Sherley v. Sebelius

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 6, 2010 Decided April 29, 2011

No. 10-5287

DR. JAMES L. SHERLEY, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN

SERVICES, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cv-01575)

Beth S. Brinkmann, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,

U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellants.

With her on the briefs were Ronald C. Machen Jr., U.S.

Attorney, and Mark B. Stern, Stephanie R. Marcus, and Abby

C. Wright, Attorneys. Joel McElvain, Senior Counsel, and R.

Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered

appearances.

2

Jon E. Pettibone, Neal Goldfarb, and Andrew T. Karron

were on the brief for amici curiae State of Wisconsin, et al. in

support of appellants.

Robert P. Charrow and Laura Metcoff Klaus were on the

brief for amicus curiae Regents of the University of

California in support of appellants.

Thomas G. Hungar argued the cause for appellees. With

him on the brief were Bradley J. Lingo, Thomas M. Johnson,

Jr., Ryan J. Watson, Blaine H. Evanson, Samuel B. Casey,

and Steven H. Aden.

Dorinda C. Bordlee was on the brief for amicus curiae

Maureen L. Condic in support of appellee.

Before: GINSBURG, HENDERSON, and GRIFFITH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: Two scientists brought this

suit to enjoin the National Institutes of Health from funding

research using human embryonic stem cells (ESCs) pursuant

to the NIH’s 2009 Guidelines. The district court granted their

motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding they were

likely to succeed in showing the Guidelines violated the

Dickey-Wicker Amendment, an appropriations rider that bars

federal funding for research in which a human embryo is

destroyed. We conclude the plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail

because Dickey-Wicker is ambiguous and the NIH seems

reasonably to have concluded that, although Dickey-Wicker

bars funding for the destructive act of deriving an ESC from

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an embryo, it does not prohibit funding a research project in

which an ESC will be used. We therefore vacate the

preliminary injunction.

I. Background

As we explained at an earlier stage of this case, stem cells

have the potential of yielding treatments for a wide range of

afflictions because scientists can cause them to function as

any one of a number of specific types of cell. 610 F.3d 69, 70

(2010) (Sherley I). We there considered two different classes

of human stem cells: adult stem cells, which are somewhat

specialized, and ESCs, which are pluripotent, meaning they

can develop into nearly any of the 200 types of human cell.

In addition to these two established categories, we note the

recent development of induced pluripotent stem cells, which

are adult stem cells reprogrammed to a stage of development

at which they are pluripotent. There is some debate as to

which type of stem cell holds more promise of yielding

therapeutic applications.

Adult stem cells can be found in the various tissues and

organs of the human body. ESCs, by contrast, can be found

only in a human embryo; isolating an ESC requires removing

the “inner cell mass” of the embryo, a process that destroys

the embryo. The stem cells among the 30 or so cells in the

inner cell mass are then placed in a culture, where they will

divide continuously without differentiating, thus forming a

“stem cell line” of identical cells. An individual ESC may be

removed from the line without disrupting either the

multiplication process or the durability of the line. The

removed cell may then be used in a research project — either

by the investigator who extracted it or by another — in which

the ESC will be caused to develop into the type of cell

pertinent to that research. Most stem cell lines are maintained

4

by one or another of several research universities, which make

them available for scientific use, usually for a small fee.

The plaintiffs in this case, Drs. James Sherley and

Theresa Deisher, are scientists who use only adult stem cells

in their research. They contend the NIH has, by funding

research projects using ESCs, violated the Dickey-Wicker

Amendment, which the Congress has included in the annual

appropriation for the Department of Health and Human

Services each year since 1996. Dickey-Wicker prohibits the

NIH from funding:

(1) the creation of a human embryo or embryos

for research purposes; or (2) research in which

a human embryo or embryos are destroyed,

discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of

injury or death greater than that allowed for

research on fetuses in utero under 45 C.F.R.

46.204(b) and section 498(b) of the Public

Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 289g(b)).

Pub. L. No. 111-117, § 509(a)(2), 123 Stat. 3034, 3280–81.

In 1996, when the Congress first passed Dickey-Wicker,

scientists had taken steps to isolate ESCs but had not yet been

able to stabilize them for research in the laboratory. The

historical record suggests the Congress passed the

Amendment chiefly to preclude President Clinton from acting

upon an NIH report recommending federal funding for

research using embryos that had been created for the purpose

of in vitro fertilization. See O. Carter Snead, Science, Public

Bioethics, and the Problem of Integration, 43 U.C. DAVIS L.

REV. 1529, 1546 (2010). Dickey-Wicker became directly

relevant to ESCs only in 1998, when researchers at the

University of Wisconsin succeeded in generating a stable line

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of ESCs, which they made available to investigators who

might apply for NIH funding.

For that reason, on January 15, 1999, the General

Counsel of the Department of Health and Human Services

issued a memorandum addressing whether Dickey-Wicker

permits federal funding of research using ESCs that had been

derived before the funded project began; she concluded such

funding is permissible because ESCs are not “embryos.”

After notice and comment, the NIH issued funding guidelines

consistent with this opinion, see 65 Fed. Reg. 51,976 (2000),

but the NIH did not fund any ESC research project while

President Clinton was in office.

Early in 2001, President Bush directed the NIH not to

fund any project pursuant to President Clinton’s policy; later

that year he decided funding for ESC research would be

limited to projects using the approximately 60 then-extant cell

lines derived from “embryos that ha[d] already been

destroyed.” See 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1149, 1151

(Aug. 9, 2001); see also Exec. Order No. 13,435, 72 Fed.

Reg. 34,591 (2007); Doe v. Obama, 631 F.3d 157, 159 (4th

Cir. 2011). Meanwhile, the Congress continued to reenact

Dickey-Wicker each year of the Bush Administration.

Upon assuming office in 2009, President Obama lifted

the temporal restriction imposed by President Bush and

permitted the NIH to “support and conduct responsible,

scientifically worthy human stem cell research, including

human embryonic stem cell research, to the extent permitted

by law.” Exec. Order 13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667, 10,667

(2009). The NIH, after notice-and-comment rulemaking, then

issued the 2009 Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,170–32,175 (July

7, 2009), which are currently in effect. In the Guidelines, the

NIH noted “funding of the derivation of stem cells from

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human embryos is prohibited by ... the Dickey-Wicker

Amendment.” Id. at 32,175/2. The Guidelines further

addressed Dickey-Wicker as follows:

Since 1999, the Department of Health and

Human Services (HHS) has consistently

interpreted [Dickey-Wicker] as not applicable

to research using [ESCs], because [ESCs] are

not embryos as defined by Section 509. This

longstanding interpretation has been left

unchanged by Congress, which has annually

reenacted the Dickey [sic] Amendment with

full knowledge that HHS has been funding

[ESC] research since 2001. These guidelines

therefore recognize the distinction, accepted by

Congress, between the derivation of stem cells

from an embryo that results in the embryo’s

destruction, for which Federal funding is

prohibited, and research involving [ESCs] that

does not involve an embryo nor result in an

embryo’s destruction, for which Federal

funding is permitted.

