Kentucky v. King

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2010 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

KENTUCKY v. KING

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY

No. 09–1272. Argued January 12, 2011—Decided May 16, 2011

Police officers in Lexington, Kentucky, followed a suspected drug dealer

to an apartment complex. They smelled marijuana outside an

apartment door, knocked loudly, and announced their presence. As

soon as the officers began knocking, they heard noises coming from

the apartment; the officers believed that these noises were consistent

with the destruction of evidence. The officers announced their intent

to enter the apartment, kicked in the door, and found respondent and

others. They saw drugs in plain view during a protective sweep of

the apartment and found additional evidence during a subsequent

search. The Circuit Court denied respondent’s motion to suppress

the evidence, holding that exigent circumstances—the need to pre

vent destruction of evidence—justified the warrantless entry. Re

spondent entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to ap

peal the suppression ruling, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals

affirmed. The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed. The court as

sumed that exigent circumstances existed, but it nonetheless invali

dated the search. The exigent circumstances rule did not apply, the

court held, because the police should have foreseen that their conduct

would prompt the occupants to attempt to destroy evidence.

Held:

1. The exigent circumstances rule applies when the police do not

create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct

that violates the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 5–16.

(a) The Fourth Amendment expressly imposes two requirements:

All searches and seizures must be reasonable; and a warrant may not

be issued unless probable cause is properly established and the scope

of the authorized search is set out with particularity. Although

“ ‘searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are pre

sumptively unreasonable,’ ” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398,

2 KENTUCKY v. KING

Syllabus

403, this presumption may be overcome when “ ‘the exigencies of the

situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a]

warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment,” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 394. One such exi

gency is the need “to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.”

Brigham City, supra, at 403. Pp. 5–6.

(b) Under the “police-created exigency” doctrine, which lower

courts have developed as an exception to the exigent circumstances

rule, exigent circumstances do not justify a warrantless search when

the exigency was “created” or “manufactured” by the conduct of the

police. The lower courts have not agreed, however, on the test for de

termining when police impermissibly create an exigency. Pp. 7–8.

(c) The proper test follows from the principle that permits war

rantless searches: warrantless searches are allowed when the cir

cumstances make it reasonable, within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment, to dispense with the warrant requirement. Thus, a

warrantless entry based on exigent circumstances is reasonable when

the police did not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to

engage in conduct violating the Fourth Amendment. A similar ap

proach has been taken in other cases involving warrantless searches.

For example, officers may seize evidence in plain view if they have

not violated the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the spot from

which the observation of the evidence is made, see Horton v. Califor

nia, 496 U. S. 128, 136–140; and they may seek consent-based en

counters if they are lawfully present in the place where the consen

sual encounter occurs, see INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210, 217, n. 5.

Pp. 8–10.

(d) Some courts, including the Kentucky Supreme Court, have

imposed additional requirements—asking whether officers “ ‘deliber

ately created the exigent circumstances with the bad faith intent to

avoid the warrant requirement,’ ” 302 S. W. 3d 649, 656 (case below);

reasoning that police may not rely on an exigency if “ ‘it was reasona

bly foreseeable that [their] investigative tactics . . . would create the

exigent circumstances,’ ”ibid.; faulting officers for knocking on a door

when they had sufficient evidence to seek a warrant but did not do

so; and finding that officers created or manufactured an exigency

when their investigation was contrary to standard or good law en

forcement practices. Such requirements are unsound and are thus

rejected. Pp. 10–14.

(e) Respondent contends that an exigency is impermissibly cre

ated when officers engage in conduct that would cause a reasonable

person to believe that entry was imminent and inevitable, but that

approach is also flawed. The ability of officers to respond to an exi

gency cannot turn on such subtleties as the officers’ tone of voice in

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 3

Syllabus

announcing their presence and the forcefulness of their knocks. A

forceful knock may be necessary to alert the occupants that someone

is at the door, and unless officers identify themselves loudly enough,

occupants may not know who is at their doorstep. Respondent’s test

would make it extremely difficult for officers to know how loudly they

may announce their presence or how forcefully they may knock with

out running afoul of the police-created exigency rule. And in most

cases, it would be nearly impossible for a court to determine whether

that threshold had been passed. Pp. 14–15.

2. Assuming that an exigency existed here, there is no evidence

that the officers either violated the Fourth Amendment or threatened

to do so prior to the point when they entered the apartment. Pp. 16–

19.

(a) Any question about whether an exigency existed here is bet

ter addressed by the Kentucky Supreme Court on remand. P. 17.

(b) Assuming an exigency did exist, the officers’ conduct—

banging on the door and announcing their presence—was entirely

consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Respondent has pointed to

no evidence supporting his argument that the officers made any sort

of “demand” to enter the apartment, much less a demand that

amounts to a threat to violate the Fourth Amendment. If there is

contradictory evidence that has not been brought to this Court’s at

tention, the state court may elect to address that matter on remand.

Finally, the record makes clear that the officers’ announcement that

they were going to enter the apartment was made after the exigency

arose. Pp. 17–19.

302 S. W. 3d 649, reversed and remanded.

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,

and SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ.,

joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 09–1272

_________________

KENTUCKY, PETITIONER v. HOLLIS DESHAUN KING

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

KENTUCKY

[May 16, 2011]

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.

