The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-30356
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CALVIN BROWN, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant,
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
(98-CR-194-3-G)
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July 9, 2001
Before DAVIS, WIENER, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
WIENER, Circuit Judge:*
IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is granted for
the limited purpose of correcting apparently misleading language on
our part, specifically replacing the phrases “approximately 1½
kilograms” and “approximately 1.5 kilograms” —— which appear
several times on pages 19-21 of our panel opinion —— with the exact
number they were intended to represent, “1.6 kilograms.” This was,
in essence, a “rounding error.”
In discussing the quantity of drugs attributed to Defendants
*
Pursuant to 5TH Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH Cir. Rule 47.5.4.
Calvin Brown and Jesse L. Cage, we correctly concluded that, even
were we to grant Defendants’ contention that the package of cocaine
discovered in Cage’s vehicle when stopped on his journey from
Houston to New Orleans contained less than the two kilograms
claimed in the PSR (and adopted by the district court), the record
“supports an inference that the packages amounted to approximately
1½ kilograms because that was the amount Easterling, the apparent
prospective purchaser of these packages of cocaine, testified that
he was buying.”1 The phrase “approximately 1½ kilograms,” repeated
on three occasions in the form “approximately 1.5 kilograms” in the
subject pages of the opinion, was merely a shorthand approximation
for “1.6 kilograms,” the number correctly employed on page 22 of
our opinion and the amount of cocaine Easterling testified to
having purchased from Cage.
We now recognize that the difference between 1.5 and 1.6
kilograms is material to Brown’s challenge of the district court’s
attribution to him of between 2 and 3.5 kilograms of cocaine for
sentencing purposes. Because we realize that our rounding of the
figure “1.6" to “approximately 1½” and “approximately 1.5” could
cast doubt on our explanation why the district court did not
reversibly err in attributing between and 2 and 3.5 kilograms of
cocaine to Brown and sentencing him accordingly, we now replace
that misleading language with “1.6 kilograms.” Otherwise, our
1
Panel Opinion at 19.
2
decision stands.
It is so ORDERED.
3