Id. at 32,173/2.

In place of President Bush’s temporal limitation, the 2009

Guidelines instituted specific ethical restrictions upon ESC

research funded by the NIH: Such research may be conducted

only upon stem cell lines derived from embryos that “were

created using in vitro fertilization for reproductive purposes

and were no longer needed for this purpose,” and that “were

donated by individuals who sought reproductive treatment ...

who gave voluntary written consent for the human embryos to

be used for research purposes,” and who were not paid

therefor. Id. at 32,174/2–3. Moreover, the research may use

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stem cell lines derived from an embryo donated after the

effective date of the Guidelines only if the in vitro clinic had

fully informed the donor of all possible options for disposing

of the embryo and had taken other specified procedural steps

to separate reproductive treatment from donation. Id.

After the 2009 Guidelines were issued, the Congress once

again reenacted Dickey-Wicker as part of the appropriations

bill for fiscal year 2010. The Congress has not enacted an

appropriations bill for FY 2011, adopting instead a series of

continuing resolutions that have carried Dickey-Wicker

forward to the present. Neither party to this case has

suggested the Congress might modify Dickey-Wicker for the

remainder of FY 2011.

Drs. Sherley and Deisher and a number of others filed

this suit in August 2009 and moved the district court for a

preliminary injunction. Instead, the district court granted the

Government’s motion to dismiss the suit for want of standing.

The plaintiffs appealed and we reversed in part, holding the

doctors alone had standing because they competed with ESC

researchers for NIH funding. Sherley I, 610 F.3d at 72–74.

On remand, the district court granted the doctors’ motion

and issued a preliminary injunction providing “that

defendants and their officers, employees, and agents are

enjoined from implementing, applying, or taking any action

whatsoever pursuant to the [2009 Guidelines], or otherwise

funding research involving human embryonic stem cells as

contemplated in the Guidelines.” Upon the Government’s

motion, this court stayed the preliminary injunction pending

appeal thereof. In the meantime, proceedings have continued

in the district court, where the parties have cross-moved for

summary judgment. The only question before us now,

therefore, is the propriety of the preliminary injunction.

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II. Analysis

A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that

may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is

entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council,

Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 376 (2008). “A plaintiff seeking a

preliminary injunction must establish [1] that he is likely to

succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable

harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance

of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the

public interest.” Id. at 374.

We pause to consider how we are to treat these four

factors. Before Winter, this court and others had allowed that

a strong showing on one factor could make up for a weaker

showing on another. See Davenport v. Int’l Bhd. of

Teamsters, 166 F.3d 356, 360–61 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also

Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 392 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“courts

have evaluated claims for equitable relief on a ‘sliding scale,’

sometimes awarding relief based on a lower likelihood of

harm when the likelihood of success is very high”). In Davis

v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1292

(2009), we noted that Winter “could be read to create a more

demanding burden” than the sliding-scale analysis requires

although, as we there observed, Justice Ginsburg does not

think so, see Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 392. In Davis, however, we

did not have to resolve the issue because we would have

reached the same conclusion under either approach. 571 F.3d

at 1292.

In their concurring opinion in Davis, two judges

expressed the view that “under the Supreme Court's

precedents, a movant cannot obtain a preliminary injunction

without showing both a likelihood of success and a likelihood

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of irreparable harm, among other things.” Id. at 1296. They

noted that the Winter Court seemed to treat the four factors as

independent requirements and specifically to reject the Ninth

Circuit’s statement that a strong likelihood of success on the

merits lessens the movant’s burden to showing merely a

“possibility” rather than a “likelihood” of irreparable harm.

Id. (citing Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374-76); see also Nken v.

Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1763 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,

concurring) (“When considering success on the merits and

irreparable harm, courts cannot dispense with the required

showing of one simply because there is a strong likelihood of

the other”).

Like our colleagues, we read Winter at least to suggest if

not to hold “that a likelihood of success is an independent,

free-standing requirement for a preliminary injunction,”

Davis, 571 F.3d at 1296 (concurring opinion). Although the

Fourth Circuit has read the same case to similar effect, see

Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 347

(2009), other circuits do not understand it to preclude

continuing adherence to the sliding-scale approach, see

Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, No. 09-35756, 2011

WL 208360, at *3–7 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2011); Citigroup

Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund

Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35–38 (2d Cir. 2010); Hoosier Energy

Rural Elec. Coop. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d

721, 725 (7th Cir. 2009). We need not wade into this circuit

split today because, as in Davis, as detailed below, in this case

a preliminary injunction is not appropriate even under the less

demanding sliding-scale analysis.

We review the district court’s balancing of the four

factors for abuse of discretion. Davis, 571 F.3d at 1291.

Insofar as the inquiry depends upon a question of law, our

review is, of course, de novo. Id.; Ark. Dairy Coop. Ass’n v.

10

USDA, 573 F.3d 815, 821 (D.C. Cir. 2009). In this case, our

de novo review is central to the plaintiffs’ likelihood of

success on the merits, see City of Las Vegas v. Lujan, 891

F.2d 927, 931–32 (D.C. Cir. 1989), which success depends

upon an issue of statutory interpretation.

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

In entering the preliminary injunction, the district court

concluded the plaintiff doctors are likely to succeed in

demonstrating the 2009 Guidelines are inconsistent with the

limits upon funding in the Dickey-Wicker Amendment. 704

F. Supp. 2d 63, 70–72 (2010). We approach this issue under

the familiar two-step framework of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–

43 (1984): If the Congress has “directly spoken to the precise

question at issue,” then we must “give effect to the

unambiguously expressed intent of Congress”; if instead the

“statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific

issue,” then we defer to the administering agency’s

interpretation as long as it reflects “a permissible construction

of the statute.”