It is well established that “exigent circumstances,”

including the need to prevent the destruction of evidence,

permit police officers to conduct an otherwise permissible

search without first obtaining a warrant. In this case, we

consider whether this rule applies when police, by knock­

ing on the door of a residence and announcing their pres­

ence, cause the occupants to attempt to destroy evidence.

The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the exigent cir­

cumstances rule does not apply in the case at hand be­

cause the police should have foreseen that their conduct

would prompt the occupants to attempt to destroy evi­

dence. We reject this interpretation of the exigent circum­

stances rule. The conduct of the police prior to their entry

into the apartment was entirely lawful. They did not

violate the Fourth Amendment or threaten to do so. In

such a situation, the exigent circumstances rule applies.

I

A

This case concerns the search of an apartment in Lex­

ington, Kentucky. Police officers set up a controlled buy of

crack cocaine outside an apartment complex. Undercover

2 KENTUCKY v. KING

Opinion of the Court

Officer Gibbons watched the deal take place from an un­

marked car in a nearby parking lot. After the deal oc­

curred, Gibbons radioed uniformed officers to move in on

the suspect. He told the officers that the suspect was

moving quickly toward the breezeway of an apartment

building, and he urged them to “hurry up and get there”

before the suspect entered an apartment. App. 20.

In response to the radio alert, the uniformed officers

drove into the nearby parking lot, left their vehicles, and

ran to the breezeway. Just as they entered the breezeway,

they heard a door shut and detected a very strong odor of

burnt marijuana. At the end of the breezeway, the officers

saw two apartments, one on the left and one on the right,

and they did not know which apartment the suspect had

entered. Gibbons had radioed that the suspect was run­

ning into the apartment on the right, but the officers did

not hear this statement because they had already left

their vehicles. Because they smelled marijuana smoke

emanating from the apartment on the left, they ap­

proached the door of that apartment.

Officer Steven Cobb, one of the uniformed officers who

approached the door, testified that the officers banged on

the left apartment door “as loud as [they] could” and an­

nounced, “ ‘This is the police’ ” or “ ‘Police, police, police.’ ”

Id., at 22–23. Cobb said that “[a]s soon as [the officers]

started banging on the door,” they “could hear people

inside moving,” and “[i]t sounded as [though] things were

being moved inside the apartment.” Id., at 24. These

noises, Cobb testified, led the officers to believe that drug­

related evidence was about to be destroyed.

At that point, the officers announced that they “were

going to make entry inside the apartment.” Ibid. Cobb

then kicked in the door, the officers entered the apart­

ment, and they found three people in the front room:

respondent Hollis King, respondent’s girlfriend, and a

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 3

Opinion of the Court

guest who was smoking marijuana.1 The officers per­

formed a protective sweep of the apartment during which

they saw marijuana and powder cocaine in plain view. In

a subsequent search, they also discovered crack cocaine,

cash, and drug paraphernalia.

Police eventually entered the apartment on the right.

Inside, they found the suspected drug dealer who was the

initial target of their investigation.

B

In the Fayette County Circuit Court, a grand jury

charged respondent with trafficking in marijuana, first­

degree trafficking in a controlled substance, and second­

degree persistent felony offender status. Respondent filed

a motion to suppress the evidence from the warrantless

search, but the Circuit Court denied the motion. The

Circuit Court concluded that the officers had probable

cause to investigate the marijuana odor and that the

officers “properly conducted [the investigation] by initially

knocking on the door of the apartment unit and awaiting

the response or consensual entry.” App. to Pet. for Cert.

9a. Exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry,

the court held, because “there was no response at all to the

knocking,” and because “Officer Cobb heard movement in

the apartment which he reasonably concluded were per­

sons in the act of destroying evidence, particularly narcot­

ics because of the smell.” Ibid. Respondent then entered a

conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the

denial of his suppression motion. The court sentenced

respondent to 11 years’ imprisonment.

The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that

——————

1 Respondent’s girlfriend leased the apartment, but respondent stayed

there part of the time, and his child lived there. Based on these facts,

Kentucky conceded in state court that respondent has Fourth Amend­

ment standing to challenge the search. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 7a;

see also 302 S. W. 3d 649, 652 (Ky. 2010).

4 KENTUCKY v. KING

Opinion of the Court

exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry

because the police reasonably believed that evidence

would be destroyed. The police did not impermissibly

create the exigency, the court explained, because they did

not deliberately evade the warrant requirement.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed. 302 S. W. 3d

649 (2010). As a preliminary matter, the court observed

that there was “certainly some question as to whether the

sound of persons moving [inside the apartment] was suffi­

cient to establish that evidence was being destroyed.” Id.,

at 655. But the court did not answer that question. In­

stead, it “assume[d] for the purpose of argument that

exigent circumstances existed.” Ibid.

To determine whether police impermissibly created the

exigency, the Supreme Court of Kentucky announced a

two-part test. First, the court held, police cannot “deliber­

ately creat[e] the exigent circumstances with the bad faith

intent to avoid the warrant requirement.” Id., at 656

(internal quotation marks omitted). Second, even absent

bad faith, the court concluded, police may not rely on

exigent circumstances if “it was reasonably foreseeable

that the investigative tactics employed by the police would

create the exigent circumstances.” Ibid. (internal quota­

tion marks omitted). Although the court found no evi­

dence of bad faith, it held that exigent circumstances could

not justify the search because it was reasonably foresee­

able that the occupants would destroy evidence when the

police knocked on the door and announced their presence.

