United States v. Courtland

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469

U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

D ERRICK C OURTLAND, JOSEPH A DDISON, and

JOHN B ACON,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 09-cr-30101-MJR—Michael J. Reagan, Judge.

A RGUED JANUARY 6, 2011—D ECIDED A PRIL 27, 2011

Before E ASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and C UDAHY and

R OVNER, Circuit Judges.

C UDAHY, Circuit Judge. Defendants Derrick Courtland,

John Bacon and Joseph Addison pleaded guilty to a dog

fighting conspiracy and the district court sentenced them

to varying terms of incarceration above the guidelines

recommendation. Each defendant appeals his sentence,

requesting that this court reverse the district court and

remand for resentencing. We affirm.

2 Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469

I. Facts and Procedural History

This case arises from a loosely-organized dog fighting

conspiracy in the St. Louis metro area called the “Back-

street Truez,” and connected with a kennel of that name.

A combined state and federal investigation led to numer-

ous arrests and indictments and the seizure of over

120 pitbulls, most of which were so aggressive that

the Humane Society destroyed them. At least seven

defendants pleaded guilty to conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371,

based on 7 U.S.C. § 2156, “Animal fighting venture pro-

hibition,” which makes it unlawful inter alia “for any

person to knowingly sponsor or exhibit an animal in an

animal fighting venture.” Seven defendants were sen-

tenced in a consolidated sentencing hearing, and of that

number, three presently appeal. The arguments on ap-

peal relate exclusively to sentencing. This case illus-

trates that innovative procedures can sometimes be

very helpful and are not to be automatically condemned

as without precedent.

In advance of the sentencing hearing, the district

court judge sua sponte submitted his own report on dog

fighting, which he entered into the record as a “sen-

tencing memorandum.” The district court explained in

the memorandum that the document’s purpose was to

fulfill “[the court’s] sentencing obligation, . . . to consider

the ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense’ ” under

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The district court judge indicated

that, unlike most crimes with which he dealt, he had

little general knowledge of dog fighting and he felt he

ought to conduct his own research into the subject. He

Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469 3

also stated that the memorandum was “entered well in

advance of the sentencing hearing in the instant case in

order to provide the parties with research the Court

has gleaned outside the record in this case.”

The court’s 22-page memorandum surveyed the

history and the present state of dog fighting, in the

United States and abroad. The memorandum was

marked by a tone of concern and alarm, and it described

a host of the worst abuses in the dog fighting world as

disclosed in various sources. For one example, the memo-

randum stated that “[t]o increase aggression, these dogs

may be starved, have lit cigarettes burned into their coats,

or may be beaten with a variety of crude instruments

including broken bottles, pipes, or even machetes.” The

memorandum directly linked dog fighting with other

crimes, stating “dog fighting is closely associated with

some of the most serious crimes plaguing our society

and may involve people with extensive criminal back-

grounds.” The memorandum occasionally seemed to

portray dog fighting as a threat running to the very heart

of civil society, stating for example that “[b]ecause of the

significant damage the sport causes children, dog fighting

offenses must be treated with the utmost seriousness

in order to avoid a future generation that is devoid of

compassion and anesthetized to violence.” And at one

point, the memorandum seemed to be transformed into

an exercise in post-apocalyptic vision, describing de-

pressed urban areas where “packs of feral dogs patrol

the streets in search of food.”

The district court made it clear that it was not

attributing the worst aspects of dog fighting described in

4 Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469

the memorandum to the defendants before it. In the

opening paragraphs of the memorandum, the judge

wrote “[t]his review of the history and methodology of

dog fighting is generic; that is, it is not meant to be con-

strued as applicable to the cases currently on the Court’s

docket which have their own histories and fact patterns.”

The defendants did not object to the court’s memoran-

dum, and several of them referred to the document

in their own sentencing memoranda. For instance,

Courtland entered a sentencing memorandum arguing

that he was merely a “hobbyist” as opposed to a “profes-

sional handler”—terms defined in the court’s Memoran-

dum.

