Opinion

Northpoint Technol v. FCC

Court
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Filed
Jul 15, 2005
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
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More cited than 9.8%

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 11, 2005 Decided July 15, 2005

No. 02-1194

NORTHPOINT TECHNOLOGY, LTD . ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,

APPELLEE

ECHOSTAR SATELLITE CORPORATION, ET AL.,

INTERVENORS

Consolidated with

02-1195, 02-1209, 03-1244, 03-1245,

03-1286, 03-1297, 03-1299, 03-1300

On Petitions for Review and Notices of Appeal

of Orders of the Federal Communications Commission

Richard P. Bress argued the cause for petitioners

DIRECTV, Inc., et al. With him on the briefs were James H.

Barker, III., Margaret L. Tobey, Pantelis Michalopoulos, Steven

G. Reed, Alice E. Loughran, Phillip L. Spector, and Jeffrey H.

Olson. Bart S. Epstein and Christa P. McAndrew entered

appearances.

2

Michael K. Kellogg argued the cause for petitioners

Northpoint Technology, Ltd., et al. With him on the briefs were

Antoinette C. Bush and J. C. Rozendaal.

Joel Marcus, Counsel, Federal Communications

Commission, argued the cause for appellee/respondents. With

him on the brief were Robert H. Pate, III, Assistant Attorney

General, Robert B. Nicholson and Steven J. Mintz, Attorneys,

John A. Rogovin, General Counsel, Austin C. Schlick, Deputy

General Counsel, and Daniel M. Armstrong, Associate General

Counsel. Jane E. Mago, Assistant General Counsel, entered an

appearance.

Before: SENTELLE, ROGERS and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: This case concerns new

regulations issued by the Federal Communications Commission

(“FCC” or “the Commission”) allowing terrestrial multichannel

video distribution and data service (“MVDDS”), to share the

12.2-12.7 GHz bandwidth (“12 GHz bandwidth”) spectrum with

direct broadcast satellite (“DBS”) television services, as well as

a decision by the FCC to auction MVDDS use of that

bandwidth.

The regulations are challenged by two sets of petitioners:1

the incumbent providers, DIRECTV, Inc., Satellite Broadcasting

and Communications Association, EchoStar Satellite Corp., and

SES Americom, Inc. (“DBS providers”), and a would-be

1

Petitioner Northpoint is also appealing from the

Commission’s decision to allocate MVDDS licenses by auction, under

47 U.S.C. § 402. For simplicity’s sake, we will generally refer to

Northpoint as a Petitioner.

3

competitor, Northpoint Technology, Ltd. (“Northpoint”), which

claims credit for inventing MVDDS technology. For reasons

stated more fully below, we deny both petitions for review.

I. Background

A. Original Allocation of the 12 GHz Bandwidth

Twenty-five years ago, as satellite technology developed to

the point at which direct broadcast satellite service to individual

homes and businesses was feasible, the FCC began to

investigate setting aside specific portions of the spectrum for

DBS service. In the runup to an international radio conference

in 1979, the Commission “decided to seek international

agreement to shift the international allocation of DBS to the 12

GHz band in order to accommodate future U.S. DBS

requirements.” National Association of Broadcasters v. FCC,

740 F.2d 1190, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The next year, “the

Commission began to consider how to protect and advance U.S.

interests in DBS use of the 12 GHz band.” Id. In 1982, the

Commission issued a Report and Order authorizing the use of

the 12.2-12.7 GHz bandwidth to DBS use as in the public

interest. Report and Order, In the Matter of Inquiry into the

Development of Regulatory Policy in Regard to Direct

Broadcast Satellites for the Period Following the 1983 Regional

Administrative Radio Conference, 90 F.C.C. 2d 676, 679 (July

14, 1982). The Report and Order highlighted the Commission’s

conclusion “that DBS has the potential to provide extremely

valuable services to the American people[,]” including “the

provision of improved service to remote areas, additional

channels of service throughout the country, programming

offering more variety and that is better suited to viewers’ tastes,

technically innovative services, and expanded non-entertainment

service.” Id. at 680.

4

In the same Report and Order, in order to effectuate the

allocation of the 12 GHz bandwidth to DBS service, the FCC

announced a plan for any remaining terrestrial use of that

bandwidth: First, after a grace period of five years, already-

authorized terrestrial operations in the bandwidth would be

required to operate on a strict non-interference basis to DBS

services. Id. at 702. Second, terrestrial operations authorized

after the Report and Order would receive conditional licenses,

requiring that they not cause any harmful interference to DBS

systems. Id.

B. Decision to Propose Rulemaking for Sharing of 12

GHz Bandwidth

This policy began to shift when, in the late 1990s, the FCC

began to look at the possibility of allowing additional broadcast

technologies to share the 12 GHz bandwidth with DBS

providers. In 1997, Skybridge, L.L.C., a provider of non-

geostationary fixed satellite service (“NGSO-FSS”), filed a

Petition for Rulemaking with the FCC to allow it to operate in

various wavelengths between 10.7 and 14.5 GHz.

