Brown v. Plata

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2010 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BROWN, GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL. v.

PLATA ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS FOR

THE EASTERN AND NORTHERN DISTRICTS OF CALIFORNIA

No. 09–1233. Argued November 30, 2010—Decided May 23, 2011

California’s prisons are designed to house a population just under

80,000, but at the time of the decision under review the population

was almost double that. The resulting conditions are the subject of

two federal class actions. In Coleman v. Brown, filed in 1990, the

District Court found that prisoners with serious mental illness do not

receive minimal, adequate care. A Special Master appointed to over

see remedial efforts reported 12 years later that the state of mental

health care in California’s prisons was deteriorating due to increased

overcrowding. In Plata v. Brown, filed in 2001, the State conceded

that deficiencies in prison medical care violated prisoners’ Eighth

Amendment rights and stipulated to a remedial injunction. But

when the State had not complied with the injunction by 2005, the

court appointed a Receiver to oversee remedial efforts. Three years

later, the Receiver described continuing deficiencies caused by over

crowding. Believing that a remedy for unconstitutional medical and

mental health care could not be achieved without reducing over

crowding, the Coleman and Plata plaintiffs moved their respective

District Courts to convene a three-judge court empowered by the

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) to order reductions in

the prison population. The judges in both actions granted the re

quest, and the cases were consolidated before a single three-judge

court. After hearing testimony and making extensive findings of fact,

the court ordered California to reduce its prison population to 137.5%

of design capacity within two years. Finding that the prison popula

tion would have to be reduced if capacity could not be increased

through new construction, the court ordered the State to formulate a

compliance plan and submit it for court approval.

2 BROWN v. PLATA

Syllabus

Held:

1. The court-mandated population limit is necessary to remedy the

violation of prisoners’ constitutional rights and is authorized by the

PLRA. Pp. 12–41.

(a) If a prison deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including

adequate medical care, the courts have a responsibility to remedy the

resulting Eighth Amendment violation. See Hutto v. Finney, 437

U. S. 678, 687, n. 9. They must consider a range of options, including

the appointment of special masters or receivers, the possibility of

consent decrees, and orders limiting a prison’s population. Under the

PLRA, only a three-judge court may limit a prison population. 18

U. S. C. §3626(a)(3). Before convening such a court, a district court

must have entered an order for less intrusive relief that failed to

remedy the constitutional violation and must have given the defen

dant a reasonable time to comply with its prior orders.

§3626(a)(3)(A). Once convened, the three-judge court must find by

clear and convincing evidence that “crowding is the primary cause of

the violation” and “no other relief will remedy [the] violation,”

§3626(a)(3)(E); and that the relief is “narrowly drawn, extends no fur

ther than necessary. . . , and is the least intrusive means necessary to

correct the violation,” §3626(a)(1)(A). The court must give “substan

tial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of

a criminal justice system caused by the relief.” Ibid. Its legal deter

minations are reviewed de novo, but its factual findings are reviewed

for clear error. Pp. 12–15.

(b) The Coleman and Plata courts acted reasonably in convening

a three-judge court. Pp. 15–19.

(1) The merits of the decision to convene are properly before

this Court, which has exercised its 28 U. S. C. §1253 jurisdiction to

determine the authority of a court below, including whether a three

judge court was properly constituted. Gonzalez v. Automatic Employ

ees Credit Union, 419 U. S. 90, 95, n. 12. Pp. 15–16.

(2) Section 3626(a)(3)(A)(i)’s previous order requirement was

satisfied in Coleman by the Special Master’s 1995 appointment and

in Plata by the 2002 approval of a consent decree and stipulated in

junction. Both orders were intended to remedy constitutional viola

tions and were given ample time to succeed—12 years in Coleman,

and 5 years in Plata. Contrary to the State’s claim,

§3626(a)(3)(A)(ii)’s reasonable time requirement did not require the

District Courts to give more time for subsequent remedial efforts to

succeed. Such a reading would in effect require courts to impose a

moratorium on new remedial orders before issuing a population limit,

which would delay an eventual remedy, prolong the courts’ involve

ment, and serve neither the State nor the prisoners. The Coleman

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 3

Syllabus

and Plata courts had a solid basis to doubt that additional efforts to

build new facilities and hire new staff would achieve a remedy, given

the ongoing deficiencies recently reported by both the Special Master

and the Receiver. Pp. 16–19.

(c) The three-judge court did not err in finding that “crowding

[was] the primary cause of the violation,” §3626(a)(3)(E)(i). Pp. 19–

29.

(1) The trial record documents the severe impact of burgeoning

demand on the provision of care. The evidence showed that there

were high vacancy rates for medical and mental health staff, e.g.,

20% for surgeons and 54.1% for psychiatrists; that these numbers

understated the severity of the crisis because the State has not budg

eted sufficient staff to meet demand; and that even if vacant positions

could be filled, there would be insufficient space for the additional

staff. Such a shortfall contributes to significant delays in treating

mentally ill prisoners, who are housed in administrative segregation

for extended periods while awaiting transfer to scarce mental health

treatment beds. There are also backlogs of up to 700 prisoners wait

ing to see a doctor for physical care. Crowding creates unsafe and

unsanitary conditions that hamper effective delivery of medical and

mental health care. It also promotes unrest and violence and can

cause prisoners with latent mental illnesses to worsen and develop

overt symptoms. Increased violence requires increased reliance on

lockdowns to keep order, and lockdowns further impede the effective

delivery of care. Overcrowding’s effects are particularly acute in

prison reception centers, which process 140,000 new or returning

prisoners annually, and which house some prisoners for their entire

incarceration period. Numerous experts testified that crowding is the

primary cause of the constitutional violations. Pp. 19–24.

(2) Contrary to the State’s claim, the three-judge court prop

erly admitted, cited, and considered evidence of current prison condi

tions as relevant to the issues before it. Expert witnesses based their

conclusions on recent observations of prison conditions; the court ad

mitted recent reports on prison conditions by the Receiver and Spe

cial Master; and both parties presented testimony related to current

conditions. The court’s orders cutting off discovery a few months be

fore trial and excluding evidence not pertinent to the issue whether a

population limit is appropriate under the PLRA were within the

court’s sound discretion. Orderly trial management may require dis

covery deadlines and a clean distinction between litigation of the

merits and the remedy. The State points to no significant evidence

that it was unable to present and that would have changed the out

come here. Pp. 24–26.

(3) It was permissible for the three-judge court to conclude that

4 BROWN v. PLATA

Syllabus

overcrowding was the “primary,” but not the only, cause of the viola

tions, and that reducing crowding would not entirely cure the viola

tions. This understanding of the primary cause requirement is con

sistent with the PLRA. Had Congress intended to require that

crowding be the only cause, the PLRA would have said so. Pp. 26–29.

(d) The evidence supports the three-judge court’s finding that “no

other relief [would] remedy the violation,” §3626(a)(3)(E)(ii). The

State’s claim that out-of-state transfers provide a less restrictive al

ternative to a population limit must fail because requiring transfers

is a population limit under the PLRA. Even if they could be regarded

as a less restrictive alternative, the three-judge court found no evi

dence of plans for transfers in numbers sufficient to relieve over

crowding. The court also found no realistic possibility that California

could build itself out of this crisis, particularly given the State’s ongo

ing fiscal problems. Further, it rejected additional hiring as a realis

tic alternative, since the prison system was chronically understaffed

and would have insufficient space were adequate personnel retained.

The court also did not err when it concluded that, absent a population

reduction, the Receiver’s and Special Master’s continued efforts

would not achieve a remedy. Their reports are persuasive evidence

that, with no reduction, any remedy might prove unattainable and

would at the very least require vast expenditures by the State. The

State asserts that these measures would succeed if combined, but a

long history of failed remedial orders, together with substantial evi

dence of overcrowding’s deleterious effects on the provision of care,

compels a different conclusion here. Pp. 29–33.

(e) The prospective relief ordered here was narrowly drawn, ex

tended no further than necessary to correct the violation, and was the

least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation. Pp. 33–41.

(1) The population limit does not fail narrow tailoring simply

because prisoners beyond the plaintiff class will have to be released

through parole or sentencing reform in order to meet the required re

duction. While narrow tailoring requires a “ ‘ “fit” between the [rem

edy’s] ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends,’ ” Board

of Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469, 480, a narrow

and otherwise proper remedy for a constitutional violation is not in

valid simply because it will have collateral effects. Nor does the

PLRA require that result. The order gives the State flexibility to de

termine who should be released, and the State could move the three

judge court to modify its terms. The order also is not overbroad be

cause it encompasses the entire prison system, rather than sepa

rately assessing each institution’s need for a population limit. The

Coleman court found a systemwide violation, and the State stipulated

to systemwide relief in Plata. Assuming no constitutional violation

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 5

Syllabus

results, some facilities may retain populations in excess of the 137.5%

limit provided others fall sufficiently below it so the system as a

whole remains in compliance with the order. This will afford the

State flexibility to accommodate differences between institutions.

The order may shape or control the State’s authority in the realm of

prison administration, but it leaves much to the State’s discretion.

The order’s limited scope is necessary to remedy a constitutional vio

lation. The State may move the three-judge court to modify its order,

but it has proposed no realistic alternative remedy at this time.

Pp. 33–36.

(2) The three-judge court gave “substantial weight” to any po

tential adverse impact on public safety from its order. The PLRA’s

“substantial weight” requirement does not require the court to certify

that its order has no possible adverse impact on the public. Here,

statistical evidence showed that prison populations had been lowered

without adversely affecting public safety in some California counties,

several States, and Canada. The court found that various available

methods of reducing overcrowding—good time credits and diverting

low-risk offenders to community programs—would have little or no

impact on public safety, and its order took account of such concerns

by giving the State substantial flexibility to select among the means

of reducing overcrowding. The State complains that the court ap

proved the State’s population reduction plan without considering

whether its specific measures would substantially threaten public

safety. But the court left state officials the choice of how best to com

ply and was not required to second-guess their exercise of discretion.

Developments during the pendency of this appeal, when the State

has begun to reduce the prison population, support the conclusion

that a reduction can be accomplished without an undue negative ef

fect on public safety. Pp. 37–41.

2. The three-judge court’s order, subject to the State’s right to seek

its modification in appropriate circumstances, must be affirmed.

Pp. 41–48.

(a) To comply with the PLRA, a court must set a population limit

at the highest level consistent with an efficacious remedy, and it

must order the population reduction to be achieved in the shortest

period of time reasonably consistent with public safety. Pp. 41–42.

(b) The three-judge court’s conclusion that the prison population

should be capped at 137.5% of design capacity was not clearly errone

ous. The court concluded that the evidence supported a limit be

tween the 130% limit supported by expert testimony and the Federal

Bureau of Prisons and the 145% limit recommended by the State

Corrections Independent Review Panel. The PLRA’s narrow tailoring

requirement is satisfied so long as such equitable, remedial judg

6 BROWN v. PLATA

Syllabus

ments are made with the objective of releasing the fewest possible

prisoners consistent with an efficacious remedy. Pp. 42–44.

(c) The three-judge court did not err in providing a 2-year dead

line for relief, especially in light of the State’s failure to contest the

issue at trial. The State has not asked this Court to extend the dead

line, but the three-judge court has the authority, and responsibility,

to amend its order as warranted by the exercise of sound discretion.

Proper respect for the State and for its governmental processes re

quire that court to exercise its jurisdiction to accord the State consid

erable latitude to find mechanisms and make plans that will

promptly and effectively correct the violations consistent with public

safety. The court may, e.g., grant a motion to extend the deadline if

the State meets appropriate preconditions designed to ensure that

the plan will be implemented without undue delay. Such observa

tions reflect the fact that the existing order, like all ongoing equitable

relief, must remain open to appropriate modification, and are not in

tended to cast doubt on the validity of the order’s basic premise.

Pp. 44–48.

Affirmed.

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GINSBURG,

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissent

ing opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting

opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., joined.

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 09–1233

_________________

EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., GOVERNOR OF CAL-

IFORNIA, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. MARCIANO

PLATA ET AL.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT AND THE NORTHERN

DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

[May 23, 2011]

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case arises from serious constitutional violations in

California’s prison system. The violations have persisted

for years. They remain uncorrected. The appeal comes to

this Court from a three-judge District Court order direct

ing California to remedy two ongoing violations of the

Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, a guarantee

binding on the States by the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. The violations are the subject of

two class actions in two Federal District Courts. The first

involves the class of prisoners with serious mental disor

ders. That case is Coleman v. Brown. The second involves

prisoners with serious medical conditions. That case is

Plata v. Brown. The order of the three-judge District

Court is applicable to both cases.

After years of litigation, it became apparent that a

remedy for the constitutional violations would not be ef

fective absent a reduction in the prison system popula

tion. The authority to order release of prisoners as a

remedy to cure a systemic violation of the Eighth Amend

2 BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

ment is a power reserved to a three-judge district court,

not a single-judge district court. 18 U. S. C. §3626(a). In

accordance with that rule, the Coleman and Plata District

Judges independently requested that a three-judge court

be convened. The Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit convened a three-judge court composed

of the Coleman and Plata District Judges and a third,

Ninth Circuit Judge. Because the two cases are interre

lated, their limited consolidation for this purpose has a

certain utility in avoiding conflicting decrees and aiding

judicial consideration and enforcement. The State in this

Court has not objected to consolidation, although the State

does argue that the three-judge court was prematurely

convened. The State also objects to the substance of the

three-judge court order, which requires the State to reduce

overcrowding in its prisons.

The appeal presents the question whether the remedial

order issued by the three-judge court is consistent with

requirements and procedures set forth in a congressional

statute, the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA).

18 U. S. C. §3626; see Appendix A, infra. The order leaves

the choice of means to reduce overcrowding to the discre

tion of state officials. But absent compliance through new

construction, out-of-state transfers, or other means—or

modification of the order upon a further showing by the

State—the State will be required to release some number

of prisoners before their full sentences have been served.

High recidivism rates must serve as a warning that mis

taken or premature release of even one prisoner can cause

injury and harm. The release of prisoners in large num

bers—assuming the State finds no other way to comply

with the order—is a matter of undoubted, grave concern.

At the time of trial, California’s correctional facilities

held some 156,000 persons. This is nearly double the

number that California’s prisons were designed to hold,

and California has been ordered to reduce its prison popu

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 3

Opinion of the Court

lation to 137.5% of design capacity. By the three-judge

court’s own estimate, the required population reduction

could be as high as 46,000 persons. Although the State

has reduced the population by at least 9,000 persons dur

ing the pendency of this appeal, this means a further

reduction of 37,000 persons could be required. As will be

noted, the reduction need not be accomplished in an indis

criminate manner or in these substantial numbers if sat

isfactory, alternate remedies or means for compliance

are devised. The State may employ measures, including

good-time credits and diversion of low-risk offenders and

technical parole violators to community-based programs,

that will mitigate the order’s impact. The population

reduction potentially required is nevertheless of unprece

dented sweep and extent.

