The opinion
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-1433
R.J. INVESTMENTS, L.L.C.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
and
MARIE E. ROBINSON; TERRI SORRELL; ENTERPRISE HOMES, INC.;
LACROSSE HOMES, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR QUEEN ANNE’S COUNTY,
MARYLAND; ERIC S. WARGOTZ, M.D., in his personal capacity,
in his capacity as Board Member of the County Commissioners
for Queen Anne’s County Maryland, and in capacity as
Sanitary Commissioner; COURTNEY M. BILLUPS, in his personal
capacity, in his capacity as Board Member of the County
Commissioners for Queen Anne’s County, Maryland, and in his
capacity as Sanitary Commissioner; PAUL L. GUNTHER, in his
personal capacity, in his capacity as Board Member of the
County Commissioners for Queen Anne’s County, Maryland, and
in his capacity as Sanitary Commissioner; GENE M. RANSOM,
III, in his personal capacity, in his capacity as Board
Member of the County Commissioners for Queen Anne’s County,
Maryland, and in his capacity as Sanitary Commissioner;
CAROL R. FORDONSKY, in her personal capacity, in her
capacity as Board Member of the County Commissioners for
Queen Anne’s County, Maryland, and in her capacity as
Sanitary Commissioner; QUEEN ANNE’S COUNTY SANITARY
COMMISSION,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(1:07-cv-01903-RDB)
Argued: January 25, 2011 Decided: March 4, 2011
Before KING, AGEE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam decision.
ARGUED: Anthony Gene Gorski, RICH & HENDERSON, PC, Annapolis,
Maryland, for Appellant. Victoria M. Shearer, KARPINSKI,
COLARESI & KARP, PA, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. ON
BRIEF: James J. Doyle, III, Warren K. Rich, RICH & HENDERSON,
PC, Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellant. Richard Colaresi,
KARPINSKI, COLARESI & KARP, PA, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
R.J. Investments, L.L.C. (“R.J.”) appeals from the judgment
of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
in favor of the Board of County Commissioners for Queen Anne’s
County, Maryland (“the Board”), the Queen Anne’s County Sanitary
Commission, and the members of the Board of County Commissioners
in their official capacities (collectively, “the Defendants”) on
its Fair Housing Act and Equal Protection claims. Finding no
error, we affirm.
I.
Queen Anne’s County (“the County”) is a rural agricultural
county located on Maryland’s Eastern Shore. To build on land in
the County, a developer must demonstrate to the Board that the
property can be adequately served by the County’s water and
sewer systems. Having executed a contract to purchase property
in the County, R.J. applied for an amendment to the County’s
Comprehensive Water and Sewerage Plan which would allow R.J. to
continue with the development process for the property. After
two public hearings on the matter, the Board unanimously denied
R.J.’s proposed amendment. In so doing, Board members expressed
their concern that the existing water and sewage treatment
facilities were insufficient to meet the needs of the proposed
development.
3
Shortly thereafter, R.J. 1 filed suit, alleging, among other
things, violations of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-
3619, and the Equal Protection Clause under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
R.J. claims that by denying its proposed amendment, the
Defendants negatively affected potential minority homebuyers and
prevented the expansion of affordable housing. Following a
four-day bench trial, the district court entered judgment in
favor of the Defendants; thereafter, R.J. noted a timely appeal.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
On appeal from a bench trial, “[w]e review a judgment . . .
under a mixed standard of review — factual findings may be
reversed only if clearly erroneous, while conclusions of law . .
. are examined de novo.” Roanoke Cement Co., LLC v. Falk Corp.,
413 F.3d 431, 433 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Williams v. Sandman,
187 F.3d 379, 381 (4th Cir. 1999); Scarborough v. Ridgeway, 726
F.2d 132, 135 (4th Cir. 1984)).
1
Enterprise Homes, Inc., Reverend Marie Robinson, Terri
Sorrell, and Lacrosse Homes, Inc. also were named plaintiffs in
the suit. The district court, however, dismissed these
additional parties for lack of standing prior to holding its
bench trial; hence, they are not parties to this appeal.
4
III.
A.
We utilize the four-prong analysis set forth in Smith v.
