Paraskevaides v. Four Seasons Washington

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 12, 2002 Decided June 14, 2002

Nos. 01-7121 & 01-7134

Thelma G. Paraskevaides, et al.,

Appellants

v.

Four Seasons Washington,

Appellee

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cv02802)

Barbara I. Michaelides argued the cause for appellants.

With her on the briefs were Nicholas H. Cobbs and Susan J.

Condon.

Karla Grossenbacher argued the cause for appellee. With

her on the brief was Joseph R. Damato.

Before: Sentelle and Garland, Circuit Judges, and

Silberman, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: Appellants Thelma and Christina

Paraskevaides, together with their insurance company Ameri-

can Home Assurance Company, brought suit against Four

Seasons Washington after over one million dollars worth of

their jewelry was stolen from a convenience safe located in

their hotel room. The Four Seasons defended on grounds

that their liability was limited by District of Columbia law.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the

hotel, finding that the Four Seasons had limited its liability

pursuant to the District of Columbia's Innkeeper Statute, and

on the alternate ground that the Paraskevaides1 were contrib-

utorily negligent for using their in-room safes rather than

safety deposit boxes. Because the Four Seasons failed to

comply fully with the Innkeeper Statute, and because we

conclude that placing valuables in a locked, in-room conve-

nience safe located inside a locked hotel room does not

constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law, we

reverse and remand the case to the district court for further

proceedings.

I. Background

Appellants Thelma and Christina Paraskevaides ("the Par-

askevaides") checked into the Four Seasons Washington ("the

Four Seasons") in Washington, D.C. on September 22, 1997.

They brought with them close to 1.2 million dollars worth of

jewelry to wear to various political functions around the city.

__________

1 The author recognizes that the rules of grammar dictate that to

create the plural form of a proper name that ends in an "s," one

must add an "es." E.g., The Chicago Manual of Style s 6.5 (13th

rev. ed. 1982). The plural of "Paraskevaides" would therefore be

"Paraskevaideses." However, the author finds the name "Paraske-

vaideses" so distracting that he chooses to ignore the rule. See In

re Gaston & Snow, 243 F.3d 599, 601 n.1 (2d Cir. 2001). No such

willingness to ignore the rules of the English language should be

imputed to Judge Garland or Senior Judge Silberman.

The Paraskevaides stayed in a suite that consisted of two

bedrooms adjoined by a living room. Each bedroom and the

living room contained a "convenience safe" that was located in

the back of a closet and accessible via keys provided by the

hotel. The Paraskevaides placed their valuables (i.e., jewelry,

travel documents, traveler's checks, etc.) in the bedroom safes

rather than the safety deposit boxes that were provided by

the hotel and located near the hotel's reception area.

On September 27, 1997, the Paraskevaides left their hotel

room with their room and safe keys. Upon returning to their

suite, they discovered that their room had been entered

(although not forcibly) and that their bedroom safes were

open and empty. Both hotel security personnel and the

Washington Metropolitan Police Department were notified,

but the items were never recovered. According to the hotel

manager, the suite doors and safes could be opened by either

of two master keys, as well as the guest room key. The

manager also testified that at least one master key ring had

been missing since March 1997. Apparently neither the room

locks nor the safe locks had been changed. The hotel did not

give any notice to appellants that the keys were missing.

District of Columbia Code s 30-101,2 "Liability for loss or

destruction of, or damage to, personal property of guests,"

states in pertinent part:

(a) If a hotel, motel or similar establishment in the

District of Columbia which provides lodging to transient

guests: (1) Provides a suitable depository (other than a

checkroom) for the safekeeping of personal property

(other than a motor vehicle); and (2) displays conspicu-

ously in the guest and public rooms of that establishment

a printed copy of this section (or summary thereof); that

establishment shall not be liable for the loss or destruc-

__________

2 At the time the parties filed the cross-motions for summary

judgment in this case, the Innkeeper Statute was codified at D.C.

Code s 34-101. Since that time, the statute has been re-codified at

D.C. Code s 30-101. For convenience purposes, we refer to the

Innkeeper Statute at issue in this case as D.C. Code s 30-101.

tion of, or damage to, any personal property of a guest or

patron not deposited for safekeeping, except that this

sentence shall not apply with respect to the liability of

that establishment for loss or destruction of, or damage

to, any personal property retained by a guest in his room

if the property is such property as is usual, common, or

prudent for a guest to retain in his room. In the case of

any personal property of a guest or patron deposited in

such a depository for safekeeping, that establishment

shall be liable for the loss or destruction of, or damage

to, that property to the extent of the lesser of $1,000 or

the fair market value of the property at the time of its

loss, destruction, or damage.