Ibid.

We granted certiorari. 561 U. S. ___ (2010).2

——————

2 After we granted certiorari, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the

petition as improvidently granted, which we denied. 562 U. S. ___

(2010). Respondent’s principal argument was that the case was moot

because, after the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed his conviction, the

Circuit Court dismissed the charges against him. Respondent’s argu­

ment is foreclosed by United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U. S.

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 5

Opinion of the Court

II

A

The Fourth Amendment provides:

“The right of the people to be secure in their per­

sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason­

able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and

no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly

describing the place to be searched, and the persons or

things to be seized.”

The text of the Amendment thus expressly imposes two

requirements. First, all searches and seizures must be

reasonable. Second, a warrant may not be issued unless

probable cause is properly established and the scope of the

authorized search is set out with particularity. See Payton

v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 584 (1980).

Although the text of the Fourth Amendment does not

specify when a search warrant must be obtained, this

Court has inferred that a warrant must generally be

secured. “It is a ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment

law,’ ” we have often said, “ ‘that searches and seizures

inside a home without a warrant are presumptively un­

reasonable.’ ” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403

(2006) (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U. S. 551, 559

(2004)). But we have also recognized that this presump­

tion may be overcome in some circumstances because

“[t]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is

‘reasonableness.’ ” Brigham City, supra, at 403; see also

——————

579, 581, n. 2 (1983). As we explained in Villamonte-Marquez, our

reversal of the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision “would reinstate the

judgment of conviction and the sentence entered” by the Circuit Court.

Ibid. The absence of an indictment does not change matters. See

ibid. (“Upon respondents’ conviction and sentence, the indictment that

was returned against them was merged into their convictions and

sentences”).

6 KENTUCKY v. KING

Opinion of the Court

Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U. S. ___, ___ (2009) (per curiam)

(slip op., at 2). Accordingly, the warrant requirement is

subject to certain reasonable exceptions. Brigham City,

supra, at 403.

One well-recognized exception applies when “ ‘the exi­

gencies of the situation’ make the needs of law en­

forcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is

objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 394 (1978); see also

Payton, supra, at 590 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment has

drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent

exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably

be crossed without a warrant”).

This Court has identified several exigencies that may

justify a warrantless search of a home. See Brigham City,

547 U. S., at 403. Under the “emergency aid” exception,

for example, “officers may enter a home without a warrant

to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or

to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Ibid.; see

also, e.g., Fisher, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 5) (upholding

warrantless home entry based on emergency aid excep­

tion). Police officers may enter premises without a war­

rant when they are in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect. See

United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42–43 (1976).

And—what is relevant here—the need “to prevent the

imminent destruction of evidence” has long been recog­

nized as a sufficient justification for a warrantless search.

Brigham City, supra, at 403; see also Georgia v. Randolph,

547 U. S. 103, 116, n. 6 (2006); Minnesota v. Olson, 495

U. S. 91, 100 (1990).3

——————

3 Preventing the destruction of evidence may also justify dispensing

with Fourth Amendment requirements in other contexts. See, e.g.,

Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U. S. 385, 395–396 (1997) (failure to comply

with the knock-and-announce requirement was justified because “the

circumstances . . . show[ed] that the officers had a reasonable suspicion

that [a suspect] might destroy evidence if given further opportunity to

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011)

7

Opinion of the Court

B

Over the years, lower courts have developed an excep­

tion to the exigent circumstances rule, the so-called “po­

lice-created exigency” doctrine. Under this doctrine, police

may not rely on the need to prevent destruction of evi­

dence when that exigency was “created” or “manufactured”

by the conduct of the police. See, e.g., United States v.

Chambers, 395 F. 3d 563, 566 (CA6 2005) (“[F]or a war­

rantless search to stand, law enforcement officers must be

responding to an unanticipated exigency rather than

simply creating the exigency for themselves”); United

States v. Gould, 364 F. 3d 578, 590 (CA5 2004) (en banc)

(“[A]lthough exigent circumstances may justify a war­

rantless probable cause entry into the home, they will not

do so if the exigent circumstances were manufactured by

the agents” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

In applying this exception for the “creation” or “manu­

facturing” of an exigency by the police, courts require

something more than mere proof that fear of detection by

the police caused the destruction of evidence. An addi­

tional showing is obviously needed because, as the Eighth

Circuit has recognized, “in some sense the police always

create the exigent circumstances.” United States v. Duchi,

906 F. 2d 1278, 1284 (CA8 1990). That is to say, in the

vast majority of cases in which evidence is destroyed by

persons who are engaged in illegal conduct, the reason for

the destruction is fear that the evidence will fall into the

hands of law enforcement. Destruction of evidence issues

probably occur most frequently in drug cases because

drugs may be easily destroyed by flushing them down a

——————

do so”); Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 770–771 (1966) (war­

rantless testing for blood-alcohol content was justified based on poten­

tial destruction of evidence); cf. United States v. Banks, 540 U. S. 31,

37–40 (2003) (15 to 20 seconds was a reasonable time for officers to wait

after knocking and announcing their presence where there was a risk

that suspect would dispose of cocaine).

