Jackson v. Indian Prairie School District 204

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 10-2290

P AULA JACKSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

INDIAN P RAIRIE S CHOOL D ISTRICT 204, ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:08-CV-04312—Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.

A RGUED F EBRUARY 11, 2011—D ECIDED A UGUST 11, 2011

Before B AUER, P OSNER, and W ILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

W ILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Paula Jackson is a special

education support teacher for the Indian Prairie School

District, where she is responsible for helping the

general population teachers educate certain disabled

students. One of the students assigned to Jackson

was W.K., who had been diagnosed with autism. W.K.

had a long history of verbal and physical outbursts,

including hitting and scratching himself, other students,

2 No. 10-2290

and teachers. He would also swing or throw objects,

including chairs. Multiple teachers and administrators

recommended that W.K. be transferred to a therapeutic

day school that was better suited to address his unique

needs, but the district let W.K. stay at his regularly as-

signed general education public school.

W.K. had another one of his frequent outbursts during

the spring of his fourth grade year. The principal of the

school went to W.K.’s “classroom,” which, at that point,

was a solitary room with one teacher where W.K. was

the only student. The principal left the room after con-

cluding that W.K. had calmed down. Shortly after the

principal left the room he saw Jackson. He told her about

W.K.’s outburst and said that he wanted her to “go up-

stairs . . . and talk it over with [W.K.].” Jackson went to

W.K.’s room and found that he was again in an agitated

state. W.K. tried to throw a chair, Jackson tried to stop

him, and W.K. injured Jackson as a result.

Jackson filed a complaint against the school district

and four of its administrators, asserting that her constitu-

tional rights were violated because she was ordered to

W.K.’s room even though he was known to be violent,

and because W.K. should have been previously trans-

ferred to an alternative school. The defendants moved

for summary judgment, and the district court granted

the defendants’ motion. Because we conclude that the

district’s actions were flawed and short-sighted, but

do not “shock the conscience” as is required to main-

tain Jackson’s substantive due process claim, we affirm

the decision of the district court.

No. 10-2290 3

I. BACKGROUND

Paula Jackson became a special education support

teacher for Indian Prairie School District 204 in 2002.

The district operates 33 schools, serves approximately

28,700 students, and employs approximately 3,100 em-

ployees. White Eagle Elementary is one of the district’s

schools. In 2005 the district assigned Jackson to White

Eagle. In her role as a special education support

teacher, Jackson was tasked with aiding the general

education teachers by providing enhanced support for

students who qualified for special programming due

to a mental or physical disability. Jackson, who had

assumed tenured status by the time she brought this

case, had been previously assigned to two different

schools within the district and had taught over 100 stu-

dents.

At the time Jackson was assigned to White Eagle, W.K.

was a second-grade student, and had been enrolled since

kindergarten. Jackson “immediately saw that W.K. was

extremely troubled and prone to erratic and violent

behavior.” On the first day of the 2005-2006 school year,

when W.K. was seven years old, his mother dropped

him off in front of the school. W.K. chased after his

mother’s car as she tried to drive away. Jackson wanted

to stop him from running into the street so she tried to

physically move him back to the school grounds. As

she was doing so, W.K. began to kick, punch, and bite

her. He stopped only when White Eagle’s principal,

Ronald Zeman, pulled him away. Principal Zeman

brought W.K. into a private room at the school and

4 No. 10-2290

thought that he had successfully calmed him down. But

then, “out of the blue [W.K.] just started flailing at [Princi-

pal Zeman] . . . trying to hit me with any part of his body

or object he could get his hands on. . . . He was trying

to hit, punch, kick.” He also tried to headbutt Principal

Zeman. Although Principal Zeman was able to restrain

him, he later noted that “[W.K.] is a strong kid.” W.K. was

suspended after this incident, but he was not expelled

from White Eagle.

On April 12, 2006, district administrators held an Indi-

vidual Education Plan (IEP) meeting regarding W.K.

W.K.’s parents requested the meeting because of “on-

going behavioral concerns. . . . [W.K.] has difficulty with

impulse control and . . . difficulty handling frustration.”

