Singer Management Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 09-2238

_______________

SINGER MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS, INC.;

LIVE GOLD OPERATIONS, INC.,

v.

ANNE MILGRAM,

Attorney General of the State of New Jersey

Live Gold Operations, Inc., Appellant

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

For the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-07-cv-03929)

District Judge: Honorable Dickinson R. Debevoise

_______________

Argued before original panel on November 17, 2009

Petition for Rehearing En Banc granted September 1, 2010

Argued En Banc February 23, 2011

_______________

Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SLOVITER, SCIRICA,

RENDELL, BARRY, AMBRO, FUENTES, SMITH,

FISHER, CHAGARES, JORDAN, HARDIMAN,

GREENAWAY JR., VANASKIE, ALDISERT

and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: June 15, 2011)

William L. Charron, Esquire (Argued)

Pryor Cashman

7 Times Square

New York, NY 10036

Counsel for Appellant

Jeffrey A. Koziar, Esquire

Andrea M. Silkowitz, Esquire (Argued)

Office of Attorney General or New Jersey

124 Halsey Street

P.O. Box 45029

Newark, NJ 07102-0000

Counsel for Appellee

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________

AMBRO, Circuit Judge, with whom SCIRICA, RENDELL,

BARRY, FUENTES, SMITH, FISHER, CHAGARES,

JORDAN, HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and

VANASKIE, Circuit Judges, join.

Does a party ―prevail‖ within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988 if it obtains a temporary restraining order the day after

it files suit (after a hearing but before briefing from the

2

opposing side), but 22 days later is denied a preliminary

injunction because the opposing party‘s voluntary change of

position moots the case? Because we believe that Supreme

Court precedent requires us to answer no, we affirm the same

determination by the District Court.1

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

Live Gold Operations, Inc. manages and promotes the

music recording and performing groups known as ―The

Platters‖ and ―The Cornell Gunter Coasters‖ pursuant to

licenses of unregistered trademarks. In August 2007, the

State of New Jersey learned that Live Gold had scheduled a

two-week concert, to begin on August 18, of the Platters and

Coasters groups at the Hilton Hotel in Atlantic City. The

State informed Live Gold that its use of the trademarks ―The

Platters‖ and ―The Cornell Gunter Coasters‖ might violate the

New Jersey Truth in Music Act, which provides in pertinent

part:

A person shall not advertise or

conduct a live musical

performance or production

through the use of an affiliation,

connection or association between

the performing group and the

recording group unless:

(a) The performing group is the

authorized registrant and owner of

a federal service mark for the

group registered in the United

1

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

3

States Patent and Trademark

Office; or

(b) At least one member of the

performing group was a member

of the recording group and has a

legal right by virtue of use or

operation under the group name

without having abandoned the

name or affiliation of the group;

or

(c) The live musical performance

or production is identified in all

advertising and promotion as a

salute or tribute; or

(d) The advertising does not

relate to a live musical

performance or production taking

place in this State; or

(e) The performance or

production is expressly authorized

by the recording group.

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:32B-2.

Live Gold responded by providing the State with

evidence of its ownership of common law unregistered

trademarks in each group‘s name and asserting that the

unregistered trademarks should be considered ―express

authorizations‖ under subsection (e). Not satisfied that

ownership of an unregistered trademark could comply with

the Truth in Music Act, the State advised the Hilton Hotel

that it could avoid liability under the Act by ticketing and

4

advertising the concert as a ―tribute‖ or ―salute‖ to the

Platters and Coasters groups. Hilton complied.

On August 17, 2007, the day before the first Hilton

concert, Live Gold sued the State, seeking a TRO and

injunctive relief against its enforcement of the Truth in Music

Act in the manner it advised. Live Gold argued, among other

things, that the State‘s enforcement of the Act conflicted with

the federal Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, and violated its

civil rights.

At the TRO hearing before Judge Debevoise, Live

Gold asserted that it had the right to conduct performances

using its unregistered trademarks, and objected to the State‘s

actions that caused the Hilton to label the groups‘

performances inaccurately as ―tributes‖ or ―salutes.‖ The

State responded that, because Live Gold‘s unregistered

trademarks were not ―express authorizations‖ under the Act,

the Hilton concert must be billed as a tribute or salute. Judge

Debevoise expressed doubts about the State‘s position:

That is not what [Live Gold‘s

groups] want to do. That is not

what they say accurately describes

them. So, in effect, the State is

telling the Hilton to advertise or

publicize this event in a way

which is not in accordance with

the description which these

promoters of the events say is

accurate.

...

I think there is sufficient problem

with the State‘s position so that I

5

– there is a likelihood of success

on the merits in this particular

case.

...

[T]here may be substantial federal

rights being impaired by the

action of the State in this case,

generally, under the statute . . .

important federal rights are at

issue, both freedom of speech

rights under the Lanham Act and

private rights to nonregistered

trademark – trade name.

Consequently, the Temporary

Restraining Order will issue.

...

[W]e‘ll have an opportunity to get

to the merits of this case on

September 7th.

(Emphasis added.) The TRO ―temporarily restrained and

enjoined [the State] from interfering in any way with [the

Hilton concert], and the marketing and promotion thereof.‖

On September 7, 2007, the parties returned to the

District Court for a hearing on the preliminary injunction. In

its written submission prior to the hearing, the State argued

that an unregistered trademark satisfied the Truth in Music

Act only if the performing group obtained express

authorization from an original group member, included an

original member, or denominated itself as a tribute or salute

to the original group. The State contended that its

6

interpretation of the Act was consistent with the Lanham Act,

the First Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. It also objected to Live Gold‘s suit

on jurisdictional grounds.

Judge Debevoise began the preliminary injunction

hearing by asking the State why it insisted on distinguishing

between registered and unregistered trademarks: ―Why

shouldn‘t they proceed on an equal basis, two valid

trademarks?‖ In response, the State contended that because

the Lanham Act accorded a rebuttable presumption of validity

to registered trademarks, its action here against unregistered

trademarks was consistent with federal law. Judge Debevoise

repeatedly rejected this argument, explaining that the

differences under federal law between registered and

unregistered trademarks for purposes of validity did not

authorize the State to discriminate against an unregistered

trademark, once proven valid. ―There‘s no reason for it,‖ he

declared. Nevertheless, the State continued to press its

interpretation of the Truth in Music Act. Judge Debevoise

again rejected the State‘s position, stating, ―Well, I fail to see

it.‖

After rejecting the State‘s arguments, Judge Debevoise

suggested that the State reconcile the Truth in Music Act with

the Lanham Act by interpreting subsection (e) of the former

to permit unregistered trademark holders to perform under

their group names without any additional requirements. The

State suddenly capitulated, effectively adopting Live Gold‘s

interpretation of the Act. Incredulous, Live Gold objected

that the State had made ―a 180 degree shift in position.‖

Judge Debevoise agreed, telling the State that the position in

its brief was ―contrary to what I [just] understood you to say.‖

In response, the State explained that its previous position

―was inadvertently put into the brief.‖ The Judge then

7

declared that the State would be ―bound‖ by its new

interpretation of the Act.

Live Gold then moved for summary disposition,

contending that it ―should win‖ because the State had

―admitt[ed] the allegations‖ in the complaint. Judge

Debevoise observed that the State‘s new position resolved the

―basic legal problem, which was an equal protection problem,

a First Amendment problem, [and] a due process problem.‖

He again took note of the State‘s ―evolved‖ position, but saw

no need to ―go any further.‖ He then announced:

We have a statement by the State

of New Jersey as to what the

meaning of this statute is insofar

as it relates to common law

trademarks, and I think we‘ve

stated it. If there‘s a valid

common law trademark under the

Lanham Act, and if whoever has

possession of it can establish a

right to that possession, he is to be

treated – or she is to be treated in

the same way as the holder of a

registered trademark. Now, no

necessity of – to say or give any

tribute to anybody. So we have

an agreement on that.

The Court then vacated the TRO, which had already expired

―by its own term[s] [after] 10 days, and . . . was directed

primarily to the August performance at the Hilton.‖ Having

secured the State‘s position going forward, Judge Debevoise

left open the option of continuing consideration of the

preliminary injunction, but he found no need to convert the

TRO to a preliminary injunction at that time.

8

Subsequently, Pryor Cashman LLP sought leave to

move for an award of its attorney‘s fees and costs incurred in

representing Live Gold. The issue was referred to Magistrate

Judge Salas, who denied Pryor Cashman‘s application,

concluding that Live Gold was not a ―prevailing party‖ under

42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) because the State had voluntarily

changed its position on the meaning of the Truth in Music

Act.