1. Chevron step one

We begin our review, of course, by looking to the text

of Dickey-Wicker, which bars federal funding specifically for

“research in which a human embryo or embryos are

destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of injury

or death greater than that allowed for research on fetuses in

utero” under the Public Health Service Act and a particular

regulation of the Department of Health and Human Services.

The district court held, and the plaintiffs argue on appeal, this

provision unambiguously bars funding for any project using

an ESC. They reason that, because an embryo had to be

11

destroyed in order to yield an ESC, any later research project

that uses an ESC is necessarily “research” in which the

embryo is destroyed. For its part, the Government argues the

“text is in no way an unambiguous ban on research using

embryonic stem cells” because Dickey-Wicker is written in

the present tense, addressing research “in which” embryos

“are” destroyed, not research “for which” embryos “were

destroyed.”

The use of the present tense in a statute strongly suggests

it does not extend to past actions. The Dictionary Act

provides “unless the context indicates otherwise ... words

used in the present tense include the future as well as the

present.” 1 U.S.C. § 1. As the Supreme Court has observed,

that provision implies “the present tense generally does not

include the past.” Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229,

2236 (2010). The context here does not, as our dissenting

colleague would have it, indicate a different understanding.

To the contrary, as amicus the University of California urges

in its brief, and as the Government emphasized at oral

argument, NIH funding decisions are forward-looking,

requiring the NIH to “determine whether what is proposed to

be funded meets with its requirements.” Therefore, a grant

application to support research that includes the derivation of

stem cells would have to be rejected. *

*

The plaintiffs urge us to adopt the district court’s view that

Dickey-Wicker incorporates the definition of “research” in the

Human Subject Protection regulations: “a systematic investigation,

including research development, testing and evaluation, designed to

develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge.” 45 C.F.R. §

46.102(d). The Government argues otherwise, but we need not

resolve this debate because, as the Government also argues, that a

project involves “research development” or is “‘systematic’ does

not mean that it includes acts or processes,” such as deriving ESCs,

“that predated the federally funded research.”

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The plaintiffs respond by reiterating their primary

argument: Because “research” using an ESC includes

derivation of the ESC, the derivation does not predate but is

an integral part of the “research.” The conclusion does not

follow from the premise; at best it shows Dickey-Wicker is

open to more than one possible reading. * The plaintiffs also

argue we must read the term “research” broadly because the

Congress, had it intended a narrower reading, would have

used a term identifying a particular action, as it did in

subsection (1) of Dickey-Wicker, which specifically bars the

“creation” of an embryo for “research purposes.” We see no

basis for that inference. The definition of research is flexible

enough to describe either a discrete project or an extended

process, but this flexibility only reinforces our conclusion that

the text is ambiguous.

2. Chevron step two

We turn, therefore, to Chevron step two, under which we

must uphold the NIH’s interpretation of Dickey-Wicker if it is

but “reasonable.” See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. Recall the

relevant text is the prohibition against funding for “research in

which a human embryo or embryos are destroyed.” The NIH

determined Dickey-Wicker does not bar its funding a project

using an ESC that was previously derived because a stem cell

*

The plaintiffs rely upon Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I,

Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005), but that case is inapposite; it

involved a statute that protected from an infringement claim the use

of patented materials “reasonably related to the development and

submission of information” to the FDA in a regulatory proceeding.

Although the Court concluded the statute protected the use of

patented materials at all phases of research, the ruling did not

depend upon an interpretation of the term “research,” and does not

bear upon our understanding of “research” in Dickey-Wicker. See

id. at 202.

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is not an “embryo” and cannot develop into a human being.

The plaintiffs do not dispute this much of the agency’s

reasoning.

The plaintiffs argue instead the NIH is not entitled to

deference because it never offered an interpretation of the

term “research.” Their premise is not entirely correct: In the

2009 Guidelines the NIH expressly distinguished between the

derivation of ESCs and “research involving [ESCs] that does

not involve an embryo nor result in an embryo’s destruction.”

74 Fed. Reg. 32,173/2. Thus, although the Guidelines do not

define the term “research,” they do make clear the agency’s

understanding that “research involving [ESCs]” does not

necessarily include the antecedent process of deriving the

cells.

The plaintiffs, invoking our opinion in Public Citizen,

Inc. v. HHS, 332 F.3d 654, 661 (2003), argue the agency’s

effort in this respect is insufficiently specific to warrant our

deference. In the cited case we did not defer to HHS because

the agency had not actually addressed the disputed portion of

the statute; indeed, it had “[done] little more than repeat the

statutory language” and had failed to offer any explanation for

its position that a Peer Review Organization could “inform” a

Medicare beneficiary of its disposition of his complaint about

a treating physician with a form letter lacking most of the

pertinent information. Id. There was, in short, “no reasoning

that we [could] evaluate for its reasonableness.” Id. Here, in

contrast, the NIH has explained how funding an ESC project

is consistent with the Dickey-Wicker Amendment. The

plaintiffs’ objection that the NIH has not explicitly defined a

word in the statute — an important word, to be sure — is

mere cavil; it disregards the agency’s use of the term, which

implicitly but unequivocally gives “research” a narrow scope,

thus ensuring no federal funding will go to a research project

14

in which an embryo is destroyed. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger

Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 420 (1992)

(that agency’s “interpretation of the word ‘required’” was

implicit “does not mean that we may not defer to that

interpretation”).

To this point the plaintiffs apparently respond that the

NIH has, by treating derivation as part of “research,” shown

its understanding of Dickey-Wicker is unreasonable. Their

argument is that, because the standard definition of “research”

requires some kind of scientific inquiry, and deriving ESCs,

standing alone, involves no such inquiry, the act of derivation

can be deemed “research” only if it is part of a larger project.

The plaintiffs refer us to 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d), supra at 11

n.*; see also, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE,

http://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/research (last visited

Mar. 20, 2011) (“careful or diligent search”; “studious inquiry

or examination; especially: investigation or experimentation

aimed at the discovery and interpretation of facts, revision of

accepted theories or laws in the light of new facts, or practical

application of such new or revised theories or laws”);

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE,

http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/163432 (last

visited Mar. 22, 2011) (“Systematic investigation or inquiry

aimed at contributing to knowledge of a theory, topic, etc., by

careful consideration, observation, or study of a subject”).

The plaintiffs’ premise is valid in part: Because the

Guidelines state Dickey-Wicker bans funding for the

derivation of ESCs and Dickey-Wicker bans only “research,”

it is clear the NIH treats the act of derivation as “research.”

The Government expressly confirmed this much at oral

argument when counsel flatly stated “derivation is research.”

