Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Autozone, Inc.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 10-1353

E QUAL E MPLOYMENT O PPORTUNITY C OMMISSION,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

A UTOZ ONE, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 1:07-cv-01154—John A. Gorman, Magistrate Judge.

A RGUED S EPTEMBER 15, 2010—D ECIDED D ECEMBER 30, 2010

Before M ANION, S YKES, and H AMILTON, Circuit Judges.

H AMILTON, Circuit Judge. From 1999 until 2004, John

Shepherd worked as a parts sales manager at AutoZone,

a vehicle services company, in Macomb, Illinois. In

2005, AutoZone terminated Shepherd’s employment

after keeping him on medical leave involuntarily for

over a year. The Equal Employment Opportunity Com-

mission filed this suit on Shepherd’s behalf under the

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.

2 No. 10-1353

The EEOC alleged that AutoZone violated the ADA in

three ways: first, by failing to accommodate Shepherd’s

physical limitations from March 2003 until September

2003; second, by discriminatorily denying Shepherd the

opportunity to work after September 2003; and third, by

terminating him in retaliation for filing charges against

the company. The district court granted summary judg-

ment for AutoZone on the first claim, finding that the

EEOC had not shown that Shepherd had a disability

within the meaning of the ADA as is required to demon-

strate a failure to accommodate. A jury later ruled in

favor of AutoZone on the discriminatory treatment and

retaliation claims. The district court then denied the

EEOC’s motion to alter the judgment and for a partial

new trial.

The EEOC appeals only the district court’s grant of

summary judgment on the failure-to-accommodate

claim. It argues that there are genuine issues of material

fact whether Shepherd had a disability and whether

AutoZone therefore violated the ADA by failing to rea-

sonably accommodate Shepherd’s known physical limita-

tions. Because we find that a reasonable jury could con-

clude that Shepherd had a disability under the ADA,

we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural Background

John Shepherd began working for AutoZone in

April 1998 as a salesperson in AutoZone’s store in Fort

Madison, Iowa. In April 1999, he was promoted to parts

sales manager and transferred to the store in Macomb,

No. 10-1353 3

Illinois, where he remained a parts sales manager until

he was fired in 2005.

As a parts sales manager, Shepherd’s responsibilities

included working closely with customers and engaging

in “manual tasks” such as routine cleaning and mainte-

nance of the store, stocking shelves, and moving mer-

chandise. At each store, daily tasks were distributed

randomly through a computer-generated assignment

system to the employees on duty, including the parts

sales manager, though the store manager maintained

discretion to re-assign tasks.

Prior to his work at AutoZone, Shepherd had sustained

an injury to his back that limited his ability to carry out

many activities requiring physical exertion. He ex-

perienced onsets of debilitating pain, referred to by the

parties as “flare-ups,” when carrying out tasks that re-

quired him to lift things or to twist or rotate his torso.

During a flare-up, Shepherd’s neck and back would

swell and he would sweat profusely. Headaches,

which also could lead to vomiting, often accompanied

the swelling.

Beginning in 1998, Shepherd received medical treat-

ment from Dr. Marc Katchen, who described Shepherd’s

impairment as myofascial tenderness, an intermittent

condition caused by tightening of the muscles upon

certain movements. The parties disagree about exactly

when Shepherd disclosed his condition to AutoZone

management. Shepherd’s supervisors knew about his

condition no later than March 2002, though they may

have known as early as 1998, the year he joined the com-

pany.

4 No. 10-1353

Shepherd’s impairment led to his taking medical

leaves of absence of one to three weeks in January 2001,

October 2001, June 2002, and March 2003. When

Shepherd returned to work in July 2002 after his third

leave of absence, he provided his supervisors with a

medical evaluation prepared by Dr. Katchen. The evalua-

tion listed physical restrictions that Dr. Katchen recom-

mended for Shepherd if he felt unwell. Based on

Dr. Katchen’s recommendation that he avoid twisting his

upper body, Shepherd requested permission to refrain

from mopping. Although store managers Terry Wilmot

and Steve Thompson knew of the restriction, they infor-

mally accommodated Shepherd only some of the time.

Wilmot and Thompson would sometimes re-assign mop-

ping tasks from Shepherd to other employees, though

district manager Steven Smith pressured them not to

give Shepherd “any preference.”

After Shepherd’s leave of absence from the end of

March 2003 through the beginning of April 2003, Dr.