Yet so too is the continuing injury and harm resulting

from these serious constitutional violations. For years the

medical and mental health care provided by California’s

prisons has fallen short of minimum constitutional re

quirements and has failed to meet prisoners’ basic health

needs. Needless suffering and death have been the well

documented result. Over the whole course of years during

which this litigation has been pending, no other remedies

have been found to be sufficient. Efforts to remedy the

violation have been frustrated by severe overcrowding in

California’s prison system. Short term gains in the provi

sion of care have been eroded by the long-term effects of

severe and pervasive overcrowding.

Overcrowding has overtaken the limited resources of

prison staff; imposed demands well beyond the capacity

of medical and mental health facilities; and created unsan

itary and unsafe conditions that make progress in the

provision of care difficult or impossible to achieve. The

overcrowding is the “primary cause of the violation of a

Federal right,” 18 U. S. C. §3626(a)(3)(E)(i), specifically

the severe and unlawful mistreatment of prisoners

4 BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

through grossly inadequate provision of medical and

mental health care.

This Court now holds that the PLRA does authorize the

relief afforded in this case and that the court-mandated

population limit is necessary to remedy the violation of

prisoners’ constitutional rights. The order of the three

judge court, subject to the right of the State to seek

its modification in appropriate circumstances, must be

affirmed.

I

A

The degree of overcrowding in California’s prisons is

exceptional. California’s prisons are designed to house a

population just under 80,000, but at the time of the three

judge court’s decision the population was almost double

that. The State’s prisons had operated at around 200% of

design capacity for at least 11 years. Prisoners are

crammed into spaces neither designed nor intended to

house inmates. As many as 200 prisoners may live in a

gymnasium, monitored by as few as two or three correc

tional officers. App. 1337–1338, 1350; see Appendix B,

infra. As many as 54 prisoners may share a single toilet.

App. 1337.

The Corrections Independent Review Panel, a body

appointed by the Governor and composed of correctional

consultants and representatives from state agencies,

concluded that California’s prisons are “ ‘severely over

crowded, imperiling the safety of both correctional em

ployees and inmates.’ ”1 Juris. Statement App., O. T. 2009,

——————

1 A similar conclusion was reached by the Little Hoover Commission,

a bipartisan and independent state body, which stated that

“[o]vercrowded conditions inside the prison walls are unsafe for inmates

and staff,” Solving California’s Corrections Crisis: Time is Running Out

17 (Jan. 2007), and that “California’s correctional system is in a tail

spin,” id., at i.

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 5

Opinion of the Court

No. 09–416, p. 56a (hereinafter Juris. App.). In 2006,

then-Governor Schwarzenegger declared a state of emer

gency in the prisons, as “ ‘immediate action is necessary to

prevent death and harm caused by California’s severe

prison overcrowding.’ ” Id., at 61a. The consequences of

overcrowding identified by the Governor include “ ‘in

creased, substantial risk for transmission of infectious

illness’ ” and a suicide rate “ ‘approaching an average of

one per week.’ ” Ibid.

Prisoners in California with serious mental illness do

not receive minimal, adequate care. Because of a shortage

of treatment beds, suicidal inmates may be held for pro

longed periods in telephone-booth sized cages without

toilets. See Appendix C, infra. A psychiatric expert re

ported observing an inmate who had been held in such a

cage for nearly 24 hours, standing in a pool of his own

urine, unresponsive and nearly catatonic. Prison officials

explained they had “ ‘no place to put him.’ ” App. 593.

——————

At trial, current and former California prison officials also testified to

the degree of overcrowding. Jeanne Woodford, who recently adminis

tered California’s prison system, stated that “ ‘[o]vercrowding in the

[California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)] is

extreme, its effects are pervasive and it is preventing the Department

from providing adequate mental and medical health care to prisoners.’ ”

Juris. App. 84a. Matthew Cate, the head of the California prison

system, stated that “ ‘overpopulation makes everything we do more

difficult.’ ” Ibid. And Robin Dezember, chief deputy secretary of Cor

rectional Healthcare Services, stated that “we are terribly overcrowded

in our prison system” and “overcrowding has negative effects on every

body in the prison system.” Tr. 853, 856.

Experts from outside California offered similar assessments. Doyle

Wayne Scott, the former head of corrections in Texas, described con

ditions in California’s prisons as “appalling,” “inhumane,” and “unac

ceptable” and stated that “[i]n more than 35 years of prison work

experience, I have never seen anything like it.” App. 1337. Joseph

Lehman, the former head of correctional systems in Washington,

Maine, and Pennsylvania, concluded that “[t]here is no question that

California’s prisons are overcrowded” and that “this is an emergency

situation; it calls for drastic and immediate action.” Id., at 1312.

6 BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

Other inmates awaiting care may be held for months in

administrative segregation, where they endure harsh and

isolated conditions and receive only limited mental health

services. Wait times for mental health care range as high

as 12 months. Id., at 704. In 2006, the suicide rate

in California’s prisons was nearly 80% higher than the

national average for prison populations; and a court

appointed Special Master found that 72.1% of suicides

involved “some measure of inadequate assessment, treat

ment, or intervention, and were therefore most probably

foreseeable and/or preventable.”2 Id., at 1781.

Prisoners suffering from physical illness also receive

severely deficient care. California’s prisons were designed

to meet the medical needs of a population at 100% of

design capacity and so have only half the clinical space

needed to treat the current population. Id., at 1024. A

correctional officer testified that, in one prison, up to 50

sick inmates may be held together in a 12- by 20-foot cage

for up to five hours awaiting treatment. Tr. 597–599. The

number of staff is inadequate, and prisoners face signifi

cant delays in access to care. A prisoner with severe

abdominal pain died after a 5-week delay in referral to a

specialist; a prisoner with “constant and extreme” chest

——————

2 At

the time of the three-judge court’s decision, 2006 was the most

recent year for which the Special Master had conducted a detailed

study of suicides in the California prisons. The Special Master later

issued an analysis for the year 2007. This report concluded that the

2007 suicide rate was “a continuation of the CDCR’s pattern of exceed

ing the national prison suicide rate.” Record in No. 2:90–CV–00520–

LKK–JFM (ED/ND Cal.), Doc. 3677, p. 1. The report found that the

rate of suicides involving inadequate assessment, treatment, or inter

vention had risen to 82% and concluded that “[t]hese numbers clearly

indicate no improvement in this area during the past several years, and

possibly signal a trend of ongoing deterioration.” Id., at 12. No de

tailed study has been filed since then, but in September 2010 the

Special Master filed a report stating that “the data for 2010 so far is not

showing improvement in suicide prevention.” App. 868.

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 7

Opinion of the Court

pain died after an 8-hour delay in evaluation by a doctor;

and a prisoner died of testicular cancer after a “failure of

MDs to work up for cancer in a young man with 17 months

of testicular pain.”3 California Prison Health Care Receiv

ership Corp., K. Imai, Analysis of CDCR Death Reviews

2006, pp. 6–7 (Aug. 2007). Doctor Ronald Shansky, former

medical director of the Illinois state prison system, sur

veyed death reviews for California prisoners. He con

cluded that extreme departures from the standard of

care were “widespread,” Tr. 430, and that the proportion

of “possibly preventable or preventable” deaths was “ex

tremely high.” Id., at 429.4 Many more prisoners, suffer

——————

3 Because plaintiffs do not base their case on deficiencies in care

provided on any one occasion, this Court has no occasion to consider

whether these instances of delay—or any other particular deficiency in

medical care complained of by the plaintiffs—would violate the Consti

tution under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 104–105 (1976), if consid

ered in isolation. Plaintiffs rely on systemwide deficiencies in the

provision of medical and mental health care that, taken as a whole,

subject sick and mentally ill prisoners in California to “substantial risk

of serious harm” and cause the delivery of care in the prisons to fall

below the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a

maturing society. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825, 834 (1994).

4 In 2007, the last year for which the three-judge court had available

statistics, an analysis of deaths in California’s prisons found 68 pre

ventable or possibly preventable deaths. California Prison Health Care

Receivership Corp., K. Imai, Analysis of Year 2007 Death Reviews 18

(Nov. 2008). This was essentially unchanged from 2006, when an

analysis found 66 preventable or possibly preventable deaths. Ibid.

These statistics mean that, during 2006 and 2007, a preventable or

possibly preventable death occurred once every five to six days.

Both preventable and possibly preventable deaths involve major

lapses in medical care and are a serious cause for concern. In one

typical case classified as a possibly preventable death, an analysis

revealed the following lapses: “16 month delay in evaluating abnormal

liver mass; 8 month delay in receiving regular chemotherapy . . . ;

multiple providers fail to respond to jaundice and abnormal liver

function tests causing 17 month delay in diagnosis.” California Prison

Health Care Receivership Corp., K. Imai, Analysis of Year 2009 Inmate

Death Reviews—California Prison Health Care System 12 (Sept. 2010)

8 BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

ing from severe but not life-threatening conditions, experi

ence prolonged illness and unnecessary pain.

B

These conditions are the subject of two federal cases.

The first to commence, Coleman v. Brown, was filed in

1990. Coleman involves the class of seriously mentally ill

persons in California prisons. Over 15 years ago, in 1995,

after a 39-day trial, the Coleman District Court found

“overwhelming evidence of the systematic failure to de

liver necessary care to mentally ill inmates” in California

prisons. Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1316 (ED

Cal.). The prisons were “seriously and chronically under

staffed,” id., at 1306, and had “no effective method for

ensuring . . . the competence of their staff,” id., at 1308.

The prisons had failed to implement necessary suicide

prevention procedures, “due in large measure to the severe

understaffing.” Id., at 1315. Mentally ill inmates “lan

guished for months, or even years, without access to nec

essary care.” Id., at 1316. “They suffer from severe hallu

cinations, [and] they decompensate into catatonic states.”

Ibid. The court appointed a Special Master to oversee

development and implementation of a remedial plan of

action.

In 2007, 12 years after his appointment, the Special

——————

(hereinafter 2009 Death Reviews).

The three-judge court did not have access to statistics for 2008, but in

that year the number of preventable or possibly preventable deaths

held steady at 66. California Prison Health Care Receivership Corp.,

K. Imai, Analysis of Year 2008 Death Reviews 9 (Dec. 2009). In 2009,

the number of preventable or possibly preventable deaths dropped to

46. 2009 Death Reviews 11, 13. The three-judge court could not have

anticipated this development, and it would be inappropriate for this

Court to evaluate its significance for the first time on appeal. The

three-judge court should, of course, consider this and any other evi

dence of improved conditions when considering future requests by the

State for modification of its order. See infra, at 45–48.

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 9

Opinion of the Court

Master in Coleman filed a report stating that, after years

of slow improvement, the state of mental health care

in California’s prisons was deteriorating. App. 489. The

Special Master ascribed this change to increased over

crowding. The rise in population had led to greater

demand for care, and existing programming space and

staffing levels were inadequate to keep pace. Prisons had

retained more mental health staff, but the “growth of the

resource [had] not matched the rise in demand.” Id., at

482. At the very time the need for space was rising, the

need to house the expanding population had also caused a

“reduction of programming space now occupied by inmate

bunks.” Id., at 479. The State was “facing a four to five

year gap in the availability of sufficient beds to meet the

treatment needs of many inmates/patients.” Id., at 481.

“[I]ncreasing numbers of truly psychotic inmate/patients

are trapped in [lower levels of treatment] that cannot meet

their needs.” Ibid. The Special Master concluded that

many early “achievements have succumbed to the inexo

rably rising tide of population, leaving behind growing

frustration and despair.” Id., at 489.

C

The second action, Plata v. Brown, involves the class of

state prisoners with serious medical conditions. After this

action commenced in 2001, the State conceded that defi

ciencies in prison medical care violated prisoners’ Eighth

Amendment rights. The State stipulated to a remedial

injunction. The State failed to comply with that injunc

tion, and in 2005 the court appointed a Receiver to oversee

remedial efforts. The court found that “the California

prison medical care system is broken beyond repair,”

resulting in an “unconscionable degree of suffering and

death.” App. 917. The court found: “[I]t is an uncontested

fact that, on average, an inmate in one of California’s

prisons needlessly dies every six to seven days due to

10 BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

constitutional deficiencies in the [California prisons’]

medical delivery system.” Ibid. And the court made

findings regarding specific instances of neglect, including

the following:

“[A] San Quentin prisoner with hypertension, diabetes

and renal failure was prescribed two different medica

tions that actually served to exacerbate his renal fail

ure. An optometrist noted the patient’s retinal bleed

ing due to very high blood pressure and referred him

for immediate evaluation, but this evaluation never

took place. It was not until a year later that the pa

tient’s renal failure was recognized, at which point he

was referred to a nephrologist on an urgent basis;

he should have been seen by the specialist within 14

days but the consultation never happened and the pa

tient died three months later.” Id., at 928 (citations

omitted).

Prisons were unable to retain sufficient numbers of com

petent medical staff, id., at 937, and would “hire any

doctor who had ‘a license, a pulse and a pair of shoes,’ ” id.,

at 926. Medical facilities lacked “necessary medical equip

ment” and did “not meet basic sanitation standards.” Id.,

at 944. “Exam tables and counter tops, where prisoners

with . . . communicable diseases are treated, [were] not

routinely disinfected.” Ibid.

In 2008, three years after the District Court’s decision,

the Receiver described continuing deficiencies in the

health care provided by California prisons:

“Timely access is not assured. The number of medical

personnel has been inadequate, and competence has

not been assured. . . . Adequate housing for the dis

abled and aged does not exist. The medical facilities,

when they exist at all, are in an abysmal state of dis

repair. Basic medical equipment is often not available

or used. Medications and other treatment options are

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 11

Opinion of the Court

too often not available when needed. . . . Indeed, it is

a misnomer to call the existing chaos a ‘medical deliv

ery system’—it is more an act of desperation than a

system.” Record in No. 3:01–CV–01351–TEH (ND

Cal.), Doc. 1136, p. 5.

A report by the Receiver detailed the impact of overcrowd

ing on efforts to remedy the violation. The Receiver ex

plained that “overcrowding, combined with staffing short

ages, has created a culture of cynicism, fear, and despair

which makes hiring and retaining competent clinicians

extremely difficult.” App. 1031. “[O]vercrowding, and the

resulting day to day operational chaos of the [prison sys

tem], creates regular ‘crisis’ situations which . . . take time

[and] energy . . . away from important remedial pro

grams.” Id., at 1035. Overcrowding had increased the

incidence of infectious disease, id., at 1037–1038, and had

led to rising prison violence and greater reliance by custo

dial staff on lockdowns, which “inhibit the delivery of

medical care and increase the staffing necessary for such

care.” Id., at 1037. “Every day,” the Receiver reported,

“California prison wardens and health care managers

make the difficult decision as to which of the class actions,

Coleman . . . or Plata they will fail to comply with because

of staff shortages and patient loads.” Id., at 1038.

D

The Coleman and Plata plaintiffs, believing that a rem

edy for unconstitutional medical and mental health care

could not be achieved without reducing overcrowding,

moved their respective District Courts to convene a three

judge court empowered under the PLRA to order reduc

tions in the prison population. The judges in both actions

granted the request, and the cases were consolidated

before a single three-judge court. The State has not chal

lenged the validity of the consolidation in proceedings

before this Court, so its propriety is not presented by this

12 BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

appeal.