Less clear is whether the act of derivation, by itself, comes

within a standard definition of research, that is, whether it

involves any investigation or inquiry. On that score, the

15

Government pointed out at oral argument that “stem cells are

not pre-labeled cells that you can simply extract,” and argued

“the scientific process” of derivation, in which cells are

“extracted and put into mediums where [they] can grow”

before being examined and chemically treated, “itself

involves experimentation.”

Rather than rely upon that account of derivation

qualifying as research, let us assume for the sake of the

plaintiffs’ argument derivation involves no scientific inquiry;

it does not follow that the NIH may define derivation as

“research” only if or insofar as the derivation is tethered to

some later project using the derived cells. Although an

understanding of “research” that includes the derivation of

stem cells is not the ordinary reading of that term, it is surely

as sensible as the plaintiffs’ alternative, in which the

derivation of a cell line is deemed part of every one of the

scores if not hundreds of subsequent research projects —

although pursued by different scientists, perhaps many years

later — to use one of the derived cells. To define derivation

as “research,” in other words, makes at least as much sense as

to treat the one-off act of derivation as though it had been

performed anew each time a researcher, however remote in

time or place, uses a stem cell from the resulting line. * The

fact is the statute is not worded precisely enough to resolve

the present definitional contest conclusively for one side or

the other.

Broadening our focus slightly, however, we can see the

words surrounding “research” in the statute support the NIH’s

*

Our dissenting colleague takes us to task for “read[ing] ‘research’

as if it were synonymous with ‘research project,’” but we give it no

such fixed meaning. Rather, our point is that “research,” although

susceptible to a broad definition, is also reasonably understood as a

more discrete endeavor.

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reading. Because the Congress wrote with particularity and in

the present tense — the statute says “in which” and “are”

rather than “for which” and “were” — it is entirely reasonable

for the NIH to understand Dickey-Wicker as permitting

funding for research using cell lines derived without federal

funding, even as it bars funding for the derivation of

additional lines.

Further, adding the temporal dimension to our

perspective, we see, as the NIH noted in promulgating the

2009 Guidelines, the Congress has reenacted Dickey-Wicker

unchanged year after year “with full knowledge that HHS has

been funding [ESC] research since 2001,” 74 Fed. Reg.

32,173/2, when President Bush first permitted federal funding

for ESC projects, provided they used previously derived ESC

lines. As the plaintiffs conceded at oral argument, because

this policy permitted the NIH to fund projects using ESCs, it

would have been prohibited under their proposed reading of

Dickey-Wicker. So, too, with the policy the Clinton

Administration announced in 1999 and, of course, with the

2009 Guidelines promulgated by the Obama Administration.

The plaintiffs have no snappy response to the agency’s point

that the Congress’s having reenacted Dickey-Wicker each and

every year provides “further evidence ... [it] intended the

Agency’s interpretation, or at least understood the

interpretation as statutorily permissible.” Barnhart v. Walton,

535 U.S. 212, 220 (2002); accord Lindahl v. OPM, 470 U.S.

768, 782 n.15 (1985) (“Congress is presumed to be aware of

an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to

adopt that interpretation when it reenacts a statute without

change” (internal quotation marks omitted)). *

*

The parties’ disagreement over whether the NIH’s interpretation

should be deemed “longstanding” is beside the point; this is not a

situation in which we are asked to infer the Congress’s assent from

17

3. Subsidiary Arguments

A few matters remain. First, we note, because the

plaintiffs bring solely a facial challenge to the Guidelines, we

have no occasion to consider their suggestion that the NIH

might grant the researcher who derived an ESC line federal

funds for research using it, which would link the act of

derivation more closely to subsequent research and test the

distinction between them drawn by the NIH. However that

case — were it ever to materialize — might play out is

irrelevant here. * To prevail in their challenge to the

Guidelines on their face the plaintiffs “must establish that no

set of circumstances exists under which the [Guidelines]

would be valid,” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301 (1993)

(internal quotation marks omitted); it is not enough for the

plaintiffs to show the Guidelines could be applied unlawfully,

see Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. DOT, 613 F.3d 206, 213 (D.C.

Cir. 2010); see also Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606,

619 (1991) (“that petitioner can point to a hypothetical case in

which the rule might lead to an arbitrary result does not

render the rule ‘arbitrary or capricious’”). **

its inaction over a long period. Regardless how much time has

passed, reenactment is evidence the Congress approves the

agency’s application of the statute. Creekstone Farms Premium

Beef L.L.C. v. USDA, 539 F.3d 492, 500–501 & n.10 (D.C. Cir.

2008).

*

The same is true of the plaintiffs’ suggestion that a researcher

might use federal funds to purchase ESCs; it is nothing more than

another argument that the Guidelines could be applied unlawfully.

**

As the dissent notes, a panel of this court once held this standard

inapplicable to a facial statutory (as opposed to a facial

constitutional) challenge to a regulation. See Nat’l Mining Ass’n v.

U.S. Corps. of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1407-08 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

That decision, however, was made in the mistaken belief that the

18

The plaintiffs also argue the Guidelines transgress the

prohibition in Dickey-Wicker against “research in which a

human embryo or embryos are ... knowingly subjected to risk

of injury or death.” To the extent this argument is distinct

from the plaintiffs’ principal argument that all ESC research

is research in which an embryo is destroyed, it relies upon the

proposition that ESC research “creat[es] demand for[] human

embryonic stem cells,” which “necessitate[s] the destruction

of embryos.” The district court did not address this theory in

entering the preliminary injunction. Although ordinarily we

“may affirm the judgment of the district court on the basis of

a different legal theory,” Harbor Ins. Co. v. Stokes, 45 F.3d

499, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (summary judgment), the decision

whether to grant a preliminary injunction is a matter of

discretion, not a question of right, see Winter, 129 S. Ct. at

376–77. Not surprisingly, therefore, the plaintiffs have not

identified, nor have we found, any precedent for upholding a

preliminary injunction based upon a legal theory not

embraced by the district court. In this as in every such case, it

is for the district court to determine, in the first instance,

whether the plaintiffs’ showing on a particular claim warrants

preliminary injunctive relief. For the same reason we do not

“Supreme Court ha[d] never adopted a ‘no set of circumstances’

test to assess the validity of a regulation challenged as facially

incompatible with governing statutory law.” Id. at 1407. The

Court had done just that several years earlier in Flores. Although

Flores is not literally, therefore, an “intervening” decision of the

Supreme Court, see Amfac Resorts, L.L.C. v. DOI, 282 F.3d 818,

827 (D.C. Cir. 2002), vacated as not ripe sub nom. Nat’l Park

Hospitality Ass’n v. DOI, 538 U.S. 803 (2003), we have followed it

since National Mining, see, e.g., Air Transp. Ass’n, 613 F.3d at

213; Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep't v. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d 28, 33

(2002), and, bound as we are by a higher authority, do so again

here.

