Hansson, Marian K. v. Norton, Gale

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 24, 2005 Decided June 10, 2005

No. 04-5157

MARIAN K. HANSSON

APPELLANT

v.

GALE A. NORTON, SECRETARY,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cv02028)

David C. Vladeck argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Marina U. Braswell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the briefs were Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S.

Attorney. R. Craig Lawrence entered an appearance.

2

John A. Payton and Paul R. Wolfson were on the brief for

amicus curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,

Inc. in support of appellant.

Before: EDWARDS, ROGERS and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Marion Hansson seeks to recover

$37,077.94 in attorney’s fees that she incurred in settling her

administrative complaints against the Bureau of Indian Affairs

(“BIA”) in the Department of the Interior for discrimination on

the basis of her national origin and age in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

(2000), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967

(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (2000). When the Secretary

of the Interior awarded only one-fourth of the requested

attorney’s fees, Hansson filed suit in the district court, alleging

that the Secretary’s final fee award violated Title VII, Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) regulations,

and the parties’ settlement agreement. The district court granted

the Secretary’s motion to dismiss the complaint, ruling that it

lacked subject matter jurisdiction under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-5(f)(3).

Upon de novo review, see Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 360 F.3d

188, 190-91 (D.C. Cir. 2004), we hold that the district court

lacked jurisdiction over Hansson’s complaint because it was a

contract claim against the United States for more than $10,000,

over which the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive

jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000).

This court generally treats settlement agreements as contracts

subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal

Claims, see Shaffer v. Veneman, 325 F.3d 370, 372 (D.C. Cir.

2003), and the court recently held in Brown v. United States, 389

3

F.3d 1296, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 2004), that a claim for breach of a

Title VII settlement agreement is a contract claim within the

meaning of the Tucker Act. Because Hansson’s claim for

attorney’s fees neither requires an interpretation of Title VII

with respect to her discrimination complaint nor seeks equitable

relief, it involves “only straightforward contract issues” that

belong in the Court of Federal Claims. Shaffer, 325 F.3d at 373.

Accordingly, we vacate the opinion and judgment of the district

court and remand the case to the district court with instructions

to transfer the case to the Court of Federal Claims. See 28

U.S.C. § 1631 (2000).

I.

Marian Hansson, “an American of Kiowa (American

Indian) origin” who is over sixty years of age, is employed by

the BIA as a curator of American Indian art. Compl. ¶ 2, at 2.

In November 2001, she retained the law firm of Gebhardt &

Associates, LLP (“Gebhardt”), to file several administrative

complaints with the BIA alleging employment discrimination on

the basis of her national origin and age. On June 28, 2002, the

BIA executed a Resolution Agreement granting Hansson

substantially all of the relief sought in her complaints, including

“reasonable attorney’s fees and costs” in accordance with the

EEOC regulations at 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e) (2004).

Resolution Agreement ¶ 8m, at 8. In exchange, Hansson agreed

to withdraw all pending and potential discrimination complaints

against the BIA, through the date of the Resolution Agreement.

Id. ¶ 5, at 3. The settlement agreement provided that “should the

Agency fail to honor its obligations as set forth in this

Resolution Agreement for any reason not attributed to acts or

conduct by the Complainant, the provisions outlined in 29

C.F.R. § 1614.504 shall govern.” Id. ¶ 11, at 9.

In accordance with the Resolution Agreement, Gebhardt

submitted to the BIA a statement of its fees and costs associated

4

with its representation of Hansson, totaling $37,077.94. By

letter of September 12, 2002, the Director of the Office for

Equal Opportunity (“OEO”) for the Department of the Interior

awarded Gebhardt $8,959.44, explaining that the law firm was

not entitled to fees for pre-complaint services or for services

related to Hansson’s age discrimination claim. The OEO letter

also stated that this was the agency’s final decision regarding

Hansson’s claim for attorney’s fees and costs, and that she could

appeal the decision to the EEOC within 30 days or, “[i]n lieu of

an appeal to the Commission, [she could] file a civil action in an

appropriate United States District Court” within 90 days,

naming the Secretary of the Interior as the defendant.

On October 16, 2002, Hansson sued the Secretary in the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia,

alleging that the final decision to award less than one-fourth of

the requested attorney’s fees was arbitrary, capricious, and in

violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k),1 the EEOC

regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e), and the Resolution

Agreement. She sought recovery of the $37,077.94 in attorney’s

fees incurred in settling her administrative complaints — the

same amount her attorney requested pursuant to the Resolution

Agreement — plus reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred

in maintaining this action. The Secretary moved to dismiss the

complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Title VII

and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and Hansson

cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court granted

the Secretary’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, and Hansson appeals.

