The opinion
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1648
VIRNA M. DANIELS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ERIC C. BROWN, in his official capacity as Executive
Director of the Housing Authority of Prince George’s County;
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District
Judge. (8:11-cv-02938-AW)
Submitted: November 25, 2013 Decided: December 16, 2013
Before AGEE, KEENAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Virna M. Daniels, Appellant Pro Se. James T. Massey, RENO &
CAVANAUGH PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
In August 2010, Virna M. Daniels began receiving a
monthly housing subsidy from the Homeownership Option of the
Housing Choice Voucher Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (West 2012)
(“Section 8”). Fourteen months later, Daniels brought suit
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) against the Housing
Authority of Prince George’s County and Eric Brown, its
executive director (collectively, “HAPGC”), alleging
deprivations of her due process rights and violations of her
rights under Section 8, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (“HUD”) regulations, and HAPGC’s Administrative
Plan. 1 Specifically, Daniels alleged that HAPGC deprived her of
her due process rights by failing to provide her an informal
hearing to challenge the calculation of her 2010 housing subsidy
(Counts I and II); and improperly reduced her subsidy by failing
to timely process her payment for August 2010 (Count III); using
an inflated estimate of her income (Count IV); failing to
exclude her son and his income from the household promptly
(Count V), and failing to credit her properly for her medical
expenses (Count VI).
1
HUD regulations require public housing authorities to
adopt written administrative plans. 24 C.F.R. § 982.54(a)
(2013).
2
Daniels filed a partial motion for summary judgment on
Counts I, IV, V, and VI. In an order entered on November 20,
2012, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Daniels as to Count I. The court dismissed Count II as
duplicative of Count I and otherwise denied Daniels’ motion.
The court scheduled a bench trial to determine damages on Count
I and liability on the remaining claims.
At the bench trial in March 2013, the district court
dismissed Count III as unsupported by the evidence. In an order
entered on April 17, 2013, which Daniels now appeals, the
district court ordered judgment for Daniels in the amount of
$25, comprising $24 in economic damages on Count VI and $1 in
nominal damages on Count I. The court ordered judgment in favor
of the HAPGC on Counts IV and V. Having thoroughly reviewed the
record, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
Daniels’ claims alleged violations of Section 8, HUD
regulations, and HAPGC’s Administrative Plan. 2 “We review a
judgment resulting from a bench trial under a mixed standard of
review — factual findings may be reversed only if clearly
2
The parties in this case do not dispute the district
court’s determination that Section 8 creates enforceable federal
rights under § 1983. Nor does either party dispute the district
court’s finding of Daniels’ right to enforce provisions of HUD
regulations and the Administrative Plan that define the housing
authority’s obligations and have a direct impact on the
calculation of her monthly assistance payments.
3
erroneous, while conclusions of law are examined de novo.”
Plasterers’ Local Union No. 96 Pension Plan v. Pepper, 663 F.3d
210, 215 (4th Cir. 2011). Decisions of a state agency
implementing federal law should be afforded deference, in an
effort to “uphold the letter of federal law while allowing
agencies the discretion to perform their function of reasonably
administering the federal program.” Clark v. Alexander, 85 F.3d
146, 150 (4th Cir. 1996). Such deference “applies only to the
extent the agency’s rules are not contrary to the statute or
regulation, and that question is one of law for the courts to
determine de novo.” Ritter v. Cecil Cnty. Office of Hous. &
Cmty. Dev., 33 F.3d 323, 328 (4th Cir. 1994). “Once it is
determined, however, that a rule is not inconsistent with the
statute or regulation, deference is accorded, and a court may
not substitute its own interpretation for the agency’s if the
agency’s interpretation is reasonable.” Id.
On appeal, Daniels first argues that HAPGC failed to
conduct a timely inspection of her residence, in violation of
HUD regulations and the Administrative Plan. As the district
court held, however, neither 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f nor HUD
regulations provide a time limit within which a housing
authority must conduct the required inspection, though they do
require that the participant’s home pass the inspection prior to
issuance of a Section 8 subsidy. 24 C.F.R. § 982.628(a)(4)
4
(2013). Daniel began receiving payments once the inspection
requirement was satisfied. Accordingly, we conclude that
Daniels’ challenge to the timeliness of the inspection lacks
merit, as does her claim for $77,000 in damages that she asserts
were caused by the delayed inspection.
Daniels argues that HAPGC failed to timely exclude the
income of her son from the calculation of her subsidy after he
moved out of the residence. 3 Section 7-II.D. of the
Administrative Plan provides in relevant part:
If an adult family member who was formerly a member of
the household is reported to be permanently absent,
the family must provide evidence to support that the
person is no longer a member of the family (e.g.,
documentation of another address at which the person
resides such as a lease or utility bill).
Thus, as the district court determined, HAPGC acted reasonably
in requiring a specific type of proof of change in residence.
Moreover, Daniels’ assertion that HAPGC did not adjust her
monthly subsidy for over a year is belied by the record.
Daniels next asserts that in June 2013, she requested
a hearing with HAPGC to discuss her housing subsidy. She
contends that the district court erred in failing to schedule a
3
Daniels contends that her son’s status as a full-time
student precluded the inclusion of his income in the subsidy
calculation. As this issue was not raised before the district
court, however, we decline to consider it in the first instance.
See United States v. Edwards, 666 F.3d 877, 887 (4th Cir. 2011);
Muth v. United States, 1 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 1993).
5
hearing and requests that this Court sanction HAPGC. Because
Daniels’ request for a hearing occurred after the district court
issued its order and judgment on April 17, 2013, this claim was
not properly before the district court, and we decline to
consider it on appeal.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. 4 We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this Court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
4
Daniels also asserts that her counsel was ineffective in
representing her. However, a litigant in a civil action has no
constitutional or statutory right to the effective assistance of
counsel. Taylor v. Dickel, 293 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 2002).
6