19

pass upon the plaintiffs’ argument they are likely to succeed

on their claim under the Administrative Procedure Act that

the NIH promulgated the Guidelines “through an inadequate

notice-and-comment process.”

Because those of the plaintiffs’ legal arguments that are

properly before us do not stand up well to analysis, it follows

they have not shown they are more likely than not to succeed

on the merits of their case. Indeed, were we to adopt the strict

reading given Winter by our concurring colleagues in Davis,

our inquiry would end here. Under the sliding-scale

approach, however, we must go on to determine whether the

other three factors so much favor the plaintiffs that they need

only have raised a “serious legal question” on the merits. See

Wash. Area Transit Comm’n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d

841, 843–44 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“a court, when confronted with

a case in which the other three factors strongly favor interim

relief may exercise its discretion to grant a stay if the movant

has made a substantial case on the merits”). That much the

plaintiffs have done. We turn therefore to another of the four

factors, whether “the balance of equities tips in [the

plaintiffs’] favor,” Winter, 555 U.S. at 374. Because it does

not, we need not consider either of the other two factors.

B. Balance of the Equities

The district court reasoned the “balance of hardships

weighs in favor of an injunction” because, for ESC

researchers, “the injunction would simply preserve the status

quo and would not interfere with their ability to obtain private

funding.” 704 F. Supp. 2d at 72. On the other hand, the court

thought it certain that increased competition would “threaten

[the plaintiffs’] very livelihood.” Id. at 72–73.

20

As we see it, however, a preliminary injunction would in

fact upend the status quo. True, the plaintiffs compete with

ESC researchers for funding — indeed, that is why they have

standing to bring this case, see Sherley I, 610 F.3d at 71–74

— but they have been competing with ESC researchers since

2001. The 2009 Guidelines inflict some incremental handicap

upon the plaintiffs’ ability to compete for NIH money — they

point to the additional time and money they must expend and

have had to expend since 2001 to meet the additional

competition from researchers proposing to use ESCs — but it

is necessarily uncertain whether invalidating the Guidelines

would result in the plaintiffs getting any more grant money

from the NIH. Accordingly, we cannot say that, if the

plaintiffs are to litigate this case without the benefit of interim

relief, then the 2009 Guidelines will place a significant

additional burden upon their ability to secure funding for their

research.

The hardship a preliminary injunction would impose

upon ESC researchers, by contrast, would be certain and

substantial. The injunction entered by the district court would

preclude the NIH from funding new ESC projects it has or

would have deemed meritorious, thereby inevitably denying

other scientists funds they would have received. Even more

problematic, the injunction would bar further disbursements

to ESC researchers who have already begun multi-year

projects in reliance upon a grant from the NIH; their

investments in project planning would be a loss, their

expenditures for equipment a waste, and their staffs out of a

job. The record shows private funding is not generally

available for stem cell research but even if, as the district

court thought, private donors or investors would provide a

reasonable alternative source of funds for ESC researchers,

704 F. Supp. 2d at 72, it remains unclear why such donors or

investors would not similarly support the plaintiffs’ research

21

using adult stem cells and why the plaintiffs’ “very

livelihood” instead depends upon obtaining grants from the

NIH.

All this is to say the balance of equities tilts against

granting a preliminary injunction. That, combined with our

conclusion the plaintiffs have not shown they are likely to

succeed on the merits, leads us to hold the district court

abused its discretion in awarding preliminary injunctive relief.

III. Conclusion

Because the plaintiffs have not shown they are likely to

succeed on the merits, we conclude they are not entitled to

preliminary injunctive relief. We reach this conclusion under

the sliding scale approach to the preliminary injunction

factors; a fortiori we would reach the same conclusion if

likelihood of success on the merits is an independent

requirement. Therefore, the preliminary injunction entered by

the district court must be and is

Vacated.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON , Circuit Judge, dissenting:

The majority opinion has taken a straightforward case of

statutory construction and produced a result that would make

Rube Goldberg tip his hat. Breaking the simple noun “research”

into “temporal” bits, Maj. Op. at 5, 6, 16, narrowing the verb

phrase “are destroyed” to an unintended scope, id. at 11,

dismissing the definition section of implementing regulations

promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services

(HHS) (in case the plain meaning of “research” were not plain

enough), id. at 11 n.*, my colleagues perform linguistic jujitsu.

I must therefore respectfully dissent.

The Government appeals from the district court’s entry of

a preliminary injunction prohibiting it “from implementing,

applying, or taking any action whatsoever pursuant to” the NIH

Guidelines for Human Stem Cell Research (Guidelines), 32 Fed.

Reg. 32,170 (July 7, 2009), “or otherwise funding research

involving human embryonic stem cells as contemplated in the

Guidelines.” Order, Sherley v. Sebelius, 704 F. Supp. 2d 63

(D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2010) (No. 09-1575). “On a motion for a

preliminary injunction, the district court must balance four

factors: (1) the movant’s showing of a substantial likelihood of

success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm to the movant, (3)

substantial harm to the nonmovant, and (4) public interest.”

Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1291

(D.C. Cir. 2009). We review the district court’s weighing of the

preliminary injunction factors for abuse of discretion and its

findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. Id. To the

extent its decision turns on a question of law, our review is de

novo. Id. I believe that the plaintiffs, researchers who use adult

stem cells only, are likely to succeed on the merits of their

challenge to the Guidelines and that the district court did not

abuse its discretion in weighing the preliminary injunction

factors in favor of granting the injunction. Accordingly, I would

affirm.

I. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The majority opinion sets out the background information

describing the “derivation” of human embryonic stem cells

(hESCs) from a human embryo—which action destroys the

embryo—and the subsequent use of the hESCs in the hope of

remedying many serious, and often fatal, diseases and

debilitating physical conditions. I take no exception to that

portion of the majority opinion except to the extent that it recites

the “historical record suggests the Congress passed the [Dickey-

Wicker] Amendment chiefly” to address matters other than

hESC research. Maj. Op. at 4. The Government’s brief suggests

otherwise. After explaining that the Congress enacted the

Amendment “in reaction to a 1994 NIH panel report,”

Appellants’ Br. 21, it recites that the 1994 report advocated

federal funding of research “designed to improve the process of

in vitro fertilization, to determine whether embryos carried

genetic abnormalities, and to isolate embryonic stem cells.” Id.