1

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provides that “[i]n any action or

proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow

the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . as part of the

costs.”

5

II.

In dismissing Hansson’s complaint, the district court ruled

that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), which grants jurisdiction over

“actions brought under” Title VII, does not extend to actions

brought solely to recover attorney’s fees incurred during Title

VII administrative proceedings. It relied on North Carolina

Department of Transportation v. Crest Street Community

Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6 (1986), which held that 42 U.S.C. §

1988 does not authorize courts to award attorney’s fees in

actions brought solely to recover attorney’s fees incurred during

Title VI administrative proceedings. Id. at 15. On appeal,

Hansson contends that her case is governed by New York

Gaslight Club v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980), which stated that

Title VII’s “authorization of a civil suit in federal court

encompasses a suit solely to obtain an award of attorney’s fees

for legal work done in state and local proceedings.” Id. at 66.

She maintains that the district court erred in relying on Crest

Street because the language and structure of Title VI are

different from that of Title VII: first, § 1988 authorizes an award

of attorney’s fees in “actions or proceedings to enforce” Title

VI, while § 2000e-5(k) authorizes an award of attorney’s fees

for any “action or proceeding under” Title VII, and second,

administrative proceedings are voluntary under Title VI, while

they are mandatory under Title VII.

In supplemental briefs on appeal the parties addressed two

issues: first, whether Hansson was a “prevailing party” within

the meaning of § 2000e-5(k) in light of the court’s recent

decision in Alegria v. District of Columbia, 391 F.3d 262 (D.C.

Cir. 2004), which applied Buckhannon Board & Care Home,

Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human

Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), to the Individuals with

Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (2000); and

second, whether the district court had jurisdiction over

Hansson’s claim for attorney’s fees in light of the court’s recent

6

decision in Brown, 333 F.3d 1296. The court expresses

appreciation to the parties for this assistance. We now conclude

that Hansson’s claim for attorney’s fees is a contract claim that

belongs in the Court of Federal Claims, and we do not reach the

question whether Title VII authorizes an award of attorney’s

fees in an action brought solely to recover attorney’s fees or the

question whether Hansson is a “prevailing party.”

Although Hansson maintains on appeal that her complaint

raises a Title VII claim for attorney’s fees and not a contract

claim to enforce the Resolution Agreement, the record indicates

otherwise. Hansson’s complaint seeks “relief for harm caused

to her by [the Agency’s] unlawful refusal to comply with the

Resolution Agreement . . . in that the Agency has without

justification refused to pay reasonable attorney’s fees.” Compl.

¶ 1, at 1. Specifically, the complaint alleges three “causes of

action”: first, that the Secretary’s final fee award “is arbitrary,

capricious, and unsupported by law, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-5(k) and 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)”; second, that it

“violates the Resolution Agreement signed by [Hansson] and the

BIA”; and third, that it “constitutes an improper deferral of

decision-making authority from the BIA to the Office of the

Secretary.” Id. ¶¶ 14-16, at 4. Hansson’s complaint does not

allege that the denial of her requested attorney’s fees violated

Title VII because it was discriminatory; nor does she seek

redetermination of her original discrimination claims. Cf. Scott

v. Johanns, No. 04-5267 (D.C. Cir. June 3, 2005). On appeal,

Hansson relies primarily on the first cause of action, which

appears to invoke this court’s authority under the Administrative

Procedure Act to review final agency actions. See 5 U.S.C. §

704 (2000). Such review is precluded, however, if there is

another “adequate remedy in a court,” id., or if “any other

statute,” such as the Tucker Act, “expressly or impliedly forbids

the relief which is sought,” id. § 702, in what is “essentially a

contract action,” Albrecht v. Comm. on Employee Benefits, 357

7

F.3d 62, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

Moreover, while Hansson claims she has the right to bring

an independent Title VII action for attorney’s fees, any such

action would be waived by her execution of the Resolution

Agreement and could not be pursued until it was reinstated

pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(a), or until there was a

determination that the Secretary had breached the Agreement.

