase agreement for $1,600.00 per month; (2)

that Defendant did not disclose to Plaintiff that this Douglas Bend Road

property was in significant disrepair and not rentable or inhabitable without

significant costly repair and restoration; (3) that Defendant testified by said

deposition and represented by his discovery responses that this Douglas Bend

Road property (a) was worth $215,000 and (b) had been appraised by Don

Turner at $215,000; (4) that none of the structural and internal problems with

the residence was [sic] disclosed by Defendant or in the Turner appraisal; and

(5) that as a result of its condition, the tenant who was to continue to pay rent

had vacated the premises or given notice of his intent to vacate the premises

to Defendant prior to the Marital Dissolution Agreement of September 5,

2012, prior to the Final Decree of Divorce of September 11, 2012, and before

Wife’s reasonable possession of the property after entry of the Final Decree of

Divorce.

Wife supported the motion with her affidavit, as well as that of Lawrence Courtright, the

tenant at the Douglas Bend Road property; Husband’s deposition; various letters between

counsel; the Turner property appraisal; and the MDA and final decree. The record does not

reflect that a response was filed to the motion. In accordance with Rule 6.02 of the Local

2

According to the MDA, four of the properties were owned by Insight Properties, which Husband

owned with Everett Lowe. The remaining fifteen properties were owned by Husband and Doug Brooks.

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Rules of Practice of the Twenty-First Judicial District, the trial court did not set Wife’s

motion for hearing; the court entered an order denying the motion on October 12.

Wife appeals, contending that the court erred in denying the motion without a hearing,

in not giving a basis for the denial, and in not applying contract principles in its consideration

of the motion.

DISCUSSION

A Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04 motion to alter or amend a judgment allows a trial court to

correct errors as to the law or facts arising when a court overlooks or fails to consider certain

matters. Chadwell v. Knox Cnty., 980 S.W.2d 378, 383 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). These

motions “may be granted (1) when the controlling law changes before a judgment becomes

final, (2) when previously unavailable evidence becomes available, or (3) when, for sui

generis reasons, a judgment should be amended to correct a clear error of law or to prevent

injustice.” Vaccarella v. Vaccarella, 49 S.W.3d 307, 312 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). Decisions

applying Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.04 are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard since

these requests for relief are “addressed to the trial court’s discretion.” Ferguson v. Brown,

291 S.W.3d 381, 386 (quoting McCracken v. Brentwood United Methodist Church, 958

S.W.2d 792, 795 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)). A trial court abuses its discretion when it causes

an injustice by applying an incorrect legal standard, reaching an illogical decision, or by

resolving the case “on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Lee Med., Inc. v.

Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010). When reviewing a discretionary decision the

“appellate courts should begin with the presumption that the decision is correct and should

review the evidence in the light most favorable to the decision.” Henderson v. SAIA, Inc.,

318 S.W.3d 328, 335 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting Overstreet v. Shoney’s, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 694, 709

(Tenn. Ct. App.1999)). The appellate court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that

of the trial court under the standard. Henry v. Goins, 104 S.W.3d 475, 479 (Tenn. 2003).

The Order entered on the motion stated the following in pertinent part:

The Court now having carefully considered the Plaintiff’s motion, respectfully

denies the motion pursuant to Rule 6.02 of the Local Rules of Civil Court for

the 21st Judicial District.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Until it is approved by the court, a mediated agreement is essentially contractual in

nature. Ledbetter v. Ledbetter, 163 S.W.3d 681, 685 (Tenn. 2005). Whether the mediated

agreement is enforceable is, therefore, a question of law. Id. at 683. Although a party may

not be released from his agreed obligation due to a “change of heart,” proof of

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misrepresentation at mediation is a different matter. See Coleman v. Coleman, E2011-00974-

COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 1622240, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2012). Further, although the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not apply to the formation of a contract,

Wallace v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 938 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Tenn. 1996), “[p]articular forms

of bad faith in bargaining are the subjects of rules . . . as to [contract] invalidating causes

such as fraud and duress.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt. c (1981).

In performing our review of the court’s ruling on the motion, we have reviewed the

materials filed in support of the motion. The affidavits of Wife and Reverend Courtright

assert facts which, if true, might support Wife’s claim that Husband misrepresented the value

and condition of the Douglas Bend Road property and that, as a consequence, the judgment

should be amended or a new trial granted.

As noted in Eldridge v. Eldridge, “[a]n abuse of discretion can be found only when

the trial court’s ruling falls outside the spectrum of rulings that might reasonably result from

an application of the correct legal standards to the evidence found in the record.” Eldridge,

42 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 2001). Because the court did not discuss the grounds of the motion

or the evidence filed in support of it, we are unable to review the court’s exercise of its

discretion in denying the motion.

Accordingly, we vacate the order denying the Motion to Alter or Amend and remand

the case for the trial court to enter an order which discusses the evidence filed in support of

the motion and articulates its basis for denying the motion.3

________________________________

RICHARD H. DINKINS, JUDGE

3

We express no opinion as to the merits of the motion.

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