On June 1, 2010, the district court held a combined

sentencing hearing. The court calculated that the “total

offense level” was eight, a figure that incorporated a two-

point reduction from ten for acceptance of responsibility.

This resulted in a guidelines recommendation of zero to

six months for the defendants with a criminal history

category of one. All three present appellants had a

criminal history category of one, and therefore all

three qualified for a guidelines recommendation of zero

to six months.

The court adduced the following facts. Courtland acted

as “either co-owner or operator or a principal” of Back-

street Truez; he bred dogs and he acted as a referee

during fights and participated in at least three roll

Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469 5

fights.1 Authorities recovered seven pitbulls from

Courtland’s property, all of which were euthanized.

Bacon was significantly involved in the dog fighting

conspiracy, and trained and possibly bred pitbulls.

Moreover, based on Bacon’s allocution, the court con-

cluded that Bacon did not believe he had done any-

thing wrong. The authorities removed over thirty pit

bulls from a property that he shared with a non-ap-

pealing conspirator, of which thirteen were euthanized.

Addison was a co-owner of Backstreet Truez, and he

bred fighting dogs and refereed fights. Once, when one

of Addison’s dogs lost a fight, he electrocuted her in

front of the crowd. Authorities removed fifty-nine pit

bulls from his property, of which twenty-four were

euthanized.

Immediately before pronouncing sentences, the court

spoke about its pre-sentencing memorandum, stating

as follows:

I have written a detailed order with respect to the

history and background of dog fighting in an effort

not only to educate myself but to give background

regarding dog fighting in general. It was not then,

nor is it now, intended to cover the details of your

respective cases. This is, however, the first dog

fighting case that I have encountered in my ten years

on the bench. I handle a lot of drug and gun cases

1

A “roll fight” is a sort of sparring match. Dog fighters

conduct them to determine the potential of the dog and to

expose it to different fighting styles.

6 Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469

and I don’t need to write a dissertation about those,

I deal with them all the time, but so that you and

your attorneys would have the benefit of my

research, since it was not part of the record, I did

make it part of the record and place[d] you on notice

in advance.

The court first sentenced all of the defendants to a 3-year

term of supervised release and imposed on each a

$100 mandatory special assessment. The court then ad-

dressed each defendant individually and imposed a

term of incarceration. Courtland received an eighteen-

month sentence, and Bacon received a sixteen-month

sentence. The court found that Addison deserved the

“extraordinary cruelty” departure described in U.S.S.G.

§ 2E3.1, application note 2,2 as a result of his electro-

cution of his defeated dog. He received a twenty-four

month sentence. On June 14, 2010, the defendants timely

appealed, raising the following issues 3 for our review:

(1) Whether the sentencing judge’s memorandum

conflicts with Article III of the Constitution or violates

the constitutional principle of separation of powers;

(2) Whether the court should remand the sentencing

because the court’s memorandum contained little

2

The application note provides, “[i]f the offense involved

extraordinary cruelty to an animal that resulted in, for example,

maiming or death to an animal, an upward departure may

be warranted.”

3

The issues have been reworded for ease of discussion.

Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469 7

more than extraneous evidence and inflammatory

comments;

(3) Whether the sentences imposed in this case

are procedurally unsound because the district court

departed upward without providing an adequate

explanation for the upward departures;

(4) Whether the defendants’ sentences are substan-

tively unreasonable.

II. Applicable Law

As we explain in greater depth below, it is not clear

exactly what legal principles govern the court’s sen-

tencing memorandum. Nevertheless, we comment briefly

on the legal principles the defendants invoke.

The defendants have raised arguments related to

Article III of the Constitution, which provides that “[t]he

judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in

one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the

Congress may . . . establish.” The Supreme Court has

recognized a “broad prohibition upon the courts’ exercise

of ‘executive or administrative duties of a nonjudicial

nature,’ . . . to maintain the separation between the Judi-

ciary and the other branches of the Federal Government

by ensuring that judges do not encroach upon executive

or legislative authority or undertake tasks that are more

properly accomplished by those branches.” Morrison v.

Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 680-81 (1988) (internal citation omit-

ted). Accordingly, we have emphasized that judges

may not take on a role properly occupied by prosecutors.

8 Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469

See In re United States, 345 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2003).

However, we view this present effort of a judge to

inform himself of the subject before him as raising no

issues of separation of powers. So this objection goes

nowhere.

The defendants also direct us to our recent opinion in

United States v. Figueroa, 622 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2010). In

that case, we reversed the district court because during

the sentencing hearing, the district court engaged in an

“extraneous and inflammatory” lecture, id. at 740-41,

which included “a number of comments about [Figueroa’s

native] Mexico and . . . Mexico’s contribution to drug

and immigration issues in the United States,” id. at 743,

and “reveal[ed] an odd focus on nation-states and

national characteristics,” id. We concluded that even

though Figueroa had been sentenced at the bottom of

the guidelines, we had “no way of knowing how, if at all,

these extraneous considerations influenced Figueroa’s

sentence.” Id. at 744. Accordingly, we vacated the sen-

tence and remanded for resentencing by a different judge.

With respect to sentencing matters unrelated to the

district court’s “sentencing memorandum,” the present

case calls on us to apply the familiar framework for

reviewing district court sentencing decisions. We first

consider whether the district court committed any pro-

cedural error, and then consider whether the sentence

was substantively unreasonable. See United States v.

Hall, 608 F.3d 340, 346 (7th Cir. 2010).

As to the procedural inquiry, we ask whether the sen-

tencing court erred by “failing to calculate (or

Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469 9

improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the

Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a)

factors . . . or failing to adequately explain the chosen

sentence—including an explanation for any deviation

from the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552

U.S. 38, 51 (U.S. 2007). But recent case law indicates

that the sentencing court need not frame its explanation

of a sentence in terms of a departure from the guide-

lines range, but may instead focus on the appropriateness

of the sentence under § 3553. United States v. Bartlett, 567

F.3d 901, 909 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Nelson v. United States,

129 S. Ct. 890 (2009)); see also United States v. Vaughn,

614 F.3d 412, 415 (7th Cir. 2010). Questions of procedural

error are reviewed de novo. See Hall, 608 F.3d at 346.

We review the substantive reasonableness of a sen-

tence for an abuse of discretion, even when it is outside

the guidelines. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. There is no pre-

sumption of unreasonableness merely because a sen-

tence is outside of the suggested guidelines range but

rather we ordinarily give the sentencing court deference

if “the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), as a whole, justify

the extent of the variance from the guidelines.”

United States v. Wise, 556 F.3d 629, 632-33 (7th Cir. 2009).

Under this analysis, “[t]he farther the judge’s sentence

departs from the guidelines . . . the more compelling the

justification based on factors in section 3553(a) that the

judge must offer in order to enable the court of appeals

to assess the reasonableness of the sentence imposed.”

United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005).

Again, however, after Bartlett a court’s explanation may

be sufficient even if not framed in terms of a departure

from the guidelines.

10 Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469

III. Discussion

A. The Sentencing Memorandum

At the outset, we disagree with the Government that

arguments relating to the court’s memorandum have

been waived. As described above, the court entered the

sentencing document on its docket as a memorandum

and opinion, and referred to it in court as an “order.” We

accept the court’s characterizations, which connote

finality, at face value. Under Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 51(a), “[e]xceptions to rulings or orders of the

court are unnecessary.” See also Bartlett, 567 F.3d at 910

(“[T]he rules do not require a litigant to complain about a

judicial choice after it has been made.”). Instead, preserv-

ing a claim is ordinarily accomplished by raising the issue

in advance of the ruling. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(b). More-

over, “[i]f a party does not have an opportunity to object

to a ruling or order, the absence of an objection does not

later prejudice that party.” Id. Here, the record does not

reveal to what extent the defendants were on notice of

the court’s impending filing, and in any case under

these unusual circumstances we could not ask them to

anticipate the contents of the document.