The next year, in 1998, Northpoint filed a Petition for

Rulemaking asking that it also be granted permission to use the

12.2-12.7 GHz bandwidth for its terrestrial MVDDS service,

which can allow DBS subscribers to receive additional channels.

As described by the FCC, the Northpoint technology “use[s]

northward pointing receivers at a DBS subscriber’s location to

receive signals transmitted from terrestrial towers whose

directional antennas point southward.” First Report and Order

and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“First Order”), 16

F.C.C. Rcd. 4096, 4160 ¶ 164 (2000).

The Commission responded to the NGSO-FSS and MVDDS

applications by issuing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14

5

F.C.C. Rcd. 1131 (1998), in which it proposed to allow NGSO-

FSS providers to use those bands for uplinks and downlinks, and

solicited comments on Northpoint’s proposal, including further

technical analyses of Northpoint’s ability to share spectrum with

DBS providers. The Commission also issued a Public Notice

soliciting competing applications from NGSO-FSS providers to

share, inter alia, the 12.2-12.7 GHz bandwidth, as a preliminary

step to adopting rules for NGSO-FSS systems in those

bandwidths. Public Notice, Report No. SPB-141, 1998 WL

758449 (Nov. 2, 1998). Northpoint, apparently seeing its

MVDDS technology as equivalent to satellite service, even

though it is terrestrial, submitted an application for usage of that

bandwidth pursuant to the November 1998 Public Notice.

C. New Congressional Mandate

Before the FCC could act further, Congress passed the

Rural Local Broadcast Signal Act of 1999, Pub L. No. 106-113

Div. B, App. I, Tit. II, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-544 (Nov. 29,

1999) (“RLBSA”), meant to give DBS

subscribers–predominantly found in small and rural television

markets–affordable access to local broadcast stations, whose

signals, at the time, typically were not carried by DBS service

providers. Specifically, the RLBSA directed the FCC to, within

one year, “make a determination regarding licenses or other

authorizations for facilities that will utilize, for delivering local

broadcast television station signals to satellite television

subscribers in unserved and under-served local television

markets, spectrum otherwise allocated to special use.” Id. §

2002(a). At the same time, the FCC was to “ensure that no

facility licensed or authorized under [the RLBSA] cause[]

harmful interference to the primary users of that spectrum or to

public safety spectrum use.” Id. § 2002(b)(2).

6

D. FCC Rulemaking

In its subsequent rulemaking, which it commenced by

issuing the First Report and Order and Further Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking in 2000, the FCC authorized both NGSO-

FSS and MVDDS providers to operate in the 12 GHz bandwidth

alongside DBS providers. See First Order, 16 F.C.C. Rcd. at

4109 ¶¶ 19, 21. The FCC reasoned that “[t]he use of innovative

spectrum sharing techniques will facilitate a high level of

frequency reuse in this band and provide a variety of broadband

services to a vast number of customers.” First Order, 16 F.C.C.

Rcd. at 4161 ¶ 168. The Commission further reasoned that

MVDDS in particular “w[ould] be capable of delivering local

broadcast signals to satellite television subscribers in unserved

and underserved local television markets” as required by the

RLBSA. Id. at 4108 ¶ 18.

As for the RLBSA’s bar on “harmful interference,” in the

First Order, the FCC adopted the definition in 47 C.F.R. §

2.1(c): “interference which endangers the functioning of a

radionavigation service or of other safety services or seriously

degrades, obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts a

radiocommunication service . . . ,” and found that “we can

develop operating requirements for MVDDS that will ensure

that DBS operations are not seriously degraded or subject to

repeated interruptions due to MVDDS operations . . . .” First

Order, 16 F.C.C. Rcd. at 4177 ¶ 213.

The First Order also served as a Further Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking, for rules developing those operating requirements.

The Commission specified that for those rules to comply with its

definition of “harmful interference,” “we will propose that the

maximum permissible increase in [DBS service] outage caused

by an MVDDS transmitter to any DBS subscriber be a value

such that the increase would generally be unnoticed by the DBS

7

subscriber.” Id.

The DBS providers petitioned for reconsideration, arguing,

inter alia, that the decision to allow the MVDDS operators to

share the 12 GHz bandwidth harmed their reasonable reliance

interests in the bandwidth, and that at any rate, the Commission

had failed to justify its decision in light of the potential for

harmful interference.

Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted section 1012 of the

LOCAL TV Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1110, which required independent

testing of “any terrestrial service technology proposed by any

entity that has filed an application to provide terrestrial service”

in the 12 GHz band, to ensure that there would not be harmful

interference with DBS service in that bandwidth. An

independent corporation engaged by the FCC to test

Northpoint’s MVDDS technology concluded that although

MVDDS “poses a significant interference threat to DBS,”

spectrum sharing would still be feasible, given “a wide variety

of mitigation techniques . . . that . . . can greatly reduce, or

eliminate” the interference.

With this information in hand, the FCC denied the DBS

providers’ first petition for reconsideration, and issued the

promised technical parameters that enabled MVDDS to share

the 12 GHz bandwidth without causing harmful interference.