Town of Clarkton to evaluate Fair Housing Act claims advanced
against governmental entities. 682 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1982);
see also Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 988 n.5
(4th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he Clarkton test has been applied only in
situations where a public body is the defendant.”). Pursuant to
this inquiry, we assess:
(1) how strong is the plaintiff’s showing of
discriminatory effect; (2) is there some evidence of
discriminatory intent, though not enough to satisfy
the constitutional standard of Washington v. Davis[,
426 U.S. 229 (1976)]; (3) what is the defendant’s
interest in taking the action complained of; and (4)
does the plaintiff seek to compel the defendant to
affirmatively provide housing for members of minority
groups or merely to restrain the defendant from
interfering with individual property owners who wish
to provide such housing.
Clarkton, 682 F.2d at 1065 (quoting Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v.
Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978)(“Arlington Heights II”)).
R.J. contends the district court erred in applying each of
the Clarkton factors. 2 For the purposes of this opinion, we
2
As it does with its Fair Housing claim, R.J. argues with
respect to its Equal Protection claim that the district court
erred in concluding that it presented no evidence of
discriminatory intent. As we conclude below, however, the
district court did not err in so finding. Because “[a] violation
(Continued)
5
assume, 3 without deciding, that the district court erred in
finding that R.J. failed to establish the Board’s actions had a
disparate impact on potential minority homeowners. 4 Of course,
not “every action which produces discriminatory effects is
illegal.” Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1290. We therefore
turn to the remaining Clarkton factors to evaluate whether the
Board’s denial of R.J.’s proposed amendment violated the Fair
Housing Act.
[of the Equal Protection Clause] is established only if the
plaintiff can prove that the state intended to discriminate,”
Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cnty., 48 F.3d 810, 819 (4th Cir.
1995)(emphasis in original), R.J. plainly fails to establish an
Equal Protection violation. We therefore do not discuss the
issue further.
3
We note that our assumption is constrained by the evidence
offered by R.J. at trial. It is clear from our review of the
record that the district court did not err when it found that,
if it were to accept the entirety of the evidence submitted by
R.J., any showing of disparate impact would be minimal, at best.
J.A. 2360. Thus, the outer limit of our assumption is that R.J.
established a minimal disparate impact.
4
R.J. further contends that the district court erred by
admitting the testimony of Peter Scanlon, Director of Housing
and Community Services for the County and the Executive Director
of the County’s Housing Authority, under Federal Rule of
Evidence 701. Scanlon’s improper testimony, R.J.’s argument
goes, led the district court to find that R.J. did not establish
a disparate impact. We need not address the issue here, however,
because in resolving this appeal we assume without deciding that
R.J. has satisfied the first Clarkton factor regarding disparate
impact.
6
B.
Our review of the record indicates that the district court,
at a minimum, did not err in applying the second and third
Clarkton factors. The district court, as to the second factor,
explicitly found “there is not a scintilla of evidence that the
Board . . . acted with racially discriminatory intent. . . .
[T]his Court finds . . . that the Plaintiff’s case was based on
conjecture and supposition.” J.A. 2361-62. We have thoroughly
examined the record and find the district court’s conclusion to
be amply supported by the record and certainly not clearly
erroneous. Further, the district court did not commit clear
error when it found that the Board’s concern over the lack of
sewer capacity presented a legitimate basis for denying R.J.’s
proposed amendment. Moreover, we agree with the district court
that the Board made its decision while acting within the scope
of its authority. The record plainly supports the district
court’s conclusion that “the Board possessed a significant and
legislative interest in exercising [its] legislative prerogative
to protect and preserve the County’s valuable sewer treatment
resources . . . .” J.A. 2363. 5
5
Having concluded that the district court correctly
determined R.J. failed to meet the second and third Clarkton
factors, it is unnecessary to address the fourth factor, which
the district court found did “not favor either party.” J.A.
2363.
7
Thus, even assuming that R.J. established a minimal
disparate impact, because the district court did not err in
finding that R.J. failed to produce any evidence of
discriminatory intent and the Board made its determination while
exercising its legislative prerogative to preserve and to
protect the county’s sewer treatment resources, we agree with
the district court that R.J. failed to establish a violation of
the Fair Housing Act.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not err
in concluding that R.J. failed to establish a violation of the
Fair Housing Act or the Equal Protection Clause. We therefore
affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED
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