State of Tennessee v. Charles Justin Woosley

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs at Knoxville October 15, 2013

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CHARLES JUSTIN WOOSLEY

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 2012B1289 Mark J. Fishburn, Judge

No. M2013-00578-CCA-R3-CD - Filed November 26, 2013

Following a bench trial, the Defendant-Appellant, Charles Justin Woosley, was convicted of

domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-101, -111 (2010). He was

sentenced to ninety days in the county jail, which the trial court suspended and ordered to be

served on unsupervised probation. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the

evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

C AMILLE R. M CM ULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. K ELLY T HOMAS,

J R., and J EFFREY S. B IVINS, JJ., joined.

Dawn Deaner, District Public Defender; Jeffrey A. DeVasher (on appeal) and Aisha McWeay

(at trial), Assistant Public Defenders, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Defendant-Appellant,

Charles Justin Woosley.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Clarence E. Lutz, Assistant Attorney

General; Victor S. Johnson, III, District Attorney General; and Rob McGuire, Assistant

District Attorney General, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Defendant-Appellant Woosley was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for

one count of domestic assault in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-111

(2010). Specifically, he was charged with intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing

bodily injury to his wife, Natalie Woosley. See id. § 39-13-101(a)(1) (2010). He waived his

right to a jury trial. The following proof was presented at the bench trial.

Bench trial. At approximately 8:30 p.m. on August 30, 2011, Officer Andrew

Chouanard of the Metro Nashville Police Department responded to a domestic disturbance

call at the 1000 block of Woods Lake Drive in Madison, Tennessee. Officer Chouanard

testified that he and another officer arrived at the residence and found the Defendant-

Appellant seated on the front step of the house smoking a cigarette. While the other officer

spoke with the Defendant-Appellant, Officer Chouanard went inside to speak with Ms.

Woosley, who had called the police. During his investigation, Officer Chouanard observed

that Ms. Woosley had “some visible red marks on both upper arms and across her chest and

she did have a small scratch on her finger.” She reported receiving these injuries during an

altercation with the Defendant-Appellant. In an interview with Officer Chouanard, the

Defendant-Appellant acknowledged that there was a disagreement but denied having had any

physical contact with Ms. Woosley.

Officer Chouanard described the marks on Ms. Woosley’s upper arms and chest as

a “red discoloration.” Ms. Woosley had reported to Officer Chouanard that during a struggle

between her and the Defendant-Appellant over a set of keys, the Defendant-Appellant

wrapped her in a bear hug around her arms and then shoved her down onto the sofa. Ms.

Woosley indicated to Officer Chouanard that she wished to prosecute the Defendant-

Appellant for domestic violence and the Defendant-Appellant was arrested. Officer

Chouanard accompanied Ms. Woosley to night court where a domestic violence detective

took photographs of her upper chest, arms, and hands. At the bench trial, Officer Chouanard

identified the photographs as depicting Ms. Woosley and her injuries from the night in

question. He also stated that since the photos were taken at 10:15 p.m., nearly two hours

after he first observed the injuries, the red marks had significantly faded. The photos were

entered into evidence as a collective exhibit without objection from the defense. Officer

Chouanard then made an in-court identification of the Defendant-Appellant as the person he

arrested for the incident.

On cross-examination, Officer Chouanard acknowledged that wedding photographs

of Ms. Woosley depicted red marks on her body that appeared similar to the red marks that

she had on the night of the domestic disturbance. He also acknowledged that the Defendant-

Appellant told him that night that Ms. Woosley’s skin becomes blotchy when she is stressed.

Officer Chouanard stated that the Woosleys’ home was not in any kind of disarray and that

the couple’s two-year-old son was asleep in the home when he arrived.

Natalie Woosley testified that the Defendant-Appellant was her estranged husband

and that they were in the midst of divorce proceedings. She described the events on the night

of August 30, 2011 as follows:

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We had just put our son to bed and we were in the kitchen having an argument

about me moving out that weekend, and he put his hands on my car keys that

were on the counter and told me that if I was going to leave I was going to

leave then, and that I wouldn’t be able to take my son with me. I was not

going to leave my son in the house with him because he’s got a horrible

temper, so I grabbed the keys off the counter and then he put me in the bear

hug with my back to him, trying to wrestle the keys out of my hands in the

kitchen, and then at some point we moved from the kitchen to the living room

and I got turned around and I was pushing on his chest to get him off of me.

And then when he finally let go, he put his hand on my chest and just pushed

and I fell down onto the couch and I got up and grabbed his cell phone and

called the police.

