recognizing that the plaintiff could not obtain injunctive relief against defendant state-court judges unless the conditions of § 1983 were satisfied, which the establish a court of record, or produce the verified criminal complaint of a real men or women that was injured. And responded to nothing. ‘When the States does not respond to a petitioner’s allegations, the unrefuted statement of fact must be taken as true’.” Chaverst v. State, 517 So.2d 643, 644 (Ala. Cr. App. 1987).”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that the plaintiff could not obtain injunctive relief against defendant state-court judges unless the conditions of § 1983 were satisfied, which the establish a court of record, or produce the verified criminal complaint of a real men or women that was injured. And responded to nothing. ‘When the States does not respond to a petitioner’s allegations, the unrefuted statement of fact must be taken as true’.” Chaverst v. State, 517 So.2d 643, 644 (Ala. Cr. App. 1987).”
- reasoning that “[w]e have no authority to issue . . . a writ to direct state courts or their judicial officers in the performance of their duties” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
- reasoning that federal courts “have no authority to issue a writ to direct state courts or their judicial officers in the performance of their duties” (cleaned up)
- holding that federal courts lack the “authority to issue . . . a writ to direct state courts or their judicial officers in the performance of their duties”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
February 14, 2011
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
ANTONE L. KNOX,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 10-7066
JAMES D. BLAND, Judge; BRYAN
DIXON, Judge; JAMES
EDMONDSON; JOSEPH WATT;
STEVEN TAYLOR; ROBERT DICK
BELL; LARRY JOPLIN; E. BAY
MITCHELL,
Defendants - Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. NO. 6:10-CV-00147-JHP-SPS)
Antone L. Knox, pro se.
Before KELLY, HARTZ, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
HARTZ, Circuit Judge.
Antone L. Knox, an inmate at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary in
McAlester, Oklahoma, brings this pro se civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against eight Oklahoma state judges. * His claims arise out of his
unsuccessful attempts in state court to have his name changed for religious
reasons to Ali Ishmael Mandingo Warrior Chief. He seeks mandamus and
injunctive relief, contending that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment
rights to equal protection and due process, his First Amendment rights to freedom
of religion and to petition the government for redress of injustice, the Seventh
Amendment, the Ninth Amendment, the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2000). 1 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma dismissed
Mr. Knox’s complaint as frivolous and malicious under 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1),
and he appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
Because Mr. Knox is proceeding pro se, we liberally construe his pleadings.
See Braxton v. Zavaras, 614 F.3d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 2010). Nevertheless, we
conclude that the relief he seeks is not available to him in federal court.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
1
In district court Mr. Knox sought a refund of his state-court filing fee, court
costs, and legal fees. On appeal, however, he states that he is not seeking damages. In
any event, judges are generally immune from monetary liability for actions taken in
their judicial capacity. See Lundahl v. Zimmer, 296 F.3d 936, 939 (10th Cir. 2002). In
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 544 (1984), the Supreme Court said that attorney fees in
§ 1983 cases are a statutory exception to the general rule; but this exception was
abrogated by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
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To begin with, Mr. Knox’s claims appear to be barred by the
Rooker/Feldman abstention doctrine, because he is essentially seeking review and
reversal of the state-court denial of his name-change request. See Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462 (1983). Under that doctrine, “a party losing in state court is barred from
seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a
United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state
judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.” Johnson v. De Grandy, 512
U.S. 997, 1005–06 (1994).
But even if Mr. Knox’s federal-court claims can survive, at least in part,
Rooker-Feldman, he is not entitled to relief. To the extent that he is seeking
relief in the nature of mandamus, ordering Defendants to take action in their
capacities as state judges, “[w]e have no authority to issue such a writ to direct
state courts or their judicial officers in the performance of their duties.” Van
Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1436 n.5 (10th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see Olson v. Hart, 965 F.2d 940, 942 (10th Cir. 1992) (“Federal
courts have no authority to issue a writ of mandamus to a state judge.”).
Likewise, he cannot obtain injunctive relief against Defendants. Although
we have previously said that a plaintiff may obtain an injunction against a state
judge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Harris v. Champion, 51 F.3d 901, 905 (10th
Cir. 1995); Olson, 965 F.2d at 943, those statements were abrogated by the
-3-
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, which provides that “injunctive relief
[against a judicial officer] shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable,” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has not
shown that either condition was satisfied here.
Finally, we note that Mr. Knox asks this court to set aside the district
court’s determination that his suit is frivolous and malicious. His concern is that
a dismissal on that ground under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A counts as a strike in
determining eligibility for in forma pauperis status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
See Hafed v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Nos. 09-1090, 09-1365, 2011 WL 338417,
at *2 (10th Cir. Feb. 4, 2011). We deny Mr. Knox’s request because, as shown by
our discussion of the merits of his claims, the district court properly characterized
them as frivolous.
CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the judgment below. We deny Mr. Knox’s motion to proceed
in forma pauperis on appeal and order him to immediately remit the unpaid
balance due of the filing fee.
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