On the back wall of each bedroom closet in the Paraske-

vaides' suite that contained a convenience safe, the Four

Seasons had posted a notice that explained the hotel's limited

liability with respect to objects not placed in the safety

deposit boxes provided by the hotel. This "NOTICE TO

GUESTS" stated in its entirety:

You are hereby notified that the Management provides

a suitable depository for the safekeeping of personal

property of its guests and you are invited to use the

same.

Under the laws of the District of Columbia, if a hotel

provides a suitable depository for the safekeeping of

personal property, the hotel is not liable for the loss or

destruction of, or damage to, any personal property of a

guest not deposited for safekeeping, except for property

as is usual, common, or prudent to retain in his room.

Where property is deposited in a depository for safe-

keeping, the hotel is liable for the loss or destruction of,

or damage to, that property only to the extent of the

lesser of $1000.00 or the fair market value of the proper-

ty at the time of its loss, damage or destruction.

These disclaimers were only located on the back walls of

closets that contained convenience safes; they were not post-

ed anywhere else in the hotel. The hotel had also placed a

disclaimer sticker that summarized the hotel's limited liability

on the door of each safe itself. These stickers stated in their

entirety:

This room safe is provided solely as a convenience for

our guests. It is not a substitute for the fireproof, front

office safe maintained by the hotel where your money,

jewelry, documents or other articles of value may be

placed for safe keeping. This hotel is not responsible for

valuables placed in this room safe. Use of this room safe

does not extend this hotel's liability under District of

Columbia Innkeeper Statutes. If you desire to use the

room safe, take the key with you when you leave. Leave

the key in the lock when you check out. In the event

that your key is lost, there will be a $25.00 charge for

opening the safe.

II. Proceedings Below

The Paraskevaides sued the Four Seasons for, inter alia,

gross negligence and breach of warranty of safety and securi-

ty for the theft of their jewelry. The Four Seasons asserted

two affirmative defenses: a statutory limitation of liability

pursuant to section 30-101 and contributory negligence. The

Paraskevaides moved for summary judgment on the issue of

liability, contending that the Four Seasons failed to comply

fully with the requirements of section 30-101 and therefore

could not take protection under the statute's limited liability

provision. The Four Seasons cross-moved for summary judg-

ment on the issue of liability, contending that they had

complied with the statutory requirements by providing a

suitable depository for guests' valuables and by conspicuously

placing notices of its limited liability on the walls next to the

in-room convenience safes. The Four Seasons also claimed

that the Paraskevaides had actual notice of the hotel's limited

liability through prior stays at the hotel and prior usage of

the safety deposit boxes. Finally, the Four Seasons contend-

ed that several of the Paraskevaides' claims were unrecog-

nized in the District of Columbia.

On June 19, 2001, the district court denied the Paraske-

vaides' motion for summary judgment and awarded summary

judgment to the Four Seasons on grounds that D.C. Code

s 30-101 limited the Four Seasons' liability to the Paraske-

vaides. The court then provided three alternative reasons for

granting summary judgment to the Four Seasons: 1) several

of the Paraskevaides' counts are not recognized in the Dis-

trict of Columbia; 2) the Paraskevaides failed to show that

the Four Seasons did not exercise reasonable care; and 3) the

Paraskevaides' contributory negligence, which resulted from

"choosing to place $1.2 million dollars worth of jewelry in a

hotel room safe," acted as a complete bar to recovery. Par-

askevaides v. Four Seasons Washington, 148 F. Supp. 2d 20,

27 (D.D.C. 2001). This appeal followed.

III. Analysis

A district court properly grants summary judgment if there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and if the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

250 (1986). In this case, the Paraskevaides appeal the district

court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the

Four Seasons and to deny summary judgment in their favor

on the issue of liability. Thus to succeed on appeal, the

Paraskevaides must demonstrate that there is a genuine

dispute over a material fact, such that a reasonable jury could

rule in their favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. We review

the district court's summary judgment ruling de novo. Gil-

vin v. Fire, 259 F.3d 749, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

A. Liability

Under the general common law doctrine of infra hospiti-

um, an innkeeper is strictly liable for loss or damage to a

guest's property "unless the property is lost or destroyed by

an act of God, the public enemy, or by fault of the guest."