Ms. Woosley testified that she and the Defendant-Appellant had been discussing divorce

since spring of that year though papers had not been filed at the time of the incident.

According to Ms. Woosley, the Defendant-Appellant had agreed to stay with his mother for

the week of August 30 to give the couple some space. Their argument that evening began

because the Defendant-Appellant said he was not going to stay with his mother. When Ms.

Woosley responded that she was moving out that weekend and taking their son, the

Defendant-Appellant became angry. Ms. Woosley did not recall what prompted the

Defendant-Appellant to release her from the bear hug and to push her. While she was on the

phone with the police, the Defendant-Appellant continued to yell, and then he went outside

to smoke a cigarette and to wait for the police.

After the physical altercation, Ms. Woosley said she had red marks on both arms from

the elbows up to where the Defendant-Appellant’s arms had been. She also reported “a huge

red mark” on her chest. According to Ms. Woosley, the photographs taken of her on the

night of the incident depicted marks that “had faded quite a bit.” She stated that her upper

chest becomes flushed from time to time when she is stressed and that the flushing lasts “just

a few minutes.” Ms. Woosley denied having any skin conditions and said that her arms do

not become flushed when she is stressed. That night, she observed “solid red marks” on her

arms and distinguished them from the normal flushing that she experiences due to stress. Ms.

Woosley reported that her chest and arms “were sore for a few days.” She said she was not

pursuing the domestic assault charge for any advantage in her pending divorce case.

On cross-examination, Ms. Woosley identified a wedding picture depicting her with

redness in her upper chest area. However, she disagreed that her arms appeared red in the

picture. The photograph was introduced into evidence. Ms. Woosley reported that during

the struggle over her keys, the Defendant-Appellant was attempting to remove her house key

off of the ring. According to Ms. Woosley, when she said she would leave and take their

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son, the Defendant-Appellant became upset and told her if she was leaving then she would

take her car and leave their son with him. The physical struggle lasted for a couple of

minutes. While she called the police, the Defendant-Appellant continued to yell at her, but

he did not attempt to grab her or the phone. Ms. Woosley testified that the cut on her finger

occurred when the Defendant-Appellant tried to wrestle the keys from her grasp “and the

keys cut [her] hand when he broke the key ring.” She said she broke the Defendant-

Appellant’s necklace chain while he was holding on to her and, in response, he broke her

necklace before letting her go and pushing her down.

Defendant-Appellant Woosley denied ever placing a hand on Ms. Woosley on the

night of August 30, 2011. He testified that on the night in question, he had returned from the

gym at about 7:30 p.m., and the couple bathed their son and put him to bed. They began

discussing their relationship, and Ms. Woosley indicated that she wanted to move out. The

Defendant-Appellant said she could leave but requested her house key so that she would not

return whenever she pleased. He also did not want Ms. Woosley to take their son until she

could provide suitable housing for him. At this point, Ms. Woosley became upset and began

yelling at the Defendant-Appellant. The couple had been fighting for the past four of five

years so the Defendant-Appellant did not participate in the argument. He was angered when

Ms. Woosley said he was a “crappy dad” because he prided himself on being a good father.

The Defendant-Appellant testified that when he told Ms. Woosley she was a “crappy wife,”

she got angry and ripped his necklace off. He responded by reaching for his cigarettes and

going to the front porch to cool off. When the Defendant-Appellant stepped back inside, his

wife was on the phone with the police reporting that she had been struck and pushed. He

denied ever ripping Ms. Woosley’s necklace off or engaging in a struggle over her keys. The

Defendant-Appellant said Ms. Woosley’s entire upper body, including her arms, “will turn

red and splotchy” when she is upset. He stated that he had spent the prior nights at his

mother’s home but returned this particular evening because he wanted to study for a test on

the following day and because he missed his son.

On cross-examination, the Defendant-Appellant acknowledged that he returned to the

home he shared with Ms. Woosley to study even though a marriage counselor had

recommended the day before that the two spend time apart. The Defendant-Appellant denied

ever losing his temper. He did not see the cut on Ms. Woosley’s finger but surmised that she

may have received a paper cut that day at the office where she worked. According to the

Defendant-Appellant, Ms. Woosley fabricated her story to the authorities and to the court.