Thirteen people were present at the meeting, including

Jackson, Principal Zeman, W.K.’s parents, a social worker,

the school nurse, and the student services coordinator.

A report was created in preparation for the meeting

that detailed W.K.’s eight incidents of aggression

towards staff and seven incidents towards other stu-

dents. Among other acts he had “pushed student,

refused time out,” “stabbed student in back with pencil,”

and “threw paper/pushed papers at teacher; called

teacher idiot.” It was noted that “[W.K.] struggles at

times with impulsive reactions to situations he finds

frustrating, unexpected, or unchosen,” and that “when

[W.K.] has an explosive incident, it is often impulsive

and unexpected.” During the meeting the participants

discussed various educational programs and placement

options for W.K. “Alternative Education Program” was

rejected as “not applicable.” “Supported Placement in

No. 10-2290 5

General Education Classroom” was selected because it

“best meets needs.” Jackson was assigned as W.K.’s

special education support teacher and became respon-

sible for assisting W.K’s general education teacher. The

district held another IEP conference regarding W.K. on

June 1, 2006, where it was noted that W.K. was presently

in supported education and that the evaluation team

would meet again in the fall to review an outside evalua-

tion.

W.K. returned to White Eagle for the third grade, the

2006-2007 school year. The district held an IEP conference

for him on September 6, 2006. The report noted that W.K.

was eligible for special education services under the

“autism” disability category, based on his diagnosis

of Asperger’s Syndrome. It was decided that W.K.’s

appropriate educational placement was in supported

general education, and Jackson was again assigned as

his support teacher. The report noted that “[W.K.’s]

disability affects his ability to self-regulate.” Additional

IEP conferences regarding W.K. were held on November

16, 2006 and February 9, 2007. Throughout this time

Jackson expressed frustration at W.K.’s disruptive and

belligerent behavior, such as his hitting and scratching

himself, and hitting, scratching, kicking, and throwing

objects at other students and teachers, including her.

Jackson stated that “at some point, [W.K.’s] violent out-

bursts became so common that his teachers stopped

documenting each such occurrence.” But there were

numerous times that W.K.’s violent outbursts were docu-

mented, such as a February 22, 2007 incident where W.K.

was suspended after he hit a social worker in the eye,

6 No. 10-2290

knocking her contact lens out. And at some point during

W.K.’s third-grade year Principal Zeman received an

anonymous letter. The letter stated that it was from

parents of students who had to attend class with W.K.

The letter stated that W.K. was a danger and that if he

was not removed from the school they would seek legal

counsel. Principal Zeman discussed the letter with the

then-superintendent of the school (who is a defendant

in this case). The superintendent did not act in response

to the letter.

In March of 2007 Jackson went to Principal Zeman’s

office and asked that a different support teacher be as-

signed to W.K. She stated that “I couldn’t handle it any-

more . . . [W.K.] needs to be off my case load.” Principal

Zeman did not want to transfer W.K. because of the time

it would take for W.K. to adjust to a new special educa-

tion support teacher. Jackson “was very upset” and

said “it’s not fair,” but W.K. was not reassigned.

The district held another IEP conference for W.K. on

May 23, 2007. There were fourteen people present at the

conference, including Jackson, Principal Zeman, W.K.’s

parents, and W.K.’s parents’ attorney. During the

meeting W.K.’s violent episodes were noted and docu-

mented. For example, in the time period between April 5,

2007 and May 18, 2007, W.K. had 34 verbal outbursts

and 36 physical outbursts. He was also averaging 2.6

“incidents” (defined as “any act of verbal or physical

aggression toward person, property, or self”) a day.

Under the “Recommended Educational Services” sec-

tion of the IEP report, the option for “Supported Place-

No. 10-2290 7

ment in General Education Classroom” was selected for

the time period of June 8, 2007 to June 8, 2008 because

it “best meets need [for] high level of support and

structure in least restrictive environment.” However,

the conference participants also discussed the option

of placing W.K. in an alternative school, and every

person present, with the exception of W.K.’s parents

and their attorney, recommended that W.K. be trans-

ferred to a therapeutic day school. The school “staff

expressed concern about the lack of progress on skills

and goals as well as the emotional needs observed on

a daily basis. [Jackson] expressed concern regarding

[W.K.’s] ability to cope and develop.” But W.K.’s parents

“expressed concern about the impact of [W.K.] being

away from his peers and home school. They see him

interacting with friends in the neighborhood.”