The three-judge court heard 14 days of testimony and

issued a 184-page opinion, making extensive findings of

fact. The court ordered California to reduce its prison

population to 137.5% of the prisons’ design capacity within

two years. Assuming the State does not increase capacity

through new construction, the order requires a population

reduction of 38,000 to 46,000 persons. Because it appears

all but certain that the State cannot complete sufficient

construction to comply fully with the order, the prison

population will have to be reduced to at least some extent.

The court did not order the State to achieve this reduction

in any particular manner. Instead, the court ordered the

State to formulate a plan for compliance and submit its

plan for approval by the court.

The State appealed to this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C.

§1253, and the Court postponed consideration of the ques

tion of jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits. Schwar

zenegger v. Plata, 560 U. S. ___ (2010).

II

As a consequence of their own actions, prisoners may be

deprived of rights that are fundamental to liberty. Yet the

law and the Constitution demand recognition of certain

other rights. Prisoners retain the essence of human dig

nity inherent in all persons. Respect for that dignity

animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel

and unusual punishment. “ ‘The basic concept underlying

the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of

man.’ ” Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304, 311 (2002) (quot

ing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality

opinion)).

To incarcerate, society takes from prisoners the means

to provide for their own needs. Prisoners are dependent

on the State for food, clothing, and necessary medical care.

A prison’s failure to provide sustenance for inmates “may

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 13

Opinion of the Court

actually produce physical ‘torture or a lingering death.’ ”

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 103 (1976) (quoting In re

Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 447 (1890)); see generally A.

Elsner, Gates of Injustice: The Crisis in America’s Prisons

(2004). Just as a prisoner may starve if not fed, he or she

may suffer or die if not provided adequate medical care. A

prison that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, includ

ing adequate medical care, is incompatible with the con

cept of human dignity and has no place in civilized society.

If government fails to fulfill this obligation, the courts

have a responsibility to remedy the resulting Eighth

Amendment violation. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678,

687, n. 9 (1978). Courts must be sensitive to the State’s

interest in punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation, as

well as the need for deference to experienced and expert

prison administrators faced with the difficult and danger

ous task of housing large numbers of convicted criminals.

See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 547–548 (1979). Courts

nevertheless must not shrink from their obligation to “en

force the constitutional rights of all ‘persons,’ including

prisoners.” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U. S. 319, 321 (1972) (per

curiam). Courts may not allow constitutional violations to

continue simply because a remedy would involve intrusion

into the realm of prison administration.

Courts faced with the sensitive task of remedying un

constitutional prison conditions must consider a range of

available options, including appointment of special mas

ters or receivers and the possibility of consent decrees.

When necessary to ensure compliance with a constitu

tional mandate, courts may enter orders placing limits on

a prison’s population. By its terms, the PLRA restricts the

circumstances in which a court may enter an order “that

has the purpose or effect of reducing or limiting the prison

population.” 18 U. S. C. §3626(g)(4). The order in this

case does not necessarily require the State to release any

prisoners. The State may comply by raising the design

14 BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

capacity of its prisons or by transferring prisoners to

county facilities or facilities in other States. Because the

order limits the prison population as a percentage of de

sign capacity, it nonetheless has the “effect of reducing or

limiting the prison population.” Ibid.

Under the PLRA, only a three-judge court may enter an

order limiting a prison population. §3626(a)(3)(B). Before

a three-judge court may be convened, a district court first

must have entered an order for less intrusive relief that

failed to remedy the constitutional violation and must

have given the defendant a reasonable time to comply

with its prior orders. §3626(a)(3)(A). The party request

ing a three-judge court must then submit “materials suffi

cient to demonstrate that [these requirements] have been

met.” §3626(a)(3)(C). If the district court concludes that

the materials are, in fact, sufficient, a three-judge court

may be convened. Ibid.; see also 28 U. S. C. §2284(b)(1)

(stating that a three-judge court may not be convened if

the district court “determines that three judges are not

required”); 17A C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper, & V.

Amar, Federal Practice and Procedure §4235 (3d ed. 2007).

The three-judge court must then find by clear and con

vincing evidence that “crowding is the primary cause of

the violation of a Federal right” and that “no other relief

will remedy the violation of the Federal right.” 18 U. S. C.

§3626(a)(3)(E). As with any award of prospective relief

under the PLRA, the relief “shall extend no further than

necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of

a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs.” §3626(a)(1)(A). The

three-judge court must therefore find that the relief is

“narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary . . . ,

and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the

violation of the Federal right.” Ibid. In making this de

termination, the three-judge court must give “substantial

weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the op

eration of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.”

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 15

Opinion of the Court

Ibid. Applying these standards, the three-judge court

found a population limit appropriate, necessary, and

authorized in this case.

This Court’s review of the three-judge court’s legal

determinations is de novo, but factual findings are re

viewed for clear error. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470

U. S. 564, 573–574 (1985). Deference to trial court fact

finding reflects an understanding that “[t]he trial judge’s

major role is the determination of fact, and with experi

ence in fulfilling that role comes expertise.” Id., at 574.

The three-judge court oversaw two weeks of trial and

heard at considerable length from California prison offi

cials, as well as experts in the field of correctional admini

stration. The judges had the opportunity to ask relevant

questions of those witnesses. Two of the judges had over

seen the ongoing remedial efforts of the Receiver and

Special Master. The three-judge court was well situated

to make the difficult factual judgments necessary to fash

ion a remedy for this complex and intractable constitu

tional violation. The three-judge court’s findings of fact

may be reversed only if this Court is left with a “ ‘definite

and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ ”

Id., at 573 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum

Co., 333 U. S. 364, 395 (1948)).

A

The State contends that it was error to convene the

three-judge court without affording it more time to comply

with the prior orders in Coleman and Plata.

1

The parties dispute this Court’s jurisdiction to review

the determinations of the Coleman and Plata District

Courts that a three-judge court should be convened.

Plaintiffs claim the State was required to raise this issue

first in the Court of Appeals by appealing the orders of the

16 BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

District Courts. When exercising jurisdiction under 28

U. S. C. §1253, however, this Court “has not hesitated to

exercise jurisdiction ‘to determine the authority of the

court below,’ ” including whether the three-judge court was

properly constituted. Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees

Credit Union, 419 U. S. 90, 95, n. 12 (1974) (quoting Bailey

v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31, 34 (1962) (per curiam)); see also

Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 292 U. S. 16, 18 (1934)

(per curiam) (“The case is analogous to those in which this

Court, finding that the court below has acted without

jurisdiction, exercises its appellate jurisdiction to correct

the improper action”). The merits of the decision to con

vene the three-judge court, therefore, are properly before

this Court.

2

Before a three-judge court may be convened to consider

whether to enter a population limit, the PLRA requires

that the court have “previously entered an order for less

intrusive relief that has failed to remedy the deprivation

of the Federal right sought to be remedied.” 18 U. S. C.

§3626(a)(3)(A)(i). This provision refers to “an order.” It

is satisfied if the court has entered one order, and this sin

gle order has “failed to remedy” the constitutional viola

tion. The defendant must also have had “a reasonable

amount of time to comply with the previous court orders.”

§3626(a)(3)(A)(ii). This provision refers to the court’s

“orders.” It requires that the defendant have been given a

reasonable time to comply with all of the court’s orders.

Together, these requirements ensure that the “ ‘last resort

remedy’ ” of a population limit is not imposed “ ‘as a first

step.’ ” Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 844 F. 2d 828, 843

(CADC 1988).

The first of these conditions, the previous order re

quirement of §3626(a)(3)(A)(i), was satisfied in Coleman

by appointment of a Special Master in 1995, and it was

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 17

Opinion of the Court

satisfied in Plata by approval of a consent decree and

stipulated injunction in 2002. Both orders were intended

to remedy the constitutional violations. Both were given

ample time to succeed. When the three-judge court was

convened, 12 years had passed since the appointment of

the Coleman Special Master, and 5 years had passed since

the approval of the Plata consent decree. The State does

not claim that either order achieved a remedy. Although

the PLRA entitles a State to terminate remedial orders

such as these after two years unless the district court

finds that the relief “remains necessary to correct a

current and ongoing violation of the Federal right,”

§3626(b)(3), California has not attempted to obtain relief

on this basis.

The State claims instead that the second condition, the

reasonable time requirement of §3626(a)(3)(A)(ii), was not

met because other, later remedial efforts should have been

given more time to succeed. In 2006, the Coleman District

Judge approved a revised plan of action calling for con

struction of new facilities, hiring of new staff, and im

plementation of new procedures. That same year, the

Plata District Judge selected and appointed a Receiver to

oversee the State’s ongoing remedial efforts. When the

three-judge court was convened, the Receiver had filed a

preliminary plan of action calling for new construction,

hiring of additional staff, and other procedural reforms.

Although both the revised plan of action in Coleman and

the appointment of the Receiver in Plata were new devel

opments in the courts’ remedial efforts, the basic plan to

solve the crisis through construction, hiring, and proce

dural reforms remained unchanged. These efforts had

been ongoing for years; the failed consent decree in Plata

had called for implementation of new procedures and

hiring of additional staff; and the Coleman Special Master

had issued over 70 orders directed at achieving a remedy

through construction, hiring, and procedural reforms. The

18 BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

Coleman Special Master and Plata Receiver were unable

to provide assurance that further, substantially similar

efforts would yield success absent a population reduction.

Instead, the Coleman Special Master explained that

“many of the clinical advances . . . painfully accomplished

over the past decade are slip-sliding away” as a result of

overcrowding. App. 481–482. And the Plata Receiver

indicated that, absent a reduction in overcrowding, a

successful remedial effort could “all but bankrupt” the

State of California. App. 1053.

Having engaged in remedial efforts for 5 years in Plata

and 12 in Coleman, the District Courts were not required

to wait to see whether their more recent efforts would

yield equal disappointment. When a court attempts to

remedy an entrenched constitutional violation through

reform of a complex institution, such as this statewide

prison system, it may be necessary in the ordinary course

to issue multiple orders directing and adjusting ongoing

remedial efforts. Each new order must be given a reason

able time to succeed, but reasonableness must be assessed

in light of the entire history of the court’s remedial efforts.

A contrary reading of the reasonable time requirement

would in effect require district courts to impose a morato

rium on new remedial orders before issuing a population

limit. This unnecessary period of inaction would delay an

eventual remedy and would prolong the courts’ involve

ment, serving neither the State nor the prisoners. Con

gress did not require this unreasonable result when it

used the term “reasonable.”

The Coleman and Plata courts had a solid basis to doubt

that additional efforts to build new facilities and hire new

staff would achieve a remedy. Indeed, although 5 years

have now passed since the appointment of the Plata

Receiver and approval of the revised plan of action in

Coleman, there is no indication that the constitutional

violations have been cured. A report filed by the Coleman

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 19

Opinion of the Court

Special Master in July 2009 describes ongoing violations,

including an “absence of timely access to appropriate

levels of care at every point in the system.” App. 807. A

report filed by the Plata Receiver in October 2010 likewise

describes ongoing deficiencies in the provision of medical

care and concludes that there are simply “too many pris

oners for the healthcare infrastructure.” Id., at 1655. The

Coleman and Plata courts acted reasonably when they

convened a three-judge court without further delay.

B

Once a three-judge court has been convened, the court

must find additional requirements satisfied before it may

impose a population limit. The first of these requirements

is that “crowding is the primary cause of the violation of a

Federal right.” 18 U. S. C. §3626(a)(3)(E)(i).

1

The three-judge court found the primary cause require

ment satisfied by the evidence at trial. The court found

that overcrowding strains inadequate medical and mental

health facilities; overburdens limited clinical and custodial

staff; and creates violent, unsanitary, and chaotic condi

tions that contribute to the constitutional violations and

frustrate efforts to fashion a remedy. The three-judge

court also found that “until the problem of overcrowding is

overcome it will be impossible to provide constitutionally

compliant care to California’s prison population.” Juris.

App. 141a.

The parties dispute the standard of review applicable to

this determination. With respect to the three-judge court’s

factual findings, this Court’s review is necessarily deferen

tial. It is not this Court’s place to “duplicate the role” of

the trial court. Anderson, 470 U. S., at 573. The ultimate

issue of primary cause presents a mixed question of law

and fact; but there, too, “the mix weighs heavily on the

20 BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

‘fact’ side.” Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U. S. 116, 148 (1999)

(Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in judgment). Because the

“district court is ‘better positioned’ . . . to decide the issue,”

our review of the three-judge court’s primary cause deter

mination is deferential. Salve Regina College v. Russell,

499 U. S. 225, 233 (1991).

The record documents the severe impact of burgeoning

demand on the provision of care. At the time of trial,

vacancy rates for medical and mental health staff ranged

as high as 20% for surgeons, 25% for physicians, 39% for

nurse practitioners, and 54.1% for psychiatrists. Juris.

App. 105a, 108a. These percentages are based on the

number of positions budgeted by the State. Dr. Ronald

Shansky, former medical director of the Illinois prison

system, concluded that these numbers understate the se

verity of the crisis because the State has not budgeted

sufficient staff to meet demand.5 According to Dr.

Shansky, “even if the prisons were able to fill all of their

vacant health care positions, which they have not been

able to do to date, . . . the prisons would still be unable to

handle the level of need given the current overcrowding.”

Record in No. 2:90–CV–00520–LKK–JFM (ED Cal.), Doc.

3231–13, p. 16 (hereinafter Doc. 3231–13). Dr. Craig

Haney, a professor of psychology, reported that mental

health staff are “managing far larger caseloads than is

appropriate or effective.” App. 596. A prison psychiatrist

told Dr. Haney that “ ‘we are doing about 50% of what we

should be doing.’ ” Ibid. In the context of physical care Dr.

Shansky agreed that “demand for care, particularly for the

high priority cases, continues to overwhelm the resources

——————

5 Dr. Craig Haney likewise testified that the State had “significantly

underestimated the staffing needed to implement critical portions of the

Coleman Program Guide requirements,” that “key tasks were omitted

when determining staffing workloads,” and that estimates were based

on “key assumptions” that caused the State to underestimate demand

for mental health care. App. 596–597.

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 21

Opinion of the Court

available.” Id., at 1408.

Even on the assumption that vacant positions could be

filled, the evidence suggested there would be insufficient

space for the necessary additional staff to perform their

jobs. The Plata Receiver, in his report on overcrowding,

concluded that even the “newest and most modern pris

ons” had been “designed with clinic space which is only

one-half that necessary for the real-life capacity of the

prisons.” App. 1023 (emphasis deleted). Dr. Haney re

ported that “[e]ach one of the facilities I toured was short

of significant amounts of space needed to perform other

wise critical tasks and responsibilities.” Id., at 597–598.