8 KENTUCKY v. KING

Opinion of the Court

toilet or rinsing them down a drain. Persons in possession

of valuable drugs are unlikely to destroy them unless they

fear discovery by the police. Consequently, a rule that

precludes the police from making a warrantless entry to

prevent the destruction of evidence whenever their con­

duct causes the exigency would unreasonably shrink the

reach of this well-established exception to the warrant

requirement.

Presumably for the purpose of avoiding such a result,

the lower courts have held that the police-created exigency

doctrine requires more than simple causation, but the

lower courts have not agreed on the test to be applied.

Indeed, the petition in this case maintains that “[t]here

are currently five different tests being used by the United

States Courts of Appeals,” Pet. for Cert. 11, and that some

state courts have crafted additional tests, id., at 19–20.

III

A

Despite the welter of tests devised by the lower courts,

the answer to the question presented in this case follows

directly and clearly from the principle that permits war­

rantless searches in the first place. As previously noted,

warrantless searches are allowed when the circumstances

make it reasonable, within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment, to dispense with the warrant requirement.

Therefore, the answer to the question before us is that the

exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search

when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is

reasonable in the same sense. Where, as here, the police

did not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to

engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment,

warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence is

reasonable and thus allowed.4

——————

4 There is a strong argument to be made that, at least in most circum­

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 9

Opinion of the Court

We have taken a similar approach in other cases involv­

ing warrantless searches. For example, we have held that

law enforcement officers may seize evidence in plain view,

provided that they have not violated the Fourth Amend­

ment in arriving at the spot from which the observation of

the evidence is made. See Horton v. California, 496 U. S.

128, 136–140 (1990). As we put it in Horton, “[i]t is . . . an

essential predicate to any valid warrantless seizure of

incriminating evidence that the officer did not violate the

Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which

the evidence could be plainly viewed.” Id., at 136. So long

as this prerequisite is satisfied, however, it does not mat­

ter that the officer who makes the observation may have

gone to the spot from which the evidence was seen with

the hope of being able to view and seize the evidence. See

id., at 138 (“The fact that an officer is interested in an

item of evidence and fully expects to find it in the course of

a search should not invalidate its seizure”). Instead, the

Fourth Amendment requires only that the steps preceding

the seizure be lawful. See id., at 136–137.

Similarly, officers may seek consent-based encounters if

they are lawfully present in the place where the consen­

sual encounter occurs. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S.

210, 217, n. 5 (1984) (noting that officers who entered

into consent-based encounters with employees in a factory

building were “lawfully present [in the factory] pursuant

to consent or a warrant”). If consent is freely given, it

makes no difference that an officer may have approached

the person with the hope or expectation of obtaining con­

sent. See id., at 216 (“While most citizens will respond to

a police request, the fact that people do so, and do so

——————

stances, the exigent circumstances rule should not apply where the

police, without a warrant or any legally sound basis for a warrantless

entry, threaten that they will enter without permission unless admit­

ted. In this case, however, no such actual threat was made, and there­

fore we have no need to reach that question.

10 KENTUCKY v. KING

Opinion of the Court

without being told they are free not to respond, hardly

eliminates the consensual nature of the response”).

B

Some lower courts have adopted a rule that is similar to

the one that we recognize today. See United States v.

MacDonald, 916 F. 2d 766, 772 (CA2 1990) (en banc) (law

enforcement officers “do not impermissibly create exigent

circumstances” when they “act in an entirely lawful man­

ner”); State v. Robinson, 2010 WI 80, ¶32, 327 Wis. 2d 302,

326–328, 786 N. W. 2d 463, 475–476 (2010). But others,

including the Kentucky Supreme Court, have imposed

additional requirements that are unsound and that we

now reject.

Bad faith. Some courts, including the Kentucky Su­

preme Court, ask whether law enforcement officers “ ‘de­

liberately created the exigent circumstances with the bad

faith intent to avoid the warrant requirement.’ ” 302 S. W.

3d, at 656 (quoting Gould, 364 F. 3d, at 590); see also, e.g.,

Chambers, 395 F. 3d, at 566; United States v. Socey, 846

F. 2d 1439, 1448 (CADC 1988); United States v. Rengifo,

858 F. 2d 800, 804 (CA1 1988).

This approach is fundamentally inconsistent with our

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. “Our cases have re­

peatedly rejected” a subjective approach, asking only

whether “the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the

action.” ’Brigham City, 547 U. S., at 404 (alteration and

internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fisher, 558

U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3–5). Indeed, we have never held,

outside limited contexts such as an “inventory search or

administrative inspection . . . , that an officer’s motive

invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the

Fourth Amendment.” Whren v. United States, 517 U. S.

806, 812 (1996); see also Brigham City, supra, at 405.

The reasons for looking to objective factors, rather than

subjective intent, are clear. Legal tests based on reason­

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 11

Opinion of the Court

ableness are generally objective, and this Court has long

taken the view that “evenhanded law enforcement is best

achieved by the application of objective standards of con­

duct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjec­

tive state of mind of the officer.” Horton, supra, at 138.

