Coates v. Powell

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 10-1639

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Crystal Coates, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Derrick Powell, in his official and * Western District of Missouri.

individual capacity; Jeff Glandon, *

in his official and individual capacity; *

James Keathley, Superintendent of the *

Missouri State Highway Patrol, in his *

official capacity, *

*

Defendants-Appellees. *

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Submitted: September 20, 2010

Filed: April 8, 2011

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Before GRUENDER, BRIGHT, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

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BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Crystal Coates brought suit against Missouri State Highway

Patrolman Derrick Powell, City of New Franklin Police Officer Jeff Glandon, and

others, alleging § 1983 constitutional claims and state tort claims for events that

occurred during the course of an investigation concerning alleged child neglect by

Crystal Coates. Coates settled her claims against Powell and several other defendants

and the district court1, in a separate order, denied her request for attorney’s fees under

42 U.S.C. § 1988.2 The district court also granted Glandon summary judgment on the

basis of qualified immunity. Coates v. Powell, 650 F.Supp.2d 932, 941 (W.D. Mo.

2009). Coates appeals these adverse determinations.

We affirm, concluding (1) the private settlement agreement between Ms. Coates

and Powell did not make Coates a prevailing party entitled to attorney’s fees under

federal law, and (2) the district court properly determined that Glandon was entitled

to qualified immunity for his Fourth Amendment violation in remaining in Coates’s

home without consent for ten to fifteen minutes. The district court found that it was

not clearly established that he was required to immediately leave her home under the

circumstances in this case.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 5, 2006, the Missouri Department of Social Services received a call

that Coates’s children were playing outside the home unattended. This prompted an

investigation by Tiffany Clevenger, a Children’s Social Worker with the Children’s

Division of the Missouri Department of Social Services. On the next day, Clevenger

contacted local law enforcement offices and requested that Officer Glandon

accompany her to investigate the call, as provided for in Missouri statutes.3 Trooper

1

The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Court for the

Western District of Missouri.

2

Although the claim for fees was brought under section 1988, the discussion on

fees would encompass any claims under section 1983.

3

The district court quoted and cited the statutory provisions applicable which

we repeat in this footnote. Missouri Revised Statute Section 210.145.4 provides that

the Children’s Division of the Missouri Department of Social Services:

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Powell was present at the time and volunteered to assist Clevenger and Officer

Glandon in the investigation.

The three proceeded to Coates’s house, arriving at approximately 10:00 in the

morning. They possessed no warrant to enter Coates’s house and believed the

children were at school. Once there, Coates’s boyfriend consented to their entry into

the house. Coates awoke from her sleep and, after some heated discussion with the

officers, she told the officers to “get the ---- out of my house.” During this time,

Coates attempted to get up from a couch where she was seated, but Powell touched

her at least twice, forcing her back into the couch. However, at no time did Officer

Glandon touch Coates. The officers remained in the house for another ten to fifteen

minutes at which time Clevenger directed that they leave and all three left the house.

After the investigators left the house, Coates also left her home, got in her car,

and drove off to pick up her daughter from school. The officers stayed outside

Coates’s home until she returned, at which time Powell asked Coates for her driver’s

license, intending to cite her for improperly displaying a license plate and not wearing

a seatbelt. Coates refused to sign the citations and told Powell to “haul her in.”

Powell arrested her, and in handcuffing her, applied a “CLAMP” maneuver during

which he broke her arm. He then called for medical assistance. Coates did not believe

shall contact the appropriate law enforcement agency

immediately upon receipt of a report which [Children's

Division] personnel determine merits an investigation and

provide such agency with a detailed description of the

report received. In such cases the local division office shall

request the assistance of the local law enforcement agency

in all aspects of the investigation of the complaint.

Section 210.145.4 also states that “[t]he appropriate law enforcement agency shall .

. . assist the division in the investigation.” Id.

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Powell intended to break her arm. The application of the CLAMP maneuver took

only a couple of seconds.