(second emphasis added). There is no reason to assume,

therefore, the Congress did not consider hESC research when it

first enacted the Dickey-Wicker Amendment (Amendment) in

1996.

The Amendment, reenacted annually as a rider to

appropriations legislation, prohibits the expenditure of federal

funds both for “the creation of a human embryo or embryos for

research purposes” and for “research in which a human embryo

or embryos are destroyed.” Consolidated Appropriations Act of

2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, § 509(a), 123 Stat. 3034, 3280-81

(Dec. 16, 2009). It is the latter ban that the plaintiffs claim is

violated by the 2009 Guidelines. Determining whether hESC

research is “research in which a human embryo or embryos are

destroyed” requires determining the meaning of “research.” The

plaintiffs contend that all hESC research constitutes research in

which human embryos are destroyed and that the Amendment

2

accordingly prohibits federal funding thereof. The Government

counters that the derivation of hESCs and the subsequent use of

those cells, although both research, are not part of the

same—and prohibited—research. We construe the Amendment

under the familiar two-step approach set forth in Chevron U.S.A.

Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43

(1984). Chevron step one asks if the “Congress has directly

spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id. at 842. “We start

with the plain meaning of the text, looking to the language itself,

the specific context in which that language is used, and the

broader context of the statute as a whole.” Blackman v. District

of Columbia, 456 F.3d 167, 176 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal

quotation marks omitted). I believe we need go no further than

Chevron step one here because the plain meaning of the

Amendment is easily grasped. See id. (“If the [statute] has a

plain and unambiguous meaning, our inquiry ends so long as the

resulting statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.” (internal

quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, “that is the end of the

matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to

the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, 467

U.S. at 842-43.

The district court correctly looked to the dictionary

definition of “research” as “diligent and systematic inquiry or

investigation into a subject in order to discover or revise facts,

theories, applications, etc.” Sherley v. Sebelius, 704 F. Supp. 2d

at 70 (citing Random House Dictionary); see also Maj. Op. at 14

(quoting Oxford English Dictionary Online (“Systematic

investigation or inquiry aimed at contributing to knowledge of

a theory, topic, etc., by careful consideration, observation, or

study of a subject”)). Research, then, comprises a systematic

inquiry or investigation. And “systematic” connotes sequenced

action. XVII Oxford English Dictionary 498 (2d ed. 1989)

(“systematic”: “Arranged or conducted according to a system,

plan, or organized method . . . .”); see also CACI Int’l, Inc. v. St.

3

Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 566 F.3d 150, 158-59 (4th Cir.

2009) (describing “systematic” behavior as “a series of acts”

(internal quotation marks omitted)). The first sequence of hESC

research is the derivation of stem cells from the human embryo.

The derivation of stem cells destroys the embryo and therefore

cannot be federally funded, as the Government concedes. See

Maj. Op. at 14-15. I believe the succeeding sequences of hESC

research are likewise banned by the Amendment because, under

the plain meaning of “research,” they continue the “systematic

inquiry or investigation.”

That the intent of the 1996 Congress, in enacting the

Amendment, is to prohibit all hESC research—not just research

attendant on the derivation of the cells—is clear by comparing

the language used to ban federal funding for the creation of an

embryo with the language the plaintiffs rely on. See Erlenbaugh

v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 244 (1972) (rule that statutes in

pari materia should be construed together “is but a logical

extension of the principle that individual sections of a single

statute should be construed together”); Motion Picture Ass’n of

Am. v. FCC, 309 F.3d 796, 801 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Statutory

provisions in pari materia normally are construed together to

discern their meaning.”). While the Amendment prohibits

federal financing of the “creation of a human embryo . . . for

research purposes,” it does not use parallel language in

addressing the destruction of embryos. It bans federal funding

of “research” rather than the “destruction of human embryos for

research purposes.” Research, then, is the express target of the

ban the Congress imposed with respect to the destruction of a

human embryo. This makes perfect sense because in 1996,

according to the record, hESC research had barely begun.

Deisher Decl. ¶ 7. The Congress, recognizing its scant

knowledge about the feasibility/scope of hESC research, chose

broad language with the plain intent to make the ban as complete

as possible. Because the meaning of research is plain, and the

4

intent of the Congress to ban the federal funding of hESC

research is equally plain, I would stop at Chevron step one and

enjoin the Guidelines as violative of the Amendment to the

extent they allow federal funds to be used for hESC research.

If there were any uncertainty about the extent of the

Amendment’s ban, it would be erased by reading the

Amendment’s language in full, as the district court—again,

correctly—did. The ban on federal funding of hESC research

provides that federal funds may not be used for:

[R]esearch in which a human embryo or embryos are

destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk of

injury or death greater than that allowed for research on

fetuses in utero under 45 CFR 46.204(b) and section

498(b) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C.

289g(b)).

Pub. L. No. 111-117, § 509(a)(2), 123 Stat. at 3280-81. The

Amendment’s incorporation of 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(b)—HHS’s

own regulation—relates to “[r]esearch involving pregnant

women and fetuses,” as section 46.204 is entitled. “Research,”

as used in section 46.204(b), means “a systematic investigation,

including research development, testing and evaluation,

designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge.”

45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (emphasis added); see id. § 46.202

(“definitions in § 46.102 [are] applicable to [§ 46.204]”). In

expressly linking “research in which a human embryo or

embryos are destroyed, discarded, or knowingly subjected to risk

of injury or death” and “research on fetuses in utero under 45

CFR 46.204(b),” the Congress unambiguously manifested its

intent that “research” as used in the Amendment is to have the

5

same meaning as “research” used in section 46.204(b).1

Moreover, the “presumption that a given term is used to mean

the same thing throughout a statute” is “at its most vigorous

when a term is repeated within a given sentence,” as “research”

is in the Amendment. Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118

(1994). Section 46.102(d) confirms that research involves

sequenced action by defining it to include “development, testing

and evaluation” sequences. “Research development” perfectly

describes the first sequence of hESC research, that is, the

derivation of the cells. The testing and evaluation sequences of

hESC research cannot be performed without first conducting the

research involved in deriving hESCs from the human embryo.

