Opinion

United States v. Warshak

  • 631 F.3d 266
  • 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25415
  • 2010 WL 5071766
Court
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Filed
Dec 14, 2010
Status
Published
On the bench
Keith, Boggs, McKeague
Cited by
345 cases
Authority
More cited than 9.5%

holding Rule 704(b) was violated by expert testimony that the business dealings of defendant’s company were commingled with his personal dealings with the “intent to conceal” and that certain cash transactions were “designed to conceal”; the former spoke directly to the defendant’s mens rea to commit money laundering and the latter was tantamount to declaring that the individual who conducted the transactions intended to achieve the outcome

How later courts described this case

  • holding Rule 704(b) was violated by expert testimony that the business dealings of defendant’s company were commingled with his personal dealings with the “intent to conceal” and that certain cash transactions were “designed to conceal”; the former spoke directly to the defendant’s mens rea to commit money laundering and the latter was tantamount to declaring that the individual who conducted the transactions intended to achieve the outcome
  • holding that "a subscriber enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of emails 'that are stored with, or sent or received through, a commercial ISP' " and neither the ability nor the right of a third-party intermediary to access the *753contents of a communication is sufficient to extinguish a reasonable expectation of privacy (citation omitted)
  • holding that “the government did not engage in any conduct indicating that it performed its Brady obligations in bad faith” and “there [was] no indication that the government deliberately concealed any exculpatory evidence in the information it turned over to the defense”
  • finding that although an expert witness’s testimony as to a defendant’s intent was error, the error was harmless because of the large amount of evidence against the defendant and the government’s clarification that it was not seeking evidence of the defendant’s intent

Written by the judges who cited it.

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by Williams v. Affinion Grp., LLC, 889 F.3d 116 (2018)

    In any event, Warshak and Van Dyke are easily distinguishable.
    Court of Appeals for the Second CircuitMay 7, 2018Read it
  • Distinguished by People v. Harris, 36 Misc. 3d 868 (2012)

    However, the Warshak case is distinguishable from the case at hand because the former deals with private emails as opposed to public postings.
    Criminal Court of the City of New YorkJun 30, 2012Read it
  • Distinguished by State v. Hinton, 169 Wash. App. 28 (2012)

    ¶26 Lastly, Hinton cites Warshak, a Sixth Circuit case that is also inapposite.
    Court of Appeals of WashingtonJun 26, 2012Read it

The opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 10a0377p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

_________________

X

Plaintiff-Appellee, -

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

-

-

-

Nos. 08-3997/4085/4087/

v.

,

4212/4429; 09-3176

>

-

STEVEN WARSHAK (08-3997/4085; 09-3176); -

-

-

HARRIET WARSHAK (08-3997/4087/4429);

TCI MEDIA, INC. (08-3997/4212), -

Defendants-Appellants. -

-

N

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati.

Nos. 06-00111; 06-00111-001; 06-00111-2; 06-00111-7

S. Arthur Spiegel, District Judge.

Argued: June 16, 2010

Decided and Filed: December 14, 2010

Before: KEITH, BOGGS, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Martin S. Pinales, STRAUSS & TROY, Cincinnati, Ohio, Martin G.

Weinberg, Boston, Massachusetts, for Appellants. Benjamin C. Glassman, ASSISTANT

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Martin

S. Pinales, Candace Crouse, STRAUSS & TROY, Cincinnati, Ohio, Martin G.

Weinberg, Boston, Massachusetts, Robert M. Goldstein, Boston, Massachusetts, for

Appellants. Anne L. Porter, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Cincinnati,

Ohio, for Appellee. Kevin S. Bankston, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION,

San Francisco, California, for Amici Curiae.

BOGGS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which McKEAGUE, J., joined.

KEITH, J. (pp. 94–98), delivered a separate opinion concurring in the result.

1

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_________________

OPINION

_________________

BOGGS, Circuit Judge. Berkeley Premium Nutraceuticals, Inc., was an

incredibly profitable company that served as the distributor of Enzyte, an herbal

supplement purported to enhance male sexual performance. In this appeal, defendants

Steven Warshak (“Warshak”), Harriet Warshak (“Harriet”), and TCI Media, Inc.

(“TCI”), challenge their convictions stemming from a massive scheme to defraud

Berkeley’s customers. Warshak and Harriet also challenge their sentences, as well as

two forfeiture judgments.

Given the volume and complexity of the issues presented, we provide the

following summary of our holdings:

(1) Warshak enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy in his emails vis-a-vis

NuVox, his Internet Service Provider. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

Thus, government agents violated his Fourth Amendment rights by compelling NuVox

to turn over the emails without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause.

However, because the agents relied in good faith on provisions of the Stored

Communications Act, the exclusionary rule does not apply in this instance. See Illinois

v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987).

(2) The district court did not err in refusing to hold a full-fledged hearing under

Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), when determining whether government

agents had improperly used privileged materials seized during a valid search of

Berkeley’s headquarters. Kastigar does not apply with full force outside the context of

compelled testimony. See United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542 (4th Cir. 2000).

(3) The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to order the

government to provide discovery in a different format, as Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 16 is silent on the issue of the form that discovery must take. Moreover, the

government did not duck its obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),

by providing the defendants with massive quantities of discovery. See United States v.

Skilling, 554 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2009), vacated in part on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 2896

(2010). Finally, the district court did not err in refusing to grant the defendants a

continuance so that they could continue examining the discovery materials turned over

by the government.

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(4) The district court did not err in refusing to grant Warshak a new trial based

on an alleged Brady violation, as the purportedly exculpatory material did not rise to the

level of materiality. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).

(5) The district court did not err in refusing to grant the defendants a new trial on

the basis of prosecutorial misconduct. Though the prosecution did make a number of

improper remarks during its rebuttal argument, the remarks were not flagrant. See

United States v. Carter, 236 F.3d 777 (6th Cir. 2001).

(6) The evidence was sufficient to support Warshak’s and Harriet’s respective

convictions for conspiracy to commit mail, wire, and bank fraud, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 1349. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Those convictions are

therefore sustained.

(7) The evidence was sufficient to support Warshak’s convictions for mail fraud,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Those convictions are therefore sustained.

(8) The evidence was sufficient to support Warshak’s and Harriet’s respective

convictions for bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344. Furthermore, the district

court did not err in instructing the jury that, under certain circumstances, the government

may prove specific intent to defraud a bank by showing specific intent to defraud a third

party. See United States v. Reaume, 338 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2003). Those convictions

are therefore sustained.

(9) The evidence was sufficient to support Warshak’s conviction for conspiracy

to commit access-device fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029. That conviction is

sustained.

(10) The evidence was sufficient to support Warshak’s and TCI’s respective

convictions for money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957. Those

convictions are affirmed. By contrast, the evidence was insufficient to support Harriet’s

money-laundering convictions. Those convictions are therefore reversed.

(11) The evidence was sufficient to support Warshak’s conviction for conspiracy

to obstruct an FTC proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1505. As a

consequence, that conviction is sustained.

(12) The district court did not err in refusing to order the government to reveal

whether or not it had conducted any additional surreptitious searches of Warshak’s

emails or communications. The discovery afforded by Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 16 is limited to the evidence referred to in its express provisions, United

States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1285 (6th Cir. 1988), and those provisions do not

encompass the information sought by the defendants.

(13) The district court failed to provide an adequate explanation of its

determination that the defendants should be held accountable for $411 million in losses.

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See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B); United States v. White, 492 F.3d 380, 415 (6th Cir.

2007). We therefore vacate Warshak’s sentence and remand.

(14) The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit certain

evidence during the forfeiture phase of the trial. Furthermore, the evidence was

sufficient to support the proceeds-money and money-laundering forfeiture judgments

against Warshak. In addition, the evidence was sufficient to support the proceeds-money

forfeiture judgment against Harriet, but it was insufficient to support the money-

laundering forfeiture judgment against her. Therefore, the proceeds-money forfeiture

judgment is affirmed with respect to both Warshak and Harriet, and the money-

laundering money judgment is affirmed with respect to Warshak, but reversed with

respect to Harriet.

I. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

A. Factual Background

In 2001, Steven Warshak (“Warshak”) owned and operated a number of small

businesses in the Cincinnati area. One of his businesses was TCI Media, Inc. (“TCI”),

which sold advertisements in sporting venues. Warshak also owned a handful of

companies that offered a modest line of so-called “nutraceuticals,” or herbal

supplements.1 While the companies bore different names and sold different products,

they appear to have been run as a single business, and they were later aggregated to form

Berkeley Premium Nutraceuticals, Inc. (“Berkeley”).2 In Berkeley’s early days, the

company’s workforce was relatively minute; the company employed approximately 12

to 15 people, nearly all of whom were Warshak’s friends and family. Among them was

his mother, Harriet Warshak (“Harriet”), who processed credit-card payments.

As the company grew, Warshak brought on additional employees to facilitate

expansion, but he remained extremely “hands-on” with respect to the company’s

operations. In 2001, he hired James Teegarden, who eventually became Berkeley’s

1

The companies also sold a product called Keflex, which supposedly masked traces of drugs in

one’s urine.

2

These companies were called Lifekey, Inc. (formed May 9, 2001); Boland Naturals, Inc. (formed

May 7, 2002); Warner Health Care, Inc. (formed August 19, 2002); and Wagner Nutraceuticals, Inc.

(formed July 9, 2004). For the sake of simplicity, these entities will typically be referred to as Berkeley,

even in cases where Berkeley was not yet in existence.

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Chief Operating Officer. Warshak also hired Shelley Kinmon to oversee the company’s

sales, later elevating her to the role of Vice-President. In 2002, Sue and Greg Cossman,

Warshak’s sister and brother-in-law, joined the company. Sue worked in Customer

Care, where she dealt with customer complaints. Greg came in as the President of the

company and thereafter functioned in various other capacities. That year also saw the

hiring of Sam Grote, who was brought on board to work in the marketing department.

To sell its products, Berkeley took orders over the phone, but it also made sales

through the mail and over the Internet. Customers purchased products with their credit

cards, and their credit-card numbers were entered into a database along with other

information. During sales calls, representatives would read from sales scripts,3 which

listed the major points to cover during the transaction. Shelley Kinmon testified that

Warshak had the final word on the content of the scripts. Often, the scripts would

include a description of the desired product, as well as language intended to persuade

more pliant customers to make additional purchases.

In the latter half of 2001, Berkeley launched Enzyte, its flagship product. At the

time of its launch, Enzyte was purported to increase the size of a man’s erection. The

product proved tremendously popular, and business rose sharply. By 2004, demand for

Berkeley’s products had grown so dramatically that the company employed 1500 people,

and the call center remained open throughout the night, taking orders at breakneck

speed. Berkeley’s line of supplements also expanded, ballooning from approximately

four products to around thirteen. By year’s end, Berkeley’s annual sales topped out at

around $250 million, largely on the strength of Enzyte.

1. Advertising

The popularity of Enzyte appears to have been due in large part to Berkeley’s

aggressive advertising campaigns. The vast majority of the advertising—approximately

98%—was conducted through television spots. Around 2004, network television was

3

Sales scripts were not employed at first.

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saturated with Enzyte advertisements featuring a character called “Smilin’ Bob,” whose

trademark exaggerated smile was presumably the result of Enzyte’s efficacy. The

“Smilin’ Bob” commercials were rife with innuendo and implied that users of Enzyte

would become the envy of the neighborhood.

In addition to the television commercials, however, there were also

advertisements in other media, such as print and radio. In 2001, just after Enzyte’s

premiere, advertisements appeared in a number of men’s interest magazines. At

Warshak’s direction, those advertisements cited a 2001 independent customer study,

which purported to show that, over a three-month period, 100 English-speaking men

who took Enzyte experienced a 12 to 31% increase in the size of their penises. The 2001

study was also referenced in radio advertisements and appeared on the company’s

website, as well as in brochures and sales calls. James Teegarden later testified that the

survey was bogus. He stated that, prior to the appearance of the advertisements,

Warshak instructed him to create a spreadsheet and to fill it with fabricated data.

Teegarden testified that he plucked the numbers out of the air and generated the

spreadsheet over a twenty-four hour period.

A number of advertisements also indicated that Enzyte boasted a 96% customer

satisfaction rating. Teegarden testified that that statistic, too, was totally spurious.

Before the claim began showing up in Berkeley’s literature, Warshak had asked him to

harvest 500 names from the customer database and to “mark an ‘X’ by either satisfied

or very satisfied on say 475 of those.” As for the remaining 25, Teegarden “was to put

not satisfied.” Thereafter, the customer-satisfaction statistic cropped up in Berkeley’s

print advertisements and in the “sales pitches, brochures, [and on the] Internet.”

Finally, numerous print and radio advertisements boasted that Enzyte was the

brainchild of reputable doctors with impressive educational pedigrees. According to the

ads, “Enzyte was developed by Dr. Fredrick Thomkins, a physician with a biology

degree from Stanford and Dr. Michael Moore, a leading urologist from Harvard.” The

ads also stated that the doctors had collaborated for thirteen years in developing a

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supplement designed to “stretch and elongate.” In reality, the doctors were just as

fictitious as “Smilin’ Bob.” Investigators who contacted Stanford and Harvard learned

that neither man existed.

2. The Auto-Ship Program

The “life blood” of the business was its auto-ship program, which was instituted

in 2001, shortly before Enzyte hit the market.4 The auto-ship program was a continuity

or negative-option program, in which a customer would order a free trial of a product

and then continue to receive additional shipments of that product until he opted out.

Before each new continuity shipment arrived on the customer’s doorstep, a

corresponding charge would appear on his credit-card statement. The shipments and

charges would continue until the customer decided to withdraw from the program, which

required the customer to notify the company.

In the early days of the auto-ship program, customers who ordered products over

the phone were not told that they were being enrolled.5 From August 2001 to at least the

end of December 2002,6 customers were simply added to the program at the time of the

initial sale without any indication that they would be on the hook for additional charges.

Apparently, products were shipped with literature explaining the program, but no

authorization was sought in advance of the shipment. According to Teegarden, Warshak

explained that the auto-ship program was never mentioned because “nobody would sign

up.” If nobody signed up, “you couldn’t make revenue.”

This policy resulted in a substantial volume of complaints, both to Berkeley and

to outside organizations. In October 2002, the Better Business Bureau (“BBB”)

contacted Berkeley and indicated that more than 1,500 customers had called to voice

4

In an email, Warshak noted, “[W]e break even on everything else. [Auto-ship] is our profit. --

[I] cannot stress just how important it is that we get it right.”

5

Indeed, early sales scripts are entirely devoid of language indicating the existence of the auto-

ship program.

6

Shelley Kinmon testified that, with respect to Enzyte, there was no disclosure of the auto-ship

program in the sales scripts until September 23, 2003.