See Memorandum Opinion and Order and Second Report and

Order (“Second Order”), 17 F.C.C. Rcd. 9614 (2002), ¶ 67. In

the Second Order, the FCC laid out detailed technical

requirements for the operation of MVDDS service in the 12

GHz bandwidth. These parameters followed the dictate for non-

interference laid out in the First Order, which was restated in

the Second Order as a requirement “that the presence of an

MVDDS signal would not be perceptible to the DBS customer

in most cases.” Id. at 9641, ¶ 68. The parameters do not set a

8

specific threshold for percentage increase in DBS signal outage

that new MVDDS transmitters may tolerably introduce in a

given geographic area. According to the FCC, the parameters

do, however, ensure that the establishment of MVDDS service

will lead to a less than 10% increase in DBS signal outage in

almost all cases. Id. at 9642, ¶ 70.

Also in the Second Order, the FCC dismissed Northpoint’s

and other later-submitted applications for terrestrial (MVDDS)

licenses as premature, on the basis that the solicitation of

applications for satellite service licenses had not given adequate

notice to providers of terrestrial services that such licenses might

be available. Second Order, 17 F.C.C. Rcd. at 9697, ¶ 213. (In

particular, the FCC in effect rejected Northpoint’s

petition–which, as set forth above, had been submitted alongside

NGSO-FSS applications when those had been solicited–by

deciding not to grant Northpoint various waivers through which

the company sought to have its application considered alongside

the satellite applications. Id. at 9697-9702, ¶¶ 215-228. This

dismissal was, however, without prejudice; Northpoint was

explicitly given permission “to refile in a subsequent window

for terrestrial applications.” Id. at 9697 ¶ 214.) Instead, the

FCC announced that it would award MVDDS licenses by

auction pursuant to the authority granted to it by 47 U.S.C. §

309(j), which requires the Commission to allocate initial

licenses for mutually exclusive applications–e.g., for use of a

specific wavelength–via auction. Second Order, 17 F.C.C. Rcd.

at 9704-05, ¶¶ 237-238. The Commission rejected several

arguments made by Northpoint in the comment period preceding

the Second Order, including two reasserted in this petition for

review: (1) that the FCC could not auction that part of the

spectrum under Section 647 of the Open-market Reorganization

for the Betterment of International Telecommunications Act

(“ORBIT Act”), which bars auctions of spectrum “used for the

provision of international or global satellite communications

9

services,” 47 U.S.C. § 765f, Second Order, 17 F.C.C. Rcd. at

9706-07, ¶ 242;2 and (2) that the FCC could not invoke its

section 309(j) auction authority, as Northpoint was the only

qualified MVDDS applicant by operation of the LOCAL TV

Act’s testing requirement, and there was therefore no mutual

exclusivity. Id. at 9705, ¶ 239.

Both the DBS providers and Northpoint petitioned for

reconsideration of the Second Order. See Fourth Memorandum

Opinion and Order, 18 F.C.C. Rcd. 8428 (2003) (“Fourth

Order”). The DBS providers objected that the technical

parameters mandated by the Second Order were insufficient to

protect their service from “harmful interference,” because they

failed to guarantee a fixed upper bound on service outages. They

further objected to a provision in the Second Order that required

DBS providers to bear the burden of adjusting their transmitters

to prevent harmful interference when installed more than a

month after a MVDDS transmitter. Northpoint reiterated its

ORBIT Act and LOCAL TV Act challenges. The FCC rejected

both petitions.

Having lost its final administrative challenge, Northpoint

did not participate in the MVDDS auction, which took place in

January 2004, and awarded ten MVDDS licenses for the 12 GHz

2

In an unrelated proceeding a year later, but also one in which

Northpoint (through a subsidiary which sought a DBS license) had an

interest, the Commission sought public comment on its authority vel

non to hold an auction of DBS licenses themselves under the ORBIT

Act. See Public Notice, Auction of Direct Broadcast Satellite Service

Licenses Scheduled for August 6, 2003, 18 F.C.C. Rcd. 3478 (2003).

Northpoint asserted a similar theory on the import of Section 647 of

the Act, which the FCC also rejected. This is the subject of another

proceeding in this Court, Northpoint Technology, Ltd. v. FCC, Case

No. 04-1053 (D.C. Cir. June 21, 2005).

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bandwidth.

E. Current Petitions/Appeals

Before this Court, the DBS providers seek review of the

provisions of the First Order that embody the decision to allow

MVDDS to share the 12 GHz bandwidth with DBS, as well as

the denials of reconsideration of that decision in the Second and

Fourth Orders. The DBS providers argue, principally, that the

Commission did not conform with the RLBSA’s requirement

that spectrum sharing cause no “harmful interference.” They

express a general concern that the regulations represent the loss

of two decades of “protection” from harmful terrestrial

interference with their services in the 12 GHz

bandwidth–protection they say the Commission provided

beginning in 1982, when it allocated the 12 GHz bandwidth for

DBS service to encourage competition with cable television

operators. Specifically, the DBS providers challenge the

regulations as violative of Section 106 of the Administrative

Procedure Act (“APA”) on the basis that (a) the Commission’s

definition of “harmful interference” is arbitrary and capricious,

and (b) the alleged lack of protections for new and existing

subscribers are contrary to law in violation of the RLBSA.