Live Gold sought review of Judge Salas‘s order by the

District Court. The State filed a motion to dismiss. Judge

Debevoise addressed both issues in a hearing on March 16,

2009. At that hearing, he first addressed the State‘s motion

to dismiss. Seeking to identify any unresolved constitutional

issues, he asked the State to confirm that ―[e]ven though

literally . . . [the Truth in Music Act] might be interpreted to

exclude [performing groups holding unregistered

trademarks], it doesn‘t really do so and you‘re not

interpreting it to do so.‖ The State concurred, stating that

―[t]he [revised] position we took on September 7, 2007, in

this courtroom, is the position we‘re taking now.‖ Judge

Debevoise then obtained the agreement of all parties that the

preliminary injunction hearing resolved Live Gold‘s

constitutional claims, and asked, ―Why shouldn‘t [Live

Gold‘s complaint] be dismissed, other than [Pryor

Cashman‘s] application for attorney‘s fees?‖ After hearing

Live Gold‘s arguments, he remained unpersuaded, explaining

―I just don‘t know what else there is to address. . . . In effect,

[Live Gold] won the case.‖

Judge Debevoise then turned to Pryor Cashman‘s

application for attorney‘s fees. After hearing from Live Gold,

he asked, ―State, why shouldn‘t you be responsible for

attorney‘s fees[?]‖ In response, the State replied that a fee

award was inappropriate because ―there was no past

enforcement action‖ and because it had never taken any

9

position on the Truth in Music Act. Judge Debevoise

disagreed with the latter contention, reminding the State that

it made a ―180 degree change in position because [it] came in

negating everything that [Live Gold] [was] urging, and in

effect conceded [Live Gold] [was] right, and permitted

everything to go forward.‖ The State again distanced itself

from its initial arguments, explaining that they were ―not . . .

as clear as they could have been‖ because the State was

rushed in responding to the TRO application. The Court took

the matter under advisement.

One month later, Judge Debevoise entered an order

affirming the Magistrate Judge‘s order denying

reimbursement of Live Gold‘s attorney‘s fees and granting

the State‘s motion to dismiss. In his order, Judge Debevoise

held that Live Gold was not a prevailing party because he

―did not enter a preliminary injunction or any other order on

the merits of the case.‖ He also concluded that the State

voluntarily changed its position, stating that ―[w]hile it may

be true that this court‘s involvement aided in the resolution of

the constitutional issues between the parties, the fact remains

that the issues were not resolved as the result of a court

order.‖ In granting the State‘s motion to dismiss, Judge

Debevoise concluded that Live Gold‘s claims were moot in

light of the parties‘ agreement that the preliminary injunction

hearing had resolved all of Live Gold‘s constitutional claims.

In this appeal, Live Gold challenges only the denial of

attorney‘s fees.

II. Governing Precedent

To be eligible to make a prevailing-party claim under

§ 1988, the plaintiff must, ―at a minimum, . . . be able to point

to a resolution of the dispute which changes the legal

relationship between itself and the defendant.‖ Tex. State

Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782,

10

792 (1989). The change must be ―judicially sanctioned,‖

Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health &

Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001), and must ―achieve[]

some of the benefit the part[y] sought in bringing suit,‖

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). A ―voluntary change

in conduct . . . lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the

change.‖ Buckhannon, 532 U.S. 598-99. In other words, ―a

plaintiff does not become a ‗prevailing party‘ solely because

his lawsuit causes a voluntary change in the defendant‘s

conduct.‖ People Against Police Violence v. City of

Pittsburgh, 520 F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (―PPAV‖).

Rather, the change in the parties‘ legal relationship must be

the product of judicial action. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at

605-06.

The Supreme Court so far has identified two

resolutions that establish prevailing party eligibility: (1)

judgments on the merits, and (2) court-ordered consent

decrees (including settlement agreements enforced through

consent decrees). Id. at 604. The first resolution contains

two independent requirements: (1) a judgment (2) that was

on the merits.2

A. The judgment requirement

A grant of summary judgment or a trial verdict in

favor of the plaintiff is no doubt a ―judgment.‖ In contrast, a

court‘s ―judicial pronouncement that the defendant has

violated the Constitution‖ does not create the requisite

―material alteration of the legal relationship between the

2

Live Gold does not argue that the second resolution, ―court-

ordered consent decree,‖ is in play here, nor could it for the

reasons discussed below. See infra note 3.

11

parties . . . until the plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a

judgment.‖ Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112–13 (1992).

Thus, when an appellate court, in reversing the district

court‘s dismissal of the plaintiff‘s claim, ruled that the

plaintiff‘s constitutional rights were violated, the Supreme

Court held that the plaintiff had not ―prevailed‖ because there

was no enforceable judgment. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S.

755, 760 (1987). The only ―relief‖ to the plaintiff from this

appellate victory was ―the moral satisfaction of knowing that

a federal court concluded that his rights had been violated.‖

Id. at 762.

B. The merits requirement

Any judgment must also be ―on the merits.‖ As

recognized by the Supreme Court shortly after § 1988 was

amended to allow attorney‘s fees, ―Congress intended to

permit the interim award of counsel fees only when a party

has prevailed on the merits of at least some of his claims.‖

Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 (1980) (per

curiam) (emphases added); see also id. at 757 (―[I]t seems

clearly to have been the intent of Congress to permit such an

interlocutory award only to a party who has established his

entitlement to some relief on the merits of his claims, either in

the trial court or on appeal.‖). Similarly, the Supreme Court

has observed that ―[r]espect for ordinary language requires

that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his

claim before he can be said to prevail.‖ Hewitt, 482 U.S. at

760.

Indeed, in an area of the law that ―has been framed in

various ways,‖ Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, the merits-based

requirement established in Hanrahan and Hewitt has been

consistently repeated throughout the Court‘s ―prevailing

party‖ jurisprudence. See Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 82

12

(2007); Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603–04, 608; Farrar, 506

U.S. at 110–12; Garland, 489 U.S. at 790, 792. We have

followed suit to hold that, to be entitled to prevailing party

fees based on interim relief, relief must be ―derived from

some determination on the merits.‖ J.O. v. Orange Twp. Bd.

of Educ., 287 F.3d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 2002).

III. Live Gold did not receive a “judgment on the

merits,” and therefore was not a prevailing party.

A. The temporary restraining order was not

issued on the merits.

In this case, we have a temporary restraining order. In

PAPV, we held that injunctive relief ―can, under appropriate

circumstances, render a party ‗prevailing.‘‖ 520 F.3d at 233.

However, the ―merits‖ requirement is difficult to meet

in the context of TROs and preliminary injunctions, as the

plaintiff in those instances needs only to show a likelihood of

success on the merits (that is, a reasonable chance, or

probability, of winning) to be granted relief. A ―likelihood‖

does not mean more likely than not. Cf. Hackett v. Price, 381

F.3d 281, 290-91 (3d Cir. 2004). Because of this, we have

held that a court‘s finding of ―reasonable probability of

success on the merits‖ is not a resolution of ―any merit-based

issue.‖ John T. v. Del. County, 318 F.3d 545, 559 (3d Cir.

2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As this

―probability‖ ruling is usually the only merits-related legal

determination made when courts grant TROs and preliminary

injunctions, it follows that parties will not often ―prevail‖

based solely on those events.

Our decision in PAPV provides an example of that rare

situation where a merits-based determination is made at the

injunction stage. There, a rally organizer challenged the

13

constitutionality of an ordinance that required groups to

prepay police protection costs before they could receive a

permit for parades and rallies. PAPV, 520 F.3d at 229. At the

first hearing in the case, the District Court granted the

requested TRO after ―concluding that [the ordinance] ‗was

facially unconstitutional,‘‖ and that, even if the City

voluntarily did not enforce the ordinance (as it had offered to

do), ―a permit regime devoid of any prescribed process would

also be unconstitutional.‖ Id. Therefore, the Court enjoined

the City from enforcing the law, imposed its own temporary

procedures governing permits, and directed the parties to

meet and confer concerning a new proposal. Id. at 229–30.

The City later proposed a revised ordinance, but the Court

found it lacking, converted the TRO to a preliminary

injunction, and requested further briefing. Id. at 230.

The City submitted a second revised ordinance, and in

the meantime formally repealed the unconstitutional

provision. Id. After this repeal, the City moved to dismiss

the suit. Id. The Court denied the motion because no new

procedures had taken the now-repealed ordinance‘s place, and

a lack of guidelines was itself unconstitutional. Id. The

injunction remained in effect for over two years until a new

ordinance was enacted that satisfied the concerns of the

Court. Id. Only then did it lift the injunction and close the

case with the parties‘ agreement. Id.