Coates subsequently filed state law tort claims and claims for deprivation of her

civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the two officers, Clevenger, Powell’s

supervisor (James Keathley), and the City of New Franklin. In December 2009, after

Powell and several other defendants settled with Coates on the eve of trial, Coates

moved for attorney’s fees against these parties under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. On January

25, 2010, the district court determined from the record that the private settlement

agreement did not make Coates a “prevailing party” entitled to attorney’s fees. Coates

v. Powell, 2010 WL 376995 (W.D. Mo. 2010).

As for Glandon, in July 2009, the district court granted him qualified immunity

against Coates’s § 1983 claims. Coates, 650 F.Supp.2d at 941. The court determined

that Glandon violated the Fourth Amendment when he refused to leave Coates’s

home. Nevertheless, the court granted Glandon qualified immunity, finding that the

law did not clearly establish “at the time of this incident that an officer was required

to leave a private home in the middle of a child neglect investigation.” Id. at 938-39.4

This timely appeal followed.

4

The court primarily relied on Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) and

Gates v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Reg. Servs., 537 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2008).

Although dicta in Georgia states that “[n]o question has been raised, or reasonably

could be, about the authority of the police to enter a dwelling to protect a resident

from domestic violence,” Georgia expressly disclaimed the effect of its holding on

domestic victims. 547 U.S. at 118. (“[T]his case has no bearing on the capacity of the

police to protect domestic victims.”). Id. The dicta in Georgia focused on the need

to protect a person present in the home who was in danger of abuse. As for Gates, we

believe it is not determinative because it considered the law before the Supreme

Court’s opinion in Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). Accordingly, these

cases are not determinative here.

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Attorney’s fees

Coates challenges the district court’s determination that she was not a

prevailing party entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. We review de

novo whether a litigant is a prevailing party. Advantage Media, LLC v. City of

Hopkins, 511 F.3d 833, 836 (8th Cir. 2008).

A “prevailing party” is one that obtains a judicially sanctioned, material

alteration of the legal relationship of the parties. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc.

v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 601 (2001).

Examples include enforceable judgments on the merits and court-ordered consent

decrees. Id. at 604. We have stated that Buckhannon “implied [that] a party that

obtains a mere private settlement does not qualify [as a prevailing party], because

‘private settlements do not entail the judicial approval and oversight involved in

consent decrees.’” Bill M. v. Nebraska Dep’t of Health and Human Services, 570 F.3d

1001, 1003 (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 n.7).

Shortly after Buckhannon, we examined whether a private settlement between

a class of prisoners and a training school rendered the class of prisoners a prevailing

party. Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990, 991-92 (8th Cir. 2003). Although

the district court in that case approved the settlement agreement as “fair, reasonable,

and adequate” under Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this exercise

failed to impose the necessary imprimatur on the agreement. Id. Nor was the district

court’s retention of enforcement jurisdiction alone sufficient to establish judicial

imprimatur. Id. We held that the private settlement agreement did not serve as a

consent decree and therefore the inmate class was not a prevailing party. Id. at 993-

94.

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Recently, in Bill M., we affirmed the denial of prevailing party status where the

parties reached an oral settlement agreement that the district court directed be reduced

to writing. Id. at 1001-02. In that case, the district court made no determination of

whether the agreement was “good or bad or fair or unfair,” nor did it incorporate the

terms of the agreement into its order of dismissal or otherwise retain jurisdiction to

enforce the settlement agreement. Id. at 1003-04. Consequently, we determined that

“the parties’ settlement does not entail the judicial approval and oversight required for

a judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties.” Id. at 1004

(quotations and citations omitted). We held that the settlement lacked “the necessary

judicial imprimatur” to confer prevailing party status upon the plaintiffs. Id.

We conclude this line of cases forecloses Coates from obtaining attorney’s fees

as a prevailing party. Shortly before trial, Powell (and others) offered to settle for

$45,000. The entirety of the offer states, “This letter is to formalize the settlement

offer on behalf of the State of Missouri. We are willing to pay your client $45,000.00

in settlement of all claims between Plaintiff and the Defendants.” Jt. App. at 750. On

the eve of trial, Coates responded to the offer via email: “We’ve reviewed the

$45,000 settlement offer you faxed on Friday and my client has accepted your terms.”