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their consternation. Because of the complaints, Berkeley’s sales scripts and website

began to include some language disclosing the auto-ship program.7 A number of

internal emails indicate that sales representatives were required to read the disclosure

language and faced punishment if they failed to do so. To monitor the interactions

between representatives and customers, Berkeley installed a recording system for all

incoming calls.

However, as a number of Berkeley insiders testified, the compulsory disclosure

language was not always read, and it was designed not to work. Shelley Kinmon

testified that the disclosure of the continuity shipments was only made after the customer

had placed his order. In other words, the sales representative had already taken the

customer’s credit-card information when auto-ship was mentioned. Also, the disclosures

were deliberately made with haste, and they were placed after unrelated language that

was intended to divert or deaden the customer’s attention. In the case of Enzyte, sales

reps were instructed to lead into the disclosure language by stating that “the product is

not a contraceptive nor will it prevent or treat any sexually transmitted disease.”8

According to Teegarden, the thinking was that, “if we started off with a statement about

a contraceptive, something other than what it was, that people wouldn’t really listen to

what we were disclosing to them.”

7

The defendants also state that Berkeley hired “Venable [LLP], the most respected law firm in

the area of direct marketing, in April 2003, to review its scripts and reformulate its disclosures[.]” Reply

Br. at 6.

8

The disclosure portion of the September 23, 2003 sales script read, in full, as follows:

AFTER order is taken:

This product is not a contraceptive nor will it prevent any sexual disease. To let you

know that with your order you would be part of our established customer program [i.e.,

auto-ship]. approx. 10 days before your current supply runs out you would receive a

2 month supply for the price of $69.95 with free shipping and handling. There is no

obligation to remain on this program it is simple to discontinue, though it is a really

good deal. All the reorder info is written on the side of your bottle when you receive

your package, along with our phone number. So we will go ahead and process this

order and have it to you within the next 5-7 business days. Thank you, (customers [sic]

name), for your order today.

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Moreover, disclosure of the auto-ship program was sometimes irrelevant. For

example, in November 2003, Berkeley hired a company called West to handle “sales

calls that were from . . . Avlimil or Enzyte advertisements.” During the calls, West’s

representatives asked customers if they wanted to be enrolled in the auto-ship program,

and over 80% of customers declined. When Warshak learned what was happening, he

issued instructions to “take those customers, even if they decline[d], even if they said no

to the Auto-Ship program, go ahead and put them on the Auto-Ship program.” A

subsequent email between Berkeley employees indicated that “all [West] customers,

whether they know it or not, are going on [auto-ship].” As a result, numerous telephone

orders resulted in unauthorized continuity shipments.

However, not all of Berkeley’s auto-ship issues related to the telephone. Many

Berkeley sales were the result of orders placed on the Internet, where disclosure of the

auto-ship program was inconsistent. In 2001, when Berkeley was in its infancy, the

company’s websites contained no indication that customers would be enrolled in the

program. Thereafter, disclosures were placed on the websites, but the disclosures would

“appear[], disappear[], and chang[e].” In 2003, for instance, disclosure language that

had been added to Berkeley’s Avlimil website was removed because sales had been

“drastically affected.” Additionally, the language that did appear was often confusing

and contained non sequiturs.

By July 2004, the complaints arising from Berkeley’s auto-ship program had not

slowed, so the President of the BBB reached out to Berkeley, sending a letter directly

to Warshak. The purpose of the letter was to express “serious concerns about the

number of complaints that [the BBB] had received.” The complaints “related to a single

issue, which was the [auto-ship] program.” According to the President of the BBB, the

organization “had asked on numerous occasions that [Berkeley] consider dropping [the

program], and got no positive response.”

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3. The Merchant Banks

In order for Berkeley’s business to operate, it was essential that the company be

able to accept credit cards as a form of payment.9 To process credit-card transactions,

Berkeley obtained lines of credit from several merchant banks. The relationships

between Berkeley and the merchant banks involved intermediaries known as credit-card

processors. Often, the processors had contractual agreements with the merchant banks,

and the processors were the ones who set up the credit-card processing arrangements

with Berkeley. Nonetheless, when Berkeley applied for a merchant account with a given

processor, the applications were passed along to the banks. Furthermore, either the

banks or the processors could terminate Berkeley’s merchant accounts.

In early 2002, Warshak’s merchant account at the Bank of Kentucky was

terminated for excessive “chargebacks.” A chargeback occurs when a customer calls the

credit card company directly and contests or disputes a charge. Merchant banks—and

credit-card processors—will generally not do business with merchants that experience

high volumes of chargebacks, as those merchants present a greater financial risk. In

determining whether a merchant is experiencing excessive chargebacks, the banks refer

to a figure known as the chargeback ratio, which is simply the percentage of transactions

in a given 30-day period that result in a chargeback. For example, if a company

conducts 100 credit-card transactions and one chargeback results, the company will have

a chargeback ratio of 1%. Typically, if a merchant experiences more than one

chargeback per hundred transactions, its chargeback ratio is deemed too high, resulting

in fines and, eventually, termination of its accounts, either by the merchant bank or the

credit-card processor.

Following the termination of the merchant account at the Bank of Kentucky, the

company applied for merchant accounts with a number of other banks. In some

instances, the applications, which often bore Harriet’s signature, falsely listed her as the

9

In the words of Greg Cossman, “without credit cards and the ability to charge them, there was

no business.”

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CEO and 100% owner of the company. In other instances, Warshak would complete the

applications in his own name but falsely claim that he had never had a merchant account

terminated. These prevarications were included in the applications because the prior

termination would likely diminish Berkeley’s chances of securing the services of other

processors.

Despite its history with the Bank of Kentucky, Berkeley was able to land (or

retain) merchant accounts with several processors. However, due to the auto-ship

program and an extremely onerous refund policy,10 Berkeley was repeatedly at risk of

crossing the critical 1% chargeback threshold.11 At company meetings, the chargeback

ratio was a frequent topic of discussion, as was the possibility that Berkeley’s accounts

would be terminated. To prevent that from happening, a number of strategies were

devised to artificially inflate the number of sales transactions and thus the denominator

of the chargeback ratio, reducing that crucial ratio. One strategy was called

“double-dinging.” That practice involved splitting a single transaction into two, thereby

driving up the number of transactions and diminishing the chargeback ratio. A

double-ding might entail carving a $59.95 charge into a $54.95 charge for the product

itself and a $5.00 charge for shipping. Warshak directed that virtually all sales be

double-dinged, and by 2003, triple-dinging was initiated.

Another way the company depressed the chargeback ratio was to make numerous

charges to Warshak’s personal credit cards. At Warshak’s behest, Berkeley employees

would ring up $1.00 charges on each of his credit cards until their limits were reached.

10

Apparently, Berkeley’s policy with respect to refunds was to “make it as difficult as possible.”

At one point, Enzyte customers seeking a refund were told they needed to obtain a notarized document

indicating that they had experienced “no size increase.” The admittedly ingenious idea behind the policy

was that nobody “would actually go and have anything notarized that said that they had a small penis.”

In 2002, “there was really no refund policy. It was: Sorry, you got it, you keep it, and we’ll cancel you

off of future shipments.” The defendants contend that this policy changed over time, suggesting that

everyone who was entitled to a refund got a refund. However, there was language on the Enzyte website

as late as 2006 indicating that “there are no refunds for orders once shipped.”

11

As Teegarden explained, the auto-ship program created a “problem because individuals, when

they didn’t know that they were getting charged, those individuals would try to call back in. They would

try to get a credit back on their credit cards. They either had a hard time getting through to us, or we would

deny them credit. And then they would have to go to their credit card companies and request a chargeback.

That, in turn, increased our chargeback rate.”

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Apparently, the thinking was that this torrent of additional transactions would dilute the

number of chargebacks and keep the ratio under 1%. The same thinking led the

company to charge and then refund the credit cards of randomly selected customers. The

charges were made without authorization, and if anyone complained about the odd

activity on his card, he was told that it was the result of a computer glitch. Through the

use of these techniques and others, the company was able to stave off termination of its

merchant-bank accounts.

B. Procedural History

In September 2006, a grand jury sitting in the Southern District of Ohio returned

a 112-count indictment charging Warshak, Harriet, TCI, and several others with various

crimes related to Berkeley’s business. Warshak was charged with conspiracy to commit

mail, wire, and bank fraud (Count 1); mail fraud (Counts 2-13); making false statements

to banks (Counts 14, 16-22, 24-26, 28); bank fraud (Counts 15, 23, 27); conspiracy to

commit and attempt to commit access-device fraud (Count 29); conspiracy to commit

money laundering (Count 34); money laundering (Counts 32-98, 102-106, 108);

conspiracy to commit misbranding (Count 109); misbranding (Count 110); and, lastly,

conspiracy to obstruct a Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) proceeding (Count 112).

Harriet was charged with conspiracy to commit mail, wire, and bank fraud (Count 1);

bank fraud (Count 27); making false statements to a bank (Count 28); conspiracy to

commit money laundering (Counts 30-31); and money laundering (Counts 99-101, 107).

TCI was charged with money laundering (Counts 57-58, 60-73, 79, 83, 91-93).

Before trial, numerous motions were filed. First, Warshak moved to exclude

thousands of emails that the government obtained from his Internet Service Providers.

That motion was denied. Warshak also moved to bar the government from using any

evidence “derived through improper access to privileged attorney-client

communications.” Appellant’s Br. at 42. Following a “Kastigar-like” evidentiary

hearing at which governmental inspectors testified that they did not make use of any

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privileged materials, the district court denied the motion. In addition, the defendants

requested a continuance, which was denied.

Over fifteen months later, in January 2008, the case proceeded to trial.

Approximately six weeks later, the trial ended and the defendants were convicted of the

majority of the charges. Warshak was acquitted of Counts 14-22, 24-26, and 28, which

charged him with making false statements to banks, and he was also acquitted of Counts

109-110, which charged him with misbranding offenses. Harriet was acquitted of Count

28, which alleged that she made false statements to a bank. She was convicted on

Counts 27, 30-31, 99-101, and 107.

As soon as the trial was over, a forfeiture hearing was held, during which the jury

heard additional evidence. At the hearing, the defendants attempted to introduce certain

evidence that many of Berkeley’s sales were legitimate, but the district court ruled that

the evidence was irrelevant. When the hearing concluded, the jury found that the

government had established the requisite nexus between certain assets and the crimes of

both fraud and money laundering.

On August 27, 2008, the defendants were sentenced. Warshak received a

sentence of 25 years of imprisonment. He was also ordered to pay a fine of $93,000 and

a special assessment of $9,300. In addition, he was ordered to surrender $459,540,000

in proceeds-money-judgment forfeiture and $44,876,781.68 in money-laundering-

judgment forfeiture. Harriet was sentenced to 24 months of imprisonment, ordered to

pay a special assessment of $800, and held jointly and severally liable for the forfeiture

judgments. TCI was sentenced to five years of probation and ordered to pay a fine of

$160,000 and a special assessment of $6,400.

Following a series of unsuccessful post-trial motions, the defendants timely

appealed.

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II. ANALYSIS

A. The Search & Seizure of Warshak’s Emails

Warshak argues that the government’s warrantless, ex parte seizure of

approximately 27,000 of his private emails constituted a violation of the Fourth

Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.12 The government

counters that, even if government agents violated the Fourth Amendment in obtaining

the emails, they relied in good faith on the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”),

18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq., a statute that allows the government to obtain certain

electronic communications without procuring a warrant. The government also argues

that any hypothetical Fourth Amendment violation was harmless. We find that the

government did violate Warshak’s Fourth Amendment rights by compelling his Internet

Service Provider (“ISP”) to turn over the contents of his emails. However, we agree that

agents relied on the SCA in good faith, and therefore hold that reversal is unwarranted.13

1. The Stored Communications Act

The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq., “permits

a ‘governmental entity’ to compel a service provider to disclose the contents of

[electronic] communications in certain circumstances.” Warshak II, 532 F.3d at 523.

As this court explained in Warshak II:

12

This is not the first time Warshak has raised this argument. In Warshak v. United States, 490

F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Warshak I”), a panel of this court determined that Warshak did indeed have a

privacy interest in the contents of his emails. That decision was vacated on ripeness grounds. See

Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“Warshak II”). In the present case,

Warshak’s claim is ripe for review.

13

Though we may surely do so, we decline to limit our inquiry to the issue of good-faith reliance.

See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009). If every court confronted with a novel Fourth

Amendment question were to skip directly to good faith, the government would be given carte blanche

to violate constitutionally protected privacy rights, provided, of course, that a statute supposedly permits

them to do so. The doctrine of good-faith reliance should not be a perpetual shield against the

consequences of constitutional violations. In other words, if the exclusionary rule is to have any bite,

courts must, from time to time, decide whether statutorily sanctioned conduct oversteps constitutional

boundaries. See id. at 816 (noting that repeated avoidance of constitutional questions leads to

“constitutional stagnation” (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001))).

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Three relevant definitions bear on the meaning of the

compelled-disclosure provisions of the Act. “[E]lectronic communication

service[s]” permit “users . . . to send or receive wire or electronic

communications,” [18 U.S.C.] § 2510(15), a definition that covers basic

e-mail services, see Patricia L. Bellia et al., Cyberlaw: Problems of

Policy and Jurisprudence in the Information Age 584 (2d ed. 2004).

“[E]lectronic storage” is “any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire

or electronic communication . . . and . . . any storage of such

communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of

backup protection of such communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17).

“[R]emote computing service[s]” provide “computer storage or

processing services” to customers, id. § 2711(2), and are designed for

longer-term storage, see Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored

Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 Geo.

Wash. L. Rev. 1208, 1216 (2004).

The compelled-disclosure provisions give different levels of privacy

protection based on whether the e-mail is held with an electronic

communication service or a remote computing service and based on how

long the e-mail has been in electronic storage. The government may

obtain the contents of e-mails that are “in electronic storage” with an

electronic communication service for 180 days or less “only pursuant to

a warrant.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). The government has three options for

obtaining communications stored with a remote computing service and

communications that have been in electronic storage with an electronic

service provider for more than 180 days: (1) obtain a warrant; (2) use an

administrative subpoena; or (3) obtain a court order under § 2703(d). Id.

§ 2703(a), (b).

532 F.3d at 523-24 (some alterations in original).

2. Factual Background

Email was a critical form of communication among Berkeley personnel. As a

consequence, Warshak had a number of email accounts with various ISPs, including an

account with NuVox Communications. In October 2004, the government formally

requested that NuVox prospectively preserve the contents of any emails to or from

Warshak’s email account. The request was made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) and

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it instructed NuVox to preserve all future messages.14 NuVox acceded to the

government’s request and began preserving copies of Warshak’s incoming and outgoing

emails—copies that would not have existed absent the prospective preservation request.

Per the government’s instructions, Warshak was not informed that his messages were

being archived.

