Walter Whitaker v. Nash-Rocky Mount Board of Education

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-1824

WALTER LEE WHITAKER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

NASH-ROCKY MOUNT BOARD OF EDUCATION, d/b/a Nash-Rocky Mount

Public Schools; RICHARD A. MCMAHON, Superintendent; CARINA

BRYANT, Southern Nash Middle School Principal,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,

District Judge. (5:11-cv-00246-BO)

Submitted: October 28, 2013 Decided: November 13, 2013

Before DAVIS, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Walter Lee Whitaker, Appellant Pro Se. Dan M. Hartzog, Jr.,

Donna Rhea Rascoe, CRANFILL, SUMNER & HARTZOG, LLP, Raleigh,

North Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Walter Lee Whitaker appeals the district court’s order

granting summary judgment to Defendants on his claims of racial

discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 2003 & Supp. 2013) (“Title

VII”). * We affirm.

Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). “At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is

a genuine dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.

372, 380 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). A district

court should grant summary judgment unless a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party on the evidence

presented. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249

(1986). “Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice,

*

To the extent Whitaker summarily contends that the

district court erred in concluding that Title VII does not apply

to claims of disability discrimination, we reject Whitaker’s

contention. Moreover, it is clear that Whitaker never alleged

or produced evidence that he suffers from a qualifying

disability. See Rohan v. Networks Presentations LLC, 375 F.3d

266, 272-73 & n.9 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that claim of

discriminatory discharge under Americans with Disabilities Act

requires showing of disability that substantially limits major

life activity or of being regarded as having such disability).

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nor does a mere scintilla of evidence in support of [the

nonmoving party’s] case.” Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,

312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks

omitted). We review de novo a district court’s order granting

summary judgment. Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th Cir.

2011).

Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice

for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual

with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race.”

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Because Whitaker produced no

direct evidence that discrimination motivated the nonrenewal of

his contract to serve as a probationary teacher, his claim must

be considered under the burden-shifting framework established in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).

Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277,

284-85 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc).

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Whitaker was

required to establish a prima facie case comprising four

elements: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) adverse

employment action; (3) performance at a level meeting his

employer’s legitimate expectations at the time of the adverse

employment action; and (4) circumstances that give rise to an

inference of discrimination. Gerner v. Cnty. of Chesterfield,

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674 F.3d 264, 266 (4th Cir. 2012); King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d

145, 149 (4th Cir. 2003). Once these elements are established,

“the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.”

Hill, 354 F.3d at 285. If the employer provides evidence of a

nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the presumption of

discrimination is rebutted, and the employee, who bears the

ultimate burden of persuasion, must show by a preponderance of

evidence that the proffered reason was a pretext for

discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530

U.S. 133, 143, 146-49 (2000).

Having carefully reviewed the record, we agree with

the district court that the evidence failed to indicate that

Whitaker was meeting his employer’s performance expectations or

that the decision not to renew his contract was racially

motivated. Whitaker’s conclusory and unsupported assertions to

the contrary were not sufficient to survive summary judgment.

King, 328 F.3d at 149-50. Thus, Whitaker is not entitled to

relief on his claim that the nonrenewal of his contract was

based on race.

To the extent Whitaker also claims that he was subject

to a racially hostile work environment, he failed to produce

evidence sufficient to carry such a claim past summary judgment.

See EEOC v. Cent. Wholesalers, Inc., 573 F.3d 167, 175 (4th Cir.

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2009) (discussing prima facie case). Finally, we reject

Whitaker’s suggestion that Title VII permits him to proceed

against Defendants Richard McMahon and Carina Bryant in their

individual capacities. Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d

177, 180-81 (4th Cir. 1998). If Whitaker intended to raise

claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (2006), such claims fail

for the same reasons as Whitaker’s Title VII claims. Love-Lane

v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 786 (4th Cir. 2004).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED

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