The legal victories in PAPV are far from the events

now before us. Judge Debevoise here never ruled, as did the

PAPV Court, that the challenged law (or application of the

law) was unconstitutional. Id. at 234. Instead, the TRO was

based only on a ―likelihood of success on the merits.‖3 App.

3

While Judge Debevoise suggested at the TRO hearing that

the State‘s interpretation of the law posed ―a very serious

problem‖ and recognized ―a significant risk there may be

14

187. In PAPV, the TRO prohibited enforcement of the

challenged ordinance and affirmatively created new

procedures to govern the City. The TRO in our case merely

enjoined the State of New Jersey ―from interfering in any way

with live performances by [Live Gold‘s] . . . groups at the

Hilton Hotel in Atlantic City, New Jersey, and the marketing

and promotion thereof.‖ The State remained free to enforce

the Truth in Music Act (so long as it did not interfere with the

Hilton performances).4

substantial federal rights being impaired by the action of the

State,‖ that will be true in almost all of these cases—§ 1988

deals with civil rights cases, which typically involve ―very

serious‖ and ―substantial federal rights.‖ Judge Debevoise

acknowledged that ―the State maybe has some merit to its

position‖ (emphasis added), and stated it could resolve the

merits ―at a later date upon the return day of the Order to

Show Cause.‖

4

Contrary to the concerns expressed by Judge Roth, we do

not mean to ―cast[] doubt‖ on the ―well-supported legal

proposition‖ that, in some cases, interim injunctive relief may

be sufficient to warrant attorney‘s fees. We agree that

―interim relief remains a proper basis for an award of

attorney‘s fees when that relief is based on a determination of

the merits of the plaintiff‘s claims.‖ We emphasize, however,

that the determination must be merits-based, like the PAPV

Court‘s decision that the challenged law in that case was

unconstitutional, and may not be merely a finding of a

likelihood of success on the merits, as in this case.

15

Therefore, the TRO here was not merits-based.5 As

such, it does not confer eligibility for prevailing party status.

We thus turn to whether anything occurred after the TRO to

resolve the controversy on the merits and render Live Gold

the prevailing party under § 1988.

B. The State’s actions after the TRO issued

were voluntary, and no judgment was issued

on the merits.

There was no determination on the merits in this case

because the State mooted the case at the preliminary

injunction hearing by agreeing with Live Gold‘s position. As

noted, the Supreme Court has identified two formal

resolutions that make a winning attorney eligible for a fee

award: (1) enforceable judgments on the merits, and (2)

court-ordered consent decrees. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604.

Buckhannon characterized these two resolutions as

―examples‖ of decisions that create the necessary material

alteration of the legal relationship of the parties. Id. at 604–

05. There may be resolutions other than the two identified in

Buckhannon that warrant prevailing party status (although the

Supreme Court has yet to identify any). But even if they are

5

Judge Roth argues that the TRO was a ―functional

determination on the merits‖ because it ―protected Live Gold

from a potential enforcement action by the State‖ and allowed

the concert series to proceed without being labeled a

―tribute.‖ Thus, she contends, ―Live Gold had largely

obtained the relief it requested.‖ While this has surface

appeal, the Supreme Court has told us it is not enough. As we

have explained, Live Gold did not obtain a judgment on the

merits of its claim. Without that, it is simply not entitled to

attorney‘s fees.

16

merely examples, Buckhannon precludes the events in this

case from qualifying as a third form of resolution that can

support prevailing party status.

Some background helps to understand the sea change

caused by Buckhannon in this area of the law. Prior to that

decision, the rule in most circuits was that a plaintiff was a

―prevailing party‖ if it ―achieve[d] the desired result because

the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the

defendant‘s conduct.‖ Id. at 601–02. This became known as

the ―catalyst theory.‖ Id.

For example, we held pre-Buckhannon that a plaintiff

who could ―prove that the existence of the lawsuit

accomplished the original objectives of the lawsuit without a

formal judgment c[ould] be a ‗prevailing party.‘‖

Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F.3d 541, 544

(3d Cir. 1994), overruled by Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602–

05. We applied the ―well-established‖ catalyst theory to

allow attorney‘s fees when defendants ―voluntarily changed

their behavior to eliminate the complained-of conduct.‖ Id.

To support this theory, we relied in part on the policy

consideration that ―if defendants could deprive plaintiffs of

attorney‘s fees by unilaterally mooting the underlying case by

conceding to plaintiffs‘ demands, attorneys might be more

hesitant about bringing these civil rights suits, a result

inconsistent with Congress‘ intent in enacting section 1988.‖

Id. at 548. Thus, we held that plaintiffs could be prevailing

parties ―notwithstanding the absence of a judgment or consent

decree‖ so long as they ―accomplished the original objectives

of the lawsuit.‖ Id. at 544, 551.

Were this the law governing us today, we would hold

the prevailing party requirement satisfied, as Live Gold

accomplished its objectives by filing a lawsuit that

―catalyzed‖ the State to change its position voluntarily. In

17

Baumgartner it did not matter that there was no judgment or

consent decree; because the ―existence of the lawsuit

accomplished the original objectives of the lawsuit,‖

attorney‘s fees would be warranted. Id. at 544.

But Buckhannon overruled Baumgartner, and the latter

is no longer the law. In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court

reiterated that theretofore it had ―only awarded attorney‘s

fees‖ when the plaintiff obtained a ―judgment on the merits‖

or a ―court-ordered consent decree.‖ 532 U.S. at 605. It had

not awarded attorney‘s fees under the following

circumstances: where the plaintiff acquired a ―judicial

pronouncement that the defendant has violated the

Constitution unaccompanied by ‗judicial relief,‘‖ id. at 606

(quoting Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 760) (emphasis in original);

where the plaintiff ―secured the reversal of a directed

verdict,‖ id. at 605–06 (citing Hanrahan, 446 U.S. at 759); or

where there was a ―nonjudicial alteration of actual

circumstances,‖ id. at 606 (citation omitted) (internal

quotations marks omitted). The ―catalyst theory‖ was added

to this list, as there is no ―judicially sanctioned change‖ in the

parties‘ ―legal relationship.‖ Id. at 605. ―A defendant‘s

voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing

what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the

necessary judicial imprimatur on the change.‖ Id. Thus, the

Supreme Court concluded, ―the ‗catalyst theory‘ is not a

permissible basis for the award of attorney‘s fees . . . .‖ Id. at

610.

In so holding, it considered the same policy argument

we raised in Baumgartner—that without the catalyst theory

―defendants [could] unilaterally moot[] an action before

judgment in an effort to avoid an award of attorney‘s fees‖—

but was not swayed. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 608–09. Thus,

18

however persuasive that argument may seem, it cannot

influence our decision here.6

* * * * *

The TRO Live Gold obtained was plainly not a

―judgment on the merits.‖ Judge Debevoise, who entered the

TRO, certainly did not think so. At the preliminary

injunction hearing the State chose to agree with the position

pressed by the plaintiff. As that agreement resolved the

constitutional issues, the case was mooted. Even if there are

circumstances where a ―judgment on the merits‖ or a ―court-

ordered consent decree‖ is not required for prevailing-party

status, Buckhannon prevents the events in this case from

qualifying.

Because no enforceable judgment on the merits issued

in this case and the State‘s actions that mooted the case were

voluntary, Buckhannon tells us that Live Gold was not a

prevailing party. Given that precedent, we affirm.

6

We doubt that the consequences of our decision today will

be nearly as severe as Judge Aldisert foreshadows. In any

event, our job is to follow Supreme Court precedent. Judge

Aldisert writes about what the law should be, but we must

deal with what the law is.

19

Singer Management Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram

No. 09-2238

ROTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting, with whom McKEE, Chief

Judge, SLOVITER and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges, join.

“When does a party „prevail‟ within the meaning of 42

U.S.C. § 1988?” That is the basic question that both parties

here are asking. The Majority qualifies the question by

referring to certain facts of record: “Does a party „prevail‟ if

it obtains a temporary restraining order the day after it files

suit . . . but 22 days later is denied a preliminary injunction

because the opposing party‟s voluntary change of position

moots the case?” The Majority answers “No” to the question.

I would add different facts to the basic question – and,

by doing so, I arrive at a different answer. My “different”

qualifying facts are clearly found in the record of this case.

Moreover, my facts support a finding of “prevailing party.”

I acknowledge that the qualifying facts that the

Majority depends upon are reflected in the record before us.

As the Majority states, there was a temporary restraining

order (TRO) granted. The Majority does not mention,

however, that the TRO granted a large part of the relief

plaintiffs sought.