Reasonable foreseeability. Some courts, again including

the Kentucky Supreme Court, hold that police may not

rely on an exigency if “ ‘it was reasonably foreseeable that

the investigative tactics employed by the police would

create the exigent circumstances.’ ” 302 S. W. 3d, at 656

(quoting Mann v. State, 357 Ark. 159, 172, 161 S. W. 3d

826, 834 (2004)); see also, e.g., United States v. Mowatt,

513 F. 3d 395, 402 (CA4 2008). Courts applying this

test have invalidated warrantless home searches on the

ground that it was reasonably foreseeable that police

officers, by knocking on the door and announcing their

presence, would lead a drug suspect to destroy evidence.

See, e.g., id., at 402–403; 302 S. W. 3d, at 656.

Contrary to this reasoning, however, we have rejected

the notion that police may seize evidence without a war­

rant only when they come across the evidence by happen­

stance. In Horton, as noted, we held that the police may

seize evidence in plain view even though the officers may

be “interested in an item of evidence and fully expec[t] to

find it in the course of a search.” 496 U. S., at 138.

Adoption of a reasonable foreseeability test would also

introduce an unacceptable degree of unpredictability. For

example, whenever law enforcement officers knock on the

door of premises occupied by a person who may be in­

volved in the drug trade, there is some possibility that the

occupants may possess drugs and may seek to destroy

them. Under a reasonable foreseeability test, it would be

necessary to quantify the degree of predictability that

must be reached before the police-created exigency doc­

trine comes into play.

A simple example illustrates the difficulties that such

12 KENTUCKY v. KING

Opinion of the Court

an approach would produce. Suppose that the officers in

the present case did not smell marijuana smoke and thus

knew only that there was a 50% chance that the fleeing

suspect had entered the apartment on the left rather than

the apartment on the right. Under those circumstances,

would it have been reasonably foreseeable that the occu­

pants of the apartment on the left would seek to destroy

evidence upon learning that the police were at the door?

Or suppose that the officers knew only that the suspect

had disappeared into one of the apartments on a floor with

3, 5, 10, or even 20 units? If the police chose a door at

random and knocked for the purpose of asking the occu­

pants if they knew a person who fit the description of the

suspect, would it have been reasonably foreseeable that

the occupants would seek to destroy evidence?

We have noted that “[t]he calculus of reasonableness

must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are

often forced to make split-second judgments—in circum­

stances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.”

Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 396–397 (1989). The

reasonable foreseeability test would create unacceptable

and unwarranted difficulties for law enforcement officers

who must make quick decisions in the field, as well as for

judges who would be required to determine after the fact

whether the destruction of evidence in response to a knock

on the door was reasonably foreseeable based on what the

officers knew at the time.

Probable cause and time to secure a warrant. Some

courts, in applying the police-created exigency doctrine,

fault law enforcement officers if, after acquiring evidence

that is sufficient to establish probable cause to search

particular premises, the officers do not seek a warrant but

instead knock on the door and seek either to speak with an

occupant or to obtain consent to search. See, e.g., Cham

bers, supra, at 569 (citing “[t]he failure to seek a warrant

in the face of plentiful probable cause” as a factor indicat­

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 13

Opinion of the Court

ing that the police deliberately created the exigency).

This approach unjustifiably interferes with legitimate

law enforcement strategies. There are many entirely

proper reasons why police may not want to seek a search

warrant as soon as the bare minimum of evidence needed

to establish probable cause is acquired. Without attempt­

ing to provide a comprehensive list of these reasons, we

note a few.

First, the police may wish to speak with the occupants of

a dwelling before deciding whether it is worthwhile to seek

authorization for a search. They may think that a short

and simple conversation may obviate the need to apply for

and execute a warrant. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,

412 U. S. 218, 228 (1973). Second, the police may want to

ask an occupant of the premises for consent to search

because doing so is simpler, faster, and less burdensome

than applying for a warrant. A consensual search also

“may result in considerably less inconvenience” and em­

barrassment to the occupants than a search conducted

pursuant to a warrant. Ibid. Third, law enforcement

officers may wish to obtain more evidence before submit­

ting what might otherwise be considered a marginal war­

rant application. Fourth, prosecutors may wish to wait

until they acquire evidence that can justify a search that

is broader in scope than the search that a judicial officer is

likely to authorize based on the evidence then available.

And finally, in many cases, law enforcement may not want

to execute a search that will disclose the existence of an

investigation because doing so may interfere with the

acquisition of additional evidence against those already

under suspicion or evidence about additional but as yet

unknown participants in a criminal scheme.

We have said that “[l]aw enforcement officers are under

no constitutional duty to call a halt to criminal investiga­

tion the moment they have the minimum evidence to

establish probable cause.” Hoffa v. United States, 385

14 KENTUCKY v. KING

Opinion of the Court

U. S. 293, 310 (1966). Faulting the police for failing to

apply for a search warrant at the earliest possible time

after obtaining probable cause imposes a duty that is

nowhere to be found in the Constitution.

Standard or good investigative tactics. Finally, some

lower court cases suggest that law enforcement officers

may be found to have created or manufactured an exi­

gency if the court concludes that the course of their inves­

tigation was “contrary to standard or good law enforce­

ment practices (or to the policies or practices of their

jurisdictions).” Gould, 364 F. 3d, at 591. This approach

fails to provide clear guidance for law enforcement officers

and authorizes courts to make judgments on matters that

are the province of those who are responsible for federal

and state law enforcement agencies.