In January 2005, the government obtained a subpoena under § 2703(b) and

compelled NuVox to turn over the emails that it had begun preserving the previous year.

In May 2005, the government served NuVox with an ex parte court order under

§ 2703(d) that required NuVox to surrender any additional email messages in Warshak’s

account. In all, the government compelled NuVox to reveal the contents of

approximately 27,000 emails. Warshak did not receive notice of either the subpoena or

the order until May 2006.

3. The Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,

shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .” U.S.

CONST. amend. IV. The fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment “is to safeguard

the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government

officials.” Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); see Skinner v. Ry. Labor

Execs.’Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989) (“The [Fourth] Amendment guarantees the

privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by

officers of the Government or those acting at their direction.”).

Not all government actions are invasive enough to implicate the Fourth

Amendment. “The Fourth Amendment’s protections hinge on the occurrence of a

‘search,’ a legal term of art whose history is riddled with complexity.” Widgren v.

14

Warshak appears to have accessed emails from his NuVox account via POP, or “Post Office

Protocol.” When POP is utilized, emails are downloaded to the user’s personal computer and generally

deleted from the ISP’s server.

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Maple Grove Twp., 429 F.3d 575, 578 (6th Cir. 2005). A “search” occurs when the

government infringes upon “an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to

consider reasonable.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). This

standard breaks down into two discrete inquiries: “first, has the [target of the

investigation] manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the

challenged search? Second, is society willing to recognize that expectation as

reasonable?” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (citing Smith v. Maryland,

442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)).

Turning first to the subjective component of the test, we find that Warshak

plainly manifested an expectation that his emails would be shielded from outside

scrutiny. As he notes in his brief, his “entire business and personal life was contained

within the . . . emails seized.” Appellant’s Br. at 39-40. Given the often sensitive and

sometimes damning substance of his emails,15 we think it highly unlikely that Warshak

expected them to be made public, for people seldom unfurl their dirty laundry in plain

view. See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (“[T]he

tenor and content of e-mail conversations between appellant and his correspondent,

‘Launchboy,’ reveal a[n] . . . expectation that the conversations were private.”).

Therefore, we conclude that Warshak had a subjective expectation of privacy in the

contents of his emails.

The next question is whether society is prepared to recognize that expectation as

reasonable. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 740. This question is one of grave import and

enduring consequence, given the prominent role that email has assumed in modern

communication. Cf. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (suggesting that the Constitution must be

read to account for “the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private

communication”). Since the advent of email, the telephone call and the letter have

waned in importance, and an explosion of Internet-based communication has taken

place. People are now able to send sensitive and intimate information, instantaneously,

15

In a number of the NuVox emails, Warshak discussed the creation of trusts for his children, as

well as the possibility that his financial dealings would mislead FTC investigators.

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to friends, family, and colleagues half a world away. Lovers exchange sweet nothings,

and businessmen swap ambitious plans, all with the click of a mouse button. Commerce

has also taken hold in email. Online purchases are often documented in email accounts,

and email is frequently used to remind patients and clients of imminent appointments.

In short, “account” is an apt word for the conglomeration of stored messages that

comprises an email account, as it provides an account of its owner’s life. By obtaining

access to someone’s email, government agents gain the ability to peer deeply into his

activities. Much hinges, therefore, on whether the government is permitted to request

that a commercial ISP turn over the contents of a subscriber’s emails without triggering

the machinery of the Fourth Amendment.

In confronting this question, we take note of two bedrock principles. First, the

very fact that information is being passed through a communications network is a

paramount Fourth Amendment consideration. See ibid.; United States v. U. S. Dist.

Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (“[T]he broad and unsuspected governmental incursions

into conversational privacy which electronic surveillance entails necessitate the

application of Fourth Amendment safeguards.”). Second, the Fourth Amendment must

keep pace with the inexorable march of technological progress, or its guarantees will

wither and perish. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (noting that

evolving technology must not be permitted to “erode the privacy guaranteed by the

Fourth Amendment”); see also Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the

Internet: A General Approach, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1005, 1007 (2010) (arguing that “the

differences between the facts of physical space and the facts of the Internet require

courts to identify new Fourth Amendment distinctions to maintain the function of Fourth

Amendment rules in an online environment”).

With those principles in mind, we begin our analysis by considering the manner

in which the Fourth Amendment protects traditional forms of communication. In Katz,

the Supreme Court was asked to determine how the Fourth Amendment applied in the

context of the telephone. There, government agents had affixed an electronic listening

device to the exterior of a public phone booth, and had used the device to intercept and

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record several phone conversations. See 389 U.S. at 348. The Supreme Court held that

this constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, see id. at 353, notwithstanding

the fact that the telephone company had the capacity to monitor and record the calls, see

Smith, 442 U.S. at 746-47 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In the eyes of the Court, the caller

was “surely entitled to assume that the words he utter[ed] into the mouthpiece w[ould]

not be broadcast to the world.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. The Court’s holding in Katz has

since come to stand for the broad proposition that, in many contexts, the government

infringes a reasonable expectation of privacy when it surreptitiously intercepts a

telephone call through electronic means. Smith, 442 U.S. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting)

(“[S]ince Katz, it has been abundantly clear that telephone conversations are fully

protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.”).

Letters receive similar protection. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 114 (“Letters and

other sealed packages are in the general class of effects in which the public at large has

a legitimate expectation of privacy[.]”); Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).

While a letter is in the mail, the police may not intercept it and examine its contents

unless they first obtain a warrant based on probable cause. Ibid. This is true despite the

fact that sealed letters are handed over to perhaps dozens of mail carriers, any one of

whom could tear open the thin paper envelopes that separate the private words from the

world outside. Put another way, trusting a letter to an intermediary does not necessarily

defeat a reasonable expectation that the letter will remain private. See Katz, 389 U.S.

at 351 (“[W]hat [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the

public, may be constitutionally protected.”).

Given the fundamental similarities between email and traditional forms of

communication, it would defy common sense to afford emails lesser Fourth Amendment

protection. See Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Protection for

Stored E-Mail, 2008 U. Chi. Legal F. 121, 135 (2008) (recognizing the need to

“eliminate the strangely disparate treatment of mailed and telephonic communications

on the one hand and electronic communications on the other”); City of Ontario v. Quon,

130 S. Ct. 2619, 2631 (2010) (implying that “a search of [an individual’s] personal e-

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mail account” would be just as intrusive as “a wiretap on his home phone line”); United

States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 511 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that “[t]he privacy

interests in [mail and email] are identical”). Email is the technological scion of tangible

mail, and it plays an indispensable part in the Information Age. Over the last decade,

email has become “so pervasive that some persons may consider [it] to be [an] essential

means or necessary instrument[] for self-expression, even self-identification.” Quon,

130 S. Ct. at 2630. It follows that email requires strong protection under the Fourth

Amendment; otherwise, the Fourth Amendment would prove an ineffective guardian of

private communication, an essential purpose it has long been recognized to serve. See

U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 313; United States v. Waller, 581 F.2d 585, 587 (6th Cir.

1978) (noting the Fourth Amendment’s role in protecting “private communications”).

As some forms of communication begin to diminish, the Fourth Amendment must

recognize and protect nascent ones that arise. See Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 473 (“It goes

without saying that like the telephone earlier in our history, e-mail is an ever-increasing

mode of private communication, and protecting shared communications through this

medium is as important to Fourth Amendment principles today as protecting telephone

conversations has been in the past.”).

If we accept that an email is analogous to a letter or a phone call, it is manifest

that agents of the government cannot compel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents

of an email without triggering the Fourth Amendment. An ISP is the intermediary that

makes email communication possible. Emails must pass through an ISP’s servers to

reach their intended recipient. Thus, the ISP is the functional equivalent of a post office

or a telephone company. As we have discussed above, the police may not storm the post

office and intercept a letter, and they are likewise forbidden from using the phone system

to make a clandestine recording of a telephone call—unless they get a warrant, that is.

See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 114; Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. It only stands to reason that, if

government agents compel an ISP to surrender the contents of a subscriber’s emails,

those agents have thereby conducted a Fourth Amendment search, which necessitates

compliance with the warrant requirement absent some exception.

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In Warshak I, the government argued that this conclusion was improper, pointing

to the fact that NuVox contractually reserved the right to access Warshak’s emails for

certain purposes. While we acknowledge that a subscriber agreement might, in some

cases, be sweeping enough to defeat a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents

of an email account, see Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 473; Warshak II, 532 F.3d at 526-27, we

doubt that will be the case in most situations, and it is certainly not the case here.

As an initial matter, it must be observed that the mere ability of a third-party

intermediary to access the contents of a communication cannot be sufficient to

extinguish a reasonable expectation of privacy. In Katz, the Supreme Court found it

reasonable to expect privacy during a telephone call despite the ability of an operator to

listen in. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 746-47 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Similarly, the ability

of a rogue mail handler to rip open a letter does not make it unreasonable to assume that

sealed mail will remain private on its journey across the country. Therefore, the threat

or possibility of access is not decisive when it comes to the reasonableness of an

expectation of privacy.

Nor is the right of access. As the Electronic Frontier Foundation points out in

its amicus brief, at the time Katz was decided, telephone companies had a right to

monitor calls in certain situations. Specifically, telephone companies could listen in

when reasonably necessary to “protect themselves and their properties against the

improper and illegal use of their facilities.” Bubis v. United States, 384 F.2d 643, 648

(9th Cir. 1967). In this case, the NuVox subscriber agreement tracks that language,

indicating that “NuVox may access and use individual Subscriber information in the

operation of the Service and as necessary to protect the Service.” Acceptable Use

Policy, available at http://business.windstream.com/Legal/acceptableUse.htm (last

visited Aug. 12, 2010). Thus, under Katz, the degree of access granted to NuVox does

not diminish the reasonableness of Warshak’s trust in the privacy of his emails.16

16

We note that the access granted to NuVox was also temporally limited, as Warshak’s email

account was configured to delete his emails from NuVox’s servers as soon as he opened them on his

personal computer. See Appellant’s Br. at 28 (“NuVox did not even save copies of account holders’

received emails once they had been opened and downloaded to the account holders’ computers[.]”).

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Our conclusion finds additional support in the application of Fourth Amendment

doctrine to rented space. Hotel guests, for example, have a reasonable expectation of

privacy in their rooms. See United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir. 1997).

This is so even though maids routinely enter hotel rooms to replace the towels and tidy

the furniture. Similarly, tenants have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their

apartments. See United States v. Washington, 573 F.3d 279, 284 (6th Cir. 2009). That

expectation persists, regardless of the incursions of handymen to fix leaky faucets.

Consequently, we are convinced that some degree of routine access is hardly dispositive

with respect to the privacy question.

Again, however, we are unwilling to hold that a subscriber agreement will never

be broad enough to snuff out a reasonable expectation of privacy. As the panel noted

in Warshak I, if the ISP expresses an intention to “audit, inspect, and monitor” its

subscriber’s emails, that might be enough to render an expectation of privacy

unreasonable. See 490 F.3d at 472-73 (quoting United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392,

398 (4th Cir. 2000)). But where, as here, there is no such statement, the ISP’s “control

over the [emails] and ability to access them under certain limited circumstances will not

be enough to overcome an expectation of privacy.” Id. at 473.

We recognize that our conclusion may be attacked in light of the Supreme

Court’s decision in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). In Miller, the Supreme

Court held that a bank depositor does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the

contents of bank records, checks, and deposit slips. Id. at 442. The Court’s holding in

Miller was based on the fact that bank documents, “including financial statements and

deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed

to their employees in the ordinary course of business.” Ibid. The Court noted,

The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the

information will be conveyed by that person to the Government. . . .[T]he

Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information

revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities,

even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used

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only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party

will not be betrayed.

Id. at 443 (citations omitted).

But Miller is distinguishable. First, Miller involved simple business records, as

opposed to the potentially unlimited variety of “confidential communications” at issue

here. See ibid. Second, the bank depositor in Miller conveyed information to the bank

so that the bank could put the information to use “in the ordinary course of business.”

Ibid. By contrast, Warshak received his emails through NuVox. NuVox was an

intermediary, not the intended recipient of the emails. See Bellia & Freiwald, Stored E-

Mail, 2008 U. Chi. Legal F. at 165 (“[W]e view the best analogy for this scenario as the

cases in which a third party carries, transports, or stores property for another. In these

cases, as in the stored e-mail case, the customer grants access to the ISP because it is

essential to the customer’s interests.”). Thus, Miller is not controlling.

Accordingly, we hold that a subscriber enjoys a reasonable expectation of

privacy in the contents of emails “that are stored with, or sent or received through, a

commercial ISP.” Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 473; see Forrester, 512 F.3d at 511

(suggesting that “[t]he contents [of email messages] may deserve Fourth Amendment

protection”). The government may not compel a commercial ISP to turn over the

contents of a subscriber’s emails without first obtaining a warrant based on probable

cause. Therefore, because they did not obtain a warrant, the government agents violated

the Fourth Amendment when they obtained the contents of Warshak’s emails.

Moreover, to the extent that the SCA purports to permit the government to obtain such

emails warrantlessly, the SCA is unconstitutional.

4. Good-Faith Reliance

Even though the government’s search of Warshak’s emails violated the Fourth

Amendment, the emails are not subject to the exclusionary remedy if the officers relied

in good faith on the SCA to obtain them. See Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-50. In Krull, the

Supreme Court noted that the exclusionary rule’s purpose of deterring law enforcement

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officers from engaging in unconstitutional conduct would not be furthered by holding

officers accountable for mistakes of the legislature. Ibid. Thus, even if a statute is later

found to be unconstitutional, an officer “cannot be expected to question the judgment of

the legislature.” Ibid. However, an officer cannot “be said to have acted in good-faith

reliance upon a statute if its provisions are such that a reasonable officer should have

known that the statute was unconstitutional.” Id. at 355.

Naturally, Warshak argues that the provisions of the SCA at issue in this case

were plainly unconstitutional. He argues that any reasonable law enforcement officer

would have understood that a warrant based on probable cause would be required to

compel the production of private emails. In making this argument, he leans heavily on

Warshak I, which opined that the SCA permits agents to engage in searches “that clearly

do not comport with the Fourth Amendment.” 490 F.3d at 477.

However, we disagree that the SCA is so conspicuously unconstitutional as to

preclude good-faith reliance. As we noted in Warshak II, “[t]he Stored Communications

Act has been in existence since 1986 and to our knowledge has not been the subject of

any successful Fourth Amendment challenges, in any context, whether to § 2703(d) or

to any other provision.” 532 F.3d at 531. Furthermore, given the complicated thicket

of issues that we were required to navigate when passing on the constitutionality of the

SCA, it was not plain or obvious that the SCA was unconstitutional, and it was therefore

reasonable for the government to rely upon the SCA in seeking to obtain the contents of

Warshak’s emails.17

But the good-faith reliance inquiry does not end with the facial validity of the

statute at issue. In Krull, the Supreme Court hinted that the good-faith exception does

not apply if the government acted “outside the scope of the statute” on which it

purported to rely. 480 U.S. at 360 n.17. It should be noted that this portion of the Krull

Court’s opinion was merely dicta, and it appears that we have yet to pass on the

17

Of course, after today’s decision, the good-faith calculus has changed, and a reasonable officer

may no longer assume that the Constitution permits warrantless searches of private emails.