Northpoint, content with the FCC’s decision to force

sharing of the 12 GHz bandwidth, but not with its decision to

auction the MVDDS licenses for that bandwidth, petitions for

review of the Second and Fourth Orders, and appeals the

licensing decision contained therein. Northpoint argues that it

should have been granted exclusive access without having to go

through an auction process, as the first MVDDS provider to

apply to the FCC for use of that bandwidth. Specifically,

Northpoint argues that the auction (a) violates the ORBIT Act’s

prohibition against auctioning “spectrum used for the provision

of international or global satellite communications services”; (b)

11

was an arbitrary choice in violation of both Section 309(j) of the

Communications Act of 1934, and principles enunciated in

Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945), when

compared to the FCC’s decision to allow the NGSO-FSS

providers to go through a simple licensing process, and (c) is not

authorized by law, insofar as Northpoint claims it is the only

qualified MVDDS provider under the LOCAL TV Act, thus

negating the Commission’s authority to auction licenses under

Section 309(j) of the Communications Act.

We have jurisdiction over licensing decisions under 47

U.S.C. § 402(a), and rulemaking orders of the FCC under 28

U.S.C. § 2342. See AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 323 F.3d 1081, 1084

(D.C. Cir. 2003). Because we conclude that the Commission

had a rational basis for concluding that MVDDS providers could

share the 12 GHz bandwidth without causing “harmful

interference” to DBS service providers, as prohibited by the

RLBSA, and that the FCC’s decision was not arbitrary,

capricious, or contrary to law under the APA, we deny the DBS

providers’ petition for review. Further, because we conclude

that the MVDDS auction was neither prohibited by the ORBIT

Act, nor arbitrary under Ashbacker, nor in excess of the

Commission’s powers due to the operation of the LOCAL TV

Act, we deny Northpoint’s petition for review and its appeal of

the FCC’s licensing decision, as well. To the extent that

Northpoint alleges any violation of prior agreements or

understandings with the FCC as to the end result of the

development and testing of its technology, that is a Tucker Act

matter not reviewed in this APA proceeding.

II. Discussion

A. DBS Challenges

1. RLBSA “Harmful Interference” Standard

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Under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837,

842-43 (1984), we defer to the Commission’s interpretation of

statutes which it is charged with implementing, so long as the

Congress has not unambiguously forbidden it and it is otherwise

permissible. This means that, if Congress “has directly spoken

to the precise question at issue,” we “give effect to [its]

unambiguously expressed intent”; “if the statute is silent or

ambiguous,” we defer to the Commission’s interpretation so

long as it is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.”

Id.

The RLBSA charges the FCC with “ensur[ing] that no

facility licensed or authorized under [the RLBSA] causes

harmful interference to the primary users of that spectrum . . .,”

113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-544 § 2002(b)(2), without specifying

what “harmful interference” might mean in this context. We

must therefore defer to the Commission’s interpretation of

“harmful interference” so long as it is “based on a permissible

construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. This

does not require that the agency construction be the only

permissible construction, nor “the reading the court would have

reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial

proceeding.” Id. at 843 n.11. Rather, all we need to conclude is

that the construction is not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly

contrary to the statute. Id. at 844.

In this case, the FCC applied its existing definition of

“harmful interference,” listed in the “Terms and definitions”

section of its General Rules and Regulations for Frequency

Allocations and Radio Treaty Matters, see 47 C.F.R § 2.1, to the

context of potential interference with DBS service by MVDDS

users of the 12 GHz bandwidth. The DBS providers argue that

the Commission’s conclusion was impermissible, because it

departed from its own standard contained in 47 C.F.R. § 2.1, and

provided no firm upper limit on the level of outages that would

13

be tolerated. Reviewing the record, we cannot agree with this

assessment. In the First Order, the Commission closely

followed the 47 C.F.R. § 2.1 definition of “harmful interference”

(i.e., “interference which endangers or repeatedly interrupts a

radiocommunication service . . .”) when it said it would strive to

set the technical parameters such that “DBS operations are not

seriously degraded or subject to repeat interruptions due to

MVDDS operations[.]” First Order, 16 F.C.C. Rcd. at 4177, ¶

213. The Commission did not stray, arbitrarily or otherwise,

when it stated in the First Order it could do this by ensuring that

“the maximum increase in outage caused by an MVDDS

transmitter to any DBS subscriber be a value such that the

increase would be generally unnoticed by the DBS subscriber.”

Id. The Commission explained in the Second Order, that “DBS

is, on the whole, extremely reliable with typical service

availabilities on the order of 99.8 to 99.9 percent,” and that the

small number of interruptions to which DBS operations are

already subject “are well tolerated by DBS subscribers[.]”