Hallman v. Federal Parking Services, Inc., 134 A.2d 382, 384

(D.C. 1957); see also Governor House v. Schmidt, 284 A.2d

660, 661 (D.C. 1971); Hotel Corp. of America v. Travelers

Indem. Co., 229 A.2d 158, 159 (D.C. 1967). Many jurisdic-

tions, however, have limited an innkeeper's common law

liability to his guests through statutory enactment. Section

30-101 of the D.C. Code is such a limiting statute, as the

district court recognized. See Paraskevaides, 148 F. Supp.

2d at 26. Under the statute, a hotel limits its liability to its

guests if it provides, and properly notifies its guests of, a

suitable depository for the safekeeping of their valuable items

and of the statutory limitations on its liability. Id.

The district court held that the Four Seasons complied with

the statutory requirements of section 30-101, reasoning that a

hotel is only liable for a guest's property loss if it fails to

display a copy of the statute, fails to post the notice conspicu-

ously, or if the guest's property is the type that would usually

or commonly be kept in a guest's room. See id. Finding that

the Four Seasons posted a conspicuous summary of section

30-101 next to the in-room convenience safes and finding that

it was not usual, common or prudent to place $1.2 million

worth of jewelry in such safes, the district court held that the

Four Seasons complied with the statutory requirements "and

no reasonable jury, based on the evidence proffered by the

plaintiffs, could make a finding to the contrary." Id.

We disagree. In limiting a hotel's liability, section 30-101

deviates from the general common law and must therefore be

strictly construed. See Osbourne v. Capital City Mortgage

Corp., 727 A.2d 322, 325 (D.C. 1999) ("[N]o statute is to be

construed as altering the common law, farther than its words

import.") (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Picker

v. Searcher's Detective Agency, Inc., 515 F.2d 1316, 1319

(D.C. Cir. 1975). The plain language of the statute states

quite clearly that a hotel must "display[ ] conspicuously in the

guest and public rooms of [the hotel] a printed copy" of the

limiting statute (or summary thereof). D.C. Code s 30-

101(a) (emphasis added). It is undisputed that the Four

Seasons only posted a copy of the limiting statute in the guest

rooms of the hotel, thereby failing to post notices in any of

the hotel's "public rooms." The Four Seasons nonetheless

contends that its posting of the "summary of the statute and

the accompanying disclaimer notice were sufficient to place

the Paraskevaides on notice of the liability limitations provid-

ed by the Innkeeper Statute." The district court agreed,

ruling that by posting a printed copy of section 30-101 next to

the in-room convenience safe, the Four Seasons "place[d] the

plaintiffs on notice and satisf[ied] [its] obligation under the

statute to do such." 148 F. Supp. 2d at 26. Perhaps the

Parasekvaides had notice; perhaps not. But whether they

did is irrelevant to our disposition of this case. The statute

says what it says: a hotel must "display[ ] conspicuously in

the guest and public rooms of [the hotel] a printed copy" of

the statute in order to limit its liability to guests. D.C. Code

s 30-101(a) (emphasis added). The Four Seasons undoubt-

edly displayed a copy or summary of the statute in its guests

rooms. It may even have done so "conspicuously," although

that remains unclear. What is clear is that the Four Seasons

did not display, conspicuously or otherwise, a copy or sum-

mary of the statute in its public rooms. Therefore, when we

strictly construe this statute, as we must, we conclude that

the Four Seasons failed to comply fully with the statute's

requirements for limiting its liability to the Paraskevaides.

Other courts interpreting similar Innkeeper Statutes agree

that strict compliance with a jurisdiction's Innkeeper Statute

is necessary before a hotel may avail itself of the statute's

limitation on liability. See Searcy v. La Quinta Motor Inns,

Inc., 676 So.2d 1137, 1141 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (literal compli-

ance with statutory provisions is required; fact that hotel

posted requirements behind guest door in partial compliance

with statute does not remove statutory requirement to post

statute behind registration area as well); Florida Sonesta

Corp. v. Aniballi, 463 So.2d 1203, 1207 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

1985) (denying limited liability to hotel that posted required

notice on back of guest bathroom doors, but failed to post

notice in the office, hall or lobby of the hotel as required by

statute); Skyways Motor Lodge, Corp. v. General Foods

Corp., 403 A.2d 722, 723 (Del. 1979) (hotel found in non-

compliance with statute that required posting of hotel's limit-

ed liability "in every lodging room and other conspicuous

places" when it only posted notices on back of room doors and

on registration card); Insurance Co. of North America v.