The derivation of hESCs is, thus, the sine qua non

developmental sequence on which all subsequent sequences of

hESC research rest. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests

that hESCs are derived for any purpose other than the testing and

evaluation of those cells. That hESCs cannot be tested and

evaluated unless and until they are derived from a human

embryo, combined with the fact that derivation of hESCs is done

solely as part of a “systematic investigation” of those cells,

demonstrates that derivation is the necessary first sequence of

hESC research. Because derivation of hESCs necessarily

destroys a human embryo or embryos, and because derivation

constitutes at least hESC research development under the

Amendment, all hESC research is “research in which a human

embryo or embryos are destroyed.” Accordingly, the plaintiffs’

challenge to the Amendment is likely to succeed because the

1

That the Amendment references section 46.204(b) in comparing

the risk of injury or death to a human embryo does not affect the

Amendment’s incorporation of section 46.102(d)’s definition of

research. Determining the level of risk permitted for “research on

fetuses in utero under [section] 46.204(b)” necessarily requires

construing “research” and section 46.102(d) defines “research.”

6

Amendment prohibits the expenditure of federal funds to engage

in hESC research in all of its sequences.

In my view, the majority opinion strains mightily to find the

ambiguity the Government presses.2 Treating “research” as

composed of free-standing pieces, it concludes that the only

piece that is banned is the derivation of the hESCs. The

authority for this novel reading of “research” is not the

dictionary but the Amendment’s use of the phrase “in which a

human embryo or embryos are destroyed” rather than “for which

a human embryo or embryos were destroyed.” Maj. Op. at 11

(emphases added).3 The majority opinion correctly notes that the

Dictionary Act, which provides that “unless the context indicates

otherwise . . . words used in the present tense include the future

as well as the present,” 1 U.S.C. § 1, implies “that the present

tense generally does not include the past,” Carr v. United States,

130 S. Ct. 2229, 2236 (2010). That is not true, however, where,

as here, “the context indicates otherwise.” 1 U.S.C. § 1. See

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 331 (1997) (“one has to strain

to find . . . ambiguity” in reading statutory provision that “is

2

The Government may not have always taken this view of the

Amendment. See Letter from Kate Berg, Deputy Scientific Director,

NCHGR, to Wendy Fibison, Researcher at Georgetown University

Medical Center (Oct. 10, 1996) (Joint Appendix 283) (“NIH position

on embryo research” is federally funded researchers “[can]not engage

in embryo related research” including certain types of “analysis from

DNA derived from a human embryo”). But see Appellants’ Reply Br.

7-8 (claiming Georgetown research, like derivation, “require[d] the

removal of a cell from an embryo”).

3

The Government’s suggested change in inflection can fairly be

described as Clintonesque (“It depends upon what the meaning of the

word ‘is’ is.” H.R. Rep. No. 105-830, at 40 (Dec. 16, 1998) (quoting

Grand Jury Testimony of President W.J. Clinton, Jones v. Clinton,

No. 94-0290 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 12, 1999), at 57-58 (Aug. 17, 1998))).

7

applicable if a State establishes . . . a mechanism” to include

State that established mechanism before statute’s enactment

(first emphasis added)); Abercrombie v. Clarke, 920 F.2d 1351,

1359 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding “abundantly clear that Congress

intended the present tense language [in provisions of Financial

Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989

providing for civil monetary penalties] to apply to past acts”),

cert. denied, 502 U.S. 809 (1991); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S.

226, 236 (1964) (“very possibl[e]” that Maryland Court of

Appeals would hold “the use of the present tense instead of the

more usual future tense” in Maryland statute “to apply to past as

well as future conduct”); Coal. for Clean Air v. S. Cal. Edison

Co., 971 F.2d 219, 225 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The present tense is

commonly used to refer to past, present, and future all at the

same time. We believe that Congress used the present tense

word . . . because it did not wish to limit [the statute’s] reach to

either past or future disapprovals.”); United States v. Reilly Tar

& Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1108-09 (D. Minn. 1982)

(provision allowing United States to seek injunction against any

person “contributing to” handling, storage, treatment,

transportation or disposal of solid or hazardous waste could be

applied, at motion to dismiss stage, to past owner of inactive site

who was no longer “contributing to the condition”); cf. Carr,

130 S. Ct. at 2244-45 (Alito, J., dissenting) (responding to

majority’s reliance on statute’s use of present tense to reject

statute’s reach to past tense by noting that “modern legislative

drafting manuals,” including those used by both the United

States Senate and House, “teach that, except in unusual

circumstances, all laws . . . should be written in the present

tense”); Nickell v. Beau View of Biloxi, LLC, No. 10-60204, —

F.3d —, 2011 WL 1120792, at *4-5 (5th Cir. Mar. 28, 2011)

(notwithstanding general rule, context indicated otherwise where

inclusion of future events would conflict with statute of

limitations and other time-limited rights conferred by statute);

8

see also Guidiville Band of Pomo Indians v. NGV Gaming, Ltd.,

531 F.3d 767, 776 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[O]n its own terms the

Dictionary Act . . . looks first to ‘context,’ and only if the

‘context’ leaves the meaning open to interpretation does the

default provision come into play.”). There is no question that,

here, context manifests that the present tense includes both the

past as well as the future.4 As already discussed, the derivation

of hESCs constitutes at least research development, which, in

context, means that it is “research in which a human embryo or

embryos are [at any point] destroyed.”

But it is not only the majority opinion’s view of verb tenses

that is wrong. My colleagues rest their Chevron step two

analysis on the transformation of “research” into “research

project” in the Amendment’s text. In other words, it reads

“research” as if it were synonymous with “research project.”

Maj. Op. at 2-5, 10-16, 20. But “research” is the overall

“systematic investigation or inquiry” in a field—here,

hESCs—of which each project is simply a part. Webster’s Third

New International Dictionary 1813 (1993) (“project” means “a

definitely formulated piece of research” (emphasis added)).

4

Moreover, the Amendment combines the present tense “are”

with the past participle “destroyed,” that is, with “[a] verb form

indicating past or completed action or time that is used as a verbal

adjective.” Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554

U.S. 33, 39 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting American Heritage

Dictionary 1287 (4th ed. 2000)). Other statutes similarly use the

present tense, especially a combination of “is” with a past participle,

to signify conduct that has already occurred. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C.

§ 6253 (Secretary of Navy “may replace . . . any medal of honor,

Navy cross[ etc.] awarded under this chapter that is stolen, lost, or

destroyed or becomes unfit for use” (emphases added), that is, a medal

which has been stolen, lost, or destroyed or become unfit for use

before replacement).