In one facility, staff cared for 7,525 prisoners in space

designed for one-third as many. Juris. App. 93a. Staff

operate out of converted storage rooms, closets, bath

rooms, shower rooms, and visiting centers. These make

shift facilities impede the effective delivery of care and

place the safety of medical professionals in jeopardy,

compounding the difficulty of hiring additional staff.

This shortfall of resources relative to demand contrib

utes to significant delays in treatment. Mentally ill pris

oners are housed in administrative segregation while

awaiting transfer to scarce mental health treatment beds

for appropriate care. One correctional officer indicated

that he had kept mentally ill prisoners in segregation for

“ ‘6 months or more.’ ” App. 594. Other prisoners awaiting

care are held in tiny, phone-booth sized cages. The record

documents instances of prisoners committing suicide while

awaiting treatment.6

Delays are no less severe in the context of physical care.

——————

6 For instance, Dr. Pablo Stewart reported that one prisoner was

referred to a crisis bed but, “[a]fter learning that the restraint room

was not available and that there were no crisis beds open, staff moved

[the prisoner] back to his administrative segregation cell without any

prescribed observation.” App. 736. The prisoner “hanged himself that

night in his cell.” Ibid.; see also Juris. App. 99a.

22 BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

Prisons have backlogs of up to 700 prisoners waiting to see

a doctor. Doc. 3231–13, at 18. A review of referrals for

urgent specialty care at one prison revealed that only 105

of 316 pending referrals had a scheduled appointment,

and only 2 had an appointment scheduled to occur within

14 days. Id., at 22–23. Urgent specialty referrals at one

prison had been pending for six months to a year. Id.,

at 27.

Crowding also creates unsafe and unsanitary living

conditions that hamper effective delivery of medical and

mental health care. A medical expert described living

quarters in converted gymnasiums or dayrooms, where

large numbers of prisoners may share just a few toilets

and showers, as “ ‘breeding grounds for disease.’ ”7 Juris.

App. 102a. Cramped conditions promote unrest and vio

lence, making it difficult for prison officials to monitor and

control the prison population. On any given day, prisoners

in the general prison population may become ill, thus

entering the plaintiff class; and overcrowding may prevent

immediate medical attention necessary to avoid suffering,

death, or spread of disease. After one prisoner was as

saulted in a crowded gymnasium, prison staff did not even

learn of the injury until the prisoner had been dead for

several hours. Tr. 382. Living in crowded, unsafe, and

unsanitary conditions can cause prisoners with latent

mental illnesses to worsen and develop overt symptoms.

Crowding may also impede efforts to improve delivery of

——————

7 Correctional officials at trial described several outbreaks of disease.

One officer testified that antibiotic-resistant staph infections spread

widely among the prison population and described prisoners “bleeding,

oozing with pus that is soaking through their clothes when they come

in to get the wound covered and treated.” Tr. 601, 604–605. Another

witness testified that inmates with influenza were sent back from the

infirmary due to a lack of beds and that the disease quickly spread to

“more than half ” the 340 prisoners in the housing unit, with the result

that the unit was placed on lockdown for a week. Id., at 720–721.

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 23

Opinion of the Court

care. Two prisoners committed suicide by hanging after

being placed in cells that had been identified as requiring

a simple fix to remove attachment points that could sup

port a noose. The repair was not made because doing so

would involve removing prisoners from the cells, and there

was no place to put them. Id., at 769–777. More gen

erally, Jeanne Woodford, the former acting secretary of

California’s prisons, testified that there “ ‘are simply too

many issues that arise from such a large number of pris

oners,’ ” and that, as a result, “ ‘management spends virtu

ally all of its time fighting fires instead of engaging in

thoughtful decision-making and planning’ ” of the sort

needed to fashion an effective remedy for these constitu

tional violations. Juris. App. 82a.

Increased violence also requires increased reliance on

lockdowns to keep order, and lockdowns further impede

the effective delivery of care. In 2006, prison officials

instituted 449 lockdowns. Id., at 116a. The average lock

down lasted 12 days, and 20 lockdowns lasted 60 days or

longer. Ibid. During lockdowns, staff must either escort

prisoners to medical facilities or bring medical staff to the

prisoners. Either procedure puts additional strain on

already overburdened medical and custodial staff. Some

programming for the mentally ill even may be canceled

altogether during lockdowns, and staff may be unable to

supervise the delivery of psychotropic medications.

The effects of overcrowding are particularly acute in

the prisons’ reception centers, intake areas that process

140,000 new or returning prisoners every year. Id., at

85a. Crowding in these areas runs as high as 300% of

design capacity. Id., at 86a. Living conditions are

“ ‘toxic,’ ” and a lack of treatment space impedes efforts to

identify inmate medical or mental health needs and pro

vide even rudimentary care. Id., at 92a. The former

warden of San Quentin reported that doctors in that

prison’s reception center “ ‘were unable to keep up with

24 BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

physicals or provid[e] any kind of chronic care follow-up.’ ”

Id., at 90a. Inmates spend long periods of time in these

areas awaiting transfer to the general population. Some

prisoners are held in the reception centers for their entire

period of incarceration.

Numerous experts testified that crowding is the primary

cause of the constitutional violations. The former warden

of San Quentin and former acting secretary of the Califor

nia prisons concluded that crowding “makes it ‘virtually

impossible for the organization to develop, much less

implement, a plan to provide prisoners with adequate

care.’ ” Id., at 83a. The former executive director of the

Texas Department of Criminal Justice testified that

“ ‘[e]verything revolves around overcrowding” and that

“ ‘overcrowding is the primary cause of the medical and

mental health care violations.’ ” Id., at 127a. The former

head of corrections in Pennsylvania, Washington, and

Maine testified that overcrowding is “ ‘overwhelming the

system both in terms of sheer numbers, in terms of the

space available, in terms of providing healthcare.’ ” Ibid.

And the current secretary of the Pennsylvania Depart

ment of Corrections testified that “ ‘‘the biggest inhibiting

factor right now in California being able to deliver appro

priate mental health and medical care is the severe over

crowding.’ ” Id., at 82a.

2

The State attempts to undermine the substantial evi

dence presented at trial, and the three-judge court’s find

ings of fact, by complaining that the three-judge court did

not allow it to present evidence of current prison condi

tions. This suggestion lacks a factual basis.

The three-judge court properly admitted evidence of

current conditions as relevant to the issues before it. The

three-judge court allowed discovery until a few months

before trial; expert witnesses based their conclusions on

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 25

Opinion of the Court

recent observations of prison conditions; the court ad

mitted recent reports on prison conditions by the Plata

Receiver and Coleman Special Master; and both parties

presented testimony related to current conditions, includ

ing understaffing, inadequate facilities, and unsanitary

and unsafe living conditions. See supra, at 4–8, 19–24.

Dr. Craig Haney, for example, based his expert report on

tours of eight California prisons. App. 539. These tours

occurred as late as August 2008, two weeks before Dr.

Haney submitted his report and less than four months

before the first day of trial. Id., at 585; see also id., at 563,

565, 580 (July tours). Other experts submitted reports

based on similar observations. See, e.g., Doc. 3231–13,

at 6 (Dr. Shansky); App. 646 (Dr. Stewart); id., at 1245

(Austin); id., at 1312 (Lehman).

The three-judge court’s opinion cited and relied on this

evidence of current conditions. The court relied exten

sively on the expert witness reports. See generally Juris.

App. 85a–143a. The court cited the most current data

available on suicides and preventable deaths in the Cali

fornia prisons. Id., at 123a, 125a. The court relied on

statistics on staff vacancies that dated to three months

before trial, id., at 105a, 108a, and statistics on shortages

of treatment beds for the same period, id., at 97a. These

are just examples of the extensive evidence of current

conditions that informed every aspect of the judgment of

the three-judge court. The three-judge court did not abuse

its discretion when it also cited findings made in earlier

decisions of the Plata and Coleman District Courts. Those

findings remained relevant to establish the nature of these

longstanding, continuing constitutional violations.

It is true that the three-judge court established a cutoff

date for discovery a few months before trial. The order

stated that site inspections of prisons would be allowed

until that date, and that evidence of “changed prison

conditions” after that date would not be admitted. App.

26 BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

1190. The court also excluded evidence not pertinent to

the issue whether a population limit is appropriate under

the PLRA, including evidence relevant solely to the exis

tence of an ongoing constitutional violation. The court

reasoned that its decision was limited to the issue of rem

edy and that the merits of the constitutional violation had

already been determined. The three-judge court made

clear that all such evidence would be considered “[t]o the

extent that it illuminates questions that are properly

before the court.” App. 2339.

Both rulings were within the sound discretion of the

three-judge court. Orderly trial management may require

discovery deadlines and a clean distinction between litiga

tion of the merits and the remedy. The State in fact

represented to the three-judge court that it would be “ap

propriate” to cut off discovery before trial because “like

plaintiffs, we, too, are really gearing up and going into a

pretrial mode.” Id., at 1683. And if the State truly be

lieved there was no longer a violation, it could have argued

to the Coleman and Plata District Courts that a three

judge court should not be convened because the District

Courts’ prior orders had not “failed to remedy the dep

rivation” of prisoners’ constitutional rights. 18 U. S. C.

§3626(a)(3)(A)(i); see also supra, at 16–17. Once the three

judge court was convened, that court was not required to

reconsider the merits. Its role was solely to consider the

propriety and necessity of a population limit.

The State does not point to any significant evidence that

it was unable to present and that would have changed the

outcome of the proceedings. To the contrary, the record

and opinion make clear that the decision of the three

judge court was based on current evidence pertaining to

ongoing constitutional violations.

3

The three-judge court acknowledged that the violations

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 27

Opinion of the Court

were caused by factors in addition to overcrowding and

that reducing crowding in the prisons would not entirely

cure the violations. This is consistent with the reports

of the Coleman Special Master and Plata Receiver, both

of whom concluded that even a significant reduction in the

prison population would not remedy the violations absent

continued efforts to train staff, improve facilities, and

reform procedures. App. 487, 1054.8 The three-judge

court nevertheless found that overcrowding was the pri

mary cause in the sense of being the foremost cause of the

violation.

This understanding of the primary cause requirement is

consistent with the text of the PLRA. The State in fact

concedes that it proposed this very definition of primary

cause to the three-judge court. “Primary” is defined as

“[f]irst or highest in rank, quality, or importance; princi

pal.” American Heritage Dictionary 1393 (4th ed. 2000);

see also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

1800 (2002) (defining “primary” as “first in rank or impor

tance”); 12 Oxford English Dictionary 472 (2d ed. 1989)

(defining “primary” as “[o]f the first or highest rank or

importance; that claims the first consideration; principal,

chief ”). Overcrowding need only be the foremost, chief, or

principal cause of the violation. If Congress had intended

——————

8 The Plata Receiver concluded that those who believed a population

reduction would be a panacea were “simply wrong.” App. 1054–1055.

The Receiver nevertheless made clear that “the time this process will

take, and the cost and the scope of intrusion by the Federal Court

cannot help but increase, and increase in a very significant manner, if

the scope and characteristics of [California prison] overcrowding

continue.” Id., at 1053. The Coleman Special Master likewise found

that a large release of prisoners, without other relief, would leave the

violation “largely unmitigated” even though deficiencies in care “are

unquestionably exacerbated by overcrowding” and “defendants’ ability

to provide required mental health services would be enhanced consid

erably by a reduction in the overall census” of the prisons. App. 486–

487.

28 BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

to require that crowding be the only cause, it would have

said so, assuming in its judgment that definition would be

consistent with constitutional limitations.

As this case illustrates, constitutional violations in

conditions of confinement are rarely susceptible of simple

or straightforward solutions. In addition to overcrowding

the failure of California’s prisons to provide adequate

medical and mental health care may be ascribed to chronic

and worsening budget shortfalls, a lack of political will in

favor of reform, inadequate facilities, and systemic admin

istrative failures. The Plata District Judge, in his order

appointing the Receiver, compared the problem to “ ‘a

spider web, in which the tension of the various strands is

determined by the relationship among all the parts of the

web, so that if one pulls on a single strand, the tension of

the entire web is redistributed in a new and complex

pattern.’ ” App. 966–967 (quoting Fletcher, The Discre

tionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial

Legitimacy, 91 Yale L. J. 635, 645 (1982)); see also Hutto,

437 U. S., at 688 (noting “the interdependence of the con

ditions producing the violation,” including overcrowd

ing). Only a multifaceted approach aimed at many causes,

including overcrowding, will yield a solution.

The PLRA should not be interpreted to place undue

restrictions on the authority of federal courts to fashion

practical remedies when confronted with complex and

intractable constitutional violations. Congress limited the

availability of limits on prison populations, but it did not

forbid these measures altogether. See 18 U. S. C. §3626.

The House Report accompanying the PLRA explained:

“While prison caps must be the remedy of last re

sort, a court still retains the power to order this

remedy despite its intrusive nature and harmful con

sequences to the public if, but only if, it is truly

necessary to prevent an actual violation of a prisoner’s

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 29

Opinion of the Court

federal rights.” H. R. Rep. No. 104–21, p. 25 (1995).

Courts should presume that Congress was sensitive to the

real-world problems faced by those who would remedy

constitutional violations in the prisons and that Congress

did not leave prisoners without a remedy for violations of

their constitutional rights. A reading of the PLRA that

would render population limits unavailable in practice

would raise serious constitutional concerns. See, e.g.,

Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476

U. S. 667, 681, n. 12 (1986). A finding that overcrowding

is the “primary cause” of a violation is therefore permissi

ble, despite the fact that additional steps will be required

to remedy the violation.

C

The three-judge court was also required to find by clear

and convincing evidence that “no other relief will remedy

the violation of the Federal right.” §3626(a)(3)(E)(ii).

The State argues that the violation could have been

remedied through a combination of new construction,

transfers of prisoners out of State, hiring of medical per

sonnel, and continued efforts by the Plata Receiver and

Coleman Special Master. The order in fact permits the

State to comply with the population limit by transferring

prisoners to county facilities or facilities in other States, or

by constructing new facilities to raise the prisons’ design

capacity. And the three-judge court’s order does not bar

the State from undertaking any other remedial efforts. If

the State does find an adequate remedy other than a

population limit, it may seek modification or termination

of the three-judge court’s order on that basis. The evi

dence at trial, however, supports the three-judge court’s

conclusion that an order limited to other remedies would

not provide effective relief.

The State’s argument that out-of-state transfers provide

a less restrictive alternative to a population limit must fail

30 BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

because requiring out-of-state transfers itself qualifies as

a population limit under the PLRA.9 Such an order “has

the purpose or effect of reducing or limiting the prison

population, or . . . directs the release from or nonadmission

of prisoners to a prison.” §3626(g)(4). The same is true of

transfers to county facilities. Transfers provide a means

to reduce the prison population in compliance with the

three-judge court’s order. They are not a less restrictive

alternative to that order.

Even if out-of-state transfers could be regarded as a less

restrictive alternative, the three-judge court found no

evidence of plans for transfers in numbers sufficient to

relieve overcrowding. The State complains that the Cole

man District Court slowed the rate of transfer by requir

ing inspections to assure that the receiving institutions

were in compliance with the Eighth Amendment, but the

State has made no effort to show that it has the resources

and the capacity to transfer significantly larger numbers

of prisoners absent that condition.