See, e.g., Brown, 389 F.3d at 1297; Saksenasingh v. Sec’y of

Educ., 126 F.3d 347, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Contrary to

Hansson’s suggestion, nothing in the Resolution Agreement

preserves Hansson’s right to bring a Title VII action for

attorney’s fees in district court pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407

if the parties disagree on the amount of fees.2 The Resolution

Agreement states that Hansson “will receive no relief or other

consideration beyond that recited in this Resolution Agreement.”

Resolution Agreement ¶ 6, at 4. While Hansson points to the

EEOC regulations incorporated by the Resolution Agreement,

those regulations provide only administrative procedures for

contesting the final fee award. The Resolution Agreement states

that “[t]he Agency shall pay reasonable attorney’s fees and costs

. . . in accordance with the EEOC regulations at 29 C.F.R. §

1614.501(e).” Id. ¶ 8m, at 8. Those regulations provide that the

final fee award “shall include a notice of right to appeal to

EEOC,” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e), not that Hansson retains the

2

Title VII provides that any federal employee “aggrieved by

the [agency’s] final disposition of his [or her] [discrimination]

complaint . . . may file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5 of

this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). The EEOC regulations at 29

C.F.R. § 1614.407 explain that a complainant “is authorized under

[T]itle VII . . . to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court . . . [w]ithin 90 days of receipt of the final action on an

individual or class complaint if no appeal has been filed [with the

EEOC].”

8

right to bring a Title VII action for attorney’s fees in district

court pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407.

The Resolution Agreement also states that “should the

Agency fail to honor its obligations as set forth in this

Resolution Agreement . . . the provisions outlined in 29 C.F.R.

§ 1614.504 shall govern.” Resolution Agreement ¶ 11, at 9.

Those provisions provide:

If the complainant believes that the agency has failed

to comply with the terms of a settlement agreement or

decision, the complainant shall notify the EEO

Director, in writing, of the alleged noncompliance

within 30 days of when the complainant knew or

should have known of the alleged noncompliance. The

complainant may request that the terms of the

settlement agreement be specifically implemented or,

alternatively, that the complaint be reinstated for

further processing from the point processing ceased.

29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(a).

As the Secretary points out, Hansson failed to notify the EEO

Director of any alleged breach of the Resolution Agreement.

Furthermore, 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504 does not authorize Hansson

to file a Title VII action in district court, for it provides only that

her complaint may be “reinstated for further processing at the

point processing ceased,” which, for Hansson, was in the

administrative process.

Nor, contrary to Hansson’s contention, did the OEO letter

of September 12, 2002 contemplate the preservation of a Title

VII action for attorney’s fees: while advising Hansson that she

could file a civil action in district court in lieu of appealing the

Secretary’s final fee award to the EEOC, it did not indicate that

9

Hansson could bring a Title VII action for attorney’s fees that

was otherwise waived by her execution of the Resolution

Agreement. Rather, the portion of the OEO letter on which

Hansson relies appears to be boilerplate language paraphrasing

29 C.F.R. § 1614.407, which was not incorporated by the

Resolution Agreement. Thus, nothing in the Resolution

Agreement or the OEO letter preserves Hansson’s right to file

a Title VII action for attorney’s fees in district court.

Accordingly, Hansson’s claim “turns entirely on the terms of a

contract,” and appears to belong in the Court of Federal Claims.

Albrecht, 357 F.3d at 69.

While the court generally treats settlement agreements as

contracts within the meaning of the Tucker Act, see Shaffer, 325

F.3d at 372, it also recognizes that when a settlement agreement

incorporates substantive provisions of federal law such that

enforcement of the agreement requires the interpretation and

application of federal law, that enforcement action arises under

federal law and belongs in the district court. See id. at 372-73;

Bd. of Trustees v. Madison Hotel, Inc., 97 F.3d 1479, 1484-86

(D.C. Cir. 1999). Here, the Resolution Agreement incorporates

29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e), which describes the familiar lodestar

method for calculating attorney’s fees:

The starting point shall be the number of hours

reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly

rate. There is a strong presumption that this amount

represents the reasonable fee. In limited circum-

stances, this amount may be reduced or increased in

consideration of the degree of success, quality of

representation, and long delay caused by the agency.

29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(e)(2)(ii)(B); see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461

U.S. 424 (1983). Hansson acknowledges that the “reasonable

hourly rate” is guided by the Laffey matrix prepared by the U.S.