Second Order, 17 F.C.C. Rcd. at 9640 ¶ 67. Thus, there is a

logical argument that if MVDDS increases that small number of

interruptions–which the DBS providers do not contest the

consumers do not notice now–to a level at which they still do

not notice the interruptions, the 47 C.F.R.§ 2.1 dictate that DBS

service not be seriously degraded will be satisfied. The FCC’s

decision to allow outages in DBS service that generally go

unnoticed is therefore based on a permissible construction of the

RLBSA.

We reject the DBS providers’ next argument, that the lack

of a numerical upper limit on the number of outages that will be

tolerated renders the FCC’s construction of “harmful

interference” impermissible, in light of the qualitative

requirement that interruptions stay at or below a level that are

“generally unnoticed by the DBS subscriber,” First Order, 16

F.C.C. Rcd. at 4177, ¶ 213. As the Commission explained,

14

although the “harmful interference” standard enunciated in the

First Order and for which it set technical parameters in the

Second Order does not set a strict limit on the percentage by

which MVDDS may increase outages in DBS service, “the

overly conservative assumptions used in [its] modeling, the

reality that DBS outage rates vary widely around the country

and from season to season, and the fact that outages occur at all

times of the day–i.e., not just when subscribers are watching

DBS, [it found] that the additional service outage that may result

. . . over and above the 10 percent starting point falls within the

permissible level.” Second Order, 17 F.C.C. Rcd. at 9643, ¶ 72.

In other words, the Commission consistently followed its

qualitative requirement that outage increases not be perceptible

to the DBS consumer: The relevant standard–that increased

interruptions be “generally unnoticed by the DBS

subscriber”–continues to be met even in those rare instances

where increases in the instance of signal outages may go above

10%. That standard, as we have just explained, passes APA

muster. The FCC’s decision not to impose a strict upper bound

on percentage increases in DBS outages, it follows, is also

permissible.

In the alternative, the DBS providers charge that even if the

FCC’s definition of harmful interference is permissible, the

technical parameters the Commission issued failed to ensure a

level of interference that would, in fact, be tolerable to the

average DBS consumer. The Commission responds that it was

reasonable to predict that DBS customers, who regardless “face

wide variations in their own service that are larger than the

increased outages that will be caused by MVDDS . . . would be

insensitive to relatively small increases in variability.” Govt.

Br. at 30. The plausibility of this prediction–that a relatively

small increase in variability would be less noticeable than

relatively large existing outages–is self-evident. Further, as the

Commission pointed out at oral argument, a 10% increase in a

15

0.1-0.2% unavailability is tiny indeed–at 0.01-0.02%. Thus,

neither the FCC’s definition of “harmful interference” nor its

anticipation that its technical parameters would prevent such

interference from occurring in practice, were unreasonable.

The decision to permit MVDDS operations under the

Second Order’s technical parameters appears particularly

reasonable in light of the “safety valve” referred to in that Order.

See Second Order, 17 F.C.C. Rcd. at 9651, ¶ 85. “[I]f due to an

anomalous situation,” the Order explains, “a DBS provider can

demonstrate a tangible detrimental impact on DBS caused by

MVDDS operations,” the FCC may adjust the relevant technical

parameters to eliminate the problem. Id. Through this safety

valve, the FCC can ensure that MVDDS causes no harmful

interference even if, contrary to the FCC’s predictions, operation

under existing parameters produces noticeable service

interruptions in some limited number of areas.

Finally, the DBS providers charge that the FCC failed to

adequately explain why MVDDS providers were not assigned to

alternative bandwidths where they would not cause harmful

interference. Because, for the reasons enunciated above, we

conclude that the Commission took adequate steps to prevent

harmful interference from occurring, such an explanation is not

necessary.

2. Other Alleged RLBSA Violations

The DBS providers also allege that the regulations at issue

violate the RLBSA insofar as they (a) fail to protect DBS

service to new subscriber locations, and (b) fail to protect DBS

service to all existing subscriber locations.

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a. New Subscriber Locations

As part of its implementation of the plan to share the 12

GHz bandwidth, the Commission issued a rule that new DBS

receiver antennas installed more than 30 days after the relevant

DBS licensee is notified of a potential MVDDS transmitter site,

shall have no further rights of complaint. 47 C.F.R. §

101.1440(e). Instead, the DBS licensee is responsible for

mitigating any harmful interference to DBS reception that might

result. Id. The DBS producers argue that this violates the

“unambiguous obligation” that the RLBSA imposes on the

Commission “to ‘ensure’ that ‘no facility licensed or authorized

to deliver local broadcast television signals . . . causes harmful

interference [to DBS operations].’” DBS Br. at 19 (quoting

RLBSA § 2002(b)(2), 113 Stat. 1501).