Holiday Inns of America, 337 N.Y.S.2d 68, 69-70 (App. Div.

1972) (hotel found in non-compliance with statute that re-

quired posting "in a public and conspicuous place and manner

in the office and public rooms, and in the public parlors of

[the] hotel," when it only posted notices in the guest rooms).

The Four Seasons attempts to strengthen its position be-

fore this Court by claiming that the Paraskevaides had actual

notice of both the availability of a "suitable depository" for

their valuables and the hotel's limited liability with respect to

their valuables because they had used the Four Seasons'

safety deposit boxes on prior visits to the hotel. Maybe so.

But if we must strictly construe the statute, then it is

altogether irrelevant whether the Paraskevaides had actual

notice of the hotel's limited liability if the Four Seasons

nonetheless failed to abide by the statute's terms to ensure its

limited liability. We are not alone in our position. Other

courts have similarly rejected the Four Seasons' "actual

notice" argument. See North River Ins. Co. v. Tisch Mgt.,

Inc., 166 A.2d 169, 172 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960)

("Evidence of actual knowledge by the guest of the availabili-

ty of a hotel depository and of the limited statutory liability,

is, by the weight of the authority, with which we agree, not an

acceptable substitute for strict compliance with the statute as

to notice by the hotelkeeper."); Johnston v. Mobile Hotel Co.,

167 So. 595, 596 (Ala. Ct. App. 1936) (finding that actual

notice of a hotelkeeper's limited liability is not compliance

with the statute's requirements); Featherstone v. Dessert, 22

P.2d 1050, 1053 (Wash. 1933) ("The statute makes no provi-

sion for an actual notice, and a strict construction of the

statute does not permit the innkeeper who has failed to

comply with the terms of it to assert the actual notice of the

guest as a sufficient substitute for the statutory require-

ment."); Heinz v. Leeds & Lippincott Co., 55 F.2d 829, 830-

31 (3d Cir. 1932) ("Certainly there ought to be a strict

compliance with the act if the hotel owner is to claim its

benefits; and it is doubtful whether actual notice ... would

operate as a bar to plaintiff's recovery."). Although a few

courts have addressed the question of actual notice and

reached the opposite conclusion, we reject their analyses as

having preceded the long line of cases offered supra. See

Nesben v. Jackson, 109 S.E. 489, 490 (W.Va. 1921) ("An inn

guest's actual knowledge that his host requires a deposit of

his jewelry, money, and other valuables in the office, as a

condition of liability, is obviously binding upon him. Actual

notice is always more potent than merely constructive no-

tice."); Shultz v. Wall, 19 A. 742, 745 (Pa. 1890) ("[I]f notice

... is proved, then the provisions for constructive notice

become immaterial.").

Acknowledging that it failed to post the necessary notices

in the public rooms of the hotel, the Four Seasons nonethe-

less argues that "the most reasonable interpretation of the

statute is that a posting of the summary of the statute in the

public room was not required in this case." By way of

explanation, the Four Seasons asserts that "the posting re-

quired by the statute is to be in the guest rooms for guests of

the hotel, and the posting in the public rooms is for patrons of

the hotel." According to the Four Seasons, because the

Paraskevaides were guests of the hotel, they were only

entitled to a posting in their guest rooms. This interpreta-

tion of the statute is certainly not the "most reasonable" one

we can think of. In fact, it is altogether unreasonable. Only

through a strained (perhaps wishful) reading of the statute

would one conclude that the statute applies differently to

different classes of persons who visit hotels. The statute says

what it says: a hotel must "provide[ ] a suitable depository"

for one's personal property and must "display[ ] conspicuously

in the guest and public rooms" a copy or summary of the

hotel's liability with respect to that property. These two

criteria are set forth in the statute before the statute even

mentions its applicability to "guest[s] or patron[s]." D.C.