C

Respondent argues for a rule that differs from those

discussed above, but his rule is also flawed. Respondent

contends that law enforcement officers impermissibly

create an exigency when they “engage in conduct that

would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry is

imminent and inevitable.” Brief for Respondent 24. In

respondent’s view, relevant factors include the officers’

tone of voice in announcing their presence and the force­

fulness of their knocks. But the ability of law enforcement

officers to respond to an exigency cannot turn on such

subtleties.

Police officers may have a very good reason to announce

their presence loudly and to knock on the door with some

force. A forceful knock may be necessary to alert the

occupants that someone is at the door. Cf. United States v.

Banks, 540 U. S. 31, 33 (2003) (Police “rapped hard

enough on the door to be heard by officers at the back

door” and announced their presence, but defendant “was

in the shower and testified that he heard nothing”). Fur­

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 15

Opinion of the Court

thermore, unless police officers identify themselves loudly

enough, occupants may not know who is at their doorstep.

Officers are permitted—indeed, encouraged—to identify

themselves to citizens, and “in many circumstances this

is cause for assurance, not discomfort.” United States v.

Drayton, 536 U. S. 194, 204 (2002). Citizens who are

startled by an unexpected knock on the door or by the

sight of unknown persons in plain clothes on their door­

step may be relieved to learn that these persons are police

officers. Others may appreciate the opportunity to make

an informed decision about whether to answer the door to

the police.

If respondent’s test were adopted, it would be extremely

difficult for police officers to know how loudly they may

announce their presence or how forcefully they may knock

on a door without running afoul of the police-created

exigency rule. And in most cases, it would be nearly im­

possible for a court to determine whether that threshold

had been passed. The Fourth Amendment does not re­

quire the nebulous and impractical test that respondent

proposes.5

——————

5 Contrary to respondent’s argument, see Brief for Respondent 13–18,

Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 (1948), does not require affir­

mance in this case. In Johnson, officers noticed the smell of burning

opium emanating from a hotel room. They then knocked on the door

and demanded entry. Upon seeing that Johnson was the only occupant

of the room, they placed her under arrest, searched the room, and

discovered opium and drug paraphernalia. Id., at 11.

Defending the legality of the search, the Government attempted to

justify the warrantless search of the room as a valid search incident to

a lawful arrest. See Brief for United States in Johnson v. United States,

O. T. 1947, No. 329, pp. 13, 16, 36. The Government did not contend

that the officers entered the room in order to prevent the destruction of

evidence. Although the officers said that they heard a “ ‘shuffling’ ”

noise inside the room after they knocked on the door, 333 U. S., at 12,

the Government did not claim that this particular noise was a noise

that would have led a reasonable officer to think that evidence was

about to be destroyed. Thus, Johnson is simply not a case about

16 KENTUCKY v. KING

Opinion of the Court

D

For these reasons, we conclude that the exigent circum­

stances rule applies when the police do not gain entry to

premises by means of an actual or threatened violation of

the Fourth Amendment. This holding provides ample

protection for the privacy rights that the Amendment

protects.

When law enforcement officers who are not armed with

a warrant knock on a door, they do no more than any

private citizen might do. And whether the person who

knocks on the door and requests the opportunity to speak

is a police officer or a private citizen, the occupant has no

obligation to open the door or to speak. Cf. Florida v.

Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 497–498 (1983). (“[H]e may decline

to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way”).

When the police knock on a door but the occupants choose

not to respond or to speak, “the investigation will have

reached a conspicuously low point,” and the occupants

“will have the kind of warning that even the most elabo­

rate security system cannot provide.” Chambers, 395

F. 3d, at 577 (Sutton, J., dissenting). And even if an occu­

pant chooses to open the door and speak with the officers,

the occupant need not allow the officers to enter the prem­

ises and may refuse to answer any questions at any time.

Occupants who choose not to stand on their constitu­

tional rights but instead elect to attempt to destroy evi­

dence have only themselves to blame for the warrantless

exigent-circumstances search that may ensue.

——————

exigent circumstances. See id., at 14–15 (noting that if “exceptional

circumstances” existed—for example, if a “suspect was fleeing or likely

to take flight” or if “evidence or contraband was threatened with

removal or destruction”—then “it may be contended that a magistrate’s

warrant for search may be dispensed with”).

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 17

Opinion of the Court

IV

We now apply our interpretation of the police-created

exigency doctrine to the facts of this case.

A

We need not decide whether exigent circumstances

existed in this case. Any warrantless entry based on

exigent circumstances must, of course, be supported by a

genuine exigency. See Brigham City, 547 U. S., at 406.

The trial court and the Kentucky Court of Appeals found

that there was a real exigency in this case, but the Ken­

tucky Supreme Court expressed doubt on this issue, ob­

serving that there was “certainly some question as to

whether the sound of persons moving [inside the apart­

ment] was sufficient to establish that evidence was being

destroyed.” 302 S. W. 3d, at 655. The Kentucky Supreme

Court “assum[ed] for the purpose of argument that exigent

circumstances existed,” ibid., and it held that the police

had impermissibly manufactured the exigency.

We, too, assume for purposes of argument that an exi­

gency existed. We decide only the question on which the

Kentucky Supreme Court ruled and on which we granted

certiorari: Under what circumstances do police impermis­

sibly create an exigency? Any question about whether an

exigency actually existed is better addressed by the Ken­

tucky Supreme Court on remand. See Kirk v. Louisiana,

536 U. S. 635, 638 (2002) (per curiam) (reversing state­

court judgment that exigent circumstances were not re­

quired for warrantless home entry and remanding for

state court to determine whether exigent circumstances

were present).