The May 23 meeting was ultimately suspended be-

fore a placement decision for W.K. could be finalized,

although the parties dispute why. Jackson contends

that the parents’ attorney asked that the conference

be paused so he could have time to convince the parents

to transfer W.K. to an alternative school. The defendants

contend that W.K.’s father and the attorney asked that

the meeting be postponed because W.K.’s mother had

to leave the meeting early, and they wanted her present

for any discussion regarding W.K.’s educational place-

ment. They also note that W.K.’s parents wanted time

to obtain recommendations from an outside consultant,

and visit a therapeutic day school. In any event, the

decision was made to suspend the IEP conference for

approximately two weeks to June 8, 2007.

8 No. 10-2290

Shortly after the May 23 conference was discontinued,

Principal Zeman met with the Assistant Superintendent

of Student Services and a Student Services Supervisor

for the district (both are defendants in this case). They

advised Principal Zeman not to follow the recommenda-

tion of the IEP team to transfer W.K. to an alterna-

tive school. They had “compiled . . . multiple data points

ranging from incidences of verbal aggression, physical

aggression, which were our two main concerns . . . [and]

the data showed a line of improvement and that it

would not make for a good case for putting this child in

an alternative educational placement.” Principal Zeman

did not agree with their position because compared to

other children at White Eagle, W.K.’s behavior was “off

the charts,” and he “was not positive” that keeping W.K.

at White Eagle “was a good idea” because “we did not

have the ability to meet his needs.”

W.K.’s IEP conference reconvened on June 8, and the

participants discussed the option of placing W.K. in an

alternative school. W.K.’s mother stated that she had

visited the therapeutic school and “felt depressed going

in, small classrooms with desks close together.” The

staff discussed W.K.’s problems at White Eagle, in-

cluding his “disrespect to his teaching assistants—it

had tended to escalate when ignored.” At some point

during the conference a school official stated that

W.K. would be allowed to return to White Eagle for

the following school year, and Jackson was “incensed.”

She was “mad that . . . they had already made that recom-

mendation without the team’s input.” The meeting con-

tinued as various participants suggested strategies

No. 10-2290 9

for W.K.’s next school year, including modifying the

programming and transition activities in his behavioral

support plan.

W.K. returned to White Eagle for the 2007-2008 school

year. He was nine years old and in the fourth grade.

Jackson was again named as his special education support

teacher. Changes to W.K.’s behavioral support plan

included designating a solitary room that the school

referred to as his “office.” Based on what was appro-

priate at the time, Jackson or a social worker would place

W.K. either in his general education class or his self-

contained office. The school held an IEP conference

for W.K. on October 25, 2007. During this meeting “sig-

nificant points/trends were discussed—total incidents

are down . . . and have shifted to more verbal than physi-

cal.” Commentary for W.K.’s “comprehensive data”

chart, which tallied W.K.’s acts of aggression, noted

that “physical [incidents] greatly reduced 1.3 to .5. Per-

centages indicate more verbal outbursts than physical

now.” But there were still numerous documented

examples of W.K. being abusive towards himself (such

as purposefully bumping into walls) and acting aggres-

sively towards others. For example, on January 30, 2008,

after a teaching assistant told W.K. that he had to wait

for physical education class, W.K. punched the assistant

in the arm, threw a chair at her, and kicked her in the

shin. On February 6, 2008, W.K. kicked Jackson in the

hand, leading Jackson to seek treatment from the school

nurse. And on February 27, 2008, W.K. threw papers,

blocks, and a laptop, and kicked his teaching assistant.