Turning to the merits, we observe that court’s memoran-

dum is apparently sui generis; it is not entirely clear

what rule or precedent might govern its propriety. See

Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Curious Appellate Judge:

Ethical Limits on Independent Research, 28 R EV. L ITIG. 131,

169 (2008) (“Principles relevant to judicial research come

from the worlds of ethics, evidence, procedure, and the

Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469 11

Constitution.”). The court obviously did not apply

the strictures of judicial notice under Federal Rule of

Evidence 201,4 but the material in the memorandum

was not treated as judicially noticed fact.5 Fortunately,

we need not find a home in legal taxonomy for the

court’s memorandum.

As indicated, we reject the defendants’ assertion that

the district court’s filing exceeded the powers of the

judiciary established in Article III of the Constitution. We

emphatically decline this invitation to set limits on a

judge’s powers to educate himself on matters relevant

to sentencing. We find nothing in the cases cited by the

defendants or in our own research that directs such

restrictions,6 and we are unwilling to recognize sig-

4

That rule requires in relevant part that a judicially noticed

fact be “either (1) generally known within the territorial juris-

diction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready

determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).

5

The judicial notice rule “governs only judicial notice of

adjudicative facts.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(a). “Adjudicative facts

are simply the facts of the particular case.” United States v.

Wolny, 133 F.3d 758, 764 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting advisory

committee notes to Rule 201).

6

Indeed, Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), which the

defendants cite for language highlighting the importance of

the separation of powers, concluded that the separation of

powers principle was not offended by the judiciary’s assump-

(continued...)

12 Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469

nificant limitations on the judicial branch in establishing

a perspective on charged crimes—particularly little-known

crimes.

Moreover, the defendants’ citation of Figueroa is com-

pletely unpersuasive. There is no indication that any

agitated or expansive language here about broad social

problems associated with dog fighting had any direct

application to these sentences. Here, the judge repeatedly

stated that the material in its memorandum was not

being attributed to the defendants. We certainly accept

the court’s representation. See, e.g., Lucini Italia Co. v.

Grappolini, 288 F.3d 1035, 1038 (7th Cir. 2002) (taking

the district court at its word about an argument it stated

it did not consider). In fact, the sentencing hearing in

the present case was routine except for the unusual

number of defendants. If this were a drug possession

case, a court’s comments about related pervasive social

problems would be taken as routine. Here, the judge

carefully and serially distinguished the evidence related

to each of seven co-conspirators. The arguably inflam-

matory language of the memorandum was absent from

6

(...continued)

tion of sentencing rulemaking duties, in view of the central

“role that the Judiciary always has played, and continues to

play, in sentencing.” Id. at 390-91. Also of possible relevance

to the present case, the Mistretta Court stated, “[o]ur constitu-

tional principles of separated powers are not violated . . . by

mere anomaly or innovation.” Id. at 385.

Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469 13

the imposition of the respective sentences.7 The judge

hewed to the § 3553 factors.

Judges generally are under no obligation to relate all

they have learned about a species of crime from what-

ever source to those accused of the crime in ques-

tion. We note with approval that the district court was

concerned with giving the parties the opportunity to com-

ment on the general reference material it consulted. To

do so here was in keeping with the spirit of, but not

required by, the Code of Conduct for United States

Judges in the sense that the Code of Conduct requires

judges to give parties an opportunity to respond to ex parte

communications.8 If the judge in this case had read

the same background material and not informed the

parties (which is common practice, and not objectionable),

it might not have reflected such a sensitive respect

for the adversary process. Nevertheless, we do not rule

7

The main manifestation of the court’s memorandum at the

sentencing hearing was that the court and parties used the

conventions of “hobbyist” versus “professional” to describe

the depth of the defendants’ immersion in the dog fighting

scene. These terms appeared in the court’s memorandum,

where they were defined. The court and the parties used

these terms fluidly, and without referencing the definitions

in the court’s memorandum. We are not troubled by the

use of these terms, which appear to have served as an

innocuous shorthand to aid in the task of distinguishing

among the seven co-conspirators.

