“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for the purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”
How later courts described this case
- “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for the purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case: 13-13337 Date Filed: 11/05/2013 Page: 1 of 2
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________
No. 13-13337
Non-Argument Calendar
__________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:12-cv-00054-TCB
CHRISTOPHER BYRANT WHITE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF LAGRANGE, GA, LOUIS M. DEKMAR, in his official and individual
capacity as Chief of Police for the City of LaGrange, Georgia, K-9 UNIT,
OFFICER J. CLOWER, individually and in his official and individual capacity,
JOHN DOE, in his official and individual capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
__________________________
(November 5, 2013)
Before HULL, MARCUS, and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 13-13337 Date Filed: 11/05/2013 Page: 2 of 2
Christopher White challenges on this appeal the district court’s order
granting the Defendants summary judgment. The district court correctly held that
White abandoned all claims in his response to the Defendants’ summary judgment
motion except for his claim against Officer Clower in his individual capacity.
(Dkt. 24 at 5–6.) Although White appeals against all Defendants, he presents no
argument that the City of LaGrange is liable. White argues only that the district
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Clower individually on
White’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that Clower used excessive force in arresting him.
The district court held that Clower was entitled to qualified immunity
because Clower did not violate a clearly established right. White contends that the
facts asserted in his affidavit show that Clower violated a clearly established
constitutional right. After careful review, we conclude that the district court
correctly held that no reasonable jury could believe White’s affidavit. (Dkt. 24 at 4
n.1.) See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007) (“When
opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by
the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that
version of the facts for the purposes of ruling on a motion for summary
judgment.”).
AFFIRMED.
2