Carter v. Rhode Island

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 95-1082

SHEREE A. CARTER,

Plaintiff, Appellee,

v.

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellants.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

[Hon. Francis J. Boyle, Senior U.S. District Judge]

Cyr, Boudin and Lynch,

Circuit Judges.

James R. Lee, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Jeffrey B.

Pine, Attorney General, was on brief for appellants.

George Carvalho, with whom Patrick J. Quinlan and George E.

Babcock were on brief for appellee.

October 18, 1995

CYR, Circuit Judge. Appellee Sheree A. Carter, a state CYR, Circuit Judge.

prison guard, filed suit against the State of Rhode Island, eight

of her supervisors or superior officers, and her union, alleging

race and gender discrimination. Four individual defendants,

among the eight individual defendants who initiated this inter-

locutory appeal, challenge a district court order disallowing

their "qualified immunity" defenses at summary judgment. We

dismiss their appeal, for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

I I

BACKGROUND1 BACKGROUND

The Rhode Island Department of Corrections hired Carter

as a prison guard in October 1990. Her superior officers and

supervisors embarked on a prolonged campaign of workplace harass-

ment in April 1991. The work environment was marked by (i)

several disciplinary measures against Carter based on infractions

for which defendants had never disciplined white male guards,

(ii) especially undesirable or dangerous work assignments made

without regard to her seniority and class ranking, and failure to

accord "serious consideration" to her application for promotion,

(iii) repeated racial slurs and sexual threats anonymously

directed against Carter in telephone calls at work and at her

home, and in graffiti posted at or near her work station, (iv)

failure to address her repeated complaints about ongoing harass-

1The material facts are related in the light most favorable

to Carter, the party resisting summary judgment. See Hegarty v.

Somerset County, 53 F.3d 1367, 1368 n.1 (1st Cir. 1995).

2

ment, amounting to implicit condonation, and (v) defamatory

comments to the press relating to Carter's discrimination com-

plaints.

Carter commenced suit in federal district court in

August 1993, alleging, inter alia, that defendants violated 42

U.S.C. 1983 by infringing her constitutional right to be free

from race and gender discrimination under the Fifth and Four-

teenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.2 She

2Only the ruling denying summary judgment on the 1983

claims is before us on appeal. An amended complaint additionally

alleged civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981 (race-based

discrimination only) and 1985, pendent state-law claims under

the Rhode Island Whistleblower Protection Act, see R.I. Gen. Laws

28-14-18 (1994), and common law tort claims for defamation and

intentional infliction of emotional distress. Later, Carter was

allowed to amend the complaint again by including a Title VII

claim, see 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1), to conform to the proffered

evidence. Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims,

based on their qualified immunity defenses to the 1981, 1983

and 1985 claims.

The district court denied summary judgment to all eight

defendants on the Title VII claims, finding trialworthy issues of

material fact. See Carter v. State of Rhode Island, No. 93-

0447B, slip op. at 6-7, 18-20 (D.R.I. Nov. 9, 1994) (Report and

Recommendation). The court also dismissed the 1985 claims

against all eight defendants because Carter failed to adduce

sufficient evidence to generate a trialworthy issue as to the

existence of a "conspiracy." Id. at 15-17, n.47. Finally,

except for the defamation claim against "supervisory" defendant

Vose, the court denied all motions for summary judgment on the

state-law claims. Id. at 25-27.

Though not at issue in this interlocutory appeal, we note an

apparent inconsistency between the district court order and the

memorandum explaining its rationale; viz., there is no foundation

in the memorandum and order for the district court's decision to

dismiss the 1981 claims against the four "supervisory" defen-

dants. The court dismissed the 1981 claims against the "union"

defendants because Carter had adduced insufficient evidence that

the union intentionally or purposefully discriminated against

Carter by selectively invoking a union policy not to investigate

a union member's complaints while the complainant is receiving

workers' compensation. Id. at 11-13. On the other hand, there

is no discussion of the 1981 claims against appellants, who

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sought injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and

attorney fees. Defendants moved for summary judgment, contending

that Carter had failed to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), (c), and asserting "quali-

fied immunity" from suit.

The district court categorized the eleven individual

defendants in three groups:

"Union" Defendants: Rhode Island Brotherhood

of Correctional Officers (Union); William

Bove (Union president); Kenneth Rivard (Union

grievance chairman);

"Supervisory" Defendants: George A. Vose, Jr.