8

Code of Conduct for United States Judges, Canon 3A(4);

see also ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.9(A)(1)(b).

14 Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469

out the possibility that where there has been a “litany of

inflammatory remarks,” Figueroa, 622 F.3d at 744, we

cannot be as certain as we are here that they did not

influence the sentence. In other words, relevant to our

affirmance is our confidence that the district court

did not attribute to the defendants the evils related in

the “sentencing memorandum.” On the whole, we

believe the district court’s recourse to, and handling of

a “sentencing memorandum” was unusually sensitive

to the rights of the parties and provided them and the

court with an appropriate perspective on the sentencing

task.

B. Sentencing Procedure and

Substantive Reasonableness

We turn now to the defendants’ argument that the

court erred with respect to the sentences themselves, and

we first address the procedural questions. As a threshold

matter, no one argues that the district court improperly

calculated the guidelines range.9 And we do not credit

9

We note that for a moment during the sentencing hearing, the

court seemed to be saying that the appropriate offense level

was ten, the base offense level prescribed in U.S.S.G.

§ 2E3.1(a)(2), instead of eight, the base level less the two-point

reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Other than pointing

this out in a footnote, App.’s Br. 25 n.6, the defendants do not

make any argument that the court applied an erroneous

guideline range, and we believe the court did not. The court

(continued...)

Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469 15

the argument that the defendants have raised—that the

district court inadequately justified its imposition of an

above-guidelines sentence.

It is clear that the district court was concerned with

the lack of incremental punishment for conspiracy in the

sentencing guidelines. The court stated:

The Guidelines in this case . . . are deficient in that

they do not account for multiple dogs, multiple fights,

or the injuries that the dogs suffered. Under the Guide-

lines, if you had one dog, one fight, you are looking at

the same Guideline range as if you had 100 and 100

fights and they all had to be euthanized. . . . That

simply does not make sense because there is no incre-

mental punishment. There are no specific offense

characteristics in the guidelines that allow for en-

hancements regarding the length of the conspiracy,

the number or circumstances surrounding the actual

fights, or as I said, the number of dogs involved.

Likewise, there is no enhancement for being a facilita-

tor or sponsor of the fight[.]

The district court’s sentencing decisions were clearly

informed by its concern about the inadequacy of the

guidelines and the factors it believed were important

but ignored. The court tallied the total number of dogs

attributed to each defendant, as well as the number of

those that had to be euthanized. The court also kept

9

(...continued)

had previously identified the “total offense level” for the

defendants as eight.

16 Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469

track of the number of dog fights in which the

defendants participated, and the approximate duration

of the defendants’ involvement in dog fighting. The court

discussed, where applicable, the leadership role of each

defendant in the dog fighting enterprise. Finally, the

court considered sentences imposed in the Eastern

District of Missouri for other participants in the same

conspiracy, with an eye toward avoiding unwarranted

disparities. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).

While we express no opinion on the district court’s

apparent belief that the guidelines are per se deficient

with respect to large dog fighting conspiracies, we agree

that the court’s sentencing considerations were proper,

and together constituted permissible rationale for

imposing an above-guidelines sentence. The number of

dogs, the number of fights, the defendant’s leadership

role in the criminal enterprise and the duration of the

misconduct can surely be considered part of the “nature

and circumstances of the offense” of conspiracy under 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). And of course, the court’s assessment

of the § 3553 factors is the proper basis for any above-

guidelines sentence. See Dean, 414 F.3d at 730-31 (“[T]he

guidelines, being advisory, can be trumped by section

3553(a), which as we have stressed is mandatory.”).1 0

10

We disagree with the defendants’ position that the judge did

not provide adequate individualized reasons for departing

from the guidelines. First, the district court is not necessarily at

fault for declining to explain a sentence from the perspective

of the guidelines, as long as it explains the sentence properly

(continued...)

Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469 17

We must address one defendant’s case individually.

No one contests that the court appropriately applied the

“extraordinary cruelty” departure described in U.S.S.G.

§ 2E3.1, application note 2, to Addison in connection

with his electrocuting a defeated dog. But Addison

argues that he received a longer sentence than a

non-appealing co-conspirator who participated in the

same electrocution. This is unpersuasive. The other

co-conspirator was a comparatively peripheral member

of the conspiracy. In particular, he apparently did not

10

(...continued)

under the § 3553 factors. Bartlett, 567 F.3d at 909 (“The court

must take the Sentencing Commission’s views into account, but

a sentence cannot be called ‘unreasonable’ just because the

judge explains why he chose that sentence, rather than ex-

plaining his decision from the Guidelines’ perspective.”). The

defendants do nothing to reconcile their position with Bart-

lett. Second, the grounds for imposing an above-guidelines

sentence may be equally applicable to the multiple defendants

because of their joint involvement in a common crime. See, e.g.,

United States v. Coe, 220 F.3d 573, 579 (7th Cir. 2000). Here, the

court clearly indicated that the circumstances of the crime

justify an above-guidelines sentence. It would elevate form

over substance to require the court to reiterate that logic

before imposing each sentence, because the court’s individual-

ized § 3553 considerations for each defendant fit obviously

within the court’s earlier-described rationale for imposing

above-guidelines sentences. Cf. United States v. Amato, 15 F.3d

230, 237 (2d Cir. 1994) (court’s joint sentencing memorandum

did not offend a defendant’s right to an individualized sen-

tence).

18 Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469

own or breed fighting dogs. There is nothing per se im-

proper about a sentencing disparity among co-con-

spirators, or even between the two of seven to whom

a specific departure provision applies. See generally

United States v. Gooden, 564 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir.

2009) (“We do not view the ‘discrepancy between sen-

tences of co-defendants as a basis for challenging a sen-

tence’ and will disturb a sentence only if it creates an

unwarranted sentence disparity between similar defen-

dants nationwide.”) (citing United States v. Omole, 523

F.3d 691, 700 (7th Cir. 2008)); United States v. Simpson, 337

F.3d 905, 909 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[A] disparity among

co-defendants’ sentences is not a valid basis to challenge

a guideline sentence otherwise correctly calculated.”)

(citing United States v. Simmons, 218 F.3d 692, 696 (7th

Cir. 2000)).11

Having reviewed each defendant’s sentence and the

court’s rationale for imposing an above-guidelines sen-

tence, we conclude that the court properly justified its

sentences.

The defendants’ argument of substantive unreasonable-

ness, which we review for an abuse of discretion, see United

States v. Miller, 601 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 2010), is equally

unavailing. It is true that the brevity of the sentences

recommended in the guidelines enables the defendants

to complain that their actual sentences are an impressive

multiple of guidelines recommendations. This is not

11

The similar arguments relating to Courtland and Bacon fail

for the same reasons.

Nos. 10-2436, 10-2468 & 10-2469 19

irrelevant, but it is also relevant that the amounts by

which the sentences exceeded the guidelines were not

extreme when viewed in absolute terms. Defendant

Addison received the greatest above-guidelines incre-

ment in absolute terms, an overage of 18 months, and

that was partly based on a finding that he qualified for

an “extraordinary cruelty” departure under U.S.S.G.

§ 2E3.1, application note 2, for electrocuting a defeated

dog. In view of the court’s justifications as discussed

above, we do not consider the district court to have

abused its discretion by imposing substantively unrea-

sonable sentences. In fact, overall we believe the sen-

tencing judge did a highly commendable job in dealing

with a crime not well known to him or to large sectors

of the public.

For the foregoing reasons, we A FFIRM the judgments of

the district court.

4-27-11