Code s 30-101. Thus the meaning of the statute is plain. If

a hotel provides a suitable depository for one's property, and

if a hotel posts a copy or summary of the statute in its guest

and public rooms, then the hotel has met its obligation under

the statute. If a guest nonetheless chooses to place $1.2

million worth of jewelry in her in-room safe, and if that

jewelry is subsequently stolen, then the statute applies. If,

however, a hotel provides a suitable depository but does not

post the statute in the guest and public rooms--in effect, if a

hotel only complies with part of the statutory requirements--

then the statute does not apply. No plain reading of the

statute leads us to conclude that different posting require-

ments are in effect for different classes of persons visiting a

hotel in the District of Columbia. Because the Four Seasons

failed to post a copy or summary of D.C. Code s 30-101 in its

public rooms, we hold that the Four Seasons cannot rely on

the statute to limit its liability to the Paraskevaides.

Once we conclude that the Innkeeper Statute does not

apply to the Four Seasons, we are left with the question:

What law, in fact, does apply? The district court noted, as do

we, that under the common law doctrine of infra hospitium

an innkeeper is strictly liable for loss or damage to a guest's

property. However, the district court reached no conclusion

as to whether this particular common law doctrine applies in

the District of Columbia. See 148 F. Supp. 2d at 26 ("The

common law rule of infra hospitium, to the extent that it

exists in DC, has been limited and qualified by" the Innkeep-

er Statute.) (emphasis added). Because we are reviewing the

district court's decision de novo, we could, if so inclined,

decide the issue of what form of the doctrine of infra hospiti-

um applies in the District of Columbia. But as this issue was

not briefed before us, we conclude that in the interests of

justice, the appropriate action is to remand this issue to the

district court for further proceedings. We simply note that

whatever precise rule of common law applies in the District of

Columbia, D.C. Code s 30-101 almost certainly deviates from

that common law and must be strictly construed.3 When the

statute is so construed, it is clear that the Four Seasons failed

to comply fully and consequently may not rely on the statute

to limit its liability to the Paraskevaides.

__________

3 In oral argument, the awkwardness of the Four Seasons' sug-

gested reading became quite clear when it was unable to answer the

question as to what category applied to a guest of a guest (not a

paying patron) who came to a private room.

B. Contributory Negligence

After ruling that the statute limited the Four Seasons'

liability to the Paraskevaides, the district court provided

alternative bases for ruling in favor of the Four Seasons.

The district court ruled that several of the Paraskevaides'

counts, including breach of safety and security warranty,

breach of duty to invitee, and gross negligence, were not

recognized by the District of Columbia "as being actionable in

cases pertaining to property loss in hotel establishments" and

therefore dismissed them. 148 F. Supp. 2d at 26. The

district court then ruled that the Paraskevaides had "failed to

establish the bare bones of their negligence claim because

they have failed to show that [the Four Seasons] did not

exercise reasonable care." Id. at 27. The district court held

instead that it was the Paraskevaides, not the Four Seasons,

who were negligent for "choosing to place $1.2 million dollars

worth of jewelry in a hotel room safe." Id. The district

court then ruled that the Paraskevaides' contributory negli-

gence acted as a complete bar to their recovery. Id.

Before beginning our analysis, we briefly review the stan-

dard a court must apply when ruling on a motion for sum-

mary judgment: whether the moving party has shown that

there is no genuine dispute of material fact and it is therefore

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As such, it was

appropriate for the district court to rule that the Paraske-

vaides were contributorily negligent only if it is negligence, as

a matter of law, for hotel guests to place their valuables in a

locked safe within their locked rooms.

Whether a plaintiff is contributorily negligent is usually a

question for the jury. "Only in exceptional cases will ques-

tions of negligence [and] contributory negligence ... pass

from the realm of fact to one of law. Unless the evidence is

so clear and undisputed that fair-minded men can draw only

one conclusion, the questions are factual and not legal." Shu

v. Basinger, 57 A.2d 295, 295-96 (D.C. 1948) (footnote omit-

ted). Indeed, it is the rare case with "evidence so clear and

unambiguous that contributory negligence should be found as

a matter of law." Tilghman v. Johnson, 513 A.2d 1350, 1351

(D.C. 1986) (per curiam). The district court's decision re-

flects its conclusion that this is the rare and exceptional

case--that the Paraskevaides demonstrated such a "lack of

prudence in choosing to place $1.2 million dollars worth of

jewelry in a hotel room safe" that a fair-minded jury could

reach this and only this conclusion. 148 F. Supp. 2d at 27.

Based on the facts before us, we conclude otherwise.

The Paraskevaides provided evidence that even though

they normally do not travel with $1.2 million worth of jewelry,

they did so on this particular trip because they were sched-

uled to attend such functions as lunch on Capitol Hill, a

reception hosted by the First Lady, dinner with the Secretary

of State, and breakfast at the Vice President's residence.