Again, as the Majority states, there was no preliminary

injunction (PI) granted when the parties returned for the

September 7 hearing. But, insofar as Live Gold was asking to

enjoin the State‟s interference with the August concert, the

issue was moot. The concert had been performed as Live

Gold requested, that relief had been granted, and there was no

further need to consider it. The issue remaining was whether

the State would attempt to force other concerts by the holder

of a valid common law trademark to be designated as

“tributes” or “salutes.” The State agreed that it would not

apply the Act in such a way. Moreover, the PI, which would

have addressed this issue, was not dismissed out of hand. The

court left open the option of continuing consideration of the

PI at a later time if necessary, explaining “[s]o I‟m not setting

a date, I‟m vacating the temporary restraining order, and if

there‟s any serious problems that arise which the plaintiffs

think require emergent relief, they can ask for it to be

rescheduled on short notice.” (App. 389.) That the court felt

that such relief would not be necessary is evident from the

fact that the court had declared that the State would be

“bound by” the State‟s new interpretation of the Act. (App.

387.) The court saw no need to “go any further.” (App.

388.)

The court took note of the State‟s “evolved” position

and then stated:

We have a statement by the State of New Jersey

as to what the meaning of this statute is insofar

as it relates to common law trademarks, and I

think we‟ve stated it. If there‟s a valid common

law trademark under the Lanham Act, and if

whoever has possession of it can establish a

right to that possession, he is to be treated – or

she is to be treated in the same way as the

holder of a registered trademark. Now, no

2

necessity of – to say or give any tribute to

anybody. So we have an agreement on that.

(App. 388.) There was no dissent.

This conclusion by the court, that a valid common law

trademark was to be recognized in the same way as a

registered trademark, was the merits question put to the court

by Live Gold – and the State of New Jersey was now bound

in this action by this legal conclusion. I cannot imagine that

the State would dare come again before the District Court and

take any position contrary to the ruling of the court: “So we

have an agreement on that.” Nor, as I discuss later, would the

State be in the position to contend in any future action before

the New Jersey District Court that a valid common law

trademark was not to be accorded the same recognition as a

registered one. If it did so, the State would be barred by

judicial estoppel.

With these facts in mind, I state my question as

follows: “Does a party „prevail‟ under the meaning of 42

U.S.C. § 1988 when it has obtained a TRO, granting an

important part of the relief sought, and further when its

opponent has been bound by the District Court to the position

of law that grants complete relief on the merits of the

complaint.” I answer “Yes.” I conclude from this factual

setting, supported by the record, that Live Gold is clearly a

prevailing party and, thus, deserves an award of its reasonable

attorney‟s fees.

Moreover, this conclusion is within the boundaries of

“prevailing party” as the Supreme Court has set them out.

First, I agree with the Majority that the Court points to two

3

types of outcomes – judgments on the merits and consent

decrees – that confer prevailing party status, and it cites one

outcome – a voluntary change in conduct as a result of

litigation – that does not. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home,

Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598,

603-05 (2001). Nevertheless, as the Majority concedes, the

Court has left the door open to other, yet to be defined, results

that may confer prevailing party status. See ante, 16-17.

The Court has articulated two factors relevant to the

prevailing party inquiry: (1) whether there is a “judicially

sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties,” id.

at 603, that “achieves some of the benefit the part[y] sought

in bringing suit,” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433

(1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and

(2) whether the party “receive[s] at least some relief on the

merits of his claims,” Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 (“„It

seems clearly to have been the intent of Congress to permit . .

. an interlocutory award only to a party who has established

his entitlement to some relief on the merits of his claims,

either in the trial court or on appeal.‟” (quoting Hanrahan v.

Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 757 (1980))).

The Majority contends, however, that Live Gold did

not receive a judgment on the merits. The Majority does

agree that the TRO Live Gold obtained constituted a

judgment and that injunctive relief “can, under appropriate

circumstances, render a party „prevailing.‟” See ante, 13

(quoting People Against Police Violence v. City of Pittsburgh

(PAPV), 520 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). But, I part ways

with the Majority on its conclusion that the TRO here was not

a resolution on the merits.

4

I find it clear that the TRO obtained by Live Gold was

a “judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship”

between Live Gold and the State of New Jersey. The TRO

allowed Live Gold to achieve much of the benefit it sought in

bringing suit and provided some relief on the merits of its

claims. Before the TRO hearing, New Jersey indicated that

Live Gold could be penalized if the Platters and the Coasters

were not billed as “tribute” bands. After the District Court

issued the TRO, the bands were permitted to perform under

the names “Platters” and “Coasters” without modifiers like

“tribute” or “salute to,” and the State was prohibited from

penalizing Live Gold for doing so.

Perhaps, the Majority balks at the straightforward

conclusion that there was relief here on the merits because it

fears that “consent decrees” and “judgments on the merits,”

or their equivalents, are the only types of outcomes that

confer prevailing party status. However, as the Majority

seems to concede, there is little doubt that a plaintiff who

gains preliminary relief may be a prevailing party. The

Supreme Court has not disturbed the longstanding rule that

“„plaintiffs may be considered „prevailing parties‟ for

attorneys‟ fees purposes if they succeed on any significant

issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the

parties sought in bringing suit,‟” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S.

103, 109 (1992) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433), as long

as the relief obtained provides at least some relief on the

merits, see Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604, and consists of a

judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the

parties, see Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988) (per

curiam) (plaintiff not prevailing party where declaratory

5

judgment was entered after his death and thus could not

change his legal relationship to defendants).1

Moreover, the precedent of this Circuit – and that of

every other circuit but one – is clear that interim injunctive

relief can, in appropriate cases, constitute a “court-ordered

change in the legal relationship between the plaintiff and the

defendant” to confer prevailing party status. See PAPV, 520

F.3d at 232-33 (concluding that “relief on the merits achieved

in the form of a preliminary injunction can confer „prevailing

party‟ status”) (internal quotations omitted).2 The Majority‟s

1

Farrar makes clear that the benefit need not be

significant. There, the Court held that a plaintiff awarded

nominal damages is a prevailing party, because the award

“modifies the defendant‟s behavior for the plaintiff‟s benefit

by forcing the defendant to pay an amount of money he

otherwise would not pay.” 506 U.S. at 113.

2

Accord McQueary v. Conway, 614 F.3d 591, 596-602

(6th Cir. 2010) (opining on whether granting a preliminary

injunction may render a party prevailing always, sometimes,

or never, and favoring an award when the interim relief

indicates probable success on the merits and effects “a lasting

change in the legal relationship between the parties”);

Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Engida, 611 F.3d 1209, 1217 (10th

Cir. 2010) (“[T]o be a prevailing party on the basis of a

preliminary injunction requires „relief on the merits‟ . . . .”);

Garcia v. Yonkers Sch. Dist., 561 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 2009)

(“the entry of an enforceable judgment, such as a stay or

preliminary injunction, may permit the district court to confer

prevailing-party status on the plaintiff notwithstanding the

absence of a final judgment on the underlying claim”);

Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1355-56 (11th

6

Cir. 2009) (awarding prevailing party status to plaintiffs that

had obtained a preliminary injunction, but were later denied a

permanent injunction as a result of intervening legislation);

Dearmore v. City of Garland, 519 F.3d 517, 524-26 (5th Cir.

2008) (noting the absence of Supreme Court authority on

point and variety in the circuits‟ handling of the issue and

applying its own three-part test to find that granting a

preliminary injunction conferred prevailing party status);

Advantage Media, LLC v. City of Hopkins, 511 F.3d 833, 837

(8th Cir. 2008) (recognizing “a preliminary injunction can in

some instances carry the judicial imprimatur required by

Buckhannon to convey prevailing party status,” but finding

that final judgment in the case before it reversed the effect of

the preliminary injunction); Dupuy v. Samuels, 423 F.3d 714,

723, 723 n.4 (7th Cir. 2005) (affirming that a preliminary

injunction may justify an award of attorney‟s fees based on

prevailing party status); Watson v. Cnty. of Riverside, 300

F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A preliminary injunction

issued by a judge carries all the „judicial imprimatur‟

necessary to satisfy Buckhannon.”); Race v. Toledo-Davilla,

291 F.3d 857, 859 (1st Cir. 2002) (“an individual may be

entitled to attorney‟s fees without having obtained a favorable

final judgment following a full trial on the merits, but he must

obtain relief based on the merits of at least some of his

claims.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted)); but see

Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 274-78 (4th Cir. 2002)

(expressing doubts as to whether a preliminary injunction

may confer prevailing party status); cf. PAPV, 520 F.3d at

232-33, 233 n.4 (noting that the Fourth Circuit is the “only

one arguably dissenting Court of Appeals” (citing Smyth, 282

F.3d at 276-77)).

7

analysis casts doubt upon this well-supported legal

proposition. I hope, however, that this Court will continue to

recognize that interim relief remains a proper basis for an

award of attorney‟s fees when that relief is based on a

determination of the merits of a plaintiff‟s claim.

Furthermore, the Majority‟s conclusion that the TRO

in this case was not granted “on the merits” suffers from the

failure of the Majority to offer a definition or test for when a

decision is “on the merits” in a case involving the grant of

preliminary relief. Rather, the Majority states merely that

“the „merits‟ requirement is difficult to meet in the context of

TROs and preliminary injunctions,” and that the “decision in

PAPV provides an example of that rare situation where a

merits-based determination is made at the injunction stage.”

Ante, 13. This conclusion is confusing in light of the

Majority‟s acknowledgment that to obtain a TRO or

preliminary injunction, the plaintiff needs to “show a

likelihood of success on the merits.” Id.; see also Munaf v.

Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 690 (2008). One would expect that

when a plaintiff makes a sufficient showing of likelihood of

success on the merits to obtain “an „extraordinary and drastic

remedy,‟” a remedy that is “never awarded as of right,”

Munaf, 533 U.S. at 689-90, this victory would frequently

result in prevailing party status. 3

3

The Majority attempts to evade this common-sense

conclusion by mistakenly arguing that “„likelihood‟ does not

mean more likely that than not.” Ante at 13 (citing Hackett v.

Price, 381 F.3d 281, 290-91 (3d Cir. 2004).) But Hackett

was not a preliminary injunction case – it was a habeas case

concerning the constitutionality of jury instructions at the

penalty phase of a capital case, where the question was

8

Instead, the Majority argues that a preliminary

injunction reflects a determination on the merits only in a

case like PAPV, where the court granted a preliminary

injunction lasting two years, and stated that the challenged

statute was “facially unconstitutional.” While it was clear in

PAPV that the District Court‟s determination was “on the

merits,” I disagree with the Majority‟s suggestion that such

elaboration of facts is required. This Court‟s post-

Buckhannon precedents have never applied such a standard.

Rather, in J.O. v. Orange Twp., we stated simply that

plaintiffs “who achieve favorable interim relief may be

entitled to prevailing party attorney‟s fees as long as the

interim relief granted derived from some determination on the

merits.” 287 F.3d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 2002) (emphasis added).

Contrary to the Majority‟s reasoning, PAPV did not

distinguish “reasonable probability” from “more likely than

not,” nor did it consider whether the district court had found

that the plaintiffs were more likely than not to prevail on their

“whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has

applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the

consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.” Id. at

290. Hackett acknowledged that “[a]s one definition of

„likely‟ is „having a better chance of existing or occurring

than not,‟ Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

1310 (1971), someone could plausibly argue that „reasonable

likelihood‟ is not a lesser standard than „more likely than

not.‟” Indeed, “courts use a bewildering variety of

formulations of the need for showing some likelihood of

success.” 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.

MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948.3 (2d.

ed. 2010).

9

claims. It simply noted that, as was the case here, the grant of

preliminary injunctive relief reflected a “finding of a

likelihood of plaintiff‟s success on the merits.” Id. at 233.

I submit that the proper test to determine whether

interim relief is on the merits is to distinguish (1) whether the

relief is a “„stay put‟ order[] which merely serve[s] to

maintain the status quo pendente lite” and which “do[es] not

afford meaningful relief on the merits of the underlying

claims,” PAPV, 520 F.3d at 226 (citing John T. ex rel. Paul T.

v. Del. Cnty. Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 558-59 (3d Cir.

2003)), or (2) whether the relief “placed a judicial imprimatur

on plaintiffs‟ entitlement to substantially all the relief they

sought in the complaint.” 520 F.3d at 233.4

4

We address temporary restraining orders and

preliminary injunctions together, as the two share nearly

identical factors which courts evaluate in granting such

interim relief and, in certain circumstances, have identical

legal effect. See Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 145 (3d

Cir. 2010). The most significant differences are that

temporary restraining orders may be issued with little or no

notice and may dissolve on their own accord. Id. (discussing

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2)). Nevertheless, temporary restraining

orders, like preliminary injunctions, may touch on the merits

of a case to sufficiently alter the legal relationship between

parties to confer prevailing party status. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

54(a) (“„Judgment‟ as used in these rules includes a decree

and any order from which an appeal lies.”); Robinson v.

Lehman, 771 F.2d 772, 782 (3d Cir. 1985) (“The denial of a

temporary restraining order is not generally appealable unless

its denial decides the merits of the case or is equivalent to a

dismissal of the claim.”).

10

Several circuits, in considering this issue, have adopted

similar rules. See, e.g., Garcia v. Yonkers Sch. Dist., 561

F.3d 97, 106 (2d Cir. 2009) (“a plaintiff‟s request for a

temporary restraining order may be sufficient grounds to

grant attorney‟s fees to the plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1988(b)[,]” as long as the temporary restraining order

addresses the merits of the case and does not “merely

maintain[] the status quo”); Dearmore v. City of Garland, 519

F.3d 517, 524 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Under these facts, to qualify

as a prevailing party under § 1988(b), we hold that the

plaintiff (1) must win a preliminary injunction, (2) based

upon an unambiguous indication of probable success on the

merits of the plaintiff‟s claims as opposed to a mere balancing

of the equities in favor of the plaintiff, (3) that causes the

defendant to moot the action, which prevents the plaintiff

from obtaining final relief on the merits.”); N. Cheyenne

Tribe v. Jackson, 433 F.3d 1083, 1086 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting

that “some preliminary injunctions are sufficiently akin to

final relief on the merits to confer prevailing party status,”

whereas others that “merely maintain[] the status quo do[] not

confer prevailing party status”); Dubuc v. Green Oak Twp.,

312 F.3d 736, 753 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding that granting a

preliminary injunction may confer prevailing party status if

the injunction represents “an unambiguous indication of

probable success on the merits, and not merely a maintenance

of the status quo ordered because the balance of equities

greatly favors the plaintiff” (internal quotation omitted)).

This well-established rule has several advantages.

First, it properly focuses the inquiry on whether the plaintiff

obtained relief based on the merits of its claims rather than

other interim relief factors. Compare PAPV, 520 F.3d at 232-

11

33 (noting district court‟s repeated findings of

unconstitutionality) with John T. v. Del. Cnty. Intermediate

Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 556 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that TRO was

merely to preserve status quo so that court could consider the

merits of plaintiff‟s claims).

Second, this rule avoids the concerns voiced in

Buckhannon and by the Majority that the catalyst theory is

being revived: the test focuses on the nature of the district

court‟s findings, not the defendant‟s response to those

findings or its motivations.

Third, this rule promotes judicial efficiency in a

significant class of civil rights cases where the plaintiff

essentially challenges government policies prohibiting a

discreet course of action in the future, such as advertising for

a concert or demonstrating in front of city hall. The practical

reality in such cases is that a TRO or preliminary injunction

that enables the plaintiff to do what it wants to do, i.e.,

advertise for a concert or demonstrate, is often all the relief

the plaintiff wants or needs. It may be counterproductive and

wasteful of judicial resources to require a plaintiff to insist on

a final order that it no longer needs before it can be

considered a prevailing party and obtain attorney‟s fees.

When the proper test is applied, it becomes clear that

the TRO granted to Live Gold provided “at least some relief

on the merits of . . . [the] claims,” Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at

604. In PAPV, this Court emphasized that:

(1) the trial court, based upon a finding of a

likelihood of plaintiffs‟ success on the merits,

entered a judicially enforceable order granting

12

plaintiffs virtually all the relief they sought,

thereby materially altering the legal relationship

between the parties; (2) the defendant, after

opposing interim relief, chose not to appeal

from that order and remained subject to its

restrictions for a period of over two years; and

(3) the defendant ultimately avoided final

resolution of the merits of plaintiffs‟case by

enacting new legislation giving plaintiffs

virtually all of the relief sought in the

complaint.

520 F.3d at 233.

The result here is substantially similar: the District

Court found that Live Gold was likely to succeed on the

merits of its claims, it entered a TRO affording Live Gold the

most significant relief it sought, the right to advertise and to

present the August concert outright, and not as a “tribute.” As

a result, the State was “temporarily restrained and enjoined

from interfering in any way with live performances by

Plaintiffs‟ respective groups at the Hilton Hotel in Atlantic

City, New Jersey, and the marketing and promotion thereof.”

(App. 190.) The District Court clearly indicated that it

considered the merits of the substantive legal issues during

the TRO hearing and granted the TRO in light of its view on

those issues:

I think there is sufficient problem with the

State‟s position so that I – there is a likelihood

of success on the merits in this particular case.

...

13

[T]here may be substantial federal rights being

impaired by the action of the State in this case,

generally, under the statute . . . important

federal rights are at issue, both freedom of

speech rights under the Lanham Act and private

rights to nonregistered trademark – trade name.

Consequently, the Temporary Restraining Order

will issue.

(App. 187-88.)

The District Court‟s statement that it will “have an

opportunity to get to the merits of this case on September 7th

[at the preliminary injunction hearing]” does not nullify its

determination on the merits that the August concert proceed

as Live Gold requested; it indicates only that the court

planned to consider whether Live Gold deserved further relief

for future concerts.

In addition, the TRO obtained in this case cannot be

characterized as a “stay put” order or relief pendent lite.

Rather, in the present case, the District Court‟s issuance of a

TRO effectively gave Live Gold a complete victory on one

important issue in the litigation. The musical groups being

promoted by Live Gold – “The Platters” and “The Cornell

Gunter Coasters” – were scheduled for a two-week

engagement at the Hilton Hotel to begin on August 18. On

August 17, the day before the first Hilton concert, Live Gold

sought and obtained the TRO preventing the State from

enforcing the Truth in Music Act in relation to the

performances at issue. By the time Live Gold and the State

returned to court on September 7, for a hearing on the

preliminary injunction, the concert series had already

14

concluded – and not as a “tribute.” Thus, at that point, the

TRO had protected Live Gold from a potential enforcement

action by the State, and Live Gold had largely obtained the

relief it requested.

In this light, the TRO Live Gold obtained was a

functional determination on the merits. It exalts form over

substance to claim, as the Majority does, that Live Gold has

not succeeded on the merits when what Live Gold wanted to

do was to promote and present without interference from the

State musical groups for which it held a valid common law

trademark. The District Court issued a TRO – clearly

premised on the merits of the claims at issue – compelling the

State to permit Live Gold to do just that. In this case, Live

Gold fits comfortably within “our respect for [the] ordinary

language” definition of “prevailing party.” Buckhannon, 532

U.S. at 603.

In addition to the judicial order here, the District Court

permanently altered the legal relationship between the parties.

The court‟s statement that the State would be “bound” by its

new interpretation of the Act should bar the State from taking

any inconsistent positions in future litigation because of the

doctrine of judicial estoppel. Judicial estoppel is an equitable

doctrine that entails “„the intrinsic ability of courts to dismiss

an offending litigant‟s complaint without considering the

merits of the underlying claims when such dismissal is

necessary to prevent a litigant from playing fast and loose

with the courts.‟” In re Kane, 628 F.3d 631, 638 (3d Cir.

2010) (quoting Krystal Cadillac-Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc.

v. Gen. Motors Corp., 337 F.3d 314, 319-20 (3d Cir. 2003)).

“[T]he basic principle of judicial estoppel . . . is that absent

any good explanation, a party should not be allowed to gain

15

an advantage by litigation on one theory, and then seek an

inconsistent advantage by pursuing an incompatible theory.”

Krystal Cadillac, 337 F.3d at 319 (quoting Ryan Operations

G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 358 (3d

Cir. 1996)). “Though there is no rigid test for judicial

estoppel, three factors inform a federal court‟s decision

whether to apply it: there must be (1) „irreconcilably

inconsistent positions;‟ (2) „adopted . . . in bad faith;‟ and (3)

„a showing that . . . estoppel . . . address[es] the harm and . . .

no lesser sanction [is] sufficient.‟” G-I Holdings, Inc. v.

Reliance Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 247, 262 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting

Chao v. Roy’s Constr., Inc., 517 F.3d 180, 186 n.5 (3d Cir.

2008)).

Here, once the State had reversed course and accepted

that a valid common law trademark must be treated in the

same way as a registered trademark, the State would be

judicially estopped from adopting a contrary interpretation of

the Act in any subsequent judicial proceeding and certainly in

any proceeding against Live Gold. This is the significance of

the District Court‟s statement that the State was “bound” to

its new interpretation. Moreover, it showed that the District

Court must have relied on this commitment by the State when

the court did not enter a permanent injunction against the

State. If the State were to assert again that the Truth in Music

Act does not recognize valid common law trademarks, it

would be asserting an inconsistent position in presumptive

bad faith after already having conceded the wrongfulness of

such an assertion. Judicial estoppel, therefore, would apply to

prevent the State from perpetuating a fraud on the court. See

New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 751 (noting that a court

addressing judicial estoppel should consider “whether the

party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive

16

an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the

opposing party if not estopped”).

In conclusion, we see that the District Court‟s binding

of the State resulted in “a court-ordered „chang[e] [in] the

legal relationship between [the plaintiff] and the defendant‟”

necessary to permit an award of attorney‟s fees. Buckhannon,

532 U.S. at 604. In this sense, the State‟s voluntary

concession and the District Court‟s “binding” of the State to

that position would prevent the State from taking contrary

positions in future litigation; it can be analogized to the

voluntary action of a consent decree: in both instances,

voluntary conduct formalized by a court results in a material

alteration in the legal relationship between the parties.

Moreover, requiring a party to go further than Live

Gold did in this case by obtaining a judgment or consent

decree would endanger the practical, efficient, and informal

resolution achieved by the District Court in this case. I

suspect that Live Gold would never have accepted the District

Court‟s resolution of the case in the way it did if it had it

known that it would not be a prevailing party. Live Gold

would have insisted on greater judicial formalization of the

change in the State‟s position, a consent decree, or the like.

The Majority‟s insistence on a “judgment,” rather than

Buckhannon‟s broader “judicial imprimatur,” will only

unnecessarily drag out cases and lead to judicial inefficiency.

The essential question in the prevailing party inquiry is

whether the party has obtained a judicial alteration of the

legal relationship between the parties. Live Gold certainly

accomplished that.

17

Under these circumstances, an award of attorney‟s fees

is consistent with Supreme Court precedent, see Buckhannon,

532 U.S. at 603, and required by this Court‟s precedent, see

PAPV, 520 F.3d at 232-33.

For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully dissent.

I would confer prevailing party status to Live Gold and award

it its attorney‟s fees.

18

Singer Management Consultants, Inc.; Live Gold Operations,

Inc. v. Annie Milgram, No 09-2238

ALDISERT, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

As I join in all respects the dissenting opinion of Judge

Roth, I deem it necessary to add these observations regarding

civil rights cases proceeding under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and

1988. How a judge applies the Supreme Court‘s decision in

Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia

Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598

(2001), to this case depends on the judge‘s philosophy of law,

jurisprudence, and jurisprudential temperament, which inform

the decision to come to grips with whether or not an action is

―judicially sanctioned.‖ The Majority holds that the decisions

of the trial judge on the record in this case did not qualify as

―judicially sanctioned‖ actions. I am equally convinced that

they did.

Before setting forth detailed support for my view, it is

necessary to emphasize the specific holding or decision of the

Court in Buckhannon because it is the decision, and not the

reasoning, that forms the precedent. The expression stare

decisis is but an abbreviation of stare decisis et non quieta

movere (to stand by or adhere to decisions and not disturb

that which is settled). ―Decisis‖ means, literally and legally,

―the decision.‖ The doctrine is not ―stare dictis‖ (―to stand by

or keep to what was said‖). Nor is the doctrine stare

rationibus decidendi (―to keep to the reasoning of past

cases‖). Rather, a case is important for what it decides: for

―the what,‖ not ―the why,‖ and not ―the how.‖ Thus, stare

decisis means what the court did, not what it said.

1

The Court in Buckhannon stated: ―we hold that the

‗catalyst theory‘ is not a permissible basis for the award of

attorney‘s fees under the [Fair Housing Amendments Act of

1988, or the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990].‖ 532

U.S. at 610. Earlier, the Court had explained that attorney

fees should not be awarded pursuant to the catalyst theory

because that theory ―allows an award where there is no

judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the

parties.‖ Id. at 605. Thus, the issue for decision in this case is

whether there was such judicially sanctioned change.

Today the Majority makes clear that the Supreme

Court has not precluded the possibility that a ―judicially

sanctioned‖ change may include events other than a judgment

on the merits or a consent decree:

As noted, the Supreme Court has identified two

formal resolutions that make a winning attorney

eligible for a fee award: (1) enforceable

judgments on the merits, and (2) court-ordered

consent decrees. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604.

Buckhannon characterized these two resolutions

as ―examples‖ of decisions that create the

necessary material alteration of the legal

relationship of the parties. Id. at 604–05. There

may be resolutions other than the two identified

in Buckhannon that warrant prevailing party

status (although the Supreme Court has yet to

identify any).

Maj. Op. at 16. To hold as does the Majority that ―[b]ecause

no enforceable judgment on the merits was issued in this case,

and the State‘s actions that mooted the case were voluntary,

2

Buckhannon tells us that Live Gold was not a prevailing

party,‖ Maj. Op. at 19, is to apply a philosophy of

jurisprudence no longer in general acceptance—conceptual

jurisprudence, a philosophy that preaches that a principle, if

sound, ought to be applied wherever it logically leads,

without reference to ulterior results—and wholly

inappropriate for cases that touch upon civil rights.

Without a nod to the effects on future civil rights

cases, the Majority fashioned a major stumbling block to

success for civil rights plaintiffs in cases based on § 1983.

The plaintiff here was: (1) victorious on the merits in

obtaining a temporary restraining order, duly recorded and

altering the position of the parties, and (2) able to persuade

the District Court at the preliminary injunction hearing that

formal registration of their mark was unnecessary. That the

District Court told the plaintiff, ―in effect [you‘ve] won the

case,‖ shows that Live Gold was, in effect, the prevailing

party on the merits.

I.

I am proud of this Court‘s civil rights history from as

far back as 1939, when this Court upheld First and Fourth

Amendments rights in Hague v. Committee of Industrial

Organization, 101 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1939), aff‘d and

modified, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). Introducing his opinion for

our Court, Judge Biggs wrote: ―The question presented by the

appeal at bar is whether or not certain fundamental civil

liberties safeguarded by the Constitution of the United States

shall be observed and protected in Jersey City or shall there

stand abridged.‖ Id. at 777. Thus, more than 20 years before

the resuscitation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape, 365

U.S. 167 (1961), this Court was in the business of expanding,

3

not contracting, civil rights protections.1 Until today. Until a

Majority of this Court embarked on a jurisprudential

1

See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 270 n.4 (1994)

(identifying the Third Circuit as having ―[t]he most

expansive approach‖ among the courts of appeals as to the

extent to which a claim of malicious prosecution is

actionable under § 1983 (citing Lee v. Mihalich, 847 F.2d

66, 70 (3d Cir. 1988) (Becker, Hutchinson, Scirica)));

Pfeiffer by Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917

F.2d 779, 788 (3d Cir. 1990) (Higginbotham, Scirica,

Aldisert) (diverging from other courts of appeals to hold

that compensatory relief is available for certain Title IX

violations), abrogated on other grounds by Fitzgerald v.

Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009); Melo v.

Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 635 (3d Cir. 1990) (Sloviter, Becker,

Stapleton) (holding that state officers sued in their

individual capacities are ―persons‖ for the purposes of

§ 1983), aff‘d, 502 U.S. 21 (1991); E.E.O.C. v. Univ. of

Pa., 850 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1988) (Becker, Hutchinson,

Scirica) (holding that under the circumstances and in light

of the purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, the first-filed rule did not govern the case), aff‘d,

493 U.S. 182 (1990); Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis Coll.,

784 F.2d 505, 514–517 (3d Cir. 1986) (Adams, Gibbons,

Stapleton) (providing a broad definition of ―race‖ under 42

U.S.C. § 1981), aff‘d, 481 U.S. 604 (1987); Ricks v. Del.

State Coll., 605 F.2d 710, 712 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams,

Rosenn, Higginbotham) (identifying the ―humanitarian and

remedial purpose‖ of Title VII to hold that its limitations

period does not run until termination of employment),

rev‘d, 449 U.S. 250 (1980); Goode v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542

(3d Cir. 1974) (Staley, Gibbons, Weis) (upholding a

4

adventure that makes it unnecessarily difficult for civil rights

plaintiffs who seek to enforce federal rights and statutes. The

Majority does so by erecting roadblocks before plaintiffs who

seek to qualify as a ―prevailing party‖ under § 1988.

The Majority employs a stingy interpretation of

―judicially sanctioned,‖ declaring that there was no act of

sanctioning notwithstanding that: (1) the District Court

entered a Temporary Restraining Order based on the merits,

and (2) in the subsequent preliminary injunction hearing the

District Court told the defendant that it completely agreed

district court‘s finding that violations of constitutional

rights by Philadelphia police occurred in a high number of

instances and allowing injunctive relief), rev‘d, 423 U.S.

362 (1976); Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442,

446 (3d Cir. 1971) (McLaughlin, Aldisert, Gibbons)

(concluding that the phrase ―by a person to be aggrieved‖

in Civil Rights Act of 1964 showed ―a congressional

intention to define standing as broadly as is permitted by

Article III of the Constitution‖), quoted approvingly by

Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209

(1972), abrogated by Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP,

131 S. Ct. 863, 869 (2011); Douglas v. City of Jeannette,

130 F.2d 652 (3d Cir. 1942) (Biggs, Maris, Jones,

Goodrich) (holding that federal courts have jurisdiction

over alleged deprivations of constitutional rights pursuant

to the Civil Rights Act of 1871), aff‘d, 319 U.S. 157

(1943); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 108 F.2d 683 (3d

Cir. 1939) (Biggs, Clark, Kalodner) (affirming an

injunction against compulsory flag salutes in schools),

rev‘d, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd.

of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

5

with the plaintiff, (3) the defendant conceded that the State of

New Jersey would be bound by the District Court‘s

interpretation of the trademark, (4) the plaintiff moved for

entry of summary judgment in its favor, and (5) the District

Court declared entry of summary judgment was unnecessary

because, ―I just don‘t know what else there is to address . . .

in effect, [Live Gold] has won the case.‖

The Majority nonetheless contends that although Live

Gold won the case, the win was not ―judicially sanctioned‖

because the District Court did not enter on the record five

words: ―Plaintiff‘s summary judgment motion granted,‖ or

four words ―Judgment ordered for plaintiff.‖

The Majority nonetheless contends that although the

District Court told the parties that the plaintiff won the case,

the win was not ―judicially sanctioned‖ because the District

Court did not formally enter its decision on the record. The

Majority‘s interpretation of ―judicially sanctioned‖ is

reminiscent of the writ-based common law pleading rules,

which were so inflexible that a plaintiff that used the wrong

writ was out of court. It was a system ―that had become rigid

and rarified‖ and a system in which ―a party could easily lose

on technical rules.‖2 I therefore disagree with my colleagues

of the Majority who believe Buckhannon prohibits us from

determining that the plaintiff was a prevailing party. That

case does not establish technical rules that prohibit us from

acknowledging that the plaintiff was the prevailing party.

Let‘s face it. It‘s not that Buckhannon prohibits us. It‘s a

2

Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law:

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical

Perspective, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909, 917 (1987).

6

matter of choice. The Majority simply chooses to not extend

its holding to different facts and precepts involving attorney

fees in civil rights actions. I prefer to follow the history of this

Court in expanding holdings in civil rights cases in new and

fresh fact patterns. In so doing, I adhere to what our Court has

been doing since 1939, and we carry forward the pioneer

efforts of American jurisprudents from as early as the end of

the Nineteenth Century.

II.

The distance between the Majority and the dissent in

this case can be traced through more than one hundred years

of American legal history. As early as 1897, American courts

were being chided for undue reliance on theoretical concepts.

This was the philosophy behind European attempts to

establish codes in every country on the continent. German

Professor Rudolf von Ihering pioneered the work of replacing

the European jurisprudence of conceptions with a

jurisprudence based upon results. Our own thinkers, across

the Atlantic Ocean, followed suit. In The Path of the Law in

1897 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. gently admonished:

I think that the judges themselves have failed

adequately to recognize their duty of weighing

considerations of social advantage. The duty is

inevitable, and the result of the often

proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with such

considerations is simply to leave the very

7

ground and foundation of judgments

inarticulate, and often unconscious . . .3

By 1906, Dean Roscoe Pound of Harvard Law School was

trumpeting the same theme. He described our system as

conceptual jurisprudence, a slavish adherence to elegantia

juris, the symmetry of law, and suggested that we resembled

too much the rigid German Begriffsjurisprudenz.4 This led

him to call upon the American Bar Association to put an end

to mechanical jurisprudence: ―The most important and most

constant cause of dissatisfaction with all law at all times is to

be found in the necessarily mechanical operation of legal

rules.‖5

In 1921, Benjamin N. Cardozo delivered the Storrs

lectures at Yale, stating: ―The final cause of law is the welfare

of society. The rule that misses its aim cannot permanently

justify its existence.‖6 The same year, he seized the

opportunity to put his new theory into practice by publicly

rejecting blind conceptual jurisprudence. See Hynes v. N.Y.

Cent. R.R., 131 N.E. 898 (N.Y. 1921).

These thinkers led us out of the methodology of

conceptual jurisprudence—the view that a legal precept

3

Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L.

Rev. 457, 467 (1897).

4

Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence 608, 610 (1908).

5

Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with

the Administration of Justice, Address Before the Am. Bar

Ass‘n (Aug. 29th 1906).

6

Benjamin N. Cardozo. The Nature of the Judicial Process

66 (1921).

8

should be followed to its dryly logical extreme, regardless of

its effects on society. If Pound‘s 1908 warning against

mechanical decision making did not create a new American

school of jurisprudence, it at least spawned widespread

respectability for social utilitarianism. It added a new

dimension to law‘s traditional objectives of consistency,

certainty and predictability—a concern for society‘s welfare,

elegantly described by Professor Harry W. Jones as a legal

rule that ―contributes to the establishment and preservation of

a social environment in which the quality of human life can

be spirited, improving and unimpaired.‖7 In all but a few

areas of static law, mechanical jurisprudence has become

more historical than operational, except for what the Majority

does in this case.

III.

I turn now to legal philosophy, jurisprudence and

jurisprudential temperament, because part of what divides the

Majority and the dissent is a difference in views of these

concepts.8 When I speak of legal philosophy, I am addressing

a very broad inquiry into what the relationship between

individuals and their government, ought to be. In this context,

the problems of legal philosophy are problems of normative

political philosophy. So perceived, legal philosophy inquires

into the problems of terminology, legal methods, the role of

precedent, statutory interpretation, underlying rationale, the

7

Harry W. Jones, An Invitation to Jurisprudence, 74 Colum.

L. Rev. 1023, 1030 (1974).

8

Ruggero J. Aldisert, Philosophy, Jurisprudence, and

Jurisprudential of Federal Judges, 20 Ind. L. Rev. 453

(1987).

9

use of different types of authority, the efficacy of various

controls and their operation in diverse factual scenarios, and

the basic issues concerning the values that are implemented.

When I speak of a legal philosophy, I am addressing

the specific answers to these basic inquiries forthcoming from

very respectable thinkers, both in academia and on the bench.

Each thinker probably articulates or at least demonstrates

some particular legal philosophy. Hence, each of their

individual solutions to myriad problems of judicial decision

making is what I call a legal philosophy.

How a judge interprets the concept of ―judicially

sanctioned‖ depends on the legal philosophy the judge

chooses to espouse. It cannot be seriously debated that the

Majority‘s refusal to grant attorney fees in this case will limit

future civil rights actions, discouraging the Congressional

intent to provide attorney fees to civil rights plaintiffs under

§ 1988. It will discourage settlements, prolong litigation, and

make work for overburdened district judges. Defendants will

use complications in petitions for § 1988 attorney fees as

bargaining tools in negotiations for calculating damages.

Members of the Majority arrive at their decision by adhering

to a philosophy of conceptual jurisprudence, an approach to

the law that extends a legal precept to a drily logical extreme,

regardless of the results upon society, and a philosophy that

has found rejection in our courts for almost 100 years.

I turn now to the concept of jurisprudence. I perceive it

as separate and apart from legal philosophy, in that it includes

obligatory norms, both substantive and procedural, that shape

and regulate the life of a people. This concept of

jurisprudence more or less takes the form of an aggregate of

legal precepts, a sort of by-laws of a given society or rules

10

that govern a given social order. It is law as it is, not as it

ought to be. It is more properly a juridical science than a

philosophy. Yet jurisprudence may also be considered ―a

body of traditional ideas as to how legal precepts should be

interpreted and applied and causes decided, and a traditional

technique of developing and applying legal precepts whereby

these precepts are eked out, extended, restricted, and adapted

to the exigencies of administration of justice.‖9

I find it necessary to distinguish between legal

philosophy and jurisprudence. If a judge is truly following ―a

body of traditional ideas,‖ he or she is probably observing the

law as it ―is‖ and not as it ―ought to be.‖ If we talk about law

as it should be, we have entered the world of legal philosophy

and philosophical generalities. Immanuel Kant suggested that

the distinction existed in two simple Latin words. When we

ask ―quid jus?‖ we are seeking some general principle of

philosophy to help us decide what the law ought to be. When

we ask ―quid juris?‖ we are seeking what already has been

established as part of the jurisprudence.10

Unfortunately, the line between what the law is and

what it ought to be is not always a bright one. As this case

shows, one legal precept, pushed to the limit of its logic with

inadequate consideration of the results, may point to one

conclusion; another precept, followed with equal logic but

emphasis on the results, may point with equal certainty to

another conclusion. Or take the questions posed by Cardozo:

9

Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 Harv.

L.Rev. 641, 645 (1923).

10

Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law 43-46 (Kelly ed.

1974) (Hastie trans. 1887).

11

If a precedent is applicable, when do I refuse to

follow it? If no precedent is applicable, how do

I reach the rule that will make a precedent for

the future? If I am seeking logical consistency,

the symmetry of the legal structure, how far

shall I seek it? At what point shall the quest be

halted by some discrepant custom, by some

consideration of the social welfare, by my own

or the common standards of justice and

morals?11

It is here where that quality I call jurisprudential

temperament, or the judge‘s intuition, comes into play.

Temperament invariably influences the decision because it

inclines the decision maker one way or another.12 It is a major

determinant in the case at bar in deciding the best

interpretation of ―judicial sanctioned.‖

If, as in cases like this one, the result is not

predetermined and the law is not clear, the courts are faced

with what Professor H.L.A. Hart called the ―penumbral‖

issues, where the language of the legislation or a particular

putative precedent of a court is general.13 Whether a judge

attempts to clarify a penumbral area of the law reflects a

value judgment, and is indicative of the judge‘s

11

Cardozo, supra note 6.

12

The key word is ―jurisprudential,‖ not ―judicial‖

temperament. The latter is descriptive of a judge‘s

personality while sitting on the bench during a trial or on

appeal.

13

H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 121-122 (1961).

12

jurisprudential temperament. Some judges have lower

thresholds than others, and are more inclined to find solace in

shades and fringes rather than the black-letter law. When this

problem occurs, as is the circumstance of this divided Court,

Professor Ronald Dworkin suggests that the decision depends

―on the judge‘s own preferences among a sea of respectable

extralegal standards, any one in principle eligible, because if

that were the case we could not say that any rules were

binding.‖14

The extent to which a court adheres to the legal

precepts attached to the facts in Buckhannon rather than those

present in the galaxy of our civil rights cases that have

extended plaintiffs‘ rights, is not just a matter of logical

analysis. In dealing with a putative precedent the judge‘s

function goes beyond a perception of what was really

intended; he or she exercises a choice. In the case at bar, it is

a choice between: (a) conceptual jurisprudence, which

preaches that a principle ought to be applied wherever it

logically leads, without reference to results; or (b) a

jurisprudence of results, which preaches ―the establishment

and preservation of a social environment in which the quality

of human life can be spirited, improving and unimpaired.‖15

Justice Walter V. Shaefer taught us:

[M]ost depends upon the judge‘s unspoken

notion as to the function of his court. If he

views the role of the court as a passive one, he

will be willing to delegate the responsibility for

change . . . . If he views that court as an

14

Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 89-90 (1977).

15

Jones, supra note 7.

13

instrument of society designed to reflect in its

decisions the morality of the community, he

will be more likely to look precedent in the

teeth and to measure it against the ideals and the

aspiration of his time. 16

*****

Through the years, it is said that in this Court we have

dissent without dissension. It is in this spirit that I have

expressed, respectfully, a failure to agree with a large number

of my colleagues without in the least inferring any diminution

of my great respect for each of them. And so, as the Marine

Corps Hymn says, it is at this ―clime and place‖ that a

difference in legal philosophy, jurisprudence and

jurisprudential temperament is demonstrated in the

divergence between the Majority and dissenting judges‘

views upon applications for attorney fees under § 1988. That

such a difference exists is not unusual; appellate courts are

fashioned as multi-judge institutions so that different views

may be publicly and forcibly expressed. What is unfortunate

about the difference in this case, however, is the result that

the Majority‘s holding will impose upon future civil rights

plaintiffs.

16

Walter V. Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. Chi. L.

Rev. 3, 23 (1966).

14