10 No. 10-2290

The district held another IEP conference for W.K. on

March 4, 2008. The corresponding report detailed W.K.’s

outbursts during the 2007-2008 school year: the staff

had reported 11 incidents of physical assaults against

them, filed four injury incident reports, and W.K. had

61 “office interventions.” Principal Zeman noted that

W.K. “appears to hold onto anger,” and that the “team

feels we are not meeting [W.K.’s] needs.” The staff “re-

ported that [W.K.] needs a lot,” and that they had “seen

improvements, but still has concerns.” Jackson voiced

her opinion that W.K. should be immediately trans-

ferred to a therapeutic day school. The district did not

transfer W.K.

A little more than a week after the March 4 IEP confer-

ence, on March 13, 2008, W.K. had another outburst. He

was in his office doing work when he became frustrated.

He began throwing objects around the room and at

his teaching assistant. The assistant called Principal

Zeman to the room. Principal Zeman spoke with W.K.,

and then left the room after he felt that W.K. had calmed

down. Shortly after leaving the room he saw Jackson,

told her about W.K.’s outburst, and said “I want you to

go upstairs, and . . . talk it over with [W.K.].” Jackson went

to the room and saw that W.K.’s emotional state had

escalated, and he was again agitated. At some point he

picked up a chair and swung it at Jackson, who raised

her hands to protect herself. She grabbed the legs of the

chair, a struggle ensued, and Jackson fell backward. She

hit her head on the white board and her neck on the

chalk ledge of the board. Principal Zeman came back

to the room and drove Jackson to a medical facility.

No. 10-2290 11

Jackson later filed a worker’s compensation claim, and

has received payments for her medical expenses under

that claim.

W.K. was suspended because of the March 13 incident.

During the suspension White Eagle gave notice to

W.K.’s parents that a recommendation was being

made to transfer W.K. to an alternative school. The recom-

mendation was “based on the serious bodily injury in-

curred by a White Eagle staff member as a result of the

[March 13] event.” Another IEP conference was scheduled

for March 26, and W.K. was not allowed to return to

White Eagle until after the conference. Fifteen people were

present at the March 26 conference, including Jackson,

Principal Zeman, W.K.’s parents, W.K.’s parents’ lawyer,

and a lawyer for the school district. On the educational

placement selection form, “Requires a placement in an

alternative education setting” was selected. W.K. was

placed in an alternative school for the remainder of

the year, and his parents did not attempt to re-enroll

him at White Eagle for the following year. Jackson

stayed at White Eagle, and remains employed by the

district as a full-time, tenured, special education sup-

port teacher.

Jackson brought suit against the school district and

four of its administrators, not including Principal Zeman,

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint alleges viola-

tions of Jackson’s constitutional right to substantive

due process. The defendants eventually moved for sum-

mary judgment, which the court granted, finding that

there was no basis in the record that the defendants’

12 No. 10-2290

actions satisfied the standard for finding a constitutional

violation. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Jackson’s complaint pursuant to § 1983 alleged that the

state-actor defendants deprived her of her constitutional

rights by knowingly creating and increasing a danger

to her. See London v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 600 F.3d 742, 745-46

(7th Cir. 2010) (in order to state a § 1983 claim, a plain-

tiff must sufficiently allege that: (1) a person acting

under color of state law (2) deprived her of a right, privi-

lege, or immunity secured by the United States Constitu-

tion or laws). After discovery the district court granted

summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding

that their conduct did not “shock the conscience” as is

required to sustain a claim for a violation of substan-

tive due process under a state-created danger theory.

We agree that the defendants’ conduct does not satisfy

the high standard for finding a violation of substantive

due process, and affirm the decision of the district court.

We review a district court’s order granting summary

judgment de novo. Walker v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 973, 976

(7th Cir. 2008). We construe all facts and reasonable

inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Marion v.

City of Corydon, Indiana, 559 F.3d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 2009).

Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings,

discovery, disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits

show that there is no genuine issue of material fact

and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Estate of Suskovich v.

No. 10-2290 13

Anthem Health Plans of Virginia, Inc., 553 F.3d 559, 563

(7th Cir. 2009). In a § 1983 case, the plaintiff bears the

burden of proof regarding the claimed constitutional

violation, and must present sufficient evidence to

create genuine issues of material fact to avoid summary

judgment. Sow v. Fortville Police Dep’t, et al., 636 F.3d 293,

300 (7th Cir. 2011).