They also provided evidence that they were uncomfortable

placing their jewelry in the safety deposit boxes provided by

the Four Seasons because the location of the boxes was "not

in a ... private place in the hotel," but was instead in a room

with a door that faced the lobby. According to the Paraske-

vaides, "when you go in to get some things or put things in

[the safety deposit boxes], then you walk [among] people [in

the lobby]." Given the location of the safety deposit boxes,

the Paraskevaides "felt it was safer" to place their valuables

in the locked in-room convenience safes.

We cannot conclude that by traveling with valuable jewelry

to attend high-level political functions in Washington, D.C.,

and by placing those valuables in a locked room safe because

it was more remote and appeared safer than a safety deposit

box, the Paraskevaides were negligent as a matter of law.

We conclude instead that these facts present a genuine issue

of material fact that is more appropriately resolved by a jury.

Traveling with valuables is not in itself negligent behavior.

Indeed, it is necessary and unavoidable in many cases. In

Kraaz v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 396 So.2d 455, 459 (La.

Ct. App. 1981), aff'd, 410 So.2d 1048, 1053 (La. 1982), the

court explained that for a plaintiff to be guilty of contributory

negligence, his own conduct must have been unreasonable in

view of the foreseeable risk. The court then held that it was

not contributorily negligent for plaintiffs to keep $25,000 in a

purse inside a motel room for purposes of buying a racehorse

during their trip. The court reasoned that "the risk of an

assailant opening their motel room door with a passkey in the

middle of the night, leaving them no time to defend them-

selves from attack or call for help, was not one which could

have been foreseeable to the plaintiffs." Id. In the case

before us, we are faced with facts that suggest a master key

was used to enter the Paraskevaides' room and then enter

their locked safes. Not knowing that a master key was

unaccounted for, the Paraskevaides were not unreasonable as

a matter of law in using the in-room safes. The in-room

convenience safe obviously serves some purpose to hotel

guests. If not to secure valuables, then what? While we

recognize that $1.2 million is considerably more than the

$25,000 at issue in Kraaz, we also recognize that the Four

Seasons Washington is not a popular price motel.

Perhaps the Paraskevaides should not have brought as

much jewelry as they did. Or, if intent on bringing their

jewelry, perhaps they should have made arrangements to

secure it elsewhere, perhaps a bank. But these are issues of

fact to be decided by a jury, not a court. It is not for courts

to determine as a matter of law the value of items that a

traveler may place in an in-room safe without being deemed

to have acted negligently. To do so raises questions that we

are ill-equipped to answer. Where would we draw the line,

and on what basis? Would it be negligent for a guest at a

motel to place a $500 watch in an in-room safe? If not, would

it be negligent for a guest at an economy hotel to place a

$5,000 necklace in the safe? What if a collector staying at the

hotel nearest a rare book auction placed a $35,000 signed,

first edition of To Kill a Mockingbird in his in-room safe? Or

if the lucky traveler placed her $1 million winning lottery

ticket in the in-room safe? More importantly, what if these

guests had used the hotel's safety deposit boxes, the hotel had

complied with the Innkeeper Statute, but their property was

nonetheless lost or destroyed? Should it make a difference

that the guests would recover at most $1,000? See D.C. Code

s 30-101.

Based on the record before the court, we cannot conclude

that by placing items of value in locked convenience safes

located in their locked hotel room, the Paraskevaides were

negligent as a matter of law. The in-room safes are provided

to hotel guests for a purpose--we assume for the placement

of some valuables that require the security of a locked

depository. It is simply not for a court to decide as a matter

of law either the circumstances in which it is acceptable for a

guest to use the in-room safes, or the value of items that a

guest may place in the safes without being considered negli-

gent. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's decision

that the Paraskevaides were contributorily negligent as a

matter of law for placing their jewelry in the locked, in-room

convenience safes.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated, we hold that the Four Seasons

failed to comply fully with the statutory requirements of D.C.

Code s 30-101, and is consequently unable to limit its liability

to the Paraskevaides as provided for in the statute. Because

the statute is not applicable to this case, we remand to the

district court for further proceedings to determine the issue

of the Four Seasons' liability. We also hold that the Paraske-

vaides were not contributorily negligent as a matter of law

and instead direct that the issue of contributory negligence be

submitted to the jury.