By citing this aspect of the MVDDS regulations out of

context, the DBS providers obscure its practical nature. That

same section of the C.F.R. earlier provides that any MVDDS

provider “shall not begin operation unless it can ensure that the

[detectable signals] from its transmitting antenna at all DBS

customers of record locations” is below the applicable limit,

calibrated to ensure no harmful interference. 47 C.F.R. §

101.1440(a). “DBS customers of record,” in turn, is defined as

“those who had their DBS antennas installed prior to or within

the 30-day period after notification to the DBS operator by the

MVDDS licensee of the proposed MVDDS transmitting antenna

site.” Id. The subsequent rule to which the DBS providers

object–that DBS providers who install receivers nearby after that

30-day period are responsible for locating them “in such a way

as to avoid the MVDDS signal,” 47 C.F.R. § 101.1440(e)–is

simply a practicable solution for what to do next, after an

MVDDS transmitter is already in operation. This rule does not,

as the DBS providers suggest, deprive new DBS subscribers of

the right to receive their satellite service free of harmful

17

interference. Instead, it simply shifts the burden for avoiding

harmful interference in those instances from the MVDDS

providers to the DBS providers–something that is clearly not

barred by the RLBSA.

The RLBSA charges the Commission only with “ensur[ing]

that no facility licensed or authorized under [the RLBSA]

cause[] harmful interference to the primary users of that

spectrum . . . .” RLBSA at § 2002(b)(2). It does not speak to

how the Commission must ensure that harmful interference not

occur, or who the Commission must enlist to ensure that harmful

interference not occur. The use of the word “ensure” in the

statute is sufficiently ambiguous to allow a construction that

shifts the burden for some protective measures onto the DBS

providers from the MVDDS providers, to which we defer under

“Chevron Step Two.” We therefore find that 47 C.F.R. §

101.1440(e) does not violate the RLBSA as the DBS providers

argue.

b. Existing Subscribers

Another subsection of the implementing regulations, 47

C.F.R. § 101.1440(g), requires new MVDDS providers to

remedy complaints by existing DBS subscribers of record only

if the complaints are received within a year from when the

MVDDS providers start operations. The DBS providers

complain that this leaves many existing subscribers with no

protection from harmful interference. Specifically, they argue

that subscribers who experience seasonal outages due to weather

may not know until it is too late that MVDDS is the source of

extra interference they may have been experiencing. They

further argue that the rule fails to properly protect from harmful

interference existing DBS subscribers who may need to move

their satellite dishes to obtain better reception after the one-year

window has passed.

18

The record supports the conclusion that the one-year limit

on remediation imposed by 47 C.F.R. § 101.1440(g) is

reasonably calculated to fulfill RLBSA’s requirement that

existing DBS subscribers not encounter “harmful interference.”

It was reasonable for the Commission to predict that any

interference imposed by new MVDDS transmitters would

become apparent within a year. Even in areas subject to severe

weather patterns that could obscure harmful interference from

an existing DBS subscriber, the natural cycle of the seasons will

allow interference above and beyond that caused by seasonal

weather patterns to announce itself before a full year is out.

Finally, our conclusion that the one-year remediation limit is

reasonable is bolstered by the accompanying provision in 47

C.F.R. § 101.1440(f) that in the event of any major modification

to an MVDDS station, including the addition of a new antenna,

all the rights of complaint accorded to existing DBS subscribers

“begin anew.”

B. Northpoint Challenges

Northpoint raises several theories for why the FCC’s

decision to allocate MVDDS licenses in the 12 GHz bandwidth

by auction is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law in violation

of the APA. Specifically, it argues that the auctioning decision

(a) violates the ORBIT Act’s prohibition against auctioning

“spectrum used for the provision of international or global

satellite communications services”; (b) was arbitrary and

capricious in violation of both Section 309(j) of the

Communications Act of 1934 and principles enunciated in

Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC; and (c) exceeds the FCC’s

auctioning authority, insofar as Northpoint claims it is the only

qualified MVDDS provider under the LOCAL TV Act. For the

reasons enunciated below, we conclude that none of these

theories unambiguously bar the Commission’s decision to

auction the MVDDS licenses.

19

1. ORBIT Act

The ORBIT Act, passed in 2000, compels the privatization

of the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization,

or INTELSAT, the U.S.-based, 143-nation, international satellite

consortium created by the Communications Satellite Act of

1962. It primarily protects and regulates INTELSAT and other

U.S.-based international or global satellite service providers.

Section 647 of the Act, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 765f, provides

that:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the

Commission shall not have the authority to assign by

competitive bidding orbital locations or spectrum used for

the provision of international or global satellite

communications services. The President shall oppose in the

International Telecommunication Union and in other

bilateral and multilateral fora any assignment by

competitive bidding of orbital locations or spectrum used

for the provision of such services.

Northpoint argues that Section 647 prohibits auctions of the

12 GHz bandwidth to MVDDS licensees, through its language

forbidding the FCC from “assign[ing] by competitive bidding

orbital locations or spectrum used for the provision of

international or global satellite communications services.” 47

U.S.C. § 765f. Northpoint argues that the 12 GHz bandwidth

cannot, therefore, be auctioned, as it is “spectrum used for the

provision of international or global satellite communications

services”–specifically, DBS and NGSO-FSS. It is irrelevant,

Northpoint argues, that what is being auctioned here–the use of

that spectrum by MVDDS providers–is not international or

global satellite service, because the statutory language was not

drafted to bar auctioning of spectrum to providers of

international or global satellite communications services.