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question. However, it seems evident that an officer’s failure to adhere to the boundaries

of a given statute should preclude him from relying upon it in the face of a constitutional

challenge.18 Once the officer steps outside the scope of an unconstitutional statute, the

mistake is no longer the legislature’s, but the officer’s. See ibid. (“In that context, the

relevant actors are not legislators or magistrates, but police officers who concededly are

engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, use of the exclusionary rule is once again

efficacious in deterring officers from engaging in conduct that violates the Constitution.

Ibid.

Warshak argues that the government violated several provisions of the SCA and

should therefore be precluded from arguing good-faith reliance. First, Warshak argues

that the government violated the SCA’s notice provisions. Under § 2703(b)(1)(B), the

government must provide notice to an account holder if it seeks to compel the disclosure

of his emails through either a § 2703(b) subpoena or a § 2703(d) order. However,

§ 2705 permits the government to delay notification in certain situations. The initial

period of delay is 90 days, but the government may seek to extend that period in 90-day

increments. In this case, the government issued both a § 2703(b) subpoena and a

§ 2703(d) order to NuVox, seeking disclosure of Warshak’s emails. At the time, the

government made the requisite showing that notice should be delayed. However, the

government did not seek to renew the period of delay. In all, the government failed to

inform Warshak of either the subpoena or the order for over a year.

Conceding that it violated the notice provisions, the government argues that such

violations are irrelevant to the issue of whether it reasonably relied on the SCA in

obtaining the contents of Warshak’s emails. We agree. As the government notes, the

violations occurred after the emails had been obtained. Thus, the mistakes at issue had

18

At least one court has translated this inquiry into the context of qualified immunity. In Roska

ex rel. Roska v. Sneddon, 437 F.3d 964 (10th Cir. 2006), the Tenth Circuit considered whether an officer’s

alleged reliance on a state statute rendered his conduct objectively reasonable. The court held that, in

determining whether such reliance had occurred, one fact to consider was “whether the official in fact

complied with the statute.” Id. at 971.

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no bearing on the constitutional violations. Because the exclusionary rule was designed

to deter constitutional violations, we decline to invoke it in this situation.

But Warshak does not hang his hat exclusively on the government’s violations

of the SCA’s notice provisions. He also argues that the government exceeded its

authority under another SCA provision—§ 2703(f)—by requesting NuVox to engage in

prospective preservation of his future emails.19 Under § 2703(f), “[a] provider of wire

or electronic communication services or a remote computing service, upon the request

of a governmental entity, shall take all necessary steps to preserve records and other

evidence in its possession pending the issuance of a court order or other process.”

18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) (emphasis added). Warshak argues that this statute permits only

retrospective preservation—in other words, preservation of emails already in existence.

He notes that the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) generally agrees with his construction

of the statute, pointing to the DOJ’s own computer-surveillance manual, which states:

“[Section] 2703(f) letters should not be used prospectively to order providers to preserve

records not yet created. If agents want providers to record information about future

electronic communications, they should comply with the [Wiretap Act and the Pen/Trap

statute].”20

Ultimately, however, this statutory violation, whether it occurred or not,21 is

irrelevant to the issue of good-faith reliance. The question here is whether the

government relied in good faith on § 2703(b) and § 2703(d) to obtain copies of

19

It appears that, below, Warshak argued that the preservation request was itself a violation of

the Fourth Amendment. He does not renew that argument on appeal, and it is therefore waived. See

Robinson v. Jones, 142 F.3d 905, 906 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Issues which were raised in the district court, yet

not raised on appeal, are considered abandoned and not reviewable on appeal.”).

20

Warshak also argues that the government’s § 2703(f) request for prospective preservation of

his emails was a violation of the Wiretap Act. However, the government does not plead reliance on the

Wiretap Act to justify its actions. Thus, this argument is immaterial.

21

Some courts and commentators have suggested that § 2703(f) applies only retroactively. See,

e.g., Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective

on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1557, 1565 (2004) (“The Wiretap

Act and Pen Register statute regulate prospective surveillance of Internet communications

(communications “in transit”), and the SCA governs retrospective surveillance (stored communications).”).

However, the language of the statute, on its face, does not compel this reading.

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Warshak’s emails. True, the government might not have been able to gain access to the

emails without the prospective preservation request, as it was NuVox’s practice to delete

all emails once they were downloaded to the account holder’s computer. Thus, in a

sense, the government’s use of § 2703(f) was a but-for cause of the constitutional

violation. But the actual violation at issue was obtaining the emails, and the government

did not rely on § 2703(f) specifically to do that. Instead, the government relied on

§ 2703(b) and § 2703(d). The proper inquiry, therefore, is whether the government

violated either of those provisions, and the preservation request is of no consequence to

that inquiry.

Warshak’s next argument is that the government violated § 2703(d) by failing

to provide any particularized factual basis when seeking an order for disclosure. Under

§ 2703(d), such an order “shall issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and

articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents

of a wire or electronic communication . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing

criminal investigation.”

To the extent that he is arguing that the government’s application was

insufficient, Warshak is wrong. The government’s application indicated that it was

“investigating a complex, large-scale mail and wire fraud operation based in Cincinnati,

Ohio.” The application also indicated that “interviews of current and former employees

of the target company suggest that electronic mail is a vital communication tool that has

been used to perpetuate the fraudulent conduct.” Additionally, the application observed

that “various sources [have verified] that NuVox provides electronic communications

services to certain individual(s) [under] investigation.” In light of these statements, it

is clear that the application was, in fact, supported by specific and articulable facts,

especially given the diminished standard that applies to § 2703(d) applications. See

United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that “the ‘specific

and articulable facts’ standard derives from the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry”);

Warshak I, 490 F.3d at 463 (“The parties agree that the standard of proof for a court

order—‘specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to

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believe that the contents . . . or records . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing

criminal investigation’—falls short of probable cause.”).

Finally, Warshak argues that a finding of good-faith reliance is improper because

the government presented the magistrate with an erroneous definition of the term

“electronic storage.” As noted above, if an email is in electronic storage for less than

180 days, the government may not compel its disclosure without a warrant. 18 U.S.C.

§ 2703(a). In applying for the subpoena and the order that eventually resulted in the

disclosure of Warshak’s NuVox emails, the government suggested to the magistrate that

an email is not in electronic storage if it has already been “accessed, viewed, or

downloaded.” Warshak argues that this definition of electronic storage does not comport

with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th

Cir. 2004), which held that “prior access is irrelevant to whether the [emails] at issue

were in electronic storage.” Warshak further argues that, because the government failed

to mention the Ninth Circuit’s definition, it “usurped the court’s function to determine

whether an email . . . [is] in ‘electronic storage[.]’” Appellant’s Br. at 38.

As an initial matter, it is manifest that the decisions of the Ninth Circuit are not

binding on courts in this circuit. It therefore cannot be said that the government

somehow violated § 2703 by failing to cite an out-of-circuit decision that it thought to

be wrongly decided. Incidentally, the government is not alone in thinking that the Ninth

Circuit’s definition of electronic storage is incorrect. One commentator has noted that

“Theofel is quite implausible and hard to square with the statutory test.” Kerr, A User’s

Guide to the Stored Communications Act, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 1217; see also

United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 773 (C.D. Ill. 2009) (“Previously opened

emails stored by Microsoft for Hotmail users are not in electronic storage, and the

Government can obtain copies of such emails using a trial subpoena.”).

Furthermore, it does a disservice to the magistrate judge to suggest that the

government usurped the role of the court. The government’s application did include a

proposed definition of the term “electronic storage.” That does not mean, however, that

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the magistrate judge unhesitatingly received that definition, and, as the government

notes, the magistrate “presumably [had] the opportunity to consider and review relevant

precedent.” Appellee’s Br. at 117.

Consequently, we find that, although the government violated the Fourth

Amendment, the exclusionary rule does not apply, as the government relied in good faith

on § 2703(b) and § 2703(d) to access the contents of Warshak’s emails.22

B. The Kastigar-Like Hearing

1. Background

During the government’s investigation of Berkeley, case agents came into

possession of myriad documents that were ostensibly subject to the attorney-client

privilege. Many of the documents were obtained during a March 16, 2005 search of

Berkeley’s headquarters, in which agents copied the contents of over 90 computers.

Other documents were procured earlier through the subpoena and court order issued to

NuVox, which granted investigators access to the contents of Warshak’s email accounts.

In all, case agents had access to approximately “60,000 email communications from or

to attorneys representing Berkeley and Warshak, communications facially and

presumptively protected by the attorney-client privilege.” Appellant’s Br. at 41.

On July 5, 2007, Warshak filed a “motion to bar the government from using the

evidence obtained in violation of the defendants’ attorney-client and work product

privileges and to dismiss the indictment since privileged material was used to secure it.”

United States v. Warshak, No. 1:06-CR-00111, 2007 WL 3306603, at *1 (S.D. Ohio

Nov. 5, 2007). In the motion, the defendants requested that the district court hold a

hearing “in the framework of Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), at which

22

In addition, we note that the Fourth Amendment violation was likely harmless. See United

States v. Carnes, 309 F.3d 950, 963 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that a Fourth Amendment violation does not

warrant reversal if the violation was harmless). The NuVox emails did not play a role in obtaining the

search warrant that produced the overwhelming majority of the evidence in this case. In addition, only

three of the emails were introduced at trial, and they were largely cumulative of the testimony of William

Bertemes, Warshak’s accountant. See Bradley v. Cowan, 561 F.2d 1213, 1217 (6th Cir. 1977) (noting that

the impact of “purely cumulative” evidence is often minimal).

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the government would bear the burden of establishing that its case was untainted by

attorney-client and work product privileged materials.” Warshak, 2007 WL 3306603,

at *1. To an extent, the district court granted the motion, setting a “Kastigar-like”

hearing with the “narrow purpose of eliciting the sworn testimony of government agents

as to their handling of evidence.” Ibid. In ordering the hearing, the district court “found

that [the] [d]efendants had raised enough of a question about the amount of time U.S.

Postal Inspector Alejandro Almaguer (‘Almaguer’) possessed privileged data, as well

as the government’s methodology in screening data for privileged information, to merit

a response.” Ibid.

The hearing was held on September 27 and 28, 2007. During the hearing, “the

government proffered evidence and the testimony of Almaguer, the [d]efendants were

afforded [an] opportunity to cross-examine Almaguer and examine other agents on

direct, and the parties argued their respective positions concerning the propriety of the

government action in this case.” Ibid. In addition, the defendants called Peter

Horstmann, an expert witness “who used software to analyze the electronic documents

the government produced to [the] [d]efendants.” Ibid.

After the hearing, the district court held that the government had satisfied its

burden, stating as follows:

The [c]ourt’s original concerns that triggered the grant of the

“Kastigar-like” evidentiary hearing were rooted in the amount of time

that Almaguer allegedly had access to privileged materials, and in the

fact the government had proffered no sworn statements backing its

contention that it did not use privileged materials to obtain witness

proffers. The government has completely allayed the [c]ourt’s concerns.

The United States has met its burden to demonstrate its agents have acted

properly and that its case is untainted by privileged information.

Id. at *8.

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2. The Adequacy of the Government’s Presentation

Warshak argues that the Kastigar-like hearing was inadequate. More precisely,

he argues that the district court failed to “hold[] the government to the burden prescribed

by Kastigar and subsequent cases applying it.” Appellant’s Br. at 48. He complains that

the district court “simply accepted the government’s blanket denials that it used

privileged materials in preparing its case against defendants, and shifted the burden to

[him] to show that privileged materials contributed to the return of the indictment.” Ibid.

(internal citations omitted). In short, he argues that the district court improperly

loosened the stringent demands of Kastigar.

In Kastigar, the Supreme Court held that when a witness is compelled to give

incriminating testimony under a grant of statutory immunity and is thereafter prosecuted

for any matter related to the compelled testimony, the government must shoulder the

“heavy burden of proving that all of the evidence it proposes to use was derived from

legitimate independent sources.” 406 U.S. at 461-62; see also United States v. Turner,

936 F.2d 221, 224 (6th Cir. 1991). “This burden of proof . . . is not limited to a negation

of taint; rather, it imposes on the prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that the

evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of

the compelled testimony.” Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460.

While Kastigar is clearly concerned with the use of testimony obtained despite

an assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, this court has

suggested that Kastigar concerns may arise in the context of other privileges, such as the

privilege accorded to attorney-client communications. Specifically, this court has

hinted, in dicta, that “the leaking of privileged materials to investigators would raise the

spectre of Kastigar-like evidentiary hearings.” In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 454 F.3d

511, 517 (6th Cir. 2006). However, no other appellate court appears to have joined us

in suggesting that Kastigar is implicated whenever investigators come into possession

of materials subject to the attorney-client privilege.

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One circuit, the Fourth, has engaged in a fairly lengthy analysis of Kastigar’s

applicability in the arena of non-constitutional privileges. In United States v.

Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542 (4th Cir. 2000), the Fourth Circuit was faced with a scenario

in which government investigators had legally conducted electronic surveillance on

several defendants pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.23 During the

surveillance, the agents heard and recorded a number of conversations between one of

the defendants and her psychotherapists. Subsequently, the defendants “moved to

suppress any evidence derived from the privileged communications,” arguing that “they

were entitled to a hearing to vindicate the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in

[Kastigar].” Id. at 558. Ultimately, the court determined that Kastigar was “simply . . .

not applicable.” Ibid.

In so holding, the Squillacote court began by conceding that the conversations

at issue, which the government had obtained during surveillance, were privileged.

According to the court, “[t]he question, then, [was] whether the mere existence of this

privileged information br[ought] to bear the full weight of Kastigar.” Id. at 559. The

court held that it did not, finding that “a Kastigar analysis is not triggered by the

existence of evidence protected by a privilege, but instead by the government’s effort to

compel a witness to testify over the witness’s claim of privilege.” Ibid. (emphasis

added). However, the court also opined “that Kastigar-like protections may be required

in cases involving testimony compelled over the assertion of a non-constitutional

privilege.” Ibid. Nonetheless, in concluding its analysis, the court reiterated that

“because the government’s right to compel testimony in the face of a claim of privilege

is the issue at the heart of Kastigar, its protections do not apply in cases where there is

privileged evidence, but no compelled testimony.” Id. at 560. We agree, and hold that,

absent compelled testimony, the full protections of Kastigar are inapplicable.