B

In this case, we see no evidence that the officers either

violated the Fourth Amendment or threatened to do so

prior to the point when they entered the apartment.

18 KENTUCKY v. KING

Opinion of the Court

Officer Cobb testified without contradiction that the offi­

cers “banged on the door as loud as [they] could” and

announced either “ ‘Police, police, police’ ” or “ ‘This is the

police.’ ” App. 22–23. This conduct was entirely consistent

with the Fourth Amendment, and we are aware of no

other evidence that might show that the officers either

violated the Fourth Amendment or threatened to do so (for

example, by announcing that they would break down the

door if the occupants did not open the door voluntarily).

Respondent argues that the officers “demanded” entry to

the apartment, but he has not pointed to any evidence in

the record that supports this assertion. He relies on a

passing statement made by the trial court in its opinion

denying respondent’s motion to suppress. See App. to Pet.

for Cert. 3a–4a. In recounting the events that preceded

the search, the judge wrote that the officers “banged on

the door of the apartment on the back left of the breeze­

way identifying themselves as police officers and demand

ing that the door be opened by the persons inside.” Ibid.

(emphasis added and deleted). However, at a later point

in this opinion, the judge stated that the officers “initially

knock[ed] on the door of the apartment unit and await[ed]

the response or consensual entry.” Id., at 9a. This later

statement is consistent with the testimony at the suppres­

sion hearing and with the findings of the state appellate

courts. See 302 S. W. 3d, at 651 (The officers “knocked

loudly on the back left apartment door and announced

‘police’ ”); App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a (The officers “knock[ed]

on the door and announc[ed] themselves as police”); App.

22–24. There is no evidence of a “demand” of any sort,

much less a demand that amounts to a threat to violate

the Fourth Amendment. If there is contradictory evidence

that has not been brought to our attention, the state court

may elect to address that matter on remand.

Finally, respondent claims that the officers “explained to

[the occupants that the officers] were going to make entry

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 19

Opinion of the Court

inside the apartment,” id., at 24, but the record is clear

that the officers did not make this statement until after

the exigency arose. As Officer Cobb testified, the officers

“knew that there was possibly something that was going to

be destroyed inside the apartment,” and “[a]t that point,

. . . [they] explained . . . [that they] were going to make

entry.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Given that this an­

nouncement was made after the exigency arose, it could

not have created the exigency.

* * *

Like the court below, we assume for purposes of argu­

ment that an exigency existed. Because the officers in this

case did not violate or threaten to violate the Fourth

Amendment prior to the exigency, we hold that the exi­

gency justified the warrantless search of the apartment.

The judgment of the Kentucky Supreme Court is re­

versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings

not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 1

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 09–1272

_________________

KENTUCKY, PETITIONER v. HOLLIS DESHAUN KING

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

KENTUCKY

[May 16, 2011]

JUSTICE GINSBURG, dissenting.

The Court today arms the police with a way routinely to

dishonor the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement in

drug cases. In lieu of presenting their evidence to a neu

tral magistrate, police officers may now knock, listen, then

break the door down, nevermind that they had ample time

to obtain a warrant. I dissent from the Court’s reduction

of the Fourth Amendment’s force.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees to the people “[t]he

right . . . to be secure in their . . . houses . . . against un

reasonable searches and seizures.” Warrants to search,

the Amendment further instructs, shall issue only upon a

showing of “probable cause” to believe criminal activity is

afoot. These complementary provisions are designed to

ensure that police will seek the authorization of a neutral

magistrate before undertaking a search or seizure. Excep

tions to the warrant requirement, this Court has ex

plained, must be “few in number and carefully delineated,”

if the main rule is to remain hardy. United States v.

United States Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. of Mich., 407

U. S. 297, 318 (1972); see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S.

27, 31 (2001).

This case involves a principal exception to the warrant

requirement, the exception applicable in “exigent circum

stances.” See ante, at 6–7. “[C]arefully delineated,” the

exception should govern only in genuine emergency situa

2 KENTUCKY v. KING

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

tions. Circumstances qualify as “exigent” when there is an

imminent risk of death or serious injury, or danger that

evidence will be immediately destroyed, or that a suspect

will escape. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403

(2006). The question presented: May police, who could

pause to gain the approval of a neutral magistrate, dis

pense with the need to get a warrant by themselves creat

ing exigent circumstances? I would answer no, as did the

Kentucky Supreme Court. The urgency must exist, I

would rule, when the police come on the scene, not subse

quent to their arrival, prompted by their own conduct.

I

Two pillars of our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence

should have controlled the Court’s ruling: First, “whenever

practical, [the police must] obtain advance judicial ap

proval of searches and seizures through the warrant pro

cedure,” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20 (1968); second,

unwarranted “searches and seizures inside a home” bear

heightened scrutiny, Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573,

586 (1980). The warrant requirement, Justice Jackson

observed, ranks among the “fundamental distinctions

between our form of government, where officers are un-

der the law, and the police-state where they are the law.”

Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 17 (1948). The

Court has accordingly declared warrantless searches, in

the main, “per se unreasonable.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437

U. S. 385, 390 (1978); see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U. S.

551, 559 (2004). “[T]he police bear a heavy burden,” the

Court has cautioned, “when attempting to demonstrate an

urgent need that might justify warrantless searches.”

Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U. S. 740, 749–750 (1984).

That heavy burden has not been carried here. There

was little risk that drug-related evidence would have been

destroyed had the police delayed the search pending

a magistrate’s authorization. As the Court recognizes,

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 3

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

“[p]ersons in possession of valuable drugs are unlikely to

destroy them unless they fear discovery by the police.”

Ante, at 8. Nothing in the record shows that, prior to the

knock at the apartment door, the occupants were appre

hensive about police proximity.

In no quarter does the Fourth Amendment apply with

greater force than in our homes, our most private space

which, for centuries, has been regarded as “ ‘entitled to

special protection.’ ” Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U. S. 103,

115, and n. 4 (2006); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U. S. 83, 99

(1998) (KENNEDY, J., concurring). Home intrusions, the

Court has said, are indeed “the chief evil against which . . .

the Fourth Amendment is directed.” Payton, 445 U. S., at

585 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Silverman v.

United States, 365 U. S. 505, 511 (1961) (“At [the Fourth

Amendment’s] very core stands the right of a man to

retreat to his own home and there be free from unreason

able governmental intrusion.”). “ ‘[S]earches and seizures

inside a home without a warrant are [therefore] presump

tively unreasonable.’ ” Brigham City, 547 U. S., at 403

(quoting Groh, 540 U. S., at 559). How “secure” do our

homes remain if police, armed with no warrant, can pound

on doors at will and, on hearing sounds indicative of

things moving, forcibly enter and search for evidence of

unlawful activity?

II

As above noted, to justify the police activity in this case,

Kentucky invoked the once-guarded exception for emer

gencies “in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant

. . . threaten[s] ‘the destruction of evidence.’ ” Schmerber

v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 770 (1966) (quoting Preston v.

United States, 376 U. S. 364, 367 (1964)). To fit within

this exception, “police action literally must be [taken] ‘now

or never’ to preserve the evidence of the crime.” Roaden v.

Kentucky, 413 U. S. 496, 505 (1973).

4 KENTUCKY v. KING

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

The existence of a genuine emergency depends not only

on the state of necessity at the time of the warrantless

search; it depends, first and foremost, on “actions taken

by the police preceding the warrantless search.” United

States v. Coles, 437 F. 3d 361, 367 (CA3 2006). See also

United States v. Chambers, 395 F. 3d 563, 565 (CA6 2005)

(“[O]fficers must seek a warrant based on probable cause

when they believe in advance they will find contraband or

evidence of a crime.”). “[W]asting a clear opportunity to

obtain a warrant,” therefore, “disentitles the officer from

relying on subsequent exigent circumstances.” S. Saltz

burg & D. Capra, American Criminal Procedure 376 (8th

ed. 2007).

Under an appropriately reined-in “emergency” or “exi

gent circumstances” exception, the result in this case

should not be in doubt. The target of the investigation’s

entry into the building, and the smell of marijuana seep

ing under the apartment door into the hallway, the Ken

tucky Supreme Court rightly determined, gave the police

“probable cause . . . sufficient . . . to obtain a warrant to

search the . . . apartment.” 302 S. W. 3d 649, 653 (2010).

As that court observed, nothing made it impracticable for

the police to post officers on the premises while proceeding

to obtain a warrant authorizing their entry. Id., at

654. Before this Court, Kentucky does not urge otherwise.

See Brief for Petitioner 35, n. 13 (asserting “[i]t should be

of no importance whether police could have obtained a

warrant”).

In Johnson, the Court confronted this scenario: standing

outside a hotel room, the police smelled burning opium

and heard “some shuffling or noise” coming from the room.

333 U. S., at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). Could

the police enter the room without a warrant? The Court

answered no. Explaining why, the Court said:

“The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home

Cite as: 563 U. S. ____ (2011) 5

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

is . . . a grave concern, not only to the individual but to

a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security

and freedom from surveillance. When the right of

privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is,

as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not a

policeman . . . .

. . . . .

“If the officers in this case were excused from the

constitutional duty of presenting their evidence to a

magistrate, it is difficult to think of [any] case in

which [a warrant] should be required.” Id., at 14–15.

I agree, and would not allow an expedient knock to over

ride the warrant requirement.* Instead, I would accord

that core requirement of the Fourth Amendment full

respect. When possible, “a warrant must generally be

secured,” the Court acknowledges. Ante, at 5. There is

every reason to conclude that securing a warrant was

entirely feasible in this case, and no reason to contract the

Fourth Amendment’s dominion.

——————

* The Court in Johnson was informed that “when [the officer]

knocked on [Johnson’s] door the ‘first thing that naturally struck [her]’

was to conceal the opium and the equipment for smoking it.” See Brief

for United States in Johnson v. United States, O. T. 1947, No. 329,

p. 17, n. 6. Had the Government in Johnson urged that the “shuffling

or noise” indicated evidence was at risk, would the result have

changed? Justice Jackson’s recognition of the primacy of the warrant

requirement suggests not. But see ante, at 15, n. 5 (distinguishing

Johnson on the ground that the Government did not contend “that

the officers entered the room in order to prevent the destruction of

evidence”).