Jackson faces a difficult road in meeting her burden

of showing that the facts of her case suffice to constitute

a constitutional deprivation. The Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment “generally does not im-

pose upon the state a duty to protect individuals from

harm by private actors.” Buchanan-Moore v. County of

Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009). However,

there are two exceptions to this general rule. The first

arises when a state has custody over a person. In that

instance, the state is obligated to offer protection

because no alternative avenues of aid exist. Id. The

second exception comes into play “when the state af-

firmatively places a particular individual in a position

of danger the individual would not otherwise have

faced.” Id. This second exception is known as the state-

created danger doctrine, and it is the basis on which

Jackson advances her claim.

To establish a substantive due process claim under a

state-created danger theory, Jackson must demonstrate

that: (1) the district, by its affirmative acts, created or

increased a danger that Jackson faced; (2) the district’s

failure to protect her from danger was the proximate

cause of her injuries; and (3) the district’s failure to

14 No. 10-2290

protect her “shocks the conscience.” King ex rel. King v.

East St. Louis School Dist. 189, 496 F.3d 812, 817-18 (7th

Cir. 2007). The defendants contend that Jackson’s claim

fails under all three prongs of this test. They argue that

Jackson voluntarily chose to teach disabled children,

including those with autism, and that the district’s

actions do not shock the conscience. They note the

district’s legal obligations under the Individuals with

Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), which mandates that

school districts ensure “access to the general education

curriculum in the regular classroom, to the maximum

extent possible.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(A); Hunt v. Sycamore

Community School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 542 F.3d 529, 544-

45 (6th Cir. 2008) (even if district failed to protect

teacher from special education student with a history

of violent assaults, injured teacher’s § 1983 claim fails

because teacher voluntarily undertook hazardous em-

ployment and district had duty under IDEA to educate

child). Here, although we question whether Jackson can

satisfy the first prong of the test, see Sandage v. Board of

Comm’rs of Vanderburgh County, 548 F.3d 595, 599 (7th

Cir. 2008) (noting the “essential distinction between

endangering and failing to protect”), we will address

whether the defendants’ actions “shock the conscience”

only, since Jackson’s claim falls short under this disposi-

tive prong.

The Supreme Court has held that state action that

shocks the conscience is conduct which may be deemed

“arbitrary in the constitutional sense.” County of

Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (citation

omitted). Only “the most egregious official conduct” will

No. 10-2290 15

satisfy this stringent inquiry. Id. Making a bad decision,

or even acting negligently, does not suffice to establish

the type of conscience-shocking behavior that results in

a constitutional violation. See id. at 849 (“conduct

intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any

government interest is the sort of official action most

likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level.”). We

have previously noted that while the “shocks the con-

science” standard lacks precise measurement, only

conduct falling towards the more culpable end of the

tort law spectrum of liability will be found to shock the

conscience. King ex rel. King, 496 F.3d at 818-19; see also

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Services, 489

U.S. 189, 202 (1989) (not every tort committed by a state

actor is a constitutional violation). Where, as here, public

officials have time for reasoned deliberation in their

decisions, the officials’ conduct will only be deemed

conscious shocking when it “evinces a deliberate indif-

ference to the rights of the individual.” King ex rel. King,

496 F.3d at 819. And because the state actor’s conduct is

evaluated along a spectrum of culpability, any analysis

of potentially conscious-shocking behavior is necessarily

fact-driven. Id. at 818. In this case, although this is a

close question, we ultimately conclude that the facts

present do not allow a finding that the defendants’

conduct shocks the conscience.