Based on the above proof, the trial court convicted Defendant-Appellant Woosley as

charged. The court made the following findings:

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I think there was some bear hugging going on that night. . . . I believe when he

came back home that night and she couldn’t get him to leave and she decided

to leave and went for the keys, knowing that she was also going to get her son,

then he got upset, grabbed her to try and get the keys, the house key away from

her, the keys in general away from her, certainly I don’t think he intended to

harm her or injure her or anything else, and I’m not sure quite frankly about

the red marks. I believe a scratch occurred during the course of the struggle

that was precipitated by him, and her testimony was also that her shoulders and

upper arms were sore for a couple of days, so that meets the definition of

bodily injury. I do agree that it’s reckless. It wasn’t intended or anything else.

I don’t think that Mr. Woosley is prone to violence or otherwise has a

temperament to intentionally want to hurt Ms. Woosley or anybody else, but

I think there was a struggle on that occasion, and it was precipitated by the fact

that he moved back in . . . it was clear that one of them needed not be there that

night, and when she decided she was going to leave if he didn’t, it upset him

when she went for the keys and he tried to stop it, so I find that the State has

established beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a struggle and that there

was bodily injury, more in terms of the pain. I’m not sure about the redness,

I don’t know what caused it, it could have been either way. I can’t find that

he caused that as part of the struggle, but she did have [a] scratch on her finger

and she did have pain for several days after the incident.

The Defendant-Appellant received a sentence of ninety days to be served on unsupervised

probation. He then filed this timely appeal.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Defendant-Appellant Woosley contends that the evidence is insufficient

to support his conviction for domestic assault. Specifically, he argues that the State has

failed to prove the element of “bodily injury” beyond a reasonable doubt. He maintains that

there was insufficient evidence to establish that Ms. Woosley experienced “physical pain”

as included in the statutory definition of “bodily injury.” The Defendant-Appellant claims

that the evidence at best may support a finding of “some lingering discomfort” but not of the

requisite “physical pain” to sustain the conviction. In response, the State argues that any

reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the Defendant-Appellant assaulted his wife and

caused injury to her arms and chest. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain

the Defendant-Appellant’s conviction.

It is well established law that the State, on appeal, is entitled to the strongest legitimate

view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from that evidence.

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State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). When a defendant challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence, the standard of review applied by this court is “whether, after

reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). Similarly, Rule 13(e) of the

Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure states, “Findings of guilt in criminal actions whether

by the trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support a finding

by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Guilt may be found beyond a

reasonable doubt in a case where there is direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a

combination of the two. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)

(citing State v. Brown, 551 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tenn. 1977); Farmer v. State, 343 S.W.2d 895,

897 (Tenn. 1961)).

The trier of fact must evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, determine the weight

given to witnesses’ testimony, and reconcile all conflicts in the evidence. State v. Odom, 928

S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). When reviewing issues regarding the sufficiency of the

evidence, this court shall not “reweigh or reevaluate the evidence.” Henley v. State, 960

S.W.2d 572, 578-79 (Tenn. 1997). This court has often stated that “[a] guilty verdict by the

jury, approved by the trial court, accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and

resolves all conflicts in favor of the prosecution’s theory.” Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659. A

guilty verdict also “removes the presumption of innocence and replaces it with a presumption

of guilt, and the defendant has the burden of illustrating why the evidence is insufficient to

support the jury’s verdict.” Id. (citing State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982)).

“In the absence of direct evidence, a criminal offense may be established exclusively

by circumstantial evidence.” State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (citing

Duchac v. State, 505 S.W.2d 237, 241 (Tenn. 1973); Marable v. State, 313 S.W.2d 451, 456-

58 (Tenn. 1958)). However, “[t]he jury decides the weight to be given to circumstantial

evidence, and ‘[t]he inferences to be drawn from such evidence, and the extent to which the

circumstances are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, are questions

primarily for the jury.’” State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 2006) (quoting Marable,

313 S.W.2d at 457). This court may not substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier

of fact in cases involving circumstantial evidence. State v. Sisk, 343 S.W.3d 60, 65 (Tenn.

2011) (citing State v. Lewter, 313 S.W.3d 745, 748 (Tenn. 2010)). We note that the standard

of review “‘is the same whether the conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial

evidence.’” State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (quoting State v. Sutton, 166 S.W.3d 686,

689 (Tenn. 2005)); State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 557 (Tenn. 2000). The court in

Dorantes specifically adopted the standard for circumstantial evidence established by the

United States Supreme Court in Holland:

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“Circumstantial evidence . . . is intrinsically no different from testimonial

evidence. Admittedly, circumstantial evidence may in some cases point to a

wholly incorrect result. Yet this is equally true of testimonial evidence. In

both instances, a jury is asked to weigh the chances that the evidence correctly

points to guilt against the possibility of inaccuracy or ambiguous inference.