Jt. App. at 751. The parties did not otherwise execute a formal written settlement

contract. The district court did not incorporate the agreement into a settlement decree

or into the order for dismissal and expressly stated that it would not incorporate the

terms of the settlement into its judgment or retain jurisdiction over enforcement of the

contract.

Here, the district court took no action judicially sanctioning or materially

altering the legal relationship of the parties. The court did not approve a settlement,

nor enter a judgment on the merits or a consent decree. There is no judicial

imprimatur on the settlement which could give rise to prevailing party status.

Accordingly, we hold that Coates is not entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. §

1988.

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B. Qualified Immunity

Coates contends the district court erred in holding that Glandon did not violate

her clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by remaining in her home after she

revoked the consent given by her boyfriend.5 Coates argues that “black letter law”

establishes that intrusions into the home, absent a warrant, exigent circumstances, or

consent of an apparently authorized party are presumed unreasonable.

Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence viewed in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party presents no genuine issue of material fact and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Seymour v. City of Des

Moines, 519 F.3d 790, 796 (8th Cir. 2008). We review de novo summary judgment

where granted on the basis of qualified immunity. Omni Behavioral Health v. Miller,

285 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 2002).

“[Q]ualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v.

Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

818 (1982)). We may first determine whether the officer’s conduct violated a

constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled in part by

Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 818 (holding Saucier’s two-step sequence is not mandatory).

5

Coates does not appear to challenge the district court’s rulings with respect to

her excessive force or state law tort claims against Glandon. We deem these issues

waived. See Milligan v. City of Red Oak, Iowa, 230 F.3d 355, 360 (8th Cir. 2000)

(holding appellant waived issues not supported with argument and legal authority);

Bechtold v. City of Rosemount, 104 F.3d 1062, 1068 (8th Cir. 1997) (“Generally, we

will consider an issue not raised or briefed in this court waived.”). Additionally, we

note that Coates frames her qualified immunity challenge as against Glandon and

Powell. But she settled “all claims” against Powell. Consequently, we need not

review the district court’s qualified immunity determination regarding Powell.

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If so, we next consider whether that right was clearly established at the time of the

misconduct. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-02.

As to the first inquiry, the district court concluded that Glandon violated the

Fourth Amendment when he refused to leave Coates’s home, explaining:

The undisputed facts indicate that there [was no threat to the

Coates children] confronting Officer Glandon. While there is evidence

of a hotline call, the only descriptions of the hotline call indicate that it

was a report of children playing outside unattended. . . . [T]here was no

urgency in the conduct of that investigation . . . .The parties agree that,

at the time Coates revoked consent, the officers knew that the children

were not in the home. . . . The officers apparently did not believe Coates

herself to be a danger to the children . . . [And] do not argue that

Coates’s agitation alone created exigent circumstances independently

allowing the officers to remain in the house. . . . They could have

attempted to obtain a warrant. They did not. The officers raise no

argument that they left Coates’s house within a reasonable time of being

ordered to leave: there is evidence that they did not leave for more than

ten minutes after consent was revoked, and only upon Clevenger’s

request. They were in violation of the Fourth Amendment when they

remained in the house for an unreasonable time after consent was

revoked.

Coates, 650 F.Supp.2d at 939-40.

On appeal, neither Coates nor Glandon challenge the court’s determination that

Glandon’s conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we turn to the

second inquiry of qualified immunity analysis.

“In determining whether the legal right at issue is clearly established, this

circuit applies a flexible standard, requiring some, but not precise factual

correspondence with precedent, and demanding that officials apply general, well-

developed legal principles.” J.H.H. v. O’Hara, 878 F.2d 240, 243 (8th Cir. 1989)

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(quotation omitted). This is a “fact-intensive inquiry and must be undertaken in light

of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Samuelson v.

City of New Ulm, 455 F.3d 871, 875 (8th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). We assess

the “objective reasonableness of the action . . . in light of clearly established law and

the information the searching officers possessed.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.

635, 641 (1987) (stating an officer’s “subjective beliefs about the search are

irrelevant”). As we explained in Omni, “the contours of the right must be sufficiently

clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that

right.” 285 F.3d at 653. Accordingly, we frame the clearly established question as

whether a reasonable police officer would have known that he violated clearly

established Fourth Amendment law by remaining in Coates’s home for ten to fifteen

minutes when the officer was accompanying a social services worker investigating a

complaint of child neglect as authorized by state statute. We affirm the grant of

qualified immunity.

We have stated that qualified immunity “protects public officials who act in

good faith while performing discretionary duties that they are obliged to undertake.”

Kloch v. Kohl, 545 F.3d 603, 609 (8th Cir. 2008). In that case, we held the Nebraska

Attorney General’s obligation to enforce the laws of his state entitled him to qualified

immunity, even though the law was of arguable constitutional validity. Id. Likewise,

the Ninth Circuit has held that an officer who acts in reliance on a duly-enacted statute

is ordinarily entitled to qualified immunity, unless the statute is “obviously”

unconstitutional. Humphries v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 554 F.3d 1170, 1202 (9th Cir.

2009), as amended by 547 F.3d 1117. And the Tenth Circuit has observed that

“reli[ance] on a state statute, regulation, or official policy that explicitly sanctioned

the conduct in question” is a relevant factor in considering the objective legal

reasonableness of a state official’s action. Roska ex rel. Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d

1230, 1251-52 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding reliance on a state statute did not authorize

removal of children absent pre-deprivation procedures).

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Here, Glandon undertook an obligation under Missouri law to assist Clevenger

in the investigation relating to Coates’s children.6 Although Coates ordered the

officers out of the house, she did not address Clevenger in that request.7 Clevenger

remained inside the house, attempting to continue the investigation. We believe that

a reasonable police officer could act in good faith and remain in the house still

assisting Clevenger. Glandon did exactly that in this case. He (and Powell)

immediately left the house when Ms. Clevenger told them to leave.

For these reasons, we agree with the finding of the district court “that Glandon

is entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established at the time of

this incident that an officer was required to leave a private home in the middle of a

child neglect investigation.” Coates, 650 F.Supp.2d at 938-39. That precisely was the

situation here.

For the above reasons, we affirm the dismissal of the § 1983 claim against

Officer Glandon on the basis of his receiving qualified immunity. Thus, we affirm on

the issues presented on this appeal.

6

We note that Missouri law describes the contours of the investigation as

follows: “The investigation shall include but not be limited to the nature, extent, and

cause of the abuse or neglect; the identity and age of the person responsible for the

abuse or neglect; . . . any indication of incidents of physical violence . . . and other

pertinent data.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 210.145.7.

7

Had Coates ordered Clevenger to leave, the qualified immunity analysis may

be different because in that instance, Glandon could not reasonably rely on his

statutory duty to assist Clevenger because Clevenger would have had no right to

remain in Coates’s home.

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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur with the majority’s conclusion that Coates was not a prevailing party

entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. I part ways with the majority,

however, over its decision to grant qualified immunity to Glandon.

I am deeply concerned about the Fourth Amendment violation at issue in this

case. Respect for the sanctity of the home “has been embedded in our traditions since

the origins of the Republic.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980). The

Supreme Court is crystal clear that without a warrant, an officer cannot enter a home

absent exigent circumstances. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211-12

(1981). Because Glandon did not have a warrant and there were no exigent

circumstances, Glandon could only enter the home with Coates’s voluntary consent,

Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 (2006), and he remained in the home subject

to her approval, United States v. McMullin, 576 F.3d 810, 815 (8th Cir. 2009).

Although a report of child abuse is a serious allegation, by the time Glandon was

asked to leave the home, Glandon knew there was no immediate danger to the

children. Accordingly, Glandon violated Coates’s Fourth Amendment rights when he

did not leave her home at her request.

A finding of a Fourth Amendment violation does not end the analysis, and I

agree with the majority that the crux of the qualified immunity question is whether a

reasonable officer would have understood that remaining in Coates’s home without

her permission violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law. But I disagree

with the majority’s conclusion that despite the longstanding Fourth Amendment

prohibition, Glandon acted reasonably because of the obligations imposed on officers

under the Missouri statute at issue. Because I believe the Missouri statute did not

make Glandon’s actions objectively reasonable, I respectfully dissent.

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The qualified immunity inquiry turns on the “objective legal reasonableness of

the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time

it was taken.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999) (internal quotations

omitted). “[T]he existence of a statute or ordinance authorizing particular conduct is

a factor which militates in favor of the conclusion that a reasonable official would find

that conduct constitutional.” Roska, 328 F.3d at 1252 (quoting Grossman v. City of

Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1209 (9th Cir. 1994)). Police officers are entitled to rely on

the assumption that the legislature considered the views of legal counsel and

concluded that the statute is constitutional. Id. at 1252 n.29 (quoting Grossman, 33

F.3d at 1209). The existence of an authorizing statute, however, does not make an

officer’s actions per se reasonable. Denton v. Rievley, 353 F. App’x 1, 6 (6th Cir.

2009); Roska, 328 F.3d at 1252; Grossman, 33 F.3d at 1209-10.

Whether a statute makes an officer’s actions reasonable depends in part on “the

degree of specificity with which the statute authorized the conduct in question.”

Roska, 328 F.3d at 1253. For example, in Denton, the Sixth Circuit found that a state

statute indicating a preference for arrest where there is probable cause of domestic

abuse was insufficiently specific to make the officer’s arrest of a person inside his

home without a warrant objectively reasonable. 353 F. App’x at 6-7. Because the

state statute did not require warrantless arrests and was silent as to whether the

preference for arrest applied to warrantless, in-home arrests, the Sixth Circuit

concluded that the statute did not make the officer’s actions reasonable in light of

longstanding Supreme Court precedent holding that such actions violate the Fourth

Amendment. Id. at 7. Accordingly, before concluding that the Missouri statute at

issue made Glandon’s actions reasonable, I think the majority should have considered

the statute’s specificity.

Because the Missouri statute imposes only a general obligation on officers,

Glandon’s compliance with the statute did not make his actions reasonable. The

relevant Missouri statute, section 2010.145.4 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, states

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that “[t]he appropriate law enforcement agency shall . . . assist the [Children’s]

division in the investigation.” The statute does not, however, define or specify the

form of assistance required. Thus, although the statute obligated Glandon to offer

some type of help, it did not specifically require him to accompany social services

workers in their investigations, let alone require him to accompany them into private

homes or remain with them in private homes even after homeowners withdraw their

consent. See Denton, 353 F. App’x at 7. Here, because remaining in Coates’s home

without her consent violated well-established Fourth Amendment law and nothing in

Missouri statute obligated Glandon to stay, Glandon’s actions were not objectively

reasonable.

The majority cites Kloch in support of its opposite conclusion. In Kloch, we

hinted at a per se rule of reasonableness when we broadly stated that officers’ actions

are objectively reasonable when they act “in good faith while performing discretionary

duties that they are obliged to undertake.” 545 F.3d at 609. However, because legal

reasonableness ultimately depends on the legal landscape taken as a whole, Wilson,

526 U.S. at 614, Kloch must stand for the limited proposition that when a state statute

specifically requires officers to take certain actions, the officer’s compliance with the

statute will generally resolve the question of reasonableness. Accordingly, Kloch is

not dispositive here because the Missouri statute did not specifically require Glandon

to remain with the social services worker.

The majority finds Kloch applicable because it treats the Missouri statute as

obligating Glandon to accompany social services workers into private homes. The

majority describes the clearly established question as whether the Fourth Amendment

was violated “when the officer was accompanying a social services worker

investigating a complaint of child neglect as required by state statute” (emphasis

added). If the Missouri statute had in fact required Glandon to “accompany” the

social services worker, I would most likely agree that it made Glandon’s actions

reasonable. Because the statute imposed only a general obligation to assist, however,

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I conclude that despite the Missouri statute, a reasonable officer would have known

that remaining in Coates’s home violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to grant qualified immunity

to Glandon.

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