The factors falling in favor of finding that the defen-

dants’ actions shock the conscience are the fol-

lowing: W.K.’s outbursts were frequent—the record is

replete with noted occurrences of W.K. hitting, kicking,

scratching, and throwing objects. The district was

16 No. 10-2290

certainly aware that W.K. was prone to acts of violence,

and was fully aware that W.K. had harmed teachers in

the past. W.K.’s bouts of physical aggression were

often unexpected, unpredictable, and “out of the blue.” No

one could be sure exactly when W.K. would have an

outburst, or what would trigger it, creating a precarious

environment for all who were around him. Even

though W.K. was a child, Principal Zeman and Jackson

considered him to be strong. And Principal Zeman said

that he wanted Jackson to go to W.K.’s room even

though he knew W.K. was either in the midst of a violent

outburst, or had recently de-escalated from one. Jackson

asserts that these factors, combined with the district’s

decision not to transfer W.K. from White Eagle, suffice

to allow her § 1983 claim to survive summary judgment.

See, e.g., White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 385-86 (7th Cir.

1979) (district court’s dismissal of complaint alleging

§ 1983 violation reversed where police officers left

children alone in a car on a cold night after arresting

the car’s driver, resulting in mental and physical

damage to the children); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122,

1126-27 (7th Cir. 1993) (district court’s dismissal of com-

plaint alleging § 1983 violation reversed where police

officers arrested original driver of a car, leaving a drunk

passenger behind who later caused a head-on collision);

Monfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d 511, 520 (7th Cir. 1998) (evidence

before jury was sufficient to find constitutional violation

where officers released identifiable voice recording of

informant who was later murdered).

However, the factors falling in favor of finding that

the defendants’ actions do not shock the conscience are

No. 10-2290 17

the following: the record shows that many of W.K.’s acts

of violence were not against other people, but were

against himself, by, for example, intentionally running

into walls. The IEP evaluation reports describe the staff

members as expressing concern that they were not

meeting W.K.’s needs, that he was incredibly needy and

disrespectful, and that he was failing to advance, but not

that they were in fear of his harming them. The district

held regular evaluations of W.K. where it was noted that

his total incidents were down, and that he was showing

a trend towards verbal, rather than physical, outbursts.

Principal Zeman went to W.K.’s room before he asked

Jackson to talk to W.K. about his outburst, and Principal

Zeman did not leave the room until after he felt that

W.K. had calmed down. And every IEP evaluation re-

port, except for the report created after the March 13

incident where W.K. injured Jackson, recommended that

the educational setting that best met W.K.’s needs was

supported education in a general educational class-

room. Without these critical factors, the district’s decision

not to transfer W.K. could be seen as an implicit ac-

ceptance of, and a deliberate indifference to, violence

towards its teachers and staff, which could satisfy the

standard for finding a constitutional violation. King ex rel.

King, 496 F.3d at 819. But see Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d

507, 510-11 (7th Cir. 1986) (due process clause does not

assure safe working conditions for public employees).

As the unique facts of this case stand, although the de-

fendants’ actions may well have been short-sighted,

flawed, negligent, and tortious, they do not satisfy the

standard for finding a constitutional violation. County of

18 No. 10-2290

Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 848; Collins v. City of Harker

Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992) (the due process

clause is not a guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised

personnel decisions by state actors).

We do not lightly reach the conclusion that the defen-

dants’ conduct does not shock the conscience. We are

cognizant of the school district’s stated policy require-

ment to “at all times take necessary measures to protect

all employees from physical or psychological harm.” And

education professionals who take on the extraordinary

task of teaching children in public schools, including

those who choose to teach children with disabilities,

should not also be expected to endure frequent and

unpredictable acts of violence. We emphasize that at

no time is it necessary for a student to inflict serious

bodily harm on a teacher before a school is justified in

deciding that a general education classroom is not the

appropriate forum for a certain disabled student. But a

“shocks the conscience” analysis is necessarily a fact-

driven one, and here, we cannot say that the decision of

the district not to transfer W.K. before the March 13

incident was the type of egregious act that constituted

a constitutional violation of Jackson’s rights.

Because we conclude that Jackson’s constitutional

rights were not violated we will not address the addi-

tional issues she briefed on appeal, specifically, that

Principal Zeman’s directive was attributable to a school

board policy; that the district’s failure to train was a

cause of Jackson’s injuries; that the non-district de-

fendants are not entitled to qualified immunity; and

No. 10-2290 19

that the defendants’ policies and practices proximately

caused Jackson’s injuries.

III. CONCLUSION

The decision of the district court is A FFIRMED.

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