In both, the jury must use its experience with people and events in weighing

the probabilities. If the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, we can

require no more.”

Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 380 (quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954)).

Domestic assault is an “assault” committed against a “domestic abuse victim.” T.C.A.

§ 39-13-111(b) (2010). As charged in the indictment, an assault occurs when a person

“[i]ntentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another[.]” Id. §

39-13-101(a)(1) (2010). A “domestic abuse victim” is defined to include “[a]dults . . . who

are current or former spouses.” Id. § 39-13-111(a)(1) (2010). “Bodily injury” is statutorily

defined to include “a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn or disfigurement, and physical pain or

temporary illness or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental

faculty[.]” Id. § 39-11-106(a)(2) (2011). In the case sub judice, the trial court considered

the evidence and found that the Defendant-Appellant held Ms. Woosley in a bear hug and

engaged in a struggle over her keys. The trial court found that during the course of the

struggle, the Defendant-Appellant recklessly caused bodily injury to Ms. Woosley in the form

of a scratch on her finger and pain in her shoulders and upper arms for a few days following

the altercation. The court did not find that the Defendant-Appellant caused the red marks on

Ms. Woosley’s body.

In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the Defendant-Appellant contends that

the State failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Woosley suffered bodily

injury. Citing to State v. Sims, 909 S.W.2d 46 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995), and State v. Farmer,

380 S.W.3d 96 (Tenn. 2012), the Defendant-Appellant argues that this court is required to

quantify pain and that the record does not indicate that Ms. Woosley experienced any degree

of physical pain.

In Sims, this court recognized “the difficulty of quantifying or measuring pain” and

concluded that evidence of a broken nose was insufficient to constitute “extreme physical

pain” within the statutory definition of “serious bodily injury.” Sims, 909 S.W.2d at 49.

Accordingly, the defendant’s conviction for especially aggravated robbery was modified to

aggravated robbery. Id. at 50. In Farmer, the supreme court held that evidence of a gunshot

wound was insufficient to establish “extreme physical pain” and to constitute “serious bodily

injury” where the bullet passed through the victim’s leg and hospital records classified the

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pain as “mild” to “moderate.” Farmer, 380 S.W.3d at 101. We respectfully disagree with

the Defendant-Appellant that the holdings in Sims and Farmer require this court to quantify

pain. On appeal, we are required to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the

State and determine whether any rational trier of fact could find the elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. 307 at 319; see also Tenn. R. App. P.

13(e) . We do not resolve questions of witness credibility and factual issues, nor do we re-

weigh or re-evaluate the evidence. See State v. Evans, 108 S.W.3d 231, 236 (Tenn. 2003)

(citing Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659). We also decline to substitute our inferences for those

drawn by the trier of fact. See State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833, 845 (Tenn. 2001) (citing State

v. Pike, 978 S.W.2d 904, 914 (Tenn.1998)).

Here, the trial court considered the testimony and accredited Ms. Woosley’s account

of the altercation, as was its prerogative. The trial court resolved all apparent inconsistencies

in favor of the prosecution’s theory, finding that the Defendant-Appellant did in fact cause

bodily injury to Ms. Woosley on August 30, 2011. See Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659; see also

Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 557-58. It is well-established law that a victim’s testimony, by

itself, is sufficient evidence to support a conviction. See e.g., State v. Wyrick, 62 S.W.3d

751, 767 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001) (“Generally, a defendant may be convicted upon the

uncorroborated testimony of one witness.”). The plain language of the statute defines

“bodily injury” to include “a cut . . . and physical pain[.]” T.C.A. § 39-11-106(a)(2) (2011).

Ms. Woosley testified that she suffered a cut on her finger in the struggle over her keys. She

also reported feeling sore in her chest and arms after the altercation. The Defendant-

Appellant concedes that Sims and Farmer involve a higher category of pain and concern

“serious bodily injury” based upon “extreme physical pain.” Although the Defendant-

Appellant classifies Ms. Woosley’s soreness as “general lingering discomfort” insufficient

to constitute “physical pain,” we conclude that such a determination goes to the weight of her

testimony, which is a matter for the trier of fact to resolve. Viewed in the light most

favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to reasonably infer that

Ms. Woosley experienced physical pain as a result of the Defendant-Appellant’s actions. We

conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant-Appellant’s conviction for

domestic assault beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief.

CO N C L U S IO N

We conclude the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction for domestic assault.

The judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court is affirmed.

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CAMILLE R. McMULLEN, JUDGE

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