Katchen again prepared a medical evaluation for Shep-

herd’s AutoZone supervisors. The doctor recommended

that Shepherd never mop or buff the floor. When

Smith learned of this evaluation, he told Shepherd that

he would not be able to return to work with such a re-

striction. Dr. Katchen then amended his prescribed re-

striction to allow Shepherd to return to work, changing

it from “never” to only “occasionally.”

On September 13, 2003, Thompson instructed Shepherd

to mop the floor. Shepherd injured himself while

wringing out the mop and was again placed on medical

No. 10-1353 5

leave. In December 2003, Shepherd underwent an inde-

pendent medical examination in connection with a work-

ers’ com pensation claim then pending against

AutoZone. The medical examiner found that Shepherd’s

September 2003 injury had resolved and that he could

return to work with whatever restrictions were in

place prior to his taking leave. On January 16, 2004,

Dr. Katchen also authorized Shepherd’s return to work

with increased medical restrictions, including a lift limit

of ten to nineteen pounds, a limitation on time spent

standing, and a prohibition on upper body twisting.

Despite these two medical evaluations, AutoZone did

not allow Shepherd to return to work, instead keeping

him on involuntary medical leave until February 2005,

when the company discharged him.

The EEOC filed a complaint on Shepherd’s behalf in the

Central District of Illinois. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c),

the parties consented to have their case decided by a

magistrate judge. AutoZone moved for summary judg-

ment on all of the EEOC’s claims. Relevant to our

review, AutoZone contended in its motion that the

EEOC had not shown any failure to accommodate Shep-

herd between March and September 2003 because it

had not proved that he was disabled within the meaning

of the ADA. The district court agreed, finding that Shep-

herd was not substantially limited in the major life

activity of caring for himself prior to September 2003 and,

as a result, could not be considered disabled under the

ADA. The court concluded that the EEOC was there-

fore unable to establish a failure-to-accommodate claim

during the relevant time, and granted AutoZone’s motion

on that claim. The EEOC now appeals, arguing that

6 No. 10-1353

disputed issues of fact exist as to whether Shepherd was

disabled within the statutory meaning.1

Discussion

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo

and assess the evidence in the light most favorable to

the EEOC as the non-moving party. Fredricksen v. United

Parcel Service, Co., 581 F.3d 516, 520 (7th Cir. 2009). We

will affirm summary judgment if there is not sufficient

evidence to conclude that the non-moving party has

raised a genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).

1

The district court correctly identified the components of

the reasonable accommodation test in the first part of its

decision, citing the three-step inquiry outlined by the

Supreme Court in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). When

applying the facts to the law, however, the court appears to

have mistakenly applied an element of the disparate treat-

ment test as part of its evaluation of reasonable accommoda-

tion. The court strayed from the reasonable accommodation

test it had identified by requiring that the EEOC demonstrate

an adverse employment action against Shepherd. No adverse

employment action is required to prove a failure to accommo-

date. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631; see also Basith v. Cook County,

241 F.3d 919, 927 (7th Cir. 2001) (describing and applying

the same test for determining whether an individual is a

qualified individual with a disability under the ADA); EEOC

v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 233 F.3d 432, 437-40 (7th Cir. 2000)

(same). This misstep was not decisive for the court’s judg-

ment; we raise it only to alert the district court so that it may

avoid proceeding down that same path on remand.

No. 10-1353 7

An employer violates the ADA by “not making reason-

able accommodations to the known physical or mental

limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a

disability . . . , unless [the employer] can demonstrate

that the accommodation would impose an undue hard-

ship on the operation of [its] business.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006); see also EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck &

Co., 417 F.3d 789, 796-97 (7th Cir. 2005). 2 In its motion

for summary judgment, AutoZone argued that Shepherd

was not a “qualified individual with a disability” from

March 2003 through September 12, 2003. Though

AutoZone acknowledged that Shepherd suffered from

an impairment throughout the relevant time, it con-

tended that Shepherd’s impairment did not constitute a

“disability” as defined by the ADA. AutoZone also as-

serted that even if Shepherd were considered disabled,

he could not, with or without reasonable accommoda-

tion, perform the essential functions of his position.

Finally, AutoZone contested the EEOC’s claim that it

failed to provide Shepherd a reasonable accommodation

that he needed to perform the essential functions of

his position. We do not reach the latter two issues. The

district court did not proceed beyond a determination

of whether Shepherd was disabled, and the EEOC’s

2

After this case was filed, Congress made significant changes

to the ADA that took effect January 1, 2009. See ADA Amend-

ments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553. Because

Congress did not express its intent for these changes to

apply retroactively, see Fredricksen, 581 F.3d at 521, we cite,

quote, and apply the ADA as it stood before the amendments.

8 No. 10-1353

claim on appeal concerns only AutoZone’s treatment of

Shepherd and his condition from March 2003 through

September 12, 2003.

AutoZone also argues on appeal that the EEOC was

required to present medical testimony to prove that

Shepherd was disabled within the meaning of the statute.

Thus, we review whether the evidence would allow a

reasonable jury to conclude that Shepherd was disabled

within the meaning of the ADA, and within this

analysis, we take up AutoZone’s assertion that medical

testimony was required.

I. Significant Limits on Personal Care

The ADA defines “disability” as (a) a physical or

mental impairment that substantially limits one or more

of the major life activities of an individual; (b) a record

of such an impairment; or (c) being regarded as having

such an impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006). The

EEOC relies on subsection (a), a physical impairment

that substantially limits a major life activity, to argue

that Shepherd was disabled from March 2003 to Septem-

ber 12, 2003, because his condition substantially limited

his ability to engage in the major life activity of caring

for himself.

Our role is not to decide whether Shepherd was

actually disabled under the ADA. Rather, we need decide

only whether a rational jury, viewing any conflicting

evidence in the light most favorable to the EEOC, could so

decide. We believe it could do so easily. We focus on

No. 10-1353 9

the two parts of the statute’s definition of disability:

First, the EEOC must demonstrate that Shepherd’s im-

pairment limited a major life activity, for which we ex-

amine the law and the evidence regarding Shepherd’s

ability to care for himself. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)

(2006). Second, the EEOC must further show that his

limitation on a major life activity was substantial. See id.

We identify disputed issues of material fact with respect

to both parts.

A. Limitations on Self-Care

Self-care has long been recognized as a major life activity

under the ADA. The federal regulations adopted in the

year following the passage of the Act listed “caring for

oneself” as a major life activity. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).

Courts followed suit. See Holt v. Grand Lake Mental

Health Center, Inc., 443 F.3d 762, 767 (10th Cir. 2006) (recog-

nizing self-care as a major life activity under the ADA);

Regional Economic Community Action Program, Inc. v. City

of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (providing

examples of limitations on self-care); Cehrs v. Northeast

Ohio Alzheimer’s Research Center, 155 F.3d 775, 780-81 (6th

Cir. 1998) (identifying caring for oneself as a recognized

major life activity under the Act); Dutcher v. Ingalls Ship-

building, 53 F.3d 723, 726 (5th Cir. 1995) (caring for one-

self encompasses a broad range of normal activities

related to daily living, including feeding oneself, driving,

grooming, and cleaning home).

We ruled in Nawrot v. CPC International, 277 F.3d 896,

904-05 (7th Cir. 2002), that an employee’s inability

10 No. 10-1353

to administer his own diabetes medication also

amounted to a limitation on the major life activity of self-

care. Likewise in Brunker v. Schwan’s Home Service, 583

F.3d 1004, 1008-09 (7th Cir. 2009), we found that not

being able to dress oneself appropriately constituted

evidence of a limitation on the major life activity of self-

care. Our application is consistent with the purpose of the

ADA to “provide a clear and comprehensive national

mandate” to combat disability discrimination. Americans

with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2, 104

Stat. 327, 329; see also ADA Amendments Act of 2008

§ 1(b), 122 Stat. at 3554 (elaborating on a broad scope

of protection intended by Congress to be available under

the original Act); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S.

471, 495 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that

the ADA was meant to serve a remedial purpose). The

specific inclusion of “caring for oneself” in the 2008

Amendments’ list of major life activities further sup-

ports this interpretation. See ADA Amendments Act of

2008 § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3555, amending 42 U.S.C. § 12102.

Shepherd testified at his deposition that he needed

assistance with dressing himself, brushing his hair, and

bathing four or five days each week while he was

working at AutoZone prior to September 13, 2003. He

also recalled experiencing other difficulties since 2003,

including an inability to tie his shoes and the develop-

ment of oral hygiene problems that resulted from his

inability to care for his teeth properly. Shepherd’s wife,

Susan Shepherd, also testified that she had to assist him

with personal care while he was working at AutoZone.

According to her deposition testimony, she had to

No. 10-1353 11

help Shepherd with showering, putting on his pants

and shoes, and brushing his hair and teeth before he

stopped working for AutoZone.

There is some ambiguity in Susan’s testimony re-

garding exactly when Shepherd began having difficulty

with certain personal tasks. Though Susan said she

assisted him with his personal tasks “before he stopped

working for AutoZone,” at other times in her May 2008

deposition, she testified that Shepherd’s difficulties

with these tasks began “three or four years ago.” For

purposes of summary judgment, however, AutoZone

removed much of the ambiguity in its own statement of

undisputed facts filed to support its summary judgment

motion. There, AutoZone stated: “Shepherd has needed

assistance with dressing himself, brushing his hair

and bathing on a daily basis from approximately the

year 2003 or 2004 to the present time”; “[s]ince 2003,

Shepherd’s wife has assisted him with washing his

back”; “[s]ince 2003, Shepherd has had difficulty

brushing his teeth; “during [his flare-ups] . . . he would

not be able to put on his own pants, his own shoes,

brush his hair, or brush his teeth”; and, “Shepherd

would not be able to wash his own hair, back or feet

when having these flare-ups.”

These statements by AutoZone as well as the Shep-

herds’ testimony could be understood to mean that Shep-

herd’s limitations on his ability to care for himself

began at any point during or immediately after 2003. At

the summary judgment stage, any ambiguity must be

resolved in favor of the non-moving party. It was the

12 No. 10-1353

responsibility of the questioning attorney at the deposi-

tion to clarify the facts if the attorney intended to move

for summary judgment on the basis of these answers.

Particularly here, where one of the key issues was the

time period during which Shepherd was affected by

his condition—March through September 12, 2003—

AutoZone could have asked follow-up questions to try

to get more specific answers from the Shepherds. For

the purposes of summary judgment, the testimony by

Susan Shepherd was consistent with her husband’s testi-

mony to the effect that Shepherd was limited in caring

for himself between March and September 2003.

B. “Substantially” Limited

We turn now to examine whether the facts support a

conclusion that Shepherd was “substantially” limited in

caring for himself. We follow the Supreme Court’s rea-

soning in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v.

Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196 (2002), such that our consider-

ation of this term is “guided first and foremost by

the words of the disability definition itself.” 3 Looking to

3

The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 superseded Williams by

expressly rejecting the Court’s narrow interpretation of the

terms “substantially limits” and “major life activity” in favor

of a broader interpretation. Part of Congress’s purpose in

enacting the Amendments was to make clear its intent that

the determination of whether an individual has a disability

under the ADA “should not demand extensive analysis.”

(continued...)

No. 10-1353 13

Webster’s Dictionary and the Oxford English Dictionary,

the Court determined that “substantially” in the phrase

“substantially limits” means “considerable” or “to a

large degree.” 534 U.S. at 196-97. This less-than-precise

meaning of the term indicates that the ADA “precludes

impairments that interfere in only a minor way with

the performance of manual tasks from qualifying as

disabilities.” Id. at 197.

The implementing federal regulation states a little

more clearly that “substantially limits” means that an

individual is:

(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the

average person in the general population can per-

form; or (ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition,

manner or duration under which an individual can

perform a particular major life activity as compared

to the condition, manner, or duration under which

3

(...continued)

ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. at 3554. Of

particular note, Congress stated that the term “substantially

limits” should be interpreted broadly to provide wide cover-

age. See id. § 2(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 3553. As we have said, be-

cause there is no indication that Congress intended the

ADA Amendments to have retroactive effect, we rely on the

ADA as it existed at the time of the relevant events, and on

the case law, including Williams, interpreting that version of

the statute and implementing regulations. We reach our

conclusion that the EEOC has raised a genuine question for

trial even without the clarifying language in the Amendments,

which only underscores our conclusion.

14 No. 10-1353

the average person in the general population can

perform that same major life activity.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). The regulation provides that when

determining whether a limitation is “substantial,” we

consider “[t]he nature and severity of the impairment;

[t]he duration or expected duration; and [t]he per-

manent or long term impact, or the expected permanent

or long term impact of . . . the impairment.” 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(j)(2); see also Williams, 534 U.S. at 196 (looking

to the regulation for guidance on the meaning of “sub-

stantially limited”); Hamm v. Runyon, 51 F.3d 721, 725

(7th Cir. 1995) (same).

We have already addressed the nature and severity of

Shepherd’s impairment in our description of the limita-

tions he faced. The Shepherds testified, and AutoZone

did not dispute (for purposes of summary judgment),

that before Shepherd went on leave in 2003, he needed

assistance with the most basic personal care tasks when

a flare-up occurred.

With respect to the duration and impact of his impair-

ment, Susan testified that Shepherd experienced flare-

ups “[a]t least four to five times a week” while he was

still working at AutoZone. Shepherd also testified that

he needed assistance with his personal care “maybe four

or five days” each week “prior to September 13, 2003.”

As noted above, there were portions of the Shepherds’

testimony that were less specific or that superficially

appeared to contradict other portions, but for the

purposes of our review, we view the evidence in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party. And again,

No. 10-1353 15

AutoZone provided its own clarification in its list of

undisputed facts accompanying its summary judg-

ment motion. In addition to its statement that Shepherd

needed assistance “on a daily basis,” AutoZone wrote

that “Shepherd was experiencing these [flare-ups] four

to five times a week before he went on leave of absence

from AutoZone.” On the basis of the significant

limits on his personal care almost every day during

the relevant period, a reasonable jury could easily find

Shepherd’s limitations to be substantial.

AutoZone contends that even if Shepherd’s condition

was limiting, it was not “substantially” limiting because

it was only episodic or sporadic. Relying on our discus-

sion in Brunker, AutoZone asserts that because a broken

leg, appendicitis, or isolated bouts of depression did not

qualify as disabilities, Shepherd’s episodic flare-ups

should not qualify either. We do not agree.4

Shepherd’s impairment in this case, a permanent condi-

tion that affected his personal care almost daily, is not

comparable to the temporary or sporadic examples

we listed in Brunker. The limitations Shepherd faced in

his self-care every day or almost every day are not com-

mensurate with the temporary limitations posed by

4

Although we do not rely on the 2008 Amendments, we note

that Congress addressed this issue for future cases there,

stating: “An impairment that is episodic . . . is a disability if it

would substantially limit a major life activity when active.”

ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 4(a), 122 Stat. at 3556, codified

at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D).

16 No. 10-1353

a broken leg or appendicitis, nor were they isolated.

AutoZone’s additional reliance on Moore v. Hunt Trans-

port, Inc., 221 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2000) is also misplaced.

Moore suffered from rheumatoid arthritis, an inflam-

matory disease of the joints that causes the joints to

swell and stiffen and that is prone to intermittent flare-

ups. AutoZone points to our statement that Moore’s

“infrequent flare-ups . . . [did not] render his condition a

disability,” but Moore’s flare-ups occurred only “one or

two [times] per year.” 221 F.3d at 952. Even with gen-

erous math, the occurrence of Shepherd’s flare-ups four

or five times a week was still greater than the frequency

experienced by the plaintiff in Moore by a factor of over

one hundred.

We find more apposite guidance in EEOC v. Sears,

Roebuck & Co., 233 F.3d 432, where we noted that an

episodic condition should not detract from the substan-

tiality analysis. The plaintiff in Sears suffered from a

permanent neuropathy that substantially limited her

ability to walk. We found that “a predictable yet intermit-

tent pattern” of impairment was sufficient to survive a

motion for summary judgment. 233 F.3d at 440 n.4 (“the

fact that [the] condition was episodic is not dispositive

in the disability inquiry”). Likewise, in Haschmann v.

Time Warner Entertainment Co., 151 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1998),

we treated “episodic flares,” characteristic of lupus, as a

disability under the ADA. 151 F.3d at 599-600. The

Haschmann plaintiff’s episodic flares of lupus are more

similar to Shepherd’s flare-ups of myofascial tenderness

than the broken leg or isolated episodes of depression

we addressed in Brunker.

No. 10-1353 17

In its order granting summary judgment for AutoZone,

the district court distinguished Shepherd’s situation

from Sears and Haschmann, as well as from our similar

holding in Vande Zande v. State of Wisconsin Department

of Administration, 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995), that pres-

sure ulcers resulting from paralysis were intermit-

tent impairments characteristic of an admitted disability.

The court differentiated them on the basis that the “pro-

gressive diseases” in our prior cases were different

from a soft tissue neck or back injury like Shepherd’s

which, the court stated, could not be diagnosed in the

absence of flare-ups. Even if that were medically correct,

we do not see a sound legal difference in the court’s

application of the statute to the facts of this case.

The assessment of an impairment under the ADA is a

highly individualized examination that considers the

facts of each case independently in light of the statutory

and regulatory language. See Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp.,

472 F.3d 930, 938 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that “whether

or not a medical condition rises to the level of a disability

is to be made on an individualized case-by-case basis”).

A reasonable jury could readily determine from the

totality of the evidence in this record that Shepherd was

substantially limited in his ability to care for himself

from March 2003 to September 2003.

II. Asserted Need for Medical Evidence

AutoZone also argues that an employee must provide

medical evidence of his or her substantial limitations to

satisfy the terms of the ADA. We do not read either the

18 No. 10-1353

statute or our prior case law as imposing a requirement

that the plaintiff provide medical testimony in all cases,

or in this one.

No language in the ADA or implementing regulations

states that medical testimony is required. In fact, the

Supreme Court has concluded very much to the con-

trary. The Williams Court noted that it is “insufficient for

individuals attempting to prove disability status . . . to

merely submit evidence of a medical diagnosis of an

impairment. Instead, the ADA requires those claiming

the Act’s protection to prove a disability by offering

evidence that the extent of the limitation caused by their

impairment in terms of their own experience is substan-

tial.” 534 U.S. at 198, quoting Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,

527 U.S. 555, 567 (1999) (internal quotation marks and

alterations omitted); see also Haynes v. Williams, 392 F.3d

478, 482 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“Whatever the comparative

credibility of medical versus personal testimony, a plain-

tiff’s personal testimony cannot be inadequate to raise a

genuine issue regarding his ‘own experience.’ ”). That is

exactly what the EEOC showed here through Shepherd’s

testimony, corroborated by Susan’s testimony.

Neither do our cases hold any differently. In Fredricksen

v. United Parcel Service, the case on which AutoZone

primarily relies, plaintiff Fredricksen suffered from

leukemia and asserted that he was substantially

limited in the major life activities of walking and breath-

ing. To corroborate his assertions, he described in vague

generalities how he had less stamina to be as mobile as he

once was. We held that Fredricksen had not met his burden

No. 10-1353 19

of demonstrating he was substantially limited; he was

merely “moderately limited.” As a separate and independ-

ent consideration, we observed that there was no med-

ical evidence to support his argument about the duration

or impact of the difficulties he faced. This observation

was limited to Fredricksen’s case, in reference to his

particular condition and the activities he asserted.

Similarly in Squibb v. Memorial Medical Center, 497 F.3d

775, 784 (7th Cir. 2007), another case that AutoZone

cites, we concluded that the evidence presented by the

plaintiff was not sufficient to defeat a motion for sum-

mary judgment on the plaintiff’s self-care disability

claim; however, we voiced no opinion as to the necessity

of expert corroboration.

Here, in contrast to the circumstances in Fredricksen

and Squibb, the Shepherds each testified about specific

activities and instances that caused Shepherd pain, the

cumulative effect of which demonstrates what could

easily be considered a “substantial” limitation. More-

over, Shepherd’s condition and its possible ramifications

were well-documented by medical professionals, in-

cluding restrictions on his movement that would prevent

him from carrying out the most basic household and

personal chores.

In other contexts, we have taught that expert testi-

mony is unnecessary to establish causation in cases where

a lay-person can understand an injury or condition. See

Wallace v. McGlothan, 606 F.3d 410, 420 (7th Cir. 2010).

When an individual suffers from a basic and obvious

injury when hit by a vehicle, for example, he or she does

not need to produce expert testimony to show that the

20 No. 10-1353

collision was the cause of the injury. See Moody v. Maine

Central Railroad Co., 823 F.2d 693, 695 (1st Cir. 1987). This

reasoning extends to the scope of a physical limitation

like Shepherd’s which is obvious to an observer and

easily described by the sufferer.

In this case, where both the Shepherds’ testimony

described in detail the limitations Shepherd faced in his

ability to care for himself and where his impairment

was well-documented, we see no need for additional

testimony regarding the extent of his limitations. The

limits of Shepherd’s personal care are the stuff of

everyday experience. At least in this case, no medical

evidence about Shepherd’s precise limitations was neces-

sary to defeat AutoZone’s summary judgment motion.

Conclusion

The evidence the EEOC has presented is plainly sus-

ceptible to the determination that Shepherd had a disa-

bility within the meaning intended by the ADA as

required to prove a failure to accommodate. Summary

judgment should not have been granted on the basis that

Shepherd was not disabled. We R EVERSE and R EMAND

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

12-30-10