9

Without the majority opinion’s misreading of “research” as

“research project,” the entire notion of pieces of research

evaporates—taking with it the “ambiguity” that sets Chevron

step two in motion.5

Finally, it is of little moment that the Congress has

reenacted the Amendment unchanged every year since 1996.

While congressional reenactment ordinarily means the Congress

intended to adopt an existing agency interpretation of the statute,

e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S.

833, 846 (1986), “[t]here is an obvious trump to the reenactment

argument . . . in the rule that ‘[w]here the law is plain,

subsequent reenactment does not constitute an adoption of a

previous administrative construction,’ ” Brown v. Gardner, 513

U.S. 115, 121 (1994) (quoting Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498

U.S. 184, 190 (1991)). Moreover, “congressional silence lacks

persuasive significance, particularly where administrative

regulations are inconsistent with the controlling statute,” id.

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted), and “[a]

regulation’s age is no antidote to clear inconsistency with a

statute,” id. at 122.6 Because I believe the Government’s reading

of the Amendment contravenes the Amendment’s plain

meaning, I am unpersuaded that the Congress, by simply

reenacting the Amendment, has sanctioned that reading.7

5

Likewise, the sequenced action inherent in “research,” supra

pp. 3-4, does not equate to individual research “projects.”

6

Moreover, the challenged Guidelines were not promulgated

until 2009 so that congressional reenactment of the Amendment in the

years predating 2009 signifies nothing in relation to the Guidelines.

7

The majority opinion dismisses the plaintiffs’ challenge that the

Guidelines permit a researcher to use federal funds to purchase hESCs

and even permit a federally-funded researcher to derive the cells

10

himself. Maj Op. at 17-18. It concludes those possibilities do not

affect the facial validity of the Guidelines because they do not

demonstrate that “no set of circumstances exists under which the

[Guidelines] would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,

745 (1987). Whether Salerno’s “no set of circumstances” approach

is properly applied in the absence of a constitutional challenge is not

altogether settled in our Circuit. We have held “that the Salerno

standard does not apply” when assessing “the validity of a regulation

challenged as facially incompatible with governing statutory law.”

Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399,

1407 (D.C. Cir. 1998). In National Mining we “confirm[ed] that the

normal Chevron test” applies and “is not transformed into an even

more lenient ‘no valid applications’ test just because the attack is

facial.” Id.; accord Becker v. FCC, 95 F.3d 75, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

Subsequently, however, we noted that National Mining “apparently

overlooked Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993).” Amfac Resorts,

LLC v. Dep’t of the Interior, 282 F.3d 818, 826 (D.C. Cir. 2002),

judgment vacated on other ground sub nom. Nat’l Park Hospitality

Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803 (2003). In Reno the Supreme

Court seemed to apply Salerno’s “no set of circumstances” test to an

ultra vires challenge to a regulation. 507 U.S. at 300-01. But see id.

at 309-15 (challenge to regulation does not succeed “if the regulation

has a reasonable foundation, that is, if it rationally pursues a purpose

that it is lawful for the [agency] to seek” (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted)). As Amfac discusses, it is not clear whether the

Salerno test applies to a purely statutory challenge or whether the

standard set forth in INS v. National Center for Immigrants’ Rights,

Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 188 (1991)—under which a regulation can be

invalid even if it has some valid applicability—applies. Amfac, 282

F.3d at 827. Amfac acknowledges that it is of course bound by the

decision of an earlier panel unless, inter alia, “an intervening

Supreme Court decision alters the law of the circuit.” 282 F.3d at

827. Reno, however, predates National Mining. Amfac does not

resolve whether, “despite Reno v. Flores, National Mining . . . must

stand as circuit law unless and until the full court overrules it.” 282

F.3d at 827. Cf. Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp.,

11

Accordingly, the plaintiffs have demonstrated to me a strong

likelihood that they will prevail on the merits.

II. Remaining Factors

In addition to likelihood of success on the merits, the

plaintiffs must also show “(2) irreparable harm to [them], (3)

[no] substantial harm to the [Government], and (4) [the] public

interest [is not harmed],” Davis, 571 F.3d at 1291, in order to

obtain injunctive relief.

To demonstrate irreparable harm in the absence of an

injunction, the plaintiffs’ injury “[must be] of such imminence

that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief to

prevent irreparable harm.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches

v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal

quotation marks omitted). We earlier held that these two

plaintiffs do indeed suffer “an actual, here-and-now injury” from

the Guidelines and that the probability they will “lose funding to

projects involving [h]ESCs” is “substantial enough . . . to deem

the injury to them imminent.” Sherley v. Sebelius, 610 F.3d 69,

74 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (emphasis added). As the district court

noted, moreover, their injury is irreparable because we “cannot

compensate [them] for their lost opportunity to receive funds.”

Sherley, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 72. The majority opinion now

613 F.3d 206, 213 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (applying Reno to facial challenge

of regulation without discussing Amfac or National Mining); Bldg. &

Constr. Trades Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Allbaugh, 295 F.3d 28, 33 (D.C.

Cir. 2002) (possibility agency could improperly apply executive order

does not establish facial invalidity thereof). See generally Stuart

Buck, Salerno vs. Chevron: What to do About Statutory Challenges,

55 Admin. L. Rev. 427 (2003).

12

dismisses their injury as “necessarily uncertain.” Maj. Op. at 20.

At the same time, my colleagues see no uncertainty in the harm

to the Government if the injunction is affirmed. Id. I agree that

enjoining the Guidelines would disrupt any hESC research

projects that have already received federal funding and therefore

harm the Government. Finally, I believe the district court

correctly determined that enjoining the Guidelines would further

the public interest. See Sherley, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 73 (“ ‘It is in

the public interest for courts to carry out the will of Congress

and for an agency to implement properly the statute it

administers.’ ” (quoting Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Shalala, 81 F.

Supp. 2d 30, 45 (D.D.C. 2000))). As discussed supra, I believe

the plaintiffs have made a strong showing of likelihood of

success on the merits. Under the sliding scale approach that

remains the law of our Circuit, see Maj. Op. at 8-9, “[i]f the

movant makes an unusually strong showing on one of the

factors, then it does not necessarily have to make as strong a

showing on another factor.” Davis, 571 F.3d at 1291-92.

Having concluded the plaintiffs have indeed made “an unusually

strong showing” on the first factor, I cannot say the district court

abused its discretion in balancing all of the factors in favor of

granting preliminary injunctive relief.

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

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