20

Rather, Northpoint points out, the statute specifically bars

auctioning “spectrum used for the provision of international or

global satellite communications services.” 47 U.S.C. 765f

(emphasis added).

The Commission responds that it is owed deference under

Chevron Step Two for its interpretation of ambiguous language,

that, it argues, “does not directly address whether the ban on

auctions applies to terrestrial usage in spectrum sharing

situations.” Govt. Br. at 35.

We agree with the Commission that the ORBIT Act does

not unambiguously ban auctioning of MVDDS licenses for the

12 GHz bandwith. As the Commission noted in the Second

Order when it addressed Northpoint’s ORBIT Act argument, see

Second Order, 17 F.C.C. Rcd. at 9707 ¶ 244, and as we

explained just a few weeks ago in another case involving

Northpoint, see Northpoint Technology, Ltd., No. 04-1053 slip

op. at 11 (D.C. Cir. June 21, 2005) (rejecting the argument that

regardless of whether DBS is an international satellite service,

DBS licenses cannot be auctioned because DBS providers use

spectrum also available for NGSO-FSS, an international satellite

service), in the context of the ORBIT Act, the meaning of “used

for the provision of international or global satellite

communications services” is not entirely clear. Northpoint’s

construction of § 765f is plausible. But it is also possible to

construe the provision to forbid the FCC from auctioning

“orbital locations or spectrum” only when that spectrum is to be

“used for the provision of international or global satellite

communications services,” but not spectrum that is to be used

for provision of domestic, non-satellite-based communications

services. Because of this ambiguity, we defer to the

Commission’s reasonable interpretation. See Chevron, 467 U.S.

at 842-43.

21

2. Arbitrary and Capricious Claim

Northpoint’s next contention is that the FCC arbitrarily

discriminated against it by failing to include it in working out

sharing arrangements with all potential 12 GHz licensees,

including NGSO-FSS applicants. For this Northpoint constructs

two main arguments.

First, Northpoint argues that the FCC violated Section

309(j)(6)(E) of the Communications Act of 1934, codified at 47

U.S.C. § 309(j)(6)(E). Section 309 governs the Commission’s

treatment of applications for bandwidth licenses; Section 309(j)

governs the use of competitive bidding, in particular. Section

309(j)(6) provides:

Nothing in this subsection, or in the use of competitive

bidding, shall . . . be construed to relieve the Commission

of the obligation in the public interest to continue to use

engineering solutions, negotiation, threshold qualifications,

service regulations, and other means in order to avoid

mutual exclusivity in application and licensing

proceedings[.]

47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(6).

Northpoint argues that the Commission violated Section

309(j)(6) by not coming up with a way to avoid “mutual

exclusivity” among MVDDS applicants for the 12 GHz

bandwidth. In Northpoint’s opinion, once the “search[] for

consensus and engineering fixes” contemplated by section

309(j)(6)(E) was under way, the Commission had no discretion

remaining and had to negotiate to the point of avoiding mutual

exclusivity for all applicants. Northpoint Br. at 15.

22

We dismiss this contention out of hand. Section 309(j)(6)

merely provides “Rules of construction” for interpreting section

309(j). See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(6). We will not interpret a

hortatory provision exhorting, in Northpoint’s words, a “search

for consensus” to require that the Commission search and

negotiate until the bitter end.

Second, Northpoint argues that since both NGSO-FSS and

MVDDS licensees sought to use the same spectrum at the same

time, Ashbacker dictates that “the FCC [can] not grant one

[competing application] while setting the other for a

comparative hearing.” Northpoint Br. at 15. Instead,

Northpoint contends, “a single proceeding [involving both

NGSO-FSS and MVDDS applicants] was in fact launched

and–in all its key technical aspects–completed; then, after years

of negotiations, the proceeding was split in two, and one

participant in the original proceeding was told to start all over

again.” Northpoint Br. at 16. This argument is also off the mark.

As we have previously explained:

In Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, the Supreme Court held

that the FCC must conduct a comparative hearing whenever

there are before it mutually exclusive applications for a

broadcast license. The FCC has promulgated various

regulations governing the processing of such applications

and establishing certain filing deadlines. The purpose of

these rules is to attract all competitive applications for a

particular license within a fixed and reasonably short time

frame, allowing the Commission to satisfy its Ashbacker

obligations with a single, fairly prompt comparative

hearing.

Oregon v. FCC, 102 F.3d 583, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quotation

marks, brackets and citations omitted). Northpoint seems to be

23

arguing that the MVDDS license it seeks is mutually exclusive

with the eight licenses granted for NGSO-FSS use of the 12

GHz bandwidth. It follows, the company seems to be arguing,

that its application for an MVDDS license should have been

considered in a single comparative hearing with those of the

NGSO-FSS providers. But, Northpoint argues, because of

alleged preferential treatment by the FCC–i.e., “two years of

intense technical negotiation” resulting in the NGSO-FSS

licenses awarded “not [being] mutually exclusive,” Northpoint

Br. at 15 (emphasis in original)–the NGSO-FSS providers did

not have to be considered alongside Northpoint in a single,

comparative hearing.