10

Attorney’s Office. See Covington v. District of Columbia, 57

F.3d 1101, 1105-11 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing Laffey v. Northwest

Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983), rev’d on other

grounds 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). Enforcement of the

Resolution Agreement’s provision for reasonable attorney’s

fees, then, does not require interpretation of the substantive

provisions of Title VII with respect to Hansson’s discrimination

complaints, but only the application of well-known standards for

determining reasonable attorney’s fees. To the extent that

Hansson also seeks attorney’s fees for services related to her age

discrimination claim under the ADEA, that determination does

not involve an interpretation of Title VII, which she

acknowledges is the only basis for her claim for attorney’s fees,

as she has not asserted a claim for fees under the ADEA itself.

Hansson’s vague policy objection that the Court of Federal

Claims is not a “national court” like the district court is

unavailing in light of our precedent.

Hansson points out that the Court of Federal Claims “has

consistently held that it lacks jurisdiction to hear claims alleging

the breach of a Title VII settlement agreement due to the

comprehensive statutory scheme established under Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act.” Griswold v. United States, 61 Fed. Cl.

458, 465 (2004); see Lee v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 374, 378-

79 (1995); Fausto v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 750, 753 (1989).

These cases can all be distinguished, however, on the ground

that they involved claims for equitable relief that the Court of

Claims lacked jurisdiction to grant. See Griswold, 61 Fed. Cl.

at 460; Lee, 33 Fed. Cl. at 376-77; Fausto, 16 Fed. Cl. at 751.

We are unaware of any case in which the Court of Federal

Claims has denied jurisdiction over an action to enforce a Title

VII settlement agreement in which only money relief is sought.

The cases cited by Hansson in her supplemental brief that

involve annual and sick leave and back pay are not to the

contrary. See Taylor v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 423, 423

11

(2002); Mitchell v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 437, 438 (1999).

The Federal Circuit appears to agree with the Court of

Federal Claims’ precedent that “the Court of Federal Claims

lacks jurisdiction ‘over actions for breach of settlement

agreements when the agreements ar[i]se from disputes which

would have been litigated in other fora.’” Massie v. United

States, 166 F.3d 1184, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (alteration in

original); cf. St. Vincent’s Med. Ctr. v. United States, 32 F.3d

548, 550 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Medicare Act); Chin v. United States,

890 F.2d 1143, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (Postal Reform Act). It

also appears to agree with this court’s precedent that the Court

of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction under the Tucker Act only

if “disposition of the contract claim would require review of

subject matter reserved to another body,” Massie, 166 F.3d at

1189; cf. Bobula v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 970 F.2d 854, 858

(Fed. Cir. 1992) (Civil Service Reform Act). In holding that the

Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction over a claim for an

annuity under the comprehensive remedial scheme of the

Military Claims Act (“MCA”), the Federal Circuit distinguished

between “review of the substantive issues of the MCA claim —

the existence and extent of the government’s liability” — and

the enforcement of “an express contract embodying” the

claimant’s entitlement to the annuity under the MCA. Massie,

166 F.3d at 1189. This jurisdictional line is analogous to that

drawn by this court in Brown, 389 F.3d at 1296, Shaffer, 725

F.3d at 373, and Madison Hotel, 97 F.3d at 1485. Finally, the

Court of Federal Claims has acknowledged our decision in

Brown, see Boston Edison Co. v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 167,

178 (2005), and the Secretary affirmatively stated in briefing

that Hansson’s claim is one in contract within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims and through counsel

represented to the court during oral argument that, contrary to

the government’s position in other cases, see, e.g., Massie, 166

F.3d at 1188; Griswold, 61 Fed. Cl. at 461, the government

12

would not argue in the Court of Federal Claims that that court

lacks jurisdiction over Hansson’s claim for attorney’s fees.

Therefore, this court has no reason to conclude that the Court of

Federal Claims will not accept jurisdiction over Hansson’s

claim. Cf. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486

U.S. 808, 818-19 (1988).

Because Hansson’s claim for attorney’s fees neither

requires an interpretation of Title VII with respect to her

discrimination complaint nor seeks equitable relief under Title

VII, but rather seeks reasonable attorney’s fees defined by well-

established standards, it is a contract claim against the United

States for more than $10,000. Under Shaffer and Brown,

Hansson’s claim for attorney’s fees is within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker

Act. Accordingly, we hold that the district court lacked

jurisdiction over Hansson’s complaint, and we vacate the

opinion and judgment of the district court and remand the case

to the district court with instructions to transfer the case to the

Court of Federal Claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631.