(Director of Rhode Island Department of Cor-

rections); Captain Walter Whitman (Warden;

Carter's supervisor); Captain Thomas Par-

tridge (Deputy Warden; Carter's supervisor);

Barry Levin (the Department's Chief Supervi-

sor of Employee Relations); and

"Superior Officer" Defendants: Lieutenant

Ronald Le Clerc; Captain Kenneth Ahearn;

Captain Peter Germani and Captain Ronald

moved for summary judgment on the 1981 and 1983 claims on

qualified immunity grounds only, and whose 1981 liability is in

no sense derivative of, nor dependent upon, the union defendants.

Nevertheless, dismissal of the 1981 claims against the

"superior officer" defendants does appear to flow from the

dismissal of the 1983 claims against those defendants based on

insufficient evidence of discriminatory intent. On the other

hand, assuming the district court correctly denied summary

judgment to the four "supervisory" defendants on the 1983

claims, we discern no basis for dismissing the 1981 claims

against these "supervi-sory" defendants. Although qualified

immunity may be available under 1981, defendants normally are

denied the pretrial benefits of an immunity defense where, as

here, the court finds trialworthy issues pertaining to their

subjective state of mind, i.e., discriminatory intent. See

Alexis v. McDonald's Restaurants of Mass., Inc., F.3d ,

(1st Cir. 1995) [No. 94-1554, slip op. at 13, n.7 (1st Cir. Oct.

10, 1995)]. Accordingly, the parties should explore this appar-

ent inconsistency on remand.

4

Brodeur (Carter's superiors).3

The first district court ruling pertinent to the

present appeal dismissed the section 1983 claims against the

"superior officer" defendants because Carter's alleged right to

be free from undesirable or dangerous work assignments is not

protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the actions charged

against defendants could not support a reasonable inference of

discriminatory intent. Carter v. State of Rhode Island, No. 93-

0447B, slip op. at 23-24 (D.R.I. Nov. 9, 1994) (Report and

Recommendation). And, as to defendant Le Clerc, who allegedly

issued a public reprimand of Carter, the district court found

that the allegation that white male prison guards were not

subjected to similar reprimands did not provide an adequate

foundation for an inference that Le Clerc was motivated by race

or gender discrimination. Accordingly, the court dismissed the

section 1983 claims against the four "superior officer" defen-

dants.4

Second, the court ruled that Carter had stated action-

3After the motions for summary judgment were referred

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(B), the district court adopted

the report and recommendation issued by a magistrate judge three

days prior to oral argument in this appeal. Accordingly, the

report and recommendation is cited throughout, as the district

court ruling.

4Although eight "superior officer" and "supervisory" defen-

dants are named in the notice of appeal, the order granting

partial summary judgment for the "superior officer" defendants is

not immediately appealable, as it has not been certified pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). See Hegarty, 53 F.3d at 1372; see

generally Kersey v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 3 F.3d 482, 486 (1st Cir.

1993).

5

able section 1983 claims against the four "supervisory" defen-

dants, by alleging that she caused copies of her complaints to be

sent to each thereby establishing that they knew about her

allegations of ongoing race and gender harassment and disparate

treatment thus demonstrating a trialworthy dispute as to their

intent in failing to redress her allegations. Id. at 23.

Finally, the district court ruled that the four "supervisory"

defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity from suit

because the right to be free from race and gender discrimination

by government officials had been "clearly established" long

before 1990. Id. at 24-25. Thus, only the four "supervisory"

defendants [hereinafter: "appellants"] presently challenge the

district court summary judgment ruling rejecting their "qualified

immunity" defenses. See supra notes 2 & 4.

II II

DISCUSSION DISCUSSION

A government official is not entitled to qualified

immunity from suit "if the right asserted by the plaintiff was

`clearly established' at the time of its alleged violation . . .

[and] a reasonable official situated in the same circumstances

should have understood that the challenged conduct violated that

established right." Burns v. Loranger, 907 F.2d 233, 235-36 (1st

Cir. 1990) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1988))

(emphasis added). The district court determined that "[t]he

constitutional right to be free from [] invidious discrimination

is so well established and so essential to the preservation of

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our constitutional order that all public officials must be

charged with knowledge of it." Carter, No. 93-0447B, slip op. at

25 (D.R.I. Nov. 9, 1994).

Appellants contend in their opening brief that the

district court should have proceeded to consider whether, as a

matter of law, the particular conduct of each individual defen-

dant was objectively reasonable. They rely heavily on an analogy

to Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993), a Title

VII case. Appellants argue that Harris prescribes minimum

evidentiary standards for establishing the "objectively abusive"

conduct needed to support a reasonable inference that a particu-

lar defendant harbored an invidious discriminatory intent. As

they see it, the facially innocuous or objectively reasonable

conduct in which appellants, as well as the "superior officer"

defendants, are alleged to have engaged (e.g., defendants "glanc-

[ed]" at Carter during roll call; refused to let her drive an

automobile without a license) falls far short of the "objectively

abusive conduct" required under Harris (viz., repeated use of

explicit gender-based insults, sexual innuendo, threats, and

coercion against a subordinate). This is demonstrated, appel-

lants say, by the district court ruling that the evidence is

insufficient to support a reasonable inference that the four

"superior officer" defendants harbored a discriminatory intent.

See Carter, No. 93-0447B, slip op. at 23-24 (D.R.I. Nov. 9,

1994); see also supra note 4. Appellants therefore insist that

they were entitled to qualified immunity because, viewing the

7

disputed evidence most favorably to Carter, reasonable officials

situated in their circumstances should not have understood that

their conduct violated Carter's established right to be free from

race or gender discrimination. See Burns, 907 F.2d at 235-36.

While this interlocutory appeal was pending, the United

States Supreme Court decided Johnson v. Jones, 115 S. Ct. 2151

(1995). Displacing our longstanding precedents allowing inter-

locutory appeals from virtually all rulings denying qualified

immunity defenses at summary judgment, see, e.g., Unwin v.

Campbell, 863 F.2d 124, 128 (1st Cir. 1988), the Supreme Court

held that

a defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified

immunity defense, may not appeal a district

court's summary judgment order insofar as

that order determines whether or not the

pretrial record sets forth a 'genuine' issue

of fact for trial.

Johnson, 115 S. Ct. at 2159. Recently, this court summarized the

Johnson message:

Thus, on the one hand, a district court's

pretrial rejection of a proffered qualified

immunity defense remains immediately appeal-

able as a collateral order to the extent that

it turns on a pure issue of law, notwith-

standing the absence of a final judgment. On

the other hand, a district court's pretrial

rejection of a qualified immunity defense is

not immediately appealable to the extent that

it turns on . . . an issue of fact . . . . In

such a situation, the movant must await the

entry of final judgment before appealing the

adverse ruling.

Stella v. Town of Tewksbury, F.3d , (1st Cir. 1995)

[No. 95-1223, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 23942, at *7-8 (1st Cir. Aug.

23, 1995)].

8

Johnson emphasized that routinely allocating fact-

intensive inquiries to appellate courts entails significant

delays and imprudent use of scarce judicial resources, since an

appellate court may have to wade through a huge, underdeveloped

pretrial record to resolve especially "nebulous" factual ques-

tions such as a defendant's "intent." Johnson, 115 S. Ct. at

2158 (emphasis added).

Appellants' first reaction to Johnson is to mis-

characterize the summary judgment ruling in this case as a "law-

based" rather than a "fact-based" denial of summary judg-

ment. Johnson explicitly directs that "a district court's

pretrial rejection of a qualified immunity defense is not immedi-

ately appealable to the extent that it turns on . . . an issue of

fact . . . ." Stella, F.3d at [No. 95-1223, 1995 U.S.

App. LEXIS 23942, at *7-8 (1st Cir. Aug. 23, 1995)] (citing

Johnson, 115 S. Ct. at 2159). Determining the presence or

absence of discriminatory "intent" based on evidentiary proffers

at summary judgment entails a quintessential factual assessment,

see Broderick v. Roache, 996 F.2d 1294 (1st Cir. 1993) (normally,

1983 defendants are not entitled to brevis disposition on

summary judgment where qualified immunity defense turns on

factual determination as to their subjective intent), which is

part and parcel of the "merits" dispute on the claims brought by

Carter in this case.

Second, appellants contend, citing Harris, 114 S. Ct.

367 (1993), that their conduct, as alleged, was not "objectively

9

abusive" as a matter of law since it was not sufficiently

egregious to support a reasonable inference that appellants were

motivated by race or gender discrimination:

[Such a standard] would permit any minority

[worker] to allege anything against a white

male [supervisor] and force that white male

to a jury trial. For example, a minority

could

allege a violation of the equal protection

clause because a white supervisor said hello,

one time, to a white worker before saying it

to the minority worker. That lawsuit would

obviously allege the violation of a clearly

established right [to be free from] racial

discrimination), but it would not allege

facts that violated that right.

Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 4. Given the evidence

adduced by Carter at summary judgment, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e),

we reject this artificial characterization as well.

For summary judgment purposes, all evidence in genuine

dispute must be viewed in the light most favorable to Carter.

The district court found that Carter adduced evidence that (i)

each appellant had been given written notice of a pervasive,

continuing campaign of workplace harassment and disparate treat-

ment aimed at her, see supra pp. 2-3, (ii) each appellant had

authority to redress her complaints, and (iii) all failed to do

so. In this factual setting, Harris does appellants no good,

even as an analog.5

For one thing, contrary to appellants' contention, see

supra pp. 6-7, the Harris Court not only did not purport to

5We need not test the assumption implicit in appellants'

analogy; viz., that Harris, a sexual harassment case, defines the

boundaries of racial harassment claims as well.

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prescribe an evidentiary threshold for establishing "objectively

abusive conduct," it explicitly noted that merely because an

earlier decision "present[ed] some especially egregious examples

of harassment, [it did] not mark the [lower] boundary of what is

actionable." Harris, 114 S. Ct at 371. Moreover, the Court

noted that

whether an environment is "hostile" or "abu-

sive" can be determined only by looking at

all the circumstances. These may include the

frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its

severity; whether it is physically threaten-

ing or humiliating, or a mere offensive ut-

terance; and whether it unreasonably inter-

feres with an employee's work performance. .

. . [N]o single factor is required.

Id. (emphasis added). The factual allegations attested to by

Carter, relating to conduct and context, are presumed true at

this stage in the case, see supra pp. 2-3, and must be evaluated

by the ultimate factfinder with a view to their adequacy as

support for a reasonable inference on the "nebulous" element of

discriminatory "intent." Thus, her factual allegations call for

precisely the type of fact-intensive inquiry that Johnson coun-

sels against, as an inappropriate judicial exercise on interlocu-

tory review.

Furthermore, the "conduct" we must deem established for

summary judgment purposes in this case cannot be confined to the

straitjacket designed for it by appellants (viz., "a white super-

visor said hello, one time, to a white worker before saying it to

the minority worker"). Rather, their hypothetical substantially

understates the allegations actually attested to by Carter.

11

Consequently, we need not address their artificial construct.

Carter expressly attests, for example, that repeated

racial and gender-based epithets were directed against her, and

that appellants condoned this harassment by their knowing inac-

tion. We can discern no permissible ground for treating the

district court ruling that there was a trialworthy issue of

fact as to whether appellants harbored a discriminatory intent

as an immediately appealable law-based decision within the

meaning of Johnson, 115 S. Ct. at 2159.6

Johnson announces a jurisdictional rule signaling a

new day in the First Circuit, see Stella, F.3d at [No. 95-

1223, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 23942, at *9 (1st Cir. Aug. 23, 1995)]

and not one to be undone by recasting fact-based rulings

denying summary judgment on qualified immunity defenses into law-

based "collateral orders" immediately appealable under Cohen v.

Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). See Elliott

v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 341 (7th Cir. 1991) ("By sleight of hand

[defendants] can turn any defense on the merits into a defense of

qualified immunity."), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1121 (1992). The

Johnson rule would be undermined its important aims frustrat-

ed, see, e.g., Johnson, 115 S. Ct. at 2158 (noting, inter alia,

"danger of denying justice by delay") were defendant offi-

6Likewise, the district court's ruling -- that there is a

trialworthy issue of fact as to the existence of an "affirmative

link" between appellants' acts or omissions and the alleged

deprivation of civil rights, see, e.g., Figueroa v. Aponte-Roque,

864 F.2d 947, 953 (1st Cir. 1989) is not an immediately

appealable law-based decision. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. at 2159.

12

cials, spurred by the prospect of delay and the leverage it

occasions, permitted to contrive insubstantial "issues of law" as

grounds for interlocutory review.

III III

CONCLUSION CONCLUSION

As Johnson precludes interlocutory review of the

district court order denying summary judgment on appellants'

qualified immunity defenses, founded on the fact-based ruling

that there was a trialworthy issue of fact as to whether appel-

lants acted with discriminatory intent, their appeal is dismissed

for lack of appellate jurisdiction, with costs to appellee.

SO ORDERED. SO ORDERED.

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