Northpoint’s use of Ashbacker Radio here is creative, but

stretches a bit too far. The NGSO-FSS and MVDDS licenses

are two different kinds of licenses, for reasons to be explained

momentarily, and need not be considered together. Perhaps what

Northpoint was getting at was a more general principle–that an

agency must provide adequate explanation before treating

similarly situated parties differently, or else be in violation of

the APA. See, e.g., Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.

Surface Transp. Bd., 403 F.3d 771, 776-77 (D.C. Cir. 2005);

Chadmoore Communications v. FCC, 113 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C.

Cir. 1997). But Northpoint’s application for an MVDDS license

is differently situated from that of the NGSO-FSS applicants, as

the Commission adequately explained in the Orders under

review. NGSO-FSS service is satellite-based; MVDDS uses

terrestrial transmitters. More saliently, at the time the FCC first

announced it would allow NGSO-FSS and MVDDS providers

to share the 12 GHz bandwidth, how NGSO-FSS providers

could share that was well understood, having been discussed at

the 2000 World Radiocommunication Conference, but how

exactly MVDDS providers would share that spectrum was not.

See First Order, 16 F.C.C. Rcd. at 4109, ¶¶ 19-21. For that

reason, and in order to support its RLBSA burden of ensuring

24

that the terrestrial-based technology did not cause “harmful

interference” with DBS service, the FCC issued a Further Notice

of Proposed Rulemaking at that time. Id. at ¶ 21. Because

MVDDS is differently situated from NGSO-FSS technology, it

was not arbitrary or capricious for the FCC to conduct the

NGSO-FSS licensing process separately, and wait to license, via

auction, MVDDS licenses after further rulemaking.

3. LOCAL TV Act

Northpoint’s final formal argument is that by operation of

the LOCAL TV Act, it was the only “qualified applicant” for

terrestrial use of the 12 GHz bandwidth, and that therefore, the

FCC lacked the section 309(j)(1) authority to auction MVDDS

use of the 12 GHz bandwidth.

As noted above, the LOCAL TV Act required independent

testing within 60 days of the Act’s enactment of “any terrestrial

service technology proposed by any entity that has filed an

application to provide terrestrial service in the direct broadcast

frequency band,” to ensure that there would not be harmful

interference with DBS service in that bandwidth. See 47 U.S.C.

§ 1110. Northpoint argues that pursuant to this provision, only

entities which submitted technology for testing are eligible for

MVDDS licenses, and that as only it submitted technology for

testing, it is the sole entity eligible for an MVDDS license.

The Commission responds that “terrestrial service

technology” in that context arguably refers more generally to

MVDDS technology, and that it could therefore “reasonably

find that an MVDDS system operated within parameters

developed pursuant to [the independent tester’s] test of

Northpoint’s hardware and FCC-developed engineering models

constitutes a method of providing service–[i.e.,] a

technology–within the meaning of the statute, without regard to

25

the particular hardware used [by, e.g. Northpoint] to operate the

system.” Govt. Br. at 39.

The Commission has the better of the argument. The term

“terrestrial service technology” as used in 47 U.S.C. § 1110

might refer to the exact system used by the authors of the

pending applications to which that section refers; the term might

also refer more generally to the scientific or technical methods

of which that (or those) authors’ pending application takes

advantage. Chevron tells us that when more than one reasonable

interpretation exists, the choice is not ours to make. See

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. Therefore, we again defer to the

Commission's interpretation.

As part of its LOCAL TV Act argument, Northpoint further

complains that “[t]he FCC could not properly rely on

Northpoint’s demonstration in order to qualify other applicants

for MVDDS licenses . . . also because Northpoint authorized the

Commission to carry out the demonstration solely for the

purpose of issuing licenses to Northpoint.” Northpoint Br. at 9

(emphasis added). If Northpoint is contending here that the

FCC violated an agreement with the company, that is a Tucker

Act matter, see 28 U.S.C. § 1491, and not for review in this

APA proceeding. Megapulse Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959, 967-

70 (D.C. Cir. 1982).3

III. Conclusion

In sum, because we defer to the FCC’s definition of

3

The Commission advances an additional argument

challenging the standing of Northpoint to bring this petition. Because

we conclude that Northpoint has in fact advanced a justiciable claim

that it has suffered injury redressable in this action, we reject that

challenge to our jurisdiction.

26

“harmful interference” as used in the RLBSA, and further find

its solutions for ensuring that both new and existing DBS

subscribers do not experience such “harmful interference”

reasonable, we reject the DBS providers’ APA challenge.

Similarly, because we find that the ORBIT Act does not

unambiguously bar the Commission’s decision to auction

MVDDS licenses for the 12 GHz bandwidth, and the LOCAL

TV Act does not unambiguously operate to bar the Commission

from auctioning those licenses to MVDDS providers other than

Northpoint, and that the Commission did not arbitrarily treat

Northpoint differently than the NGSO-FSS applicants in

violation of the APA, we reject Northpoint’s petition, as well.

Both petitions for review are denied, and the Orders of the

Commission affirmed.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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