Opinion

Scott v. TOWN OF BLOOMFIELD

  • 98 N.J. Super. 321
  • 237 A.2d 297
Court
New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
Filed
Dec 21, 1967
Status
Published
On the bench
Judges Sullivan, Foley and Leonard
Cited by
7 cases
Authority
More cited than 77.5%

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by Davidson Bros. v. D. Katz & Sons, Inc., 121 N.J. 196 (1990)

    We reject plaintiff’s assertion, however, that Scott v. Town of Bloomfield, 94 N.J.Super. 592, 229 A.2d 667 (Law Div.1967), aff'd, 98 N.J.Super. 321, 237 A.2d 297 (App.Div.), appeal dismissed, 52 N.J. 473, 246 A.2d 129 (1968), and East Orange v. Board of Water Commissioners, 79 N.J.Super. 363, 191 A.2d 749 (App.Div.), aff'd on other grounds, 41 N.J. 6, 194 A.2d 459 (1963), command that the public entity receive fair…
    Supreme Court of New JerseyJul 26, 1990Read it

The opinion

98 N.J. Super. 321 (1967)

237 A.2d 297

DONALD L. SCOTT AND THEODORE DUNN, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS,

v.

TOWN OF BLOOMFIELD, RALPH G. CONTE AND H. JOSEPH NORTH, DEFENDANTS, AND BOYS' CLUB OF BLOOMFIELD, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued December 11, 1967.

Decided December 21, 1967.

*322 Before Judges SULLIVAN, FOLEY and LEONARD.

Mr. Paul Alongi for appellant ( Messrs. Marinello, Henkel, Soriano & Klein, attorneys).

Mr. David C. Thompson for respondents ( Messrs. Joyce & Brown, attorneys).

Mr. Elias Abelson, Deputy Attorney General, for State of New Jersey, intervenor, ( Mr. Arthur J. Sills, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

PER CURIAM.

The Town of Bloomfield, pursuant to a resolution and under the authority of N.J.S.A. 40:60-45.3, leased certain municipal property for a period of 99 years at a rental of $1 per year to defendant Boys' Club of Bloomfield. Plaintiffs, taxpayers of the municipality, instituted an action in lieu of prerogative writs challenging the validity of this lease. The trial court entered summary judgment declaring the resolution and lease void. 94 N.J. Super. 592 . Defendant Boys' Club now appeals.

The trial court's action was based, inter alia, upon the determination that the statutory provision authorizing the lease was a special law that was unconstitutional because the appropriate pre-enactment public notification ( R.S. 1:6-1) required by Art. IV, § 7, par. 8 of our State Constitution had not been given.

We agree and therefore affirm. However, we limit our affirmance to the above determination.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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