23

That is to say, the federal agents had established probable cause to believe that the targets of

the surveillance were a foreign power or agents of a foreign power. Squillacote, 221 F.3d at 554; see 50

U.S.C. § 1804(a).

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As further justification for its holding in Squillacote, the Fourth Circuit observed

that “suppression of any evidence derived from the privileged conversations would be

[im]proper in this case, given that the privilege is a testimonial or evidentiary one, and

not constitutionally-based.” Ibid. In making this assertion, the court observed that, as

of the year 2000, no court had applied the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine to

derivative evidence obtained as a result of improper access to materials covered by a

non-constitutional privilege. Ibid. (quoting United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 731

n.11 (9th Cir. 1990)); see also Nickel v. Hannigan, 97 F.3d 403, 409 (10th Cir. 1996)

(“[W]e decline to apply the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine to the possible breach

of attorney-client privilege in this case.”). We have found no subsequent authority

indicating that such derivative evidence is subject to suppression, and we agree that it

is unwise to extend the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine beyond the context of

constitutional violations. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)

(indicating that testimonial privileges must be balanced against “the need for probative

evidence in the administration of criminal justice”).

In the present case, the privileged materials were not obtained from Warshak as

a result of compelled testimony. Instead, they were garnered pursuant to a subpoena, a

court order, and a search warrant, much like the psychotherapist-patient conversations

at issue in Squillacote. Thus, because the documents were not the product of compelled

testimony, a full Kastigar hearing was not required. Moreover, there is no indication

that the government made any direct use of the privileged communications, either at trial

or before the grand jury. Consequently, given the fact that evidence derived from a

violation of the attorney-client privilege is not fruit of the poisonous tree, Warshak’s

argument withers.

C. Volume & Format of Discovery

The volume of discovery in the present case was prodigious. Indeed, the

government turned over millions of pages of discovery, but that discovery appears to

have come from relatively few sources. Most of the discovery came from Berkeley

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itself, when, in March 2005, inspectors executed a search warrant and “imaged” (i.e.,

copied) the electronic contents of the company’s computers and servers. After the

search, the computers and servers remained on Berkeley’s premises, except for several

laptops, which were taken offsite and returned two days later. All told, the electronic

evidence originating at Berkeley filled three “tera-drives” and numbered 17 million

pages. In addition to the electronic evidence, agents seized approximately 506,000

pages of hard-copy documents, all of which the defendants were eventually permitted

to copy. On top of the evidence obtained at Berkeley, discovery included 275 discs of

material gathered by the grand jury and 13 discs of potential trial exhibits compiled by

the government.

The defendants make three arguments with respect to the immense volume of

discovery in this case. First, they argue that the district court abused its discretion and

violated their right to a fair trial by allowing the government to turn over stupendous

quantities of evidence in a disorganized and unsearchable format. Next, they argue that

the government was improperly permitted to “abdicate” its Brady obligations by

producing gargantuan “haystacks” of discovery that swallowed any “needles” of

exculpatory information. Appellant’s Br. at 52. Finally, the defendants argue that the

district court erroneously denied a 90-day continuance, which was requested to enable

the defendants to continue sifting through the mountains of discovery furnished by the

government. Ultimately, none of these arguments is persuasive.24

1. The Manner in Which the Government Produced Discovery

The defendants’ first argument is that the district court erroneously permitted the

government to produce titanic amounts of electronic discovery in formats that were

simultaneously disorganized and unsearchable. Specifically, the defendants assert that

the electronic images of the Berkeley computers and the discs of potential trial exhibits

24

In making their discovery-related arguments, the defendants contend that the alleged errors

should be evaluated collectively. That is, the defendants contend that the alleged mistakes combined to

result in a violation of due process and the right to a fair trial. However, the aggregate impact of these

supposed evils does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.

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were difficult to search. The defendants further contend that the government’s failure

to supplement the discovery materials with indices was prejudicial to the preparation of

an adequate defense.25 In making this argument, the defendants lean heavily on Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b)(2)(E)(i), which requires a party to “produce [discovery

materials] as they are kept in the usual course of business or [to] organize and label them

to correspond to the categories in the request.” The defendants acknowledge that there

is no corresponding provision in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, which governs

criminal discovery, but they argue that due process mandates enforcement of the civil

rule in the criminal context.

A district court’s decision on a discovery matter is reviewed for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Gray, 521 F.3d 514, 529 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing United

States v. $174,206.00 in U.S. Currency, 320 F.3d 658, 663 (6th Cir. 2003)); see United

States v. Maples, 60 F.3d 244, 246 (6th Cir. 1995) (“It is well settled that a district court

has considerable discretion under Rule 16 . . . .”).

As an initial matter, it must be noted that the defendants cite scant authority

suggesting that a district court must order the government to produce electronic

discovery in a particular fashion.26 Furthermore, it bears noting that Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 16, which governs discovery in criminal cases, is entirely silent on

the issue of the form that discovery must take; it contains no indication that documents

must be organized or indexed. Thus, if we are to find that the district court abused its

discretion, we must do so despite a pronounced dearth of precedent suggesting that the

district court was wrong.

25

The defendants concede that “[t]he government provided indices to some of the hard-copy

discovery.” Appellant’s Br. at 52 n.16.

26

In suggesting that criminal discovery must comply with Rule 34(b), the defendants point to a

single case, namely, United States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2008). There, the district court

looked to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b) in assessing the form in which the government should

produce documents. Id. at 19. However, the O’Keefe court admitted that, “[i]n criminal cases, there is

unfortunately no rule to which the courts can look for guidance in determining whether the production of

documents by the government has been in a form or format that is appropriate.” Id. at 18-19.

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There are a number of factors that counsel against such a finding. First, the

overwhelming majority of the discovery at issue was taken directly from Berkeley’s

computers, which means the defendants had ready access to that information. It also

means that the defendants had access to the documents “as they [were] kept in the usual

course of business.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(i). Thus, any difficulty that the

defendants had in accessing the copies is arguably immaterial.27

Furthermore, there is reason to believe that the defendants were experiencing

little difficulty in accessing the contents of the electronic discovery. Though the

defendants claim that they were provided with data that had been rendered in

unsearchable formats, they were citing discovery material to the district court in their

motions, leading the district court to observe that the “[d]efendants’ motion[s]

demonstrate[d] [that] they [were] capably navigating discovery.” Additionally, at the

Kastigar-like hearing held before the district court, an expert witness who testified for

the defense indicated that, with the use of certain software, he could perform “very quick

and thorough” searches of the electronic discovery. Consequently, it does not appear

that the discovery materials were nearly as unsearchable as the defense purports.

Lastly, it should be observed that the government did provide the defense with

something of a guide to the electronic discovery. In response to the defense’s discovery

request, the government furnished the defendants with “a detailed room-by-room

inventory of all items seized from the company, including a listing of the various

computers that were imaged.” Appellee’s Br. at 127. That listing surely offered the

defendants some aid in identifying and marshaling the documents relevant to the

litigation. Accordingly, we decline to hold that the district court abused its discretion

in failing to order the government to produce discovery in a different form.

27

Moreover, any disorganization in the documents was likely attributable to the defendants

themselves. It cannot be that the government is necessarily responsible for curing the disarray that they

inherited.

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2. The Abdication of Brady

The defendants next argue that the government shrugged off its obligations under

Brady by simply handing over millions of pages of evidence and forcing the defense to

find any exculpatory information contained therein. In essence, the defendants contend

that the government was obliged to sift fastidiously through the evidence—the vast

majority of which came from Berkeley itself—in an attempt to locate anything favorable

to the defense. This argument comes up empty.

In United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2009), vacated in part on

other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010), the Fifth Circuit confronted and rejected a nearly

identical argument. There, disgraced Enron CEO Jeffrey K. Skilling advanced the

following contentions:

Skilling . . . asserts that the government’s use of an open file failed to

satisfy its Brady obligation to disclose material evidence. Skilling

contends that the government’s open file, which consisted of several

hundred million pages of documents, “resulted in the effective

concealment of a huge quantity of exculpatory evidence.” As the

government never directed Skilling to a single Brady document

contained in the open file, Skilling argues that the government

suppressed evidence in violation of Brady.

Id. at 576.

In dismissing Skilling’s argument, the Fifth Circuit noted that, “[a]s a general

rule, the government is under no duty to direct a defendant to exculpatory evidence

within a larger mass of disclosed evidence.” Ibid. (citing United States v. Mulderig, 120

F.3d 534, 541 (5th Cir. 1997)). However, the Skilling court added a caveat:

We do not hold that the use of a voluminous open file can never violate

Brady. For instance, evidence that the government “padded” an open file

with pointless or superfluous information to frustrate a defendant’s

review of the file might raise serious Brady issues. Creating a

voluminous file that is unduly onerous to access might raise similar

concerns. And it should go without saying that the government may not

hide Brady material of which it is actually aware in a huge open file in

the hope that the defendant will never find it. These scenarios would

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indicate that the government was acting in bad faith in performing its

obligations under Brady.

Id. at 577.

Here, the government did not engage in any conduct indicating that it performed

its Brady obligations in bad faith. First, there is no proof that the government larded its

production with entirely irrelevant documents.28 Furthermore, it cannot be said that the

government made access to the documents unduly onerous. While access to the

documents may have been somewhat hampered due to the format in which they were

transferred, the district court noted that the defendants’ motion practice “demonstrate[d]

they [were] capably navigating the discovery, which primarily all came from [the]

[d]efendants in the first place.”29 Finally, there is no indication that the government

deliberately concealed any exculpatory evidence in the information it turned over to the

defense.30 Consequently, the government has not “abdicated” its duties under Brady.

3. The Denial of a Continuance

On December 28, 2007, the defendants requested a 90-day continuance, which

would have pushed the commencement of the trial from January 8, 2008 to April 8,

2008. In making the request, the defendants contended that they had been afforded

insufficient opportunity to review the evidence, stating: “[i]t is as if the government has

pointed the defendants to the Earth’s oceans, saying ‘there is your discovery.’” The

district court declined to grant the request, noting that “[c]ounsel for [the] [d]efendants

28

The defendants contest this point, noting that the government admitted it did not review

everything that it turned over to the defense. However, the fact that the government did not know whether

the documents were relevant does not establish that the government intentionally produced irrelevant

discovery. Nor is there any indication that the government was willfully blind as to the pertinence of the

materials that it was handing over.

29

As the government points out, the defendants’ ability to peruse the electronic discovery was

admitted by the defendants’ expert witness at the Kastigar-like hearing. Specifically, the witness testified

that he was able to sift through the discovery using software called Concordance, which “does a very quick

and thorough search . . . and tells you how many hits you have, and then tells you how many documents

there are associated with that search.”

30

“If there is something exculpatory still in the [discovery that was produced], we must

assume—as there is no compelling evidence to the contrary—that the government does not know about

it either.” Skilling, 554 F.3d at 577.

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outnumber counsel for the government, and have all been working on this case for a

substantial amount of time.”31 The defendants now argue that the district court’s denial

of their request for a continuance was error.

The district court’s denial of a motion for a continuance is reviewed for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Crossley, 224 F.3d 847, 854 (6th Cir. 2000). “Denial

amounts to a constitutional violation only if there is an unreasoning and arbitrary

‘insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay.’ To

demonstrate reversible error, the defendant must show that the denial resulted in actual

prejudice to his defense.” United States v. Gallo, 763 F.2d 1504, 1523 (6th Cir. 1985)

(quoting United States v. Mitchell, 744 F.2d 701, 704 (9th Cir. 1984)). “The defendant

demonstrates ‘actual prejudice’ by showing that a continuance would have made relevant

witnesses available or added something to the defense.” United States v. King, 127 F.3d

483, 487 (6th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Faulkner, 538 F.2d 724, 729 (6th Cir.

1976) (“No absolute rule can be articulated as to the minimum amount of time required

for an adequate preparation for trial of a criminal case.”).

The defendants argue that they were prejudiced in two ways. First, they argue

that “their counsel could not satisfy their constitutional obligation to review all the

evidence in the government’s possession, custody, or control.”32 Appellant’s Br. at 60.

In making this argument, they allege that “the entirety of the government’s 360,000

pages of trial exhibits . . . were largely disclosed on November 29, 2007, only six weeks

before trial.” Id. at 59. Second, the defendants argue that “[t]he defense simply did not

have sufficient time to locate and then utilize material and exculpatory evidence that was

hidden within the millions of pages of discovery.” Id. at 60.

These arguments lead nowhere. With respect to the first, it must be noted that

more than a year elapsed between the time the indictment was handed down and the time

31

The district court also observed that “[t]rial was originally scheduled for November 13, 2007,

and the [c]ourt continued it for other reasons than any purported evidentiary problems.”

32

The defendants’ attorneys submitted sworn affidavits to this effect, though they point to no

authority establishing a “constitutional obligation” to review all evidence in the government’s possession.

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the trial began, affording the defendants ample opportunity to construct a defense.33

Additionally, the discovery time line does not indicate that the defendants were short-

changed with respect to preparation time. The bulk of the documents in question were

in the company’s possession as early as April 2005.34 Furthermore, the entirety of the

discovery material in the case was in the defendants’ hands by June 2007, more than six

months in advance of the trial. While the government did not provide the defense with

thirteen discs of potential trial exhibits until November 29, 2007—approximately six

weeks before trial was to begin—those exhibits were ostensibly culled from the

discovery material that the government had already provided.35 It is true that this case

involved millions of pages of documents, but there is no dispute that the defendants were

given months to comb through the bulk of them. As a result, it cannot be said that the

district court’s unwillingness to postpone the trial was the product of an undue insistence

on haste.

The defendants’ second argument—that they were not given enough time to mine

exculpatory evidence from the mountains of discovery dumped at their feet—similarly

fails. As an initial matter, it should be noted that this argument assumes that exculpatory

evidence exists. In the absence of such evidence, the lack of time to look for it would

be harmless. In other words, it would not be prejudicial if the defendants were denied

the chance to excavate in a mine that contained no ore. On that score, the most the

defendants can say is that they “fervently believe[] . . . that with sufficient time they

would unearth the necessary volume of emails to counter the government’s accusations.”

Appellant’s Brief at 60. Consequently, the defendants have failed to demonstrate that

33

The defendants were indicted in September 2006, and trial commenced in January 2008.

34

As mentioned earlier, most of the discovery in this case was obtained from Berkeley computers,

which were imaged during the March 2005 search of Berkeley’s headquarters. Aside from several laptops

which were seized and returned, Berkeley remained in possession of all the imaged computers once the

physical search was done. Thus, Berkeley’s claim that it had too little time to review the contents of the

computers rings hollow.