Construction of new facilities, in theory, could alleviate

overcrowding, but the three-judge court found no realistic

possibility that California would be able to build itself out

of this crisis. At the time of the court’s decision the State

had plans to build new medical and housing facilities, but

funding for some plans had not been secured and funding

for other plans had been delayed by the legislature for

years. Particularly in light of California’s ongoing fiscal

crisis, the three-judge court deemed “chimerical” any

“remedy that requires significant additional spending by

the state.” Juris. App. 151a. Events subsequent to the

——————

9 A program of voluntary transfers by the State would, of course, be

less restrictive than an order mandating a reduction in the prison

population. In light of the State’s longstanding failure to remedy these

serious constitutional violations, the three-judge court was under no

obligation to consider voluntary population-reduction measures by the

State as a workable alternative to injunctive relief.

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 31

Opinion of the Court

three-judge court’s decision have confirmed this conclu

sion. In October 2010, the State notified the Coleman

District Court that a substantial component of its con

struction plans had been delayed indefinitely by the legis

lature. And even if planned construction were to be

completed, the Plata Receiver found that many so-called

“expansion” plans called for cramming more prisoners into

existing prisons without expanding administrative and

support facilities. Juris. App. 151a–152a. The former

acting secretary of the California prisons explained that

these plans would “ ‘compound the burdens imposed on

prison administrators and line staff’’ ” by adding to the

already overwhelming prison population, creating new

barriers to achievement of a remedy. Id., at 152a.

The three-judge court also rejected additional hiring as

a realistic means to achieve a remedy. The State for years

had been unable to fill positions necessary for the ade

quate provision of medical and mental health care, and

the three-judge court found no reason to expect a change.

Although the State points to limited gains in staffing

between 2007 and 2008, the record shows that the prison

system remained chronically understaffed through trial in

2008. See supra, at 20. The three-judge court found that

violence and other negative conditions caused by crowding

made it difficult to hire and retain needed staff. The court

also concluded that there would be insufficient space for

additional staff to work even if adequate personnel could

somehow be retained. Additional staff cannot help to

remedy the violation if they have no space in which to see

and treat patients.

The three-judge court also did not err, much less commit

clear error, when it concluded that, absent a population

reduction, continued efforts by the Receiver and Special

Master would not achieve a remedy. Both the Receiver

and the Special Master filed reports stating that over

crowding posed a significant barrier to their efforts. The

32 BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

Plata Receiver stated that he was determined to achieve

a remedy even without a population reduction, but he

warned that such an effort would “all but bankrupt” the

State. App. 1053. The Coleman Special Master noted

even more serious concerns, stating that previous reme

dial efforts had “succumbed to the inexorably rising tide of

population.” App. 489. Both reports are persuasive evi

dence that, absent a reduction in overcrowding, any rem

edy might prove unattainable and would at the very least

require vast expenditures of resources by the State. Noth

ing in the long history of the Coleman and Plata actions

demonstrates any real possibility that the necessary re

sources would be made available.

The State claims that, even if each of these measures

were unlikely to remedy the violation, they would succeed

in doing so if combined together. Aside from asserting this

proposition, the State offers no reason to believe it is so.

Attempts to remedy the violations in Plata have been

ongoing for 9 years. In Coleman, remedial efforts have

been ongoing for 16. At one time, it may have been possi

ble to hope that these violations would be cured without a

reduction in overcrowding. A long history of failed reme

dial orders, together with substantial evidence of over

crowding’s deleterious effects on the provision of care,

compels a different conclusion today.

The common thread connecting the State’s proposed

remedial efforts is that they would require the State to

expend large amounts of money absent a reduction in

overcrowding. The Court cannot ignore the political and

fiscal reality behind this case. California’s Legislature has

not been willing or able to allocate the resources necessary

to meet this crisis absent a reduction in overcrowding.

There is no reason to believe it will begin to do so now,

when the State of California is facing an unprecedented

budgetary shortfall. As noted above, the legislature re

cently failed to allocate funds for planned new construc

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 33

Opinion of the Court

tion. Supra, at 30–31. Without a reduction in overcrowd

ing, there will be no efficacious remedy for the unconsti

tutional care of the sick and mentally ill in California’s

prisons.

D

The PLRA states that no prospective relief shall issue

with respect to prison conditions unless it is narrowly

drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the

violation of a federal right, and is the least intrusive

means necessary to correct the violation. 18 U. S. C.

§3626(a). When determining whether these requirements

are met, courts must “give substantial weight to any ad

verse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal

justice system.” Ibid.

1

The three-judge court acknowledged that its order “is

likely to affect inmates without medical conditions or

serious mental illness.” Juris. App. 172a. This is because

reducing California’s prison population will require reduc

ing the number of prisoners outside the class through

steps such as parole reform, sentencing reform, use of

good-time credits, or other means to be determined by the

State. Reducing overcrowding will also have positive

effects beyond facilitating timely and adequate access to

medical care, including reducing the incidence of prison

violence and ameliorating unsafe living conditions. Ac

cording to the State, these collateral consequences are

evidence that the order sweeps more broadly than

necessary.

The population limit imposed by the three-judge court

does not fail narrow tailoring simply because it will have

positive effects beyond the plaintiff class. Narrow tailor

ing requires a “ ‘ “fit” between the [remedy’s] ends and the

means chosen to accomplish those ends.’ ” Board of Trus

34 BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

tees of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469, 480

(1989). The scope of the remedy must be proportional

to the scope of the violation, and the order must extend

no further than necessary to remedy the violation. This

Court has rejected remedial orders that unnecessarily

reach out to improve prison conditions other than those

that violate the Constitution. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U. S.

343, 357 (1996). But the precedents do not suggest that a

narrow and otherwise proper remedy for a constitutional

violation is invalid simply because it will have collateral

effects.

Nor does anything in the text of the PLRA require that

result. The PLRA states that a remedy shall extend no

further than necessary to remedy the violation of the

rights of a “particular plaintiff or plaintiffs.” 18 U. S. C.

§3626(a)(1)(A). This means only that the scope of the

order must be determined with reference to the consti

tutional violations established by the specific plaintiffs

before the court.

This case is unlike cases where courts have impermis

sibly reached out to control the treatment of persons or

institutions beyond the scope of the violation. See Dayton

Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406, 420 (1977). Even

prisoners with no present physical or mental illness may

become afflicted, and all prisoners in California are at risk

so long as the State continues to provide inadequate care.

Prisoners in the general population will become sick, and

will become members of the plaintiff classes, with rou-

tine frequency; and overcrowding may prevent the timely

diagnosis and care necessary to provide effective treat

ment and to prevent further spread of disease. Relief

targeted only at present members of the plaintiff classes

may therefore fail to adequately protect future class mem

bers who will develop serious physical or mental illness.

Prisoners who are not sick or mentally ill do not yet have a

claim that they have been subjected to care that violates

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 35

Opinion of the Court

the Eighth Amendment, but in no sense are they remote

bystanders in California’s medical care system. They are

that system’s next potential victims.

A release order limited to prisoners within the plaintiff

classes would, if anything, unduly limit the ability of State

officials to determine which prisoners should be released.

As the State acknowledges in its brief, “release of seriously

mentally ill inmates [would be] likely to create special

dangers because of their recidivism rates.” Consolidated

Reply Brief for Appellants 34. The order of the three

judge court gives the State substantial flexibility to

determine who should be released. If the State truly be

lieves that a release order limited to sick and mentally ill

inmates would be preferable to the order entered by the

three-judge court, the State can move the three-judge

court for modification of the order on that basis. The State

has not requested this relief from this Court.

The order also is not overbroad because it encompasses

the entire prison system, rather than separately assessing

the need for a population limit at every institution. The

Coleman court found a systemwide violation when it first

afforded relief, and in Plata the State stipulated to sys

temwide relief when it conceded the existence of a viola

tion. Both the Coleman Special Master and the Plata

Receiver have filed numerous reports detailing system

wide deficiencies in medical and mental health care.

California’s medical care program is run at a systemwide

level, and resources are shared among the correctional

facilities.

Although the three-judge court’s order addresses the

entire California prison system, it affords the State flexi

bility to accommodate differences between institutions.

There is no requirement that every facility comply with

the 137.5% limit. Assuming no constitutional violation

results, some facilities may retain populations in excess of

the limit provided other facilities fall sufficiently below it

36 BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

so the system as a whole remains in compliance with the

order. This will allow prison officials to shift prisoners

to facilities that are better able to accommodate over

crowding, or out of facilities where retaining sufficient

medical staff has been difficult. The alternative—a series

of institution-specific population limits—would require

federal judges to make these choices. Leaving this discre

tion to state officials does not make the order overbroad.

Nor is the order overbroad because it limits the State’s

authority to run its prisons, as the State urges in its brief.

While the order does in some respects shape or control the

State’s authority in the realm of prison administration, it

does so in a manner that leaves much to the State’s discre

tion. The State may choose how to allocate prisoners

between institutions; it may choose whether to increase

the prisons’ capacity through construction or reduce the

population; and, if it does reduce the population, it may

decide what steps to take to achieve the necessary reduc

tion. The order’s limited scope is necessary to remedy a

constitutional violation.

As the State implements the order of the three-judge

court, time and experience may reveal targeted and effec

tive remedies that will end the constitutional violations

even without a significant decrease in the general prison

population. The State will be free to move the three-judge

court for modification of its order on that basis, and these

motions would be entitled to serious consideration. See

infra, at 45–48. At this time, the State has not proposed

any realistic alternative to the order. The State’s desire to

avoid a population limit, justified as according respect to

state authority, creates a certain and unacceptable risk of

continuing violations of the rights of sick and mentally ill

prisoners, with the result that many more will die or

needlessly suffer. The Constitution does not permit this

wrong.

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 37

Opinion of the Court

2

In reaching its decision, the three-judge court gave

“substantial weight” to any potential adverse impact on

public safety from its order. The court devoted nearly 10

days of trial to the issue of public safety, and it gave the

question extensive attention in its opinion. Ultimately,

the court concluded that it would be possible to reduce

the prison population “in a manner that preserves public

safety and the operation of the criminal justice system.”

Juris. App. 247a–248a.

The PLRA’s requirement that a court give “substantial

weight” to public safety does not require the court to cer

tify that its order has no possible adverse impact on the

public. A contrary reading would depart from the statute’s

text by replacing the word “substantial” with “conclusive.”

Whenever a court issues an order requiring the State to

adjust its incarceration and criminal justice policy, there

is a risk that the order will have some adverse impact on

public safety in some sectors. This is particularly true

when the order requires release of prisoners before their

sentence has been served. Persons incarcerated for even

one offense may have committed many other crimes prior

to arrest and conviction, and some number can be ex

pected to commit further crimes upon release. Yet the

PLRA contemplates that courts will retain authority to

issue orders necessary to remedy constitutional violations,

including authority to issue population limits when neces

sary. See supra, at 28–29. A court is required to consider

the public safety consequences of its order and to struc

ture, and monitor, its ruling in a way that mitigates those

consequences while still achieving an effective remedy of

the constitutional violation.

This inquiry necessarily involves difficult predictive

judgments regarding the likely effects of court orders.

Although these judgments are normally made by state

officials, they necessarily must be made by courts when

38 BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

those courts fashion injunctive relief to remedy serious

constitutional violations in the prisons. These questions

are difficult and sensitive, but they are factual questions

and should be treated as such. Courts can, and should,

rely on relevant and informed expert testimony when

making factual findings. It was proper for the three-judge

court to rely on the testimony of prison officials from

California and other States. Those experts testified on the

basis of empirical evidence and extensive experience in

the field of prison administration.

The three-judge court credited substantial evidence that

prison populations can be reduced in a manner that does

not increase crime to a significant degree. Some evidence

indicated that reducing overcrowding in California’s pris

ons could even improve public safety. Then-Governor

Schwarzenegger, in his emergency proclamation on over

crowding, acknowledged that “ ‘overcrowding causes harm

to people and property, leads to inmate unrest and mis

conduct, . . . and increases recidivism as shown within this

state and in others.’ ” Juris. App. 191a–192a. The former

warden of San Quentin and acting secretary of the Cali

fornia prison system testified that she “ ‘absolutely be

lieve[s] that we make people worse, and that we are not

meeting public safety by the way we treat people.’ ”10 Id.,

at 129a. And the head of Pennsylvania’s correctional

system testified that measures to reduce prison population

——————

10 The former head of correctional systems in Washington, Maine, and

Pennsylvania, likewise referred to California’s prisons as “ ‘crimino

genic.’ ” Juris. App. 191a. The Yolo County chief probation officer

testified that “ ‘it seems like [the prisons] produce additional criminal

behavior.’ ” Id., at 190a. A former professor of sociology at George

Washington University, reported that California’s present recidivism

rate is among the highest in the Nation. App. 1246. And the three

judge court noted the report of California’s Little Hoover Commission,

which stated that “ ‘[e]ach year, California communities are burdened

with absorbing 123,000 offenders returning from prison, often more

dangerous than when they left.’ ” Juris. App. 191a.

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 39

Opinion of the Court

may “actually improve on public safety because they ad

dress the problems that brought people to jail.” Tr. 1552–

1553.

Expert witnesses produced statistical evidence that

prison populations had been lowered without adversely

affecting public safety in a number of jurisdictions, includ

ing certain counties in California, as well as Wisconsin,

Illinois, Texas, Colorado, Montana, Michigan, Florida, and

Canada. Juris. App. 245a.11 Washington’s former secretary

of corrections testified that his State had implemented

population reduction methods, including parole reform

and expansion of good time credits, without any “deleteri

ous effect on crime.” Tr. 2008–2009. In light of this evi

dence, the three-judge court concluded that any negative

impact on public safety would be “substantially offset, and

perhaps entirely eliminated, by the public safety benefits”

——————

11 Philadelphia’s experience in the early 1990’s with a federal court

order mandating reductions in the prison population was less positive,

and that history illustrates the undoubted need for caution in this area.

One congressional witness testified that released prisoners committed

79 murders and multiple other offenses. See Hearing on S. 3 et al.

before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.,

45 (1995) (statement of Lynne Abraham, District Attorney of Philadel

phia). Lead counsel for the plaintiff class in that case responded that

“[t]his inflammatory assertion has never been documented.” Id., at

212 (statement of David Richman). The Philadelphia decree was also

different from the order entered in this case. Among other things, it

“prohibited the City from admitting to its prisons any additional

inmates, except for persons charged with, or convicted of, murder,

forcible rape, or a crime involving the use of a gun or knife in the

commission of an aggravated assault or robbery.” Harris v. Reeves, 761

F. Supp. 382, 384–385 (ED Pa. 1991); see also Crime and Justice

Research Institute, J. Goldkamp & M. White, Restoring Accountability

in Pretrial Release: The Philadelphia Pretrial Release Supervision

Experiments 6–8 (1998). The difficulty of determining the precise

relevance of Philadelphia’s experience illustrates why appellate courts

defer to the trier of fact. The three-judge court had the opportunity to

hear testimony on population reduction measures in other jurisdictions

and to ask relevant questions of informed expert witnesses.

40 BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

of a reduction in overcrowding. Juris. App. 248a.

The court found that various available methods of re

ducing overcrowding would have little or no impact on

public safety. Expansion of good-time credits would allow

the State to give early release to only those prisoners who

pose the least risk of reoffending. Diverting low-risk

offenders to community programs such as drug treatment,

day reporting centers, and electronic monitoring would

likewise lower the prison population without releasing

violent convicts.12 The State now sends large numbers of

persons to prison for violating a technical term or condi

tion of their parole, and it could reduce the prison popula

tion by punishing technical parole violations through

community-based programs. This last measure would be

particularly beneficial as it would reduce crowding in the

reception centers, which are especially hard hit by over

crowding. See supra, at 23–24. The court’s order took

account of public safety concerns by giving the State sub

stantial flexibility to select among these and other means

of reducing overcrowding.

The State submitted a plan to reduce its prison popula

tion in accordance with the three-judge court’s order, and

it complains that the three-judge court approved that

plan without considering whether the specific measures

contained within it would substantially threaten public

safety. The three-judge court, however, left the choice of

how best to comply with its population limit to state

——————

12 Expanding such community-based measures may require an ex

penditure of resources by the State to fund new programs or expand

existing ones. The State complains that the order therefore requires it

to “divert” savings that will be achieved by reducing the prison popula

tion and that setting budgetary priorities in this manner is a “severe,

unlawful intrusion on the State authority.” Brief for Appellants 55.

This argument is not convincing. The order does not require the State

to use any particular approach to reduce its prison population or

allocate its resources.

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 41

Opinion of the Court

prison officials. The court was not required to second

guess the exercise of that discretion. Courts should pre

sume that state officials are in a better position to gauge

how best to preserve public safety and balance competing

correctional and law enforcement concerns. The decision

to leave details of implementation to the State’s discretion

protected public safety by leaving sensitive policy deci

sions to responsible and competent state officials.

During the pendency of this appeal, the State in fact

began to implement measures to reduce the prison popula

tion. See Supp. Brief for Appellants 1. These measures

will shift “thousands” of prisoners from the state prisons

to the county jails by “mak[ing] certain felonies punishable

by imprisonment in county jail” and “requir[ing] that

individuals returned to custody for violating their condi

tions of parole ‘serve any custody term in county jail.’ ”

Ibid. These developments support the three-judge court’s

conclusion that the prison population can be reduced in

a manner calculated to avoid an undue negative effect on

public safety.

III

Establishing the population at which the State could

begin to provide constitutionally adequate medical and

mental health care, and the appropriate time frame within

which to achieve the necessary reduction, requires a de

gree of judgment. The inquiry involves uncertain predic

tions regarding the effects of population reductions, as

well as difficult determinations regarding the capacity of

prison officials to provide adequate care at various popu

lation levels. Courts have substantial flexibility when

making these judgments. “ ‘Once invoked, “the scope of a

district court’s equitable powers . . . is broad, for breadth

and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.” ’ ”

Hutto, 437 U. S., at 687, n. 9 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley,

433 U. S. 267, 281 (1977), in turn quoting Swann v.

42 BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U. S. 1, 15 (1971)).

Nevertheless, the PLRA requires a court to adopt a

remedy that is “narrowly tailored” to the constitutional

violation and that gives “substantial weight” to public

safety. 18 U. S. C. §3626(a). When a court is imposing a

population limit, this means the court must set the limit

at the highest population consistent with an efficacious

remedy. The court must also order the population reduc

tion achieved in the shortest period of time reasonably

consistent with public safety.

A

The three-judge court concluded that the population of

California’s prisons should be capped at 137.5% of design

capacity. This conclusion is supported by the record.

Indeed, some evidence supported a limit as low as 100% of

design capacity. The chief deputy secretary of Correc

tional Healthcare Services for the California prisons tes

tified that California’s prisons “ ‘were not designed and

made no provision for any expansion of medical care space

beyond the initial 100% of capacity.’ ” Juris. App. 176a.

Other evidence supported a limit as low as 130%. The

head of the State’s Facilities Strike Team recommended

reducing the population to 130% of design capacity as a

long-term goal. Id., at 179a–180a. A former head of cor

rectional systems in Washington State, Maine, and Penn

sylvania testified that a 130% limit would “ ‘give prison

officials and staff the ability to provide the necessary

programs and services for California’s prisoners.’ ” Id., at

180a. A former executive director of the Texas prisons

testified that a limit of 130% was “ ‘realistic and appro

priate’ ” and would “ ‘ensure that [California’s] prisons are

safe and provide legally required services.’ ” Ibid. And a

former acting secretary of the California prisons agreed

with a 130% limit with the caveat that a 130% limit might

prove inadequate in some older facilities. Ibid.

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 43

Opinion of the Court

According to the State, this testimony expressed the

witnesses’ policy preferences, rather than their views as to

what would cure the constitutional violation. Of course,

courts must not confuse professional standards with con

stitutional requirements. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S.

337, 348, n. 13 (1981). But expert opinion may be relevant

when determining what is obtainable and what is accept

able in corrections philosophy. See supra, at 37–38.

Nothing in the record indicates that the experts in this

case imposed their own policy views or lost sight of the

underlying violations. To the contrary, the witnesses

testified that a 130% population limit would allow the

State to remedy the constitutionally inadequate provision

of medical and mental health care. When expert opinion

is addressed to the question of how to remedy the relevant

constitutional violations, as it was here, federal judges can

give it considerable weight.

The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has set 130% as a

long-term goal for population levels in the federal prison

system. Brief for Appellants 43–44. The State suggests

the expert witnesses impermissibly adopted this profes

sional standard in their testimony. But courts are not

required to disregard expert opinion solely because it

adopts or accords with professional standards. Profes

sional standards may be “helpful and relevant with re

spect to some questions.” Chapman, supra, at 348, n. 13.

The witnesses testified that a limit of 130% was necessary

to remedy the constitutional violations, not that it should

be adopted because it is a BOP standard. If anything, the

fact that the BOP views 130% as a manageable population

density bolsters the three-judge court’s conclusion that a

population limit of 130% would alleviate the pressures

associated with overcrowding and allow the State to begin

to provide constitutionally adequate care.

Although the three-judge court concluded that the “evi

dence in support of a 130% limit is strong,” it found that

44 BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

some upward adjustment was warranted in light of “the

caution and restraint required by the PLRA.” Juris. App.

183a, 184a. The three-judge court noted evidence support

ing a higher limit. In particular, the State’s Corrections

Independent Review Panel had found that 145% was the

maximum “operable capacity” of California’s prisons, id.,

at 181a–182a, although the relevance of that determina

tion was undermined by the fact that the panel had not

considered the need to provide constitutionally adequate

medical and mental health care, as the State itself con

cedes. Brief for Coleman Appellees 45. After considering,

but discounting, this evidence, the three-judge court con

cluded that the evidence supported a limit lower than

145%, but higher than 130%. It therefore imposed a limit

of 137.5%.

This weighing of the evidence was not clearly erroneous.

The adversary system afforded the court an opportunity

to weigh and evaluate evidence presented by the parties.

The plaintiffs’ evidentiary showing was intended to justify

a limit of 130%, and the State made no attempt to show

that any other number would allow for a remedy. There

are also no scientific tools available to determine the

precise population reduction necessary to remedy a consti

tutional violation of this sort. The three-judge court made

the most precise determination it could in light of the

record before it. The PLRA’s narrow tailoring require

ment is satisfied so long as these equitable, remedial

judgments are made with the objective of releasing the

fewest possible prisoners consistent with an efficacious

remedy. In light of substantial evidence supporting an

even more drastic remedy, the three-judge court complied

with the requirement of the PLRA in this case.

B

The three-judge court ordered the State to achieve this

reduction within two years. At trial and closing argument

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 45

Opinion of the Court

before the three-judge court, the State did not argue that

reductions should occur over a longer period of time. The

State later submitted a plan for court approval that would

achieve the required reduction within five years, and that

would reduce the prison population to 151% of design

capacity in two years. The State represented that this

plan would “safely reach a population level of 137.5% over

time.” App. to Juris. Statement 32a. The three-judge

court rejected this plan because it did not comply with the

deadline set by its order.

The State first had notice that it would be required to

reduce its prison population in February 2009, when the

three-judge court gave notice of its tentative ruling after

trial. The 2-year deadline, however, will not begin to run

until this Court issues its judgment. When that happens,

the State will have already had over two years to begin

complying with the order of the three-judge court. The

State has used the time productively. At oral argument,

the State indicated it had reduced its prison population

by approximately 9,000 persons since the decision of the

three-judge court. After oral argument, the State filed a

supplemental brief indicating that it had begun to imple

ment measures to shift “thousands” of additional prisoners

to county facilities. Supp. Brief for Appellants at 1.

Particularly in light of the State’s failure to contest the

issue at trial, the three-judge court did not err when

it established a 2-year deadline for relief. Plaintiffs pro

posed a 2-year deadline, and the evidence at trial was

intended to demonstrate the feasibility of a 2-year dead

line. See Tr. 2979. Notably, the State has not asked this

Court to extend the 2-year deadline at this time.

The three-judge court, however, retains the authority,

and the responsibility, to make further amendments to the

existing order or any modified decree it may enter as

warranted by the exercise of its sound discretion. “The

power of a court of equity to modify a decree of injunctive

46 BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

relief is long-established, broad, and flexible.” New York

State Assn. for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706 F. 2d

956, 967 (CA2 1983) (Friendly, J.). A court that invokes

equity’s power to remedy a constitutional violation by an

injunction mandating systemic changes to an institution

has the continuing duty and responsibility to assess the

efficacy and consequences of its order. Id., at 969–971.

Experience may teach the necessity for modification or

amendment of an earlier decree. To that end, the three

judge court must remain open to a showing or demonstra

tion by either party that the injunction should be altered

to ensure that the rights and interests of the parties are

given all due and necessary protection.

Proper respect for the State and for its governmental

processes require that the three-judge court exercise its

jurisdiction to accord the State considerable latitude to

find mechanisms and make plans to correct the violations

in a prompt and effective way consistent with public

safety. In order to “give substantial weight to any adverse

impact on public safety,” 18 U. S. C. §3626(a)(1)(A), the

three-judge court must give due deference to informed

opinions as to what public safety requires, including the

considered determinations of state officials regarding

the time in which a reduction in the prison population can

be achieved consistent with public safety. An extension of

time may allow the State to consider changing political,

economic, and other circumstances and to take advantage

of opportunities for more effective remedies that arise as

the Special Master, the Receiver, the prison system, and

the three-judge court itself evaluate the progress being

made to correct unconstitutional conditions. At the same

time, both the three-judge court and state officials must

bear in mind the need for a timely and efficacious remedy

for the ongoing violation of prisoners’ constitutional rights.

The State may wish to move for modification of the

three-judge court’s order to extend the deadline for the

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 47

Opinion of the Court

required reduction to five years from the entry of the

judgment of this Court, the deadline proposed in the

State’s first population reduction plan. The three-judge

court may grant such a request provided that the State

satisfies necessary and appropriate preconditions designed

to ensure that measures are taken to implement the plan

without undue delay. Appropriate preconditions may

include a requirement that the State demonstrate that it

has the authority and the resources necessary to achieve

the required reduction within a 5-year period and to meet

reasonable interim directives for population reduction.

The three-judge court may also condition an extension of

time on the State’s ability to meet interim benchmarks for

improvement in provision of medical and mental health

care.

The three-judge court, in its discretion, may also con

sider whether it is appropriate to order the State to begin

without delay to develop a system to identify prisoners

who are unlikely to reoffend or who might otherwise be

candidates for early release. Even with an extension of

time to construct new facilities and implement other

reforms, it may become necessary to release prisoners to

comply with the court’s order. To do so safely, the State

should devise systems to select those prisoners least likely

to jeopardize public safety. An extension of time may

provide the State a greater opportunity to refine and elab

orate those systems.

The State has already made significant progress toward

reducing its prison population, including reforms that will

result in shifting “thousands” of prisoners to county jails.

See Supp. Brief for Appellants at 1. As the State makes

further progress, the three-judge court should evaluate

whether its order remains appropriate. If significant

progress is made toward remedying the underlying consti

tutional violations, that progress may demonstrate that

further population reductions are not necessary or are less

48 BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

urgent than previously believed. Were the State to make

this showing, the three-judge court in the exercise of its

discretion could consider whether it is appropriate to ex

tend or modify this timeline.

Experience with the three-judge court’s order may also

lead the State to suggest other modifications. The three

judge court should give any such requests serious consid

eration. The three-judge court should also formulate its

orders to allow the State and its officials the authority

necessary to address contingencies that may arise during

the remedial process.

These observations reflect the fact that the three-judge

court’s order, like all continuing equitable decrees, must

remain open to appropriate modification. They are not

intended to cast doubt on the validity of the basic premise

of the existing order. The medical and mental health care

provided by California’s prisons falls below the standard of

decency that inheres in the Eighth Amendment. This

extensive and ongoing constitutional violation requires

a remedy, and a remedy will not be achieved without a

reduction in overcrowding. The relief ordered by the

three-judge court is required by the Constitution and was

authorized by Congress in the PLRA. The State shall

implement the order without further delay.

The judgment of the three-judge court is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 49

Opinion of the Court

APPENDIXES

A

18 U. S. C. §3626:

“(a) REQUIREMENTS FOR RELIEF.

“(1) PROSPECTIVE RELIEF.—(A) Prospective relief in any

civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend

no further than necessary to correct the violation of the

Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The

court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief

unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn,

extends no further than necessary to correct the violation

of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means

necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The

court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact

on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice

system caused by the relief.

. . . . .

“(3) PRISONER RELEASE ORDER.—(A) In any civil action

with respect to prison conditions, no court shall enter a

prisoner release order unless—

“(i) a court has previously entered an order for less

intrusive relief that has failed to remedy the deprivation

of the Federal right sought to be remedied through the

prisoner release order; and

“(ii) the defendant has had a reasonable amount of time

to comply with the previous court orders.

“(B) In any civil action in Federal court with respect to

prison conditions, a prisoner release order shall be entered

only by a three-judge court in accordance with section

2284 of title 28, if the requirements of subparagraph (E)

have been met.

“(C) A party seeking a prisoner release order in Federal

court shall file with any request for such relief, a request

50 BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

for a three-judge court and materials sufficient to demon

strate that the requirements of subparagraph (A) have

been met.

“(D) If the requirements under subparagraph (A) have

been met, a Federal judge before whom a civil action with

respect to prison conditions is pending who believes that a

prison release order should be considered may sua sponte

request the convening of a three-judge court to determine

whether a prisoner release order should be entered.

“(E) The three-judge court shall enter a prisoner release

order only if the court finds by clear and convincing evi

dence that—

“(i) crowding is the primary cause of the violation of a

Federal right; and

“(ii) no other relief will remedy the violation of the Fed

eral right.

“(F) Any State or local official including a legislator or

unit of government whose jurisdiction or function includes

the appropriation of funds for the construction, operation,

or maintenance of prison facilities, or the prosecution or

custody of persons who may be released from, or not ad

mitted to, a prison as a result of a prisoner release order

shall have standing to oppose the imposition or continua

tion in effect of such relief and to seek termination of such

relief, and shall have the right to intervene in any pro

ceeding relating to such relief.

. . . . .

(g) DEFINITIONS.—As used in this section

. . . . .

“(4) the term “prisoner release order” includes any order,

including a temporary restraining order or preliminary

injunctive relief, that has the purpose or effect of reducing

or limiting the prison population, or that directs the re

lease from or nonadmission of prisoners to a prison . . . .”

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)

51

Opinion of the Court

B

Mule Creek State Prison

Aug. 1, 2008

California Institution for Men

Aug. 7, 2006

52 BROWN v. PLATA

Opinion of the Court

C

Salinas Valley State Prison

July 29, 2008

Correctional Treatment Center (dry cages/holding cells for people wait

ing for mental health crisis bed)

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 1

SCALIA, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 09–1233

_________________

EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., GOVERNOR OF CAL-

IFORNIA, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. MARCIANO

PLATA ET AL.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT AND THE NORTHERN

DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

[May 23, 2011]

JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins,

dissenting.

Today the Court affirms what is perhaps the most radi

cal injunction issued by a court in our Nation’s history: an

order requiring California to release the staggering num

ber of 46,000 convicted criminals.

There comes before us, now and then, a case whose

proper outcome is so clearly indicated by tradition and

common sense, that its decision ought to shape the law,

rather than vice versa. One would think that, before

allowing the decree of a federal district court to release

46,000 convicted felons, this Court would bend every effort

to read the law in such a way as to avoid that outrageous

result. Today, quite to the contrary, the Court disregards

stringently drawn provisions of the governing statute, and

traditional constitutional limitations upon the power of a

federal judge, in order to uphold the absurd.

The proceedings that led to this result were a judicial

travesty. I dissent because the institutional reform the

District Court has undertaken violates the terms of the gov

erning statute, ignores bedrock limitations on the power

of Article III judges, and takes federal courts wildly

beyond their institutional capacity.

2 BROWN v. PLATA

SCALIA, J., dissenting

I

A

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) states that

“[p]rospective relief in any civil action with respect to

prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary

to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular

plaintiff or plaintiffs”; that such relief must be “narrowly

drawn, [and] exten[d] no further than necessary to correct

the violation of the Federal right”; and that it must be “the

least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of

the Federal right.” 18 U. S. C. §3626(a)(1)(A). In deciding

whether these multiple limitations have been complied

with, it is necessary to identify with precision what is the

“violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or

plaintiffs” that has been alleged. What has been alleged

here, and what the injunction issued by the Court is

tailored (narrowly or not) to remedy is the running of a

prison system with inadequate medical facilities. That

may result in the denial of needed medical treatment to “a

particular [prisoner] or [prisoners],” thereby violating (ac

cording to our cases) his or their Eighth Amendment

rights. But the mere existence of the inadequate system

does not subject to cruel and unusual punishment the

entire prison population in need of medical care, including

those who receive it.

The Court acknowledges that the plaintiffs “do not base

their case on deficiencies in care provided on any one

occasion”; rather, “[p]laintiffs rely on systemwide deficien

cies in the provision of medical and mental health care

that, taken as a whole, subject sick and mentally ill pris

oners in California to ‘substantial risk of serious harm’

and cause the delivery of care in the prisons to fall below

the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress

of a maturing society.” Ante, at 7, n. 3. But our judge

empowering “evolving standards of decency” jurisprudence

(with which, by the way, I heartily disagree, see, e.g.,

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 3

SCALIA, J., dissenting

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U. S. 551, 615–616 (2005) (SCALIA,

J., dissenting)) does not prescribe (or at least has not until

today prescribed) rules for the “decent” running of schools,

prisons, and other government institutions. It forbids

“indecent” treatment of individuals—in the context of this

case, the denial of medical care to those who need it. And

the persons who have a constitutional claim for denial of

medical care are those who are denied medical care—not

all who face a “substantial risk” (whatever that is) of being

denied medical care.

The Coleman litigation involves “the class of seriously

mentally ill persons in California prisons,” ante, at 8, and

the Plata litigation involves “the class of state prisoners

with serious medical conditions,” ante, at 9. The plaintiffs

do not appear to claim—and it would absurd to suggest—

that every single one of those prisoners has personally

experienced “torture or a lingering death,” ante, at 13

(internal quotation marks omitted), as a consequence of

that bad medical system. Indeed, it is inconceivable that

anything more than a small proportion of prisoners in

the plaintiff classes have personally received sufficiently

atrocious treatment that their Eighth Amendment right

was violated—which, as the Court recognizes, is why the

plaintiffs do not premise their claim on “deficiencies in

care provided on any one occasion.” Ante, at 7, n. 3.

Rather, the plaintiffs’ claim is that they are all part of a

medical system so defective that some number of prisoners

will inevitably be injured by incompetent medical care,

and that this number is sufficiently high so as to render

the system, as a whole, unconstitutional.

But what procedural principle justifies certifying a class

of plaintiffs so they may assert a claim of systemic uncon

stitutionality? I can think of two possibilities, both of

which are untenable. The first is that although some or

most plaintiffs in the class do not individually have viable

Eighth Amendment claims, the class as a whole has collec

4 BROWN v. PLATA

SCALIA, J., dissenting

tively suffered an Eighth Amendment violation. That

theory is contrary to the bedrock rule that the sole purpose

of classwide adjudication is to aggregate claims that are

individually viable. “A class action, no less than tradi

tional joinder (of which it is a species), merely enables a

federal court to adjudicate claims of multiple parties at

once, instead of in separate suits. And like traditional

joinder, it leaves the parties’ legal rights and duties intact

and the rules of decision unchanged.” Shady Grove Or

thopedic Associates, P. A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U. S. ___,

___ (2010) (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 14).

The second possibility is that every member of the plain

tiff class has suffered an Eighth Amendment violation

merely by virtue of being a patient in a poorly-run prison

system, and the purpose of the class is merely to aggregate

all those individually viable claims. This theory has the

virtue of being consistent with procedural principles, but

at the cost of a gross substantive departure from our case

law. Under this theory, each and every prisoner who

happens to be a patient in a system that has systemic

weaknesses—such as “hir[ing] any doctor who had a li

cense, a pulse and a pair of shoes,” ante, at 10 (internal

quotation marks omitted)—has suffered cruel or unusual

punishment, even if that person cannot make an individu

alized showing of mistreatment. Such a theory of the

Eighth Amendment is preposterous. And we have said as

much in the past: “If . . . a healthy inmate who had suf

fered no deprivation of needed medical treatment were

able to claim violation of his constitutional right to medi

cal care . . . simply on the ground that the prison medical

facilities were inadequate, the essential distinction be

tween judge and executive would have disappeared: it

would have become the function of the courts to assure

adequate medical care in prisons.” Lewis v. Casey, 518

U. S. 343, 350 (1996).

Whether procedurally wrong or substantively wrong,

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 5

SCALIA, J., dissenting

the notion that the plaintiff class can allege an Eighth

Amendment violation based on “systemwide deficiencies”

is assuredly wrong. It follows that the remedy decreed

here is also contrary to law, since the theory of systemic

unconstitutionality is central to the plaintiffs’ case. The

PLRA requires plaintiffs to establish that the systemwide

injunction entered by the District Court was “narrowly

drawn” and “extends no further than necessary” to correct

“the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff

or plaintiffs.” If (as is the case) the only viable constitu

tional claims consist of individual instances of mistreat

ment, then a remedy reforming the system as a whole goes

far beyond what the statute allows.

It is also worth noting the peculiarity that the vast

majority of inmates most generously rewarded by the re

lease order—the 46,000 whose incarceration will be ended—

do not form part of any aggrieved class even under the

Court’s expansive notion of constitutional violation. Most

of them will not be prisoners with medical conditions or

severe mental illness; and many will undoubtedly be fine

physical specimens who have developed intimidating

muscles pumping iron in the prison gym.

B

Even if I accepted the implausible premise that the

plaintiffs have established a systemwide violation of

the Eighth Amendment, I would dissent from the Court’s

endorsement of a decrowding order. That order is an

example of what has become known as a “structural in

junction.” As I have previously explained, structural

injunctions are radically different from the injunctions

traditionally issued by courts of equity, and presumably

part of “the judicial Power” conferred on federal courts by

Article III:

“The mandatory injunctions issued upon termination

of litigation usually required ‘a single simple act.’ H.

6 BROWN v. PLATA

SCALIA, J., dissenting

McClintock, Principles of Equity §15, pp. 32–33 (2d

ed. 1948). Indeed, there was a ‘historical prejudice of

the court of chancery against rendering decrees which

called for more than a single affirmative act.’ Id., §61,

at 160. And where specific performance of contracts

was sought, it was the categorical rule that no decree

would issue that required ongoing supervision. . . .

Compliance with these ‘single act’ mandates could, in

addition to being simple, be quick; and once it was

achieved the contemnor’s relationship with the court

came to an end, at least insofar as the subject of the

order was concerned. Once the document was turned

over or the land conveyed, the litigant’s obligation to

the court, and the court’s coercive power over the liti

gant, ceased. . . . The court did not engage in any on

going supervision of the litigant’s conduct, nor did its

order continue to regulate its behavior.” Mine Work

ers v. Bagwell, 512 U. S. 821, 841–842 (1994) (SCALIA,

J., concurring).

Structural injunctions depart from that historical prac

tice, turning judges into long-term administrators of

complex social institutions such as schools, prisons, and

police departments. Indeed, they require judges to play a

role essentially indistinguishable from the role ordinarily

played by executive officials. Today’s decision not only

affirms the structural injunction but vastly expands its

use, by holding that an entire system is unconstitutional

because it may produce constitutional violations.

The drawbacks of structural injunctions have been

described at great length elsewhere. See, e.g., Lewis,

supra, at 385–393 (1996) (THOMAS, J., concurring); Mis

souri v. Jenkins, 515 U. S. 70, 124–133 (1995) (THOMAS,

J., concurring); Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational

Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983

Duke L. J. 1265. This case illustrates one of their most

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 7

SCALIA, J., dissenting

pernicious aspects: that they force judges to engage in a

form of factfinding-as-policymaking that is outside the

traditional judicial role. The factfinding judges tradition

ally engage in involves the determination of past or pre

sent facts based (except for a limited set of materials of

which courts may take “judicial notice”) exclusively upon

a closed trial record. That is one reason why a district

judge’s factual findings are entitled to plain-error review:

because having viewed the trial first hand he is in a better

position to evaluate the evidence than a judge reviewing a

cold record. In a very limited category of cases, judges

have also traditionally been called upon to make some

predictive judgments: which custody will best serve the

interests of the child, for example, or whether a particular

one-shot injunction will remedy the plaintiff’s grievance.

When a judge manages a structural injunction, however,

he will inevitably be required to make very broad empiri

cal predictions necessarily based in large part upon policy

views—the sort of predictions regularly made by legis

lators and executive officials, but inappropriate for the

Third Branch.

This feature of structural injunctions is superbly illus

trated by the District Court’s proceeding concerning the

decrowding order’s effect on public safety. The PLRA

requires that, before granting “[p]rospective relief in [a]

civil action with respect to prison conditions,” a court must

“give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public

safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused

by the relief.” 18 U. S. C. §3626(a)(1)(A). Here, the Dis

trict Court discharged that requirement by making the

“factual finding” that “the state has available methods by

which it could readily reduce the prison population to

137.5% design capacity or less without an adverse impact

on public safety or the operation of the criminal justice

system.” Juris. Statement App., O. T. 2009, No. 09-416, p.

253a. It found the evidence “clear” that prison overcrowd

8 BROWN v. PLATA

SCALIA, J., dissenting

ing would “perpetuate a criminogenic prison system that

itself threatens public safety,” id., at 186a, and volun

teered its opinion that “[t]he population could be reduced

even further with the reform of California’s antiquated

sentencing policies and other related changes to the laws.”

Id., at 253a. It “reject[ed] the testimony that inmates

released early from prison would commit additional new

crimes,” id., at 200a, finding that “shortening the length of

stay through earned credits would give inmates incentives

to participate in programming designed to lower recidi

vism,” id., at 204a, and that “slowing the flow of technical

parole violators to prison, thereby substantially reducing

the churning of parolees, would by itself improve both

the prison and parole systems, and public safety.” Id., at

209a. It found that “the diversion of offenders to commu

nity correctional programs has significant beneficial ef

fects on public safety,” id., at 214a, and that “additional

rehabilitative programming would result in a significant

population reduction while improving public safety,” id., at

216a.

The District Court cast these predictions (and the Court

today accepts them) as “factual findings,” made in reliance

on the procession of expert witnesses that testified at trial.

Because these “findings” have support in the record, it is

difficult to reverse them under a plain-error standard of

review. Ante, at 38. And given that the District Court

devoted nearly 10 days of trial and 70 pages of its opinion

to this issue, it is difficult to dispute that the District

Court has discharged its statutory obligation to give “sub

stantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety.”

But the idea that the three District Judges in this case

relied solely on the credibility of the testifying expert

witnesses is fanciful. Of course they were relying largely

on their own beliefs about penology and recidivism. And

of course different district judges, of different policy views,

would have “found” that rehabilitation would not work

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 9

SCALIA, J., dissenting

and that releasing prisoners would increase the crime

rate. I am not saying that the District Judges rendered

their factual findings in bad faith. I am saying that it is

impossible for judges to make “factual findings” without

inserting their own policy judgments, when the factual

findings are policy judgments. What occurred here is no

more judicial factfinding in the ordinary sense than would

be the factual findings that deficit spending will not lower

the unemployment rate, or that the continued occupation

of Iraq will decrease the risk of terrorism. Yet, because

they have been branded “factual findings” entitled to

deferential review, the policy preferences of three District

Judges now govern the operation of California’s penal

system.

It is important to recognize that the dressing-up of pol

icy judgments as factual findings is not an error pecu-

liar to this case. It is an unavoidable concomitant of insti

tutional-reform litigation. When a district court issues an

injunction, it must make a factual assessment of the an

ticipated consequences of the injunction. And when the

injunction undertakes to restructure a social institution,

assessing the factual consequences of the injunction is

necessarily the sort of predictive judgment that our sys

tem of government allocates to other government officials.

But structural injunctions do not simply invite judges to

indulge policy preferences. They invite judges to indulge

incompetent policy preferences. Three years of law school

and familiarity with pertinent Supreme Court precedents

give no insight whatsoever into the management of social

institutions. Thus, in the proceeding below the District

Court determined that constitutionally adequate medical

services could be provided if the prison population was

137.5% of design capacity. This was an empirical finding

it was utterly unqualified to make. Admittedly, the court

did not generate that number entirely on its own; it heard

the numbers 130% and 145% bandied about by various

10 BROWN v. PLATA

SCALIA, J., dissenting

witnesses and decided to split the difference. But the

ability of judges to spit back or even average-out numbers

spoon-fed to them by expert witnesses does not render

them competent decisionmakers in areas in which they

are otherwise unqualified.

The District Court also relied heavily on the views of the

Receiver and Special Master, and those reports play a

starring role in the Court’s opinion today. The Court notes

that “the Receiver and the Special Master filed reports

stating that overcrowding posed a significant barrier to

their efforts” and deems those reports “persuasive evi

dence that, absent a reduction in overcrowding, any rem

edy might prove unattainable and would at the very least

require vast expenditures of resources by the State.” Ante,

at 31–32. The use of these reports is even less consonant

with the traditional judicial role than the District Court’s

reliance on the expert testimony at trial. The latter, even

when, as here, it is largely the expression of policy judg

ments, is at least subject to cross-examination. Relying on

the un-cross-examined findings of an investigator, sent

into the field to prepare a factual report and give sugges

tions on how to improve the prison system, bears no re

semblance to ordinary judicial decisionmaking. It is true

that the PLRA contemplates the appointment of Special

Masters (although not Receivers), but Special Masters are

authorized only to “conduct hearings and prepare pro

posed findings of fact” and “assist in the development of

remedial plans,” 18 U. S. C. §3626(f)(6). This does not

authorize them to make factual findings (unconnected to

hearings) that are given seemingly wholesale deference.

Neither the Receiver nor the Special Master was selected

by California to run its prisons, and the fact that they may

be experts in the field of prison reform does not justify the

judicial imposition of their perspectives on the state.

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)

11

SCALIA, J., dissenting

C

My general concerns associated with judges’ running

social institutions are magnified when they run prison

systems, and doubly magnified when they force prison

officials to release convicted criminals. As we have previ

ously recognized:

“[C]ourts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly

urgent problems of prison administration and re-

form. . . . [T]he problems of prisons in America are

complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they

are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. . . .

Running a prison is an inordinately difficult under

taking that requires expertise, planning, and the com

mitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly

within the province of the legislative and executive

branches of government. Prison is, moreover, a task

that has been committed to the responsibility of those

branches, and separation of powers concerns counsel a

policy of judicial restraint. Where a state penal sys

tem is involved, federal courts have . . . additional

reason to accord deference to the appropriate prison

authorities.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 84–85

(1987) (internal quotation marks omitted).

These principles apply doubly to a prisoner-release

order. As the author of today’s opinion explained earlier

this Term, granting a writ of habeas corpus “ ‘disturbs the

State’s significant interest in repose for concluded litiga

tion, denies society the right to punish some admitted

offenders, and intrudes on state sovereignty to a degree

matched by few exercises of federal judicial authority.’ ”

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at

13) (quoting Harris v. Reed, 489 U. S. 255, 282 (1989)

(KENNEDY, J., dissenting)). Recognizing that habeas relief

must be granted sparingly, we have reversed the Ninth

Circuit’s erroneous grant of habeas relief to individual

12 BROWN v. PLATA

SCALIA, J., dissenting

California prisoners four times this Term alone. Cullen

v. Pinholster, 563 U. S. ___ (2011); Felkner v. Jackson,

562 U. S. ___ (2011) (per curiam); Swarthout v. Cooke, 562

U. S. ___ (2011) (per curiam); Harrington, supra. And yet

here, the Court affirms an order granting the functional

equivalent of 46,000 writs of habeas corpus, based on its

paean to courts’ “substantial flexibility when making these

judgments.” Ante, at 41. It seems that the Court’s respect

for state sovereignty has vanished in the case where it

most matters.

II

The Court’s opinion includes a bizarre coda noting

that “[t]he State may wish to move for modification of the

three-judge court’s order to extend the deadline for the

required reduction to five years.” Ante, at 46–47. The Dis

trict Court, it says, “may grant such a request provided

that the State satisfies necessary and appropriate precon

ditions designed to ensure the measures are taken to

implement the plan without undue delay”; and it gives

vague suggestions of what these preconditions “may in

clude,” such as “interim benchmarks.” Ante, at 47. It also

invites the District Court to “consider whether it is appro

priate to order the State to begin without delay to develop

a system to identify prisoners who are unlikely to reof

fend,” and informs the State that it “should devise systems

to select those prisoners least likely to jeopardize public

safety.” Ibid. (What a good idea!)

The legal effect of this passage is unclear—I suspect

intentionally so. If it is nothing but a polite reminder to

the State and to the District Court that the injunction is

subject to modification, then it is entirely unnecessary. As

both the State and the District Court are undoubtedly

aware, a party is always entitled to move to modify an

equitable decree, and the PLRA contains an express provi

sion authorizing District Courts to modify or terminate

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 13

SCALIA, J., dissenting

prison injunctions. See 18 U. S. C. §3626(b).

I suspect, however, that this passage is a warning shot

across the bow, telling the District Court that it had better

modify the injunction if the State requests what we invite

it to request. Such a warning, if successful, would achieve

the benefit of a marginal reduction in the inevitable mur

ders, robberies, and rapes to be committed by the released

inmates. But it would achieve that at the expense of in

tellectual bankruptcy, as the Court’s “warning” is en-

tirely alien to ordinary principles of appellate review of

injunctions. When a party moves for modification of

an injunction, the district court is entitled to rule on that

motion first, subject to review for abuse of discretion if it

declines to modify the order. Horne v. Flores, 557 U. S.

___, ___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 10, 20). Moreover, when a

district court enters a new decree with new benchmarks,

the selection of those benchmarks is also reviewed under

a deferential, abuse-of-discretion standard of review—a

point the Court appears to recognize. Ante, at 45. Appel

late courts are not supposed to “affirm” injunctions while

preemptively noting that the State “may” request, and the

District Court “may” grant, a request to extend the State’s

deadline to release prisoners by three years based on some

suggestions on what appropriate preconditions for such a

modification “may” include.

Of course what is really happening here is that the

Court, overcome by common sense, disapproves of the

results reached by the District Court, but cannot remedy

them (it thinks) by applying ordinary standards of appel

late review. It has therefore selected a solution unknown

in our legal system: A deliberately ambiguous set of sug

gestions on how to modify the injunction, just deferential

enough so that it can say with a straight face that it is

“affirming,” just stern enough to put the District Court on

notice that it will likely get reversed if it does not follow

them. In doing this, the Court has aggrandized itself,

14 BROWN v. PLATA

SCALIA, J., dissenting

grasping authority that appellate courts are not supposed

to have, and using it to enact a compromise solution with

no legal basis other than the Court’s say-so. That we are

driven to engage in these extralegal activities should be a

sign that the entire project of permitting district courts to

run prison systems is misbegotten.

But perhaps I am being too unkind. The Court, or at

least a majority of the Court’s majority, must be aware

that the judges of the District Court are likely to call its

bluff, since they know full well it cannot possibly be an

abuse of discretion to refuse to accept the State’s proposed

modifications in an injunction that has just been approved

(affirmed) in its present form. An injunction, after all,

does not have to be perfect; only good enough for govern

ment work, which the Court today says this is. So perhaps

the coda is nothing more than a ceremonial washing of the

hands—making it clear for all to see, that if the terrible

things sure to happen as a consequence of this outrageous

order do happen, they will be none of this Court’s respon

sibility. After all, did we not want, and indeed even sug

gest, something better?

III

In view of the incoherence of the Eighth Amendment

claim at the core of this case, the nonjudicial features of

institutional reform litigation that this case exemplifies,

and the unique concerns associated with mass prisoner

releases, I do not believe this Court can affirm this injunc

tion. I will state my approach briefly: In my view, a court

may not order a prisoner’s release unless it determines

that the prisoner is suffering from a violation of his consti

tutional rights, and that his release, and no other relief,

will remedy that violation. Thus, if the court determines

that a particular prisoner is being denied constitutionally

required medical treatment, and the release of that pris

oner (and no other remedy) would enable him to obtain

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 15

SCALIA, J., dissenting

medical treatment, then the court can order his release;

but a court may not order the release of prisoners who

have suffered no violations of their constitutional rights,

merely to make it less likely that that will happen to them

in the future.

This view follows from the PLRA’s text that I discussed

at the outset, 18 U. S. C. §3626(a)(1)(A). “[N]arrowly

drawn” means that the relief applies only to the “particu

lar [prisoner] or [prisoners]” whose constitutional rights

are violated; “extends no further than necessary” means

that prisoners whose rights are not violated will not obtain

relief; and “least intrusive means necessary to correct the

violation of the Federal right” means that no other relief is

available.*

I acknowledge that this reading of the PLRA would se

verely limit the circumstances under which a court could

issue structural injunctions to remedy allegedly unconsti

tutional prison conditions, although it would not eliminate

them entirely. If, for instance, a class representing all

prisoners in a particular institution alleged that the tem

perature in their cells was so cold as to violate the Eighth

Amendment, or that they were deprived of all exercise

time, a court could enter a prisonwide injunction ordering

that the temperature be raised or exercise time be pro

vided. Still, my approach may invite the objection that the

PLRA appears to contemplate structural injunctions in

general and mass prisoner-release orders in particular.

The statute requires courts to “give substantial weight to

——————

* Any doubt on this last score, at least as far as prisoner-release or

ders are concerned, is eliminated by §3626(a)(3)(E) of the statute, which

provides that to enter a prisoner-release order the court must find

“by clear and convincing evidence that—

(i) crowding is the primary cause of the violation of a Federal right;

and

(ii) no other relief will remedy the violation of the Federal right.”

16 BROWN v. PLATA

SCALIA, J., dissenting

any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a

criminal justice system caused by the relief” and author

izes them to appoint Special Masters, §3626 (a)(1)(A), (f),

provisions that seem to presuppose the possibility of a

structural remedy. It also sets forth criteria under which

courts may issue orders that have “the purpose or effect of

reducing or limiting the prisoner population,” §3626(g)(4).

I do not believe that objection carries the day. In addi

tion to imposing numerous limitations on the ability of

district courts to order injunctive relief with respect to

prison conditions, the PLRA states that “[n]othing in this

section shall be construed to . . . repeal or detract from

otherwise applicable limitations on the remedial powers of

the courts.” §3626(a)(1)(C). The PLRA is therefore best

understood as an attempt to constrain the discretion of

courts issuing structural injunctions—not as a mandate

for their use. For the reasons I have outlined, structural

injunctions, especially prisoner-release orders, raise grave

separation-of-powers concerns and veer significantly from

the historical role and institutional capability of courts. It

is appropriate to construe the PLRA so as to constrain

courts from entering injunctive relief that would exceed

that role and capability.

* * *

The District Court’s order that California release 46,000

prisoners extends “further than necessary to correct the

violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or

plaintiffs” who have been denied needed medical care. 18

U. S. C. §3626(a)(1)(A). It is accordingly forbidden by the

PLRA—besides defying all sound conception of the proper

role of judges.

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 1

ALITO, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 09–1233

_________________

EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., GOVERNOR OF CAL-

IFORNIA, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. MARCIANO

PLATA ET AL.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT AND THE NORTHERN

DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

[May 23, 2011]

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins,

dissenting.

The decree in this case is a perfect example of what

the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 110 Stat.

1321–66, was enacted to prevent.

The Constitution does not give federal judges the au

thority to run state penal systems. Decisions regarding

state prisons have profound public safety and financial

implications, and the States are generally free to make

these decisions as they choose. See Turner v. Safley, 482

U. S. 78, 85 (1987).

The Eighth Amendment imposes an important—but

limited—restraint on state authority in this field. The

Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from de-

priving inmates of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, 347

(1981). Federal courts have the responsibility to ensure

that this constitutional standard is met, but undesirable

prison conditions that do not violate the Constitution are

beyond the federal courts’ reach.

In this case, a three-judge court exceeded its authority

under the Constitution and the PLRA. The court ordered

a radical reduction in the California prison population

2 BROWN v. PLATA

ALITO, J., dissenting

without finding that the current population level violates

the Constitution.

Two cases were before the three-judge court, and neither

targeted the general problem of overcrowding. Indeed, the

plaintiffs in one of those cases readily acknowledge that

the current population level is not itself unconstitutional.

Brief for Coleman Appellees 56. Both of the cases were

brought not on behalf of all inmates subjected to over

crowding, but rather in the interests of much more limited

classes of prisoners, namely, those needing mental health

treatment and those with other serious medical needs.

But these cases were used as a springboard to implement

a criminal justice program far different from that chosen

by the state legislature. Instead of crafting a remedy to

attack the specific constitutional violations that were

found—which related solely to prisoners in the two plain

tiff classes—the lower court issued a decree that will at

best provide only modest help to those prisoners but that

is very likely to have a major and deleterious effect on

public safety.

The three-judge court ordered the premature release of

approximately 46,000 criminals—the equivalent of three

Army divisions.

The approach taken by the three-judge court flies in the

face of the PLRA. Contrary to the PLRA, the court’s rem

edy is not narrowly tailored to address proven and ongoing

constitutional violations. And the three-judge court vio

lated the PLRA’s critical command that any court con

templating a prisoner release order must give “substantial

weight to any adverse impact on public safety.” 18

U. S. C. §3626(a)(1)(A). The three-judge court would have

us believe that the early release of 46,000 inmates will not

imperil—and will actually improve—public safety. Juris.

Statement App., O. T. 2009, No. 09–416, pp. 248a–249a

(hereinafter Juris. App.). Common sense and experience

counsel greater caution.

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 3

ALITO, J., dissenting

I would reverse the decision below for three interrelated

reasons. First, the three-judge court improperly refused

to consider evidence concerning present conditions in the

California prison system. Second, the court erred in hold

ing that no remedy short of a massive prisoner release can

bring the California system into compliance with the

Eighth Amendment. Third, the court gave inadequate

weight to the impact of its decree on public safety.

I

Both the PLRA and general principles concerning in

junctive relief dictate that a prisoner release order cannot

properly be issued unless the relief is necessary to remedy

an ongoing violation. Under the PLRA, a prisoner release

may be decreed only if crowding “is the primary cause” of

an Eighth Amendment violation and only if no other re

lief “will remedy” the violation. §3626(a)(3)(E) (emphasis

added). This language makes it clear that proof of past

violations alone is insufficient to justify a court-ordered

prisoner release.

Similarly, in cases not governed by the PLRA, we have

held that an inmate seeking an injunction to prevent a

violation of the Eighth Amendment must show that prison

officials are “knowingly and unreasonably disregarding an

objectively intolerable risk of harm, and that they will

continue to do so . . . into the future.” Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U. S. 825, 846 (1994). The “deliberate indifference”

needed to establish an Eighth Amendment violation must

be examined “in light of the prison authorities’ current

attitudes and conduct,” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U. S. 25,

36 (1993), which means “their attitudes and conduct at the

time suit is brought and persisting thereafter,” Farmer,

supra, at 845.

For these reasons, the propriety of the relief ordered

here cannot be assessed without ascertaining the nature

and scope of any ongoing constitutional violations. Proof

4

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