35

Allegedly, two of those discs were corrupted and could not be opened until approximately a

week before the trial began. However, that does not change the analysis. Though the defendants were

given relatively little time to review the trial exhibits, they were nonetheless given a significant period of

time in which to review the discovery materials and prepare their defense.

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the denial of a continuance worked any prejudice with respect to their ability to glean

exculpatory evidence.36

D. Warshak’s New Trial Motion: Brady

The next issue is whether the district court erred in denying Warshak’s motion

for a new trial, which was based on the assertion that the government had suppressed

exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady. “This court reviews [the] denial of a motion

for new trial based on Brady violations under an abuse of discretion standard.” United

States v. Graham, 484 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Jones,

399 F.3d 640, 647 (6th Cir. 2005)). “However, the district court’s determination as to

the existence of a Brady violation is reviewed de novo.” Id. at 416-17 (citing United

States v. Miller, 161 F.3d 977, 987 (6th Cir. 1998)).

“To establish a violation of Brady, the [defendant] has the burden of establishing

that the prosecutor suppressed evidence; that such evidence was favorable to the defense;

and that the suppressed evidence was material.” Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 601 (6th

Cir. 2000). “[E]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence

in the outcome.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); see also Kyles v.

Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (holding that the “touchstone of materiality is a

‘reasonable probability’ of a different result”). “Moreover, in determining whether

undisclosed evidence is material, the suppressed evidence is considered collectively,

rather than item-by-item, to determine if the ‘reasonable probability’ test is met.”

Schledwitz v. United States, 169 F.3d 1003, 1012 (6th Cir. 1999).

In this case, the information alleged to constitute Brady material was discovered

post-trial while Warshak was defending himself in a civil action involving the FTC.

36

Furthermore, any emails that the defendants might have found were continuously in their

possession from the time of the indictment to the time of the trial. Thus, the defendants had more than a

year to turn up anything exculpatory.

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During that litigation, Warshak deposed Sue and Greg Cossman, his sister and brother-

in-law, whom the government had interviewed extensively in the run-up to Warshak’s

criminal trial.37 In their depositions, the Cossmans spoke favorably of Berkeley and

testified that government investigators were pushing a particular version of the facts. In

addition to the depositions, Warshak’s involvement in the FTC litigation led to the

discovery of (1) several recordings of Berkeley sales calls during which disclosure of the

auto-ship program was made and (2) several printouts of Berkeley’s website on which

disclosure of the auto-ship program could be seen. Warshak argues that this evidence

was exculpatory and should have been turned over prior to trial.

However, Warshak’s argument fails because the evidence at issue was not

“material” for Brady purposes. First of all, with respect to Sue Cossman’s deposition

testimony, it must be noted that, as Warshak’s sister and a participant in the Berkeley

fraud, she had plenty of incentive to stretch the truth in Warshak’s favor. Furthermore,

many of the favorable things she said in her deposition were echoed in the statements

of trial witnesses, who stated that they did not realize what they were doing was wrong.

Thus, the cumulative nature of her deposition testimony cuts against a finding of

materiality. See Spence v. Johnson, 80 F.3d 989, 995 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[W]hen the

undisclosed evidence is merely cumulative of other evidence, no Brady violation

occurs.”). Finally, her testimony would not have undermined confidence in the finding

of fraud, as numerous witnesses and scores of emails confirmed that Berkeley executives

were engaging in deliberately deceitful practices. See Jones, 399 F.3d at 648 (“Given

the overwhelming evidence of guilt, a new trial under Brady was inappropriate.”).

Greg Cossman’s deposition testimony is likewise immaterial. Critically, Greg

Cossman took the stand at Warshak’s trial, at which time he actually made most of the

favorable remarks that later appeared in his post-trial deposition.38 For example,

37

Sue Cossman did not testify at Warshak’s trial. Greg Cossman did, however.

38

For the same reason, we conclude that the information in Greg Cossman’s deposition was not

suppressed.

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Cossman testified at trial that, “while [he] was participating at Berkeley, [he] had no

suspicion of participating in a conspiracy doing anything that was criminal.” Also,

Cossman apparently testified that the government’s investigators were “calculating,

ruthless, relentless and intimidating.” In light of these statements, Greg Cossman’s post-

trial deposition testimony adds nothing new to the mix, and it therefore does not

constitute Brady material.

Nor can it be said that the tapes and printouts meet the materiality requirement.

Though the recorded calls do contain disclosure of the auto-ship program, that fact is not

particularly helpful to Warshak’s case, given the testimony that the disclosures were

designed to be ineffective. Similarly, the appearance of the disclosure on the company

website at a given instant in time is also unhelpful; there was testimony that the

disclosure on the website appeared, shifted, and disappeared like water in the vision of

a desert traveler. As a consequence, these materials do not generate a “reasonable

probability” of a different result.39 Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. Accordingly, the district

court did not err in finding that Warshak failed to demonstrate a Brady violation.

E. Prosecutorial Misconduct

The defendants also argue that a new trial is warranted in light of “serious

improprieties in the government’s rebuttal argument.” Appellant’s Br. at 69.

Specifically, the defendants assert that the following acts constitute reversible

misconduct:

The government’s attorney vouched for the “honesty and integrity” of the

prosecution team.

The government’s attorney expressed his personal opinion with respect

to the guilt of the defendants, describing the defendants as “weak” and

“self-aggrandiz[ing].”

39

The calls and website printouts clearly fail to satisfy the suppression requirement as well.

There was testimony in the record that Berkeley taped all of its calls, meaning Warshak had access to the

calls long before the government disclosed the tapes. Furthermore, with respect to the website printouts,

it must be noted that they came from Berkeley’s website. Anything on Berkeley’s website should have

been known to Berkeley’s owner.

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The government’s attorney described his personal life, relating anecdotes

about his time in the JAG Corps and his association with a military

celebrity.

The government “suggested to the jury that the fact that the grand jury

had found probable cause . . . was evidence of . . . guilt.” Appellant’s Br.

at 72.

The government improperly asserted that the defendants’ guilt was

supported by evidence that had not been presented during trial.

The government impermissibly argued that the guilty pleas of

coconspirators were evidence of a conspiracy.

The government employed rebuttal “to give a second principal closing

argument.”

Appellant’s Br. at 74.40

In determining whether a prosecutor’s remarks and conduct merit a new trial,41

this court utilizes a two-part test. Cristini v. McKee, 526 F.3d 888, 899 (6th Cir. 2008)

(citing Girts v. Yanai, 501 F.3d 743, 758-59 (6th Cir. 2007)). First, we must determine

“whether the prosecutor’s conduct and remarks were improper.” United States v. Carter,

236 F.3d 777, 783 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1387

(6th Cir. 1994)). Second, if the conduct and remarks were improper, “the court must

. . . consider and weigh four factors in determining whether the impropriety was flagrant

and thus warrants reversal.” Ibid. The four factors are: “(1) whether the conduct and

remarks of the prosecutor tended to mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant;

(2) whether the conduct or remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) whether the remarks

were deliberately or accidentally made; and (4) whether the evidence against the

defendant was strong.” Ibid. Additionally, “[w]hen considering challenges to a

prosecutor’s statements at trial, we examine those statements within the context of the

40

The defense did not immediately object to any of these acts, although it did request a curative

instruction after the argument, objecting to the first four sets of remarks made by the prosecutor.

41

“Whether statements made by a prosecutor amount to misconduct and whether such statements

render a trial fundamentally unfair are mixed questions of law and fact, which we review de novo.” United

States v. Carson, 560 F.3d 566, 574 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Francis, 170 F.3d 546, 549 (6th

Cir. 1999)).

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[entire] trial to determine whether they were prejudicial error.” Cristini, 526 F.3d at 899

(citing Girts, 501 F.3d at 759).

The flagrancy analysis does not necessarily end this court’s inquiry. But if the

improper statements were not flagrant, reversal of a conviction is warranted only if

“1) the proof of the defendant’s guilt is not overwhelming; 2) the defense objected to the

statements; and 3) the trial judge did not cure the impropriety through an admonishment

to the jury.” United States v. Galloway, 316 F.3d 624, 632 (6th Cir. 2003); see also

United States v. Cobleigh, 75 F.3d 242, 247 (6th Cir. 1996).

1. Were the Prosecutor’s Conduct and Remarks Improper?

The first step in the prosecutorial-misconduct analysis is to determine whether

the conduct and remarks at issue were improper. The first set of allegedly inappropriate

remarks related to the honesty and moral character of the prosecution team. Responding

to a number of comments made during closing arguments for the defendants, the

government’s attorney, Mr. Kadon, suggested that the defense had labeled the

prosecution team “abusive and horrible and evil people.” Kadon then stated:

First of all, I think the biggest thing you heard [during the defense’s

argument] was that this is a big conspiracy, that the conspirators are not

seated behind me; the conspirators are seated over there where I am. I

mean, I’m a conspirator, I guess; that Ms. Porter, Mr. Josephs, the federal

police that have been investigating this case, somehow the Postal

Inspection Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Food and Drug

Administration, the Department of Justice, the United States Attorney’s

Office and the Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal Revenue

Service all got together and conspired, that over the last several years all

we thought about every single day when we came to work was how we

were going to get these guys.

Kadon then suggested that he “hope[d] [the jury] d[id]n’t believe that,” and he went on

to argue that “it is kind of preposterous that we would all get together and lie to do this,

that this case is somehow worth everything—our reputations, our lives, our

families—just because convicting this guy or these people is so important to us.”

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The defendants contend that these remarks constitute improper prosecutorial

vouching, which typically “occurs when a prosecutor supports the credibility of a

witness by indicating a personal belief in the witness’s credibility[,] thereby placing the

prestige of the office of the United States Attorney behind that witness.” Francis, 170

F.3d at 550 (emphasis added). Here, however, Kadon did not vouch for the credibility

of a witness. Rather, he spoke to the likelihood that the government’s attorneys had

engaged in a monomaniacal witch-hunt. Furthermore, he did not overtly suggest that the

government’s attorneys were honest or morally superior. Instead, he suggested that the

prosecution team had no motive to lie. That said, we do think Kadon went a bit

overboard, and his remarks veered into dangerous territory.

The next allegedly improper remarks pertained to Kadon’s opinion of the

defendants. At one point, Kadon posed and then answered the following series of

rhetorical questions: “Do I believe that these people were weak, that they sought

self-aggrandizement, personal gain, and they sought it at the expense of other people,

consumers? And, in fact, it’s okay to lie to banks, because who cares about them

anyway? Do I believe that they believe that? Yes.”

These remarks were also inappropriate. As the defendants correctly note, “it is

improper for a prosecuting attorney in a criminal case to state his personal opinion

concerning . . . the guilt of a defendant.” United States v. Krebs, 788 F.2d 1166, 1176

(6th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Daniels, 528 F.2d 705, 709 (6th Cir. 1976));

see also United States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749, 755 (6th Cir. 1979) (“Implicit in an

assertion of personal belief that a defendant is guilty, is an implied statement that the

prosecutor, by virtue of his experience, knowledge and intellect, has concluded that the

jury must convict. The devastating impact of such ‘testimony’ should be apparent.”).

In this case, Kadon plainly voiced a personal belief regarding the guilt of the defendants.

While he did not directly state that he believed the defendants were guilty, he stated that,

in his mind, they were weak and sought wealth and notoriety at the expense, both literal

and figurative, of the consuming public. Thus, Kadon’s remarks were improper.

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Next, we must consider Kadon’s statements about his time in the JAG Corps.

In the middle of his summation, Kadon remarked:

And, you know, when I was on active duty, I worked for a guy named

Gary Harrell, who—he was kind of a famous guy. If you have ever seen

the movie Black Hawk Down, he was in the movie Black Hawk Down.

He’s a Green Beret. And he would always tell me when we talked about

things—I was his JAG officer, but I don’t fly Black Hawks—he would

always say, you know, Karl, life is full of choices. You make your

choices and accept the consequences, about the things that we were doing

with respect to prosecuting the war on terror.

The defendants argue that the prosecutor’s remarks about his military service and

his quasi-famous colleague were improper. With respect to these remarks, the

government concedes impropriety, acknowledging that the remarks were entirely

irrelevant to the closing argument. We agree. The remarks served no purpose other than

to enhance Kadon’s stature in the eyes of the jury, and they were therefore inappropriate.

This conclusion is especially apparent when one considers the good guys/bad guys

dichotomy that the remarks create when paired with Kadon’s statements regarding the

“weakness” and cupidity of the defendants.

The fourth set of statements at issue touched on the relevance of the grand jury’s

decision to indict the defendants. Following his comments about his stint in the armed

forces, Kadon noted that all 112 counts in the indictment were “things that a grand jury

determined were probable cause, these people committed these crimes, that’s what that

means.” Sometime thereafter, Kadon returned to the mindset of the grand jury, stating

that “[t]he grand jury believed [the defendants] committed crimes.”

These remarks were plainly out of bounds. As this court stated in Bess, “it is

always improper for a prosecutor to suggest that a defendant is guilty merely because he

is being prosecuted or has been indicted.” 593 F.2d at 754; see United States v. Bowen,

500 F.2d 41, 42 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that it was improper for a prosecutor to state

that an eyewitness identification “was good enough” when it was presented to the grand

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jury). Here, there is no question that Kadon invoked the grand jury’s probable-cause

determination when arguing for a finding of guilt. His remarks were therefore improper.

The fifth set of remarks at issue involved individuals who had filed complaints

but had not testified at trial.42 First, Kadon stated that, despite floods of complaints to

Berkeley and the BBB, the government had made a strategic decision not to “bring[] in

a million people or hundreds of thousands of people” to testify that Berkeley was

shipping them unwanted supplements. Then, Kadon remarked that thousands of callers

had unsuccessfully attempted to call Berkeley and that the government did not “have to

go and have everyone here say: I called; it was a problem.”

The defendants argue that these comments impermissibly “convey[ed] the

impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor,

support[ed] the charges against the defendant[s] and . . . thus jeopardize[d] the

defendant[s’] right to be tried solely on the basis of the evidence presented to the jury.”

Hodge v. Hurley, 426 F.3d 368, 378 (6th Cir. 2005). However, the defendants are

incorrect. The remarks in question merely alluded to evidence already before the jury,

namely, testimony that droves of customers had complained and that scores of others had

tried in vain to do the same. In suggesting that those witnesses could have testified, the

government was simply explaining their absence. As a result, these remarks were

permissible.

The penultimate allegation of prosecutorial impropriety stems from a remark

about the coconspirators who testified at trial.43 Specifically, Kadon stated: “And if you

believe that there was an agreement to put this on between the people here at the table,

the ones who were charged and the people that testified, they pled guilty to doing that,

that’s one part of the conspiratorial element right there, those people.”

42

It should be noted that because the defendants did not object to these statements below, they

are subjected to review for plain error. See Cristini, 526 F.3d at 901. Ultimately, however, the level of

review is irrelevant, as the remarks were not improper.

43

As with the previous set of remarks concerning potential witnesses, this comment did not spur

an objection at trial and is therefore subject to plain-error review.

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This declaration was not improper. While it is true that a jury “may not . . .

consider the guilty plea of any [other] person as evidence of guilt on the part of the

defendant [standing trial],” United States v. Stavroff, 149 F.3d 478, 484 (6th Cir. 1998),

Kadon’s remark did not directly implore the jurors to consider the guilty pleas of the

defendants’ coconspirators. Instead, Kadon simply added an identifier as to whom the

charged defendants were shown to have conspired with—a number of other defendants

who had pleaded guilty. That portion of his statement did not lie at the core of the

message he was intending to convey, which was that the jurors should convict if they

found the existence of a conspiratorial agreement. Consequently, Kadon’s statement

should not be deemed inappropriate.44

Lastly, the defendants argue that Kadon engaged in improper conduct,

specifically by employing the government’s rebuttal argument as an impermissible

second attempt at a full-scale closing. The defendants contend that the government

deliberately limited its initial closing argument to a “45-minute long [sic] broad-brush

overview of its evidence, and withheld many of its most pointed arguments for rebuttal.”

Appellant’s Br. at 75.

However, the defendants’ argument fails. True, a number of cases suggest that

the government may not advance any new contentions on rebuttal. See, e.g., United

States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2, 26 (2d Cir. 1979) (indicating that prejudice might have

arisen if a rebuttal argument containing new assertions had not been followed by

surrebuttal). However, the defendants point to nothing in Kadon’s rebuttal argument that

was raised for the first time after their summation. Furthermore, to the extent that Kadon

made any new arguments in response to assertions made by the defense, those new

arguments were permissible. See United States v. Sarmiento, 744 F.2d 755, 765 (11th

Cir. 1984).

44

Even if it were deemed improper, the third of the four flagrancy factors—whether the remark

was deliberate or accidental—would militate against a finding that this remark was particularly pernicious.

Kadon’s statement was clearly a spontaneous aside that, in fact, interrupted the flow of the main point he

was trying to make.

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2. The Four Flagrancy Factors

Having determined that a number of Kadon’s remarks were improper, we must

now proceed to the flagrancy analysis, which involves the application of the four factors

delineated above. None of the four factors is dispositive. Galloway, 316 F.3d at 632.

On balance, it appears that the prosecutor’s remarks, though improper, were not flagrant

enough to “render [the] trial fundamentally unfair.” Carson, 560 F.3d at 574.

a. Tendency to Mislead the Jury or Prejudice the Jury

The first factor requires us to consider whether the remarks in question were

misleading or prejudicial. Carter, 236 F.3d at 783. As an initial matter, it must be noted

that the defendants did not immediately object to any of the remarks. In some cases, the

defendants did not object at all. That cuts in favor of a finding that the remarks were not

particularly prejudicial, as anything significantly deleterious would presumably prompt

a swift objection from experienced defense counsel. See United States v. Trutenko, 490

F.2d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 1973) (“We are inclined to believe[,] however, that if the

comment were sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal, counsel who was present at

the time either would have objected forthwith or else would have requested the trial

judge to give a curative instruction.”).45

Setting aside the failure to lodge an immediate objection, it seems evident that

a number of the improper remarks would tend, in isolation, to prejudice the defendants.

The perceptions of the jury were surely impacted to some extent when the prosecutor

suggested that he believed the defendants to be weak, greedy, and capable of criminal

designs. See Bess, 593 F.2d at 755. Furthermore, it is plain that Kadon’s military

anecdote was likely to stir the patriotic fibers of at least several jurors, shifting their

45

As noted in footnote 40, the defense did request a curative instruction following the argument,

objecting to all of the remarks at issue, save those about additional evidence and the guilty pleas of co-

defendants. But the request for a curative instruction does not alter the analysis in any great respect. If

veteran trial counsel failed to interrupt the argument, then counsel must have been of the opinion that a

somewhat delayed curative instruction would suffice to extinguish any prejudice. This assertion finds

corroboration in the mystification of the trial judge, who was somewhat perplexed when the defendants

presented objections after Kadon had concluded his rebuttal and asked, “Why didn’t you object at the

time?”

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focus, if only slightly, away from the critical issue of whether the defendants were

actually guilty. In addition, the defendants were surely injured when Kadon suggested

that the grand jury had formed an opinion as to their guilt. See Bess, 593 F.2d at 754

(indicating that a prosecutor commits an “egregious” error when he opines that “a

defendant is guilty merely because he . . . has been indicted”). Thus, in a vacuum,

Kadon’s remarks would appear to entail a certain measure of prejudicial force.46

However, to the sting of potential prejudice was applied the salve of forceful

curative instructions. Once closing arguments were completed, and following a brief

recess, the district court warned the jurors that the closing arguments were not evidence.

The district court also stated, “[I]t is not appropriate for the lawyers . . . to express a

personal opinion about the truthfulness of a witness’ testimony. That is for you to

decide.” In addition, the district court commanded the jurors to “disregard any personal

opinions or personal backgrounds of counsel.” The district court also touched on the

issue of Kadon’s references to the grand jury. In light of these ameliorative instructions,

any prejudice precipitated by Kadon’s comments was either extinguished entirely or

diminished drastically. See Carson, 560 F.3d at 576 (holding that “any prejudice

resulting from the comments was ‘cured, or at least minimized, by curative instructions

to the jury’”); Carter, 236 F.3d at 787 (“Ordinarily, a court should not overturn a

criminal conviction on the basis of a prosecutor’s comments alone, especially where the

46

With respect to Kadon’s remarks about the honesty and moral uprightness of the prosecution

team, we note that those remarks were invited by the defense and therefore minimally prejudicial. Indeed,

the defendants’ attorneys implied on several occasions that the prosecution was ruthless and prized victory

in the court over justice in the land. At one juncture, attorneys for the defense stated, “A federal

prosecution is supposed to be a search for the truth. It is not a quest to win at all costs on the part of the

Department of Justice.” Given such remarks, the prejudice resulting from Kadon’s replies—which sought

to counter the notion of corruption within the prosecution team—was plainly minimized because the jury

would have “underst[ood] that the prosecutor was countering defense counsel’s repeated attacks on the

prosecution’s integrity.” United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1985).

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district court has given the jury an instruction that may cure the error.”).47 Accordingly,

the first factor does not cut in favor of the defendants.

b. Isolated v. Extensive

The second factor requires this court to assess the pervasiveness of the improper

remarks; that is, this court must determine whether the remarks were isolated or

extensive. “If a prosecutor’s comments were simply isolated remarks made during the

course of a long trial, then the error caused by such misconduct may be harmless.”

Carter, 236 F.3d at 788 (citing United States v. Leon, 534 F.2d 667, 679 (6th Cir. 1976)).

In this case, it is tempting to describe the remarks as isolated, as they were

confined to a single portion of the trial. Indeed, when the remarks are viewed—as they

must be—against the backdrop of the trial as a whole, they are certainly fairly localized.

See Macais v. Makowski, 291 F.3d 447, 453 (6th Cir. 2002) (“The prosecutor’s statement

took place during rebuttal closing argument, and Macias does not contend that the

prosecutor acted inappropriately at any other point during the trial. Because the

comments were isolated, this factor does not weigh in Macias’s favor.”); Cobleigh,

75 F.3d at 247 (holding that there was no prosecutorial misconduct where the defendants

complained of “a few unrelated statements and events from an eight-defendant trial that

lasted one month and involved the testimony of dozens of witnesses and the presentation

of more than 200 exhibits”). However, the fact that the remarks were confined to the

rebuttal argument does not mean that they are sufficiently isolated to merit a finding of

harmlessness. In some instances, a single forbidden comment is sufficient to poison the

entire trial. See United States v. Smith, 500 F.2d 293, 297 (6th Cir. 1974) (“[E]ven a

single misstep on the part of the prosecutor may be so destructive of the right of the

defendant to a fair trial that reversal must follow.” (citation and internal quotation marks

47

The defendants argue that any remediation achieved by the curative instructions was “too little

and too late.” Appellant’s Br. at 77. However, this assertion is essentially toothless, as the defendants

themselves remained mum until the government’s attorney had concluded his remarks. If the prosecutor

were truly wreaking havoc and casually tossing around indelibly prejudicial remarks, the attorneys for the

defense would have vehemently objected, which they were clearly adept at doing during all other phases

of the trial.

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omitted)). Ultimately, we think the remarks, though confined to the rebuttal argument,

were numerous enough to escape categorization as isolated. But, at the same time, the

remarks were not plentiful enough to merit a finding that they were pervasive. Thus, the

second factor is a wash.

c. Deliberate v. Accidental

Next, this court must consider whether the remarks were deliberate or accidental.

Carter, 236 F.3d at 783. Here, only two sets of allegedly improper remarks appear to

have been deliberate—the statements regarding the good intentions of the prosecution

team and the statements regarding Kadon’s experiences as a JAG officer. The remaining

remarks appear to have been made on the spur of the moment, sometimes coming in the

middle of wholly unrelated sentences. As a consequence, it does not appear that either

side benefits tremendously from this factor. In any event, the prosecutor’s intent in

making certain remarks is a fairly rough proxy for the ultimate question, which is

whether the remarks at issue contaminated the trial with unfairness.

d. Strength of the Evidence

The final factor is the strength of the evidence. Ibid. In this case, the force of

the government’s evidentiary presentation weighs heavily against a finding of flagrancy.

The government introduced the testimony of multiple Berkeley executives, each of

whom testified that the company knowingly attempted to deceive its customers. The

executives also testified that the company was manipulating its financial information in

order to remain in relationships with its banking partners. The case against the

defendants also included copious emails. In short, the evidence against the defendants

was extensive. Thus, the fourth and final factor militates in favor of the conclusion that

Kadon’s remarks, though imprudent, were ultimately harmless. Accordingly, we hold

that, on balance, Kadon’s improper comments did not rise to the level of flagrancy.

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3. Reversal For Non-Flagrant Remarks

As noted above, a holding that the remarks at issue were non-flagrant does not

put the analysis to rest. Reversal is nonetheless appropriate if three conditions are met:

(1) the evidence against the defendants was not overwhelming; (2) the defendants

objected to the prosecution’s remarks; and (3) the district court failed to issue a curative

instruction. See Galloway, 316 F.3d at 632. Here, only one of the prerequisites was met:

the defendants objected to several of the improper remarks. However, the evidence

against the defendants was strong, and the district court offered a curative instruction.

Thus, reversal under Galloway is not appropriate.

F. Conspiracy to Commit Mail, Wire, & Bank Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1349)

Warshak and Harriet contend that the evidence was insufficient to establish the

existence of a conspiracy to commit mail, wire, and bank fraud. In reviewing the

sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant question is “whether, after viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). “A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence

bears a very heavy burden.” United States v. Prince, 214 F.3d 740, 746 (6th Cir. 2000)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]e will reverse a judgment for

insufficiency of evidence only if, viewing the record as a whole, the judgment is not

supported by substantial and competent evidence.” United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d

1001, 1010 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Ellzey, 874 F.2d 324, 328 (6th Cir.

1989)).

“A conviction for conspiracy to commit . . . fraud requires proof beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and willfully joined in an agreement with

at least one other person to commit an act of . . . fraud and that there was at least one

overt act in furtherance of the agreement.” United States v. Cantrell, 278 F.3d 543, 546

(6th Cir. 2001) (citing Crossley, 224 F.3d at 856). “Circumstantial evidence that a

reasonable person could interpret as showing participation in a common plan may be

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used to establish the existence of a conspiracy agreement.” Ibid. Furthermore, “a

conspiracy to achieve two or more unlawful goals, in the conjunctive, can properly be

supported by proof of any of the alleged goals.” United States v. Thomas, 54 F.3d 73,

81 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 56-57 (1991)).

1. Warshak

Warshak argues that the government failed to satisfy its burden of proof in

several respects. First, he argues that, even if the government proved that a conspiracy

existed, the government’s proof was insufficient to show that the conspiracy lasted for

the entirety of the period alleged in the indictment. Second, Warshak argues that there

was simply no proof that he entered into a conspiracy to commit mail, wire, and bank

fraud. He argues that all of the practices that the government labeled fraud were simply

the missteps of a fledgling business attempting to find its footing while simultaneously

experiencing radical growth. Third, he argues that there was no conspiracy to commit

bank fraud as the chargeback-manipulation efforts were never intended to harm a bank.

All three of these arguments fail.48

Warshak’s first argument is a non-starter. While the indictment did allege a

conspiracy lasting from 2001 to 2006, the government was under no obligation to prove

that the conspiracy spanned the entirety of that time frame. As the Tenth Circuit

explained in United States v. Henderson, “the temporal scope of a conspiracy is not an

‘essential’ or ‘material’ element of the charge.” 179 F. App’x 535, 538 (10th Cir. 2006)

(quoting United States v. Cina, 699 F.2d 853, 859 (7th Cir. 1983)); see United States v.

Davis, 679 F.2d 845, 852 (11th Cir. 1982) (“Neither is time an essential element so long

as the time frame proved was within the period alleged in the indictment.”) (citing

Russell v. United States, 429 F.2d 237, 238 (5th Cir. 1970)). Thus, the evidence was

sufficient so long as the government proved a conspiracy within the relevant

chronological bounds.

48

Warshak also alleges that his conviction on Count 1 should be reversed because the district

court permitted the jury to convict him on a legally erroneous theory of bank fraud. As explained infra

in Part II.H, this argument also fails.

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And the government did. Though Warshak claims that his company’s early

practices were the result of his status as a managerial neophyte, and that the company

later took corrective measures to ensure that any deceptive practices were remediated,

a reasonable juror could nonetheless conclude that Warshak and his associates conspired

to defraud both customers and merchant banks. As a number of former Berkeley

executives testified, the existence of the auto-ship program was not disclosed to

customers for the first year that Berkeley was in business, leading to scores of

unauthorized credit-card transactions. Furthermore, though disclosures were eventually

made during sales calls, the disclosures were designed to fail. They were made at the

end of the calls and came on the heels of information relating to sexually transmitted

diseases. A reasonable juror could easily conclude that any supposedly remedial

measures were simply undertaken to create plausible deniability. As a result, there was

sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the defendants conspired to commit

mail and wire fraud.49 Under Thomas, that is enough to sustain a conviction on Count

1. See 54 F.3d at 81 (holding that proof of any single illegal aim of the conspiracy is

sufficient to sustain a conviction).

A reasonable juror could also conclude that the defendants conspired to commit

bank fraud. Though Warshak argues that the chargeback-manipulation scheme was not

intended to harm any banks, a reasonable juror could nonetheless conclude that the

scheme was concocted and implemented with fraudulent intent. According to a number

of Berkeley insiders, Warshak and his employees manipulated the chargeback ratio

because, if they did not, their merchant accounts would be terminated. Thus, a

reasonable juror could find that the intent of the chargeback-manipulation scheme was

to deceive merchant banks (and credit-card processors) into continuing to provide a

service that they would otherwise have declined to provide. That action would constitute

fraud by increasing a risk of loss, even if no actual monetary loss were shown. United

49

Additionally, a reasonable juror could conclude that the conspiracy lasted for the entirety of

the period alleged in the indictment. While the supposed remedial measures took place in 2004, those

remedial measures were, according to testimony, merely for show. Thus, one could conclude that any

business conducted after disclosures were instituted was part and parcel of an ongoing scheme to defraud

customers.

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States v. Reaume, 338 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2003). Consequently, there was sufficient

evidence to support the conclusion that Warshak and the other named defendants

conspired to commit bank fraud.50

2. Harriet

Harriet argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that she knowingly

joined the conspiracy. She argues that, although she was in charge of processing

continuity shipments at Berkeley, her job amounted to little more than pushing a button.

In addition, she contends that she was not made privy to any emails discussing the

auto-ship program or the chargeback ratio. In sum, she asserts that she was oblivious

to any fraud that was occurring at the company and that she was convicted simply by

virtue of her name.

However, there is competent evidence in the record suggesting that Harriet was

a knowing participant in the pervasive fraud at Berkeley. According to Shelley Kinmon,

Harriet was used to input auto-ship charges because she was the only one Washak

trusted. Furthermore, there is testimony that Harriet was present at staff meetings where

the need to manipulate the chargeback ratio was discussed. From this evidence, a

rational factfinder could properly determine that Harriet knowingly joined the

conspiracy.51

G. Mail Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341)

Warshak also argues that the government failed to offer sufficient evidence that

he was guilty of the twelve mail-fraud counts alleged in the indictment (Counts 2-13).

“Mail fraud [under 18 U.S.C. § 1341] consists of (1) a scheme or artifice to defraud;

(2) use of mails in furtherance of the scheme; and (3) intent to deprive a victim of money

50

Testimony that the defendants submitted a number of falsified applications to banks and

processors was also offered in support of the conspiracy charge. However, because the evidence relating

to the chargeback scheme was sufficient to sustain a conviction, any evidence relating to the applications

need not be discussed.

51

There is also evidence linking Harriet to the falsified bank applications.

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or property.” United States v. Turner, 465 F.3d 667, 680 (6th Cir. 2006). Notably, “the

mail . . . fraud statute[] do[es] not require proof that the intended victim was actually

defrauded; the actual success of a scheme to defraud is not an element of . . . § 1341

. . . .” United States v. Merklinger, 16 F.3d 670, 678 (6th Cir. 1994). Indeed, “[u]sing

the mail to execute or attempt to execute a scheme to defraud is indictable as mail fraud

. . . even if no one relied on any misrepresentation.” Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem.

Co., 553 U.S. 639, 648 (2008) (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1999)).

The first element of mail fraud, the requirement of a “scheme or artifice to

defraud,” escapes precise definition. In United States v. Daniel, we held that “‘[a]

scheme to defraud includes any plan or course of action by which someone intends to

deprive another by deception of money . . . or property by means of false or fraudulent

pretenses, representations, or promises.’” 329 F.3d 480, 485 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting

United States v. Gold Unlimited, Inc., 177 F.3d 472, 479 (6th Cir. 1999)). However, we

have acknowledged that the “scheme to defraud element required under § 1341 is not

defined according to a technical standard. The standard is a ‘reflection of moral

uprightness, of fundamental honesty, fair play and right dealing in the general and

business life of members of society.’” United States v. Van Dyke, 605 F.2d 220, 225

(6th Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v. Bruce, 488 F.2d 1224, 1229 (5th Cir. 1973)).

Mail fraud’s second element, the requirement of a mailing in furtherance of the

scheme, is also fairly expansive. See United States v. Wood, 364 F.3d 704, 726 (6th Cir.

2004) (“[T]he Supreme Court has minimized the importance of mailings in establishing

a mail fraud offense[.]”). As the Supreme Court noted in Schmuck v. United States,

“[t]he relevant question . . . is whether the mailing is part of the execution of the scheme

as conceived by the perpetrator at the time.” 489 U.S. 705, 715 (1989). “[T]he use of

the mails need not be an essential element of the scheme.” Id. at 710 (citing Pereira v.

United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954)). Rather, “[i]t is sufficient for the mailing to be

incident to an essential part of the scheme, or a step in the plot.” Id. at 710-11 (internal

citation and quotation marks omitted). “Those who use the mails to defraud proceed at

their peril.” Id. at 715.

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In the present case, the mail-fraud charges involved specific customers who

ordered a free trial of some Berkeley product—whether over the phone, online, or

through the mail—and thereafter received an unwanted (and unauthorized) additional

shipment. In a number of cases, the customers were never informed during the ordering

process that they would be charged for anything beyond the shipping-and-handling costs

associated with the trial offer. In other cases, customers were notified that they would

be receiving additional shipments and incurring additional charges, but those customers

were also told that they could remove themselves from the auto-ship program within a

certain period of time. Those customers later attempted to cancel their enrollment in the

program but were unsuccessful, some despite receiving confirmation numbers. In

addition, the majority of the customers, including those to whom disclosure was not

made, reported encountering great difficulty in obtaining a refund.

Warshak argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions

on these charges, as the government failed to demonstrate the existence of an intentional

scheme to defraud. Appellant’s Br. at 102-10. Warshak notes that, in some cases, the

customers involved were aware that they had been enrolled in the auto-ship program.

Warshak also notes that a number of customers were able to obtain full or partial

refunds. He contends that, at best, the evidence shows a number of “classic dispute[s]

between company and customer.” Appellant’s Br. at 108. He also posits that a number

of the shipments at issue might be attributable to individual mistakes on the part of

telephone operators.

But Warshak misses the point. The government’s theory was that Berkeley’s

method of doing business was deliberately geared toward deceiving customers into

purchasing additional supplements through the auto-ship program, and there was

certainly sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that the government’s

theory was correct. At trial, James Teegarden testified that the auto-ship program was

the “life blood” of the company and that no pre-sale disclosure of the auto-ship program

was made in the early stages of the business. Both Teegarden and Shelley Kinmon

testified that, while disclosures were later implemented after the company was inundated

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with complaints, the disclosures were designed to be ineffective because nobody would

sign up for continuity if it were properly described. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude

that Berkeley’s whole sales operation was simply one gargantuan scheme to defraud.

Whether the individual consumers named in the mail-fraud counts were actually

deceived is immaterial; the success of the scheme is not an essential element of mail

fraud. See Bridge, 553 U.S. at 648; Merklinger, 16 F.3d at 678. All that matters is that

the customers were the targets of an intentional scheme to defraud, and there is certainly

sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that they were.

Additionally, there is sufficient evidence to establish the mailing element of the

offense. Each of the customers testified that he or she received an additional, unwanted

shipment of herbal supplements through the mail. Without those shipments, Berkeley

would have had absolutely no justification for placing additional charges on its

customers’ credit cards. Only with the subsequent shipments could Berkeley even begin

to create the illusion that the unauthorized charges were legitimate. Thus, the shipments

plainly satisfy the mailing requirement, as they were clearly “part of the execution of the

scheme.” Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 715.

H. Bank Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1344)

1. The Jury Instructions

The defendants’ first argument is that the district court’s instructions permitted

the jury to convict them under a legally erroneous theory of bank fraud. “We review a

jury instruction to determine ‘whether the charge, taken as a whole, fairly and adequately

submits the issues and applicable law to the jury.’” United States v. Hoglund, 178 F.3d

410, 412 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Martin, 740 F.2d 1352, 1361 (6th Cir.

1984)).

To obtain a conviction for bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344, the government

must demonstrate three elements: “(1) that the defendant knowingly executed or

attempted to execute a scheme to defraud a financial institution; (2) that the defendant

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did so with the intent to defraud; and (3) that the financial institution was insured by the

FDIC.” United States v. Everett, 270 F.3d 986, 989 (6th Cir. 2001).

At trial, the district court instructed the jury that the government could

demonstrate the requisite intent to defraud (i.e., the second element of the offense) in

“several different ways,” and stated that “it is not necessary that a bank be the intended

target of the fraud.” The district court also suggested that “the government can . . . show

that the defendant had the requisite intent to defraud, even if the intended target . . . was

a third party, if it proves . . . that: (1) the defendant exposed a bank to risk of loss or

intended to do so; or (2) caused the bank to transfer funds that were in its possession or

control.”

The defendants argue that these instructions were improper because they allowed

the jury to convict on the basis of an intent to defraud the credit-card processors, as

opposed to an intent to defraud the merchant banks. The defendants contend that the

language of the bank-fraud statute clearly requires that any fraudulent scheme “be

directed at an FDIC-insured bank and not at any other entity or person.”52 Appellant’s

Br. at 112. In support of their contention, the defendants point to several out-of-circuit

decisions holding that, to prove bank fraud, the government must show that the

defendant intended to defraud the bank itself or that the defendant intended to harm the

bank. See, e.g., United States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 647 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[W]here

there is no evidence that the perpetrator had an intent to victimize the bank, . . . an intent

to victimize some third party does not render the conduct actionable under § 1344.”);

United States v. Laljie, 184 F.3d 180, 189-90 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[A] conviction under

§ 1344 is not supportable by evidence merely that some person other than a federally

insured financial institution was defrauded in a way that happened to involve banking,

without evidence that such an institution was an intended victim.”).

But the state of the law is different in this circuit. In Everett, we definitively held

that “to have the specific intent required for bank fraud the defendant need not have put

52

It is conceded that the merchant banks were FDIC-insured.

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the bank at risk of loss in the usual sense or intended to do so.” 270 F.3d at 991. Rather,

“[i]t is sufficient if the defendant in the course of committing fraud on someone causes

a federally insured bank to transfer funds under its possession and control.” Ibid.; see

United States v. Reaume, 338 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Everett . . . can be said to

stand for the proposition that the bank fraud statute is violated, even if the intended

victim of the fraudulent activity is an entity other than a federally insured financial

institution, when the fraudulent activity causes the bank to transfer funds.”). In Reaume,

this court extended the principle articulated in Everett, “find[ing] that intent to defraud

the federally insured institution itself is satisfied where: (1) the intent to defraud some

entity was present; and (2) that intended fraud placed a federally insured financial

institution at a risk of loss.” 338 F.3d at 582.

Accordingly, it is clear that the district court’s instructions did not misstate the

law. In the Sixth Circuit, a defendant may be convicted of bank fraud if he intends to

defraud someone and implements a fraudulent scheme that either causes a federally

insured financial institution to transfer funds or exposes that institution to some degree

of risk.

2. Constructive Amendment/Prejudicial Variance

Next, the defendants argue that the district court’s instructions, when coupled

with the government’s evidentiary presentation, resulted in a constructive amendment

to the indictment. “Constructive amendments . . . occur[] when an indictment’s terms

are effectively altered by the presentation of evidence and jury instructions that ‘so

modify essential elements of the offense charged that there is a substantial likelihood the

defendant [was] convicted of an offense other than that charged in the indictment.’”

United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925, 936 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v.

Hathaway, 798 F.2d 902, 910 (6th Cir. 1986)).

Here, no constructive amendment occurred. The offense charged in the

indictment was bank fraud, and the district court’s instructions did not add any elements

extrinsic to that offense. Cf. Combs, 369 F.3d at 936 (holding that a constructive

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amendment had occurred where the jury instructions mixed elements of two distinct

offenses). Indeed, the instructions simply clarified that one of the familiar elements of

bank fraud—namely, intent to defraud—could be shown through proof of intent to

defraud a third party. Thus, it cannot be said that there is a substantial likelihood that

either of the defendants was convicted of an uncharged offense.53

Nor was there a prejudicial variance. A variance takes place “when the charging

terms of an indictment are left unaltered, but the evidence offered at trial proves facts

materially different from those alleged in the indictment.” United States v. Ford,

872 F.2d 1231, 1235 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061,

1071 (D.C. Cir. 1969)). For a variance to merit reversal, it must be prejudicial—that is,

it must detrimentally affect the ability of the defendants to defend themselves.

Hathaway, 798 F.2d at 910-11 (quoting United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 138 n.5

(1985)).

In this case, the facts proved at trial were entirely congruent with the facts

delineated in the indictment. The bank-fraud counts alleged that the defendants misled

merchant banks and credit-card processors about the chargeback ratio. At trial, the

government introduced evidence to the same effect. Additionally, the bank-fraud counts

alleged that the defendants submitted falsified applications to numerous merchant banks

and credit-card processors for the purpose of establishing merchant accounts. Again, the

evidence proffered at trial corresponded with the allegations. It is therefore plain that

no variance occurred.

53

The defendants do not argue that the counts improperly mixed the language of § 1344(1) with

the language of § 1344(2). If the defendants did, however, such an argument would be fruitless, as the

counts charged both offenses in the conjunctive. Furthermore, the district court appears to have given a

jury unanimity instruction.

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3. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Lastly, the defendants argue that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient

to support their bank-fraud convictions (Counts 15, 23, & 27). In each of the bank-fraud

counts, the defendants were charged with scheming to defraud a merchant bank in two

ways. First, they were alleged to have “falsely inflated the number of sales transactions

in order to cause the corresponding ratio of credit card chargebacks from disputed credit

card charges to appear lower than, in fact, it was.” Second, they were alleged to have

submitted falsified applications to obtain credit-card processing services from merchant

banks and processors.54

The defendants argue that the government failed to prove that the manipulation

of the chargeback ratio caused any of the merchant banks to transfer funds. The

defendants claim that “[t]here was . . . no testimony from any banker or processor that

any bank ever transferred money to Berkeley, nor were any bank, processor, or customer

account records introduced reflecting such a transfer.” Appellant’s Br. at 114-15. The

defendants claim that the testimony instead showed that “the processors transferred

Berkeley’s own credit card proceeds to Berkeley, subtracting any transaction fees and

chargeback penalties or reserves from the operating revenues.” Id. at 115 (emphasis

added). In short, the defendants claim that there was “no evidence that the banks lost

access to any of their funds for any period of time whatsoever.” Ibid.

However, there is evidence in the record suggesting the that the merchant banks

did indeed transfer funds as a result of the chargeback-manipulation scheme. According

to Hector Rodriguez, who managed VISA’s chargeback-monitoring program, credit-card

processing relationships inherently require merchant banks to transfer funds. In other

words, if a credit-card transaction is processed, money flows through a merchant bank.

There appears to be some question as to whether the money goes directly into the hands

54

Because the evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions for the chargeback-manipulation

scheme, we have omitted discussion of the allegedly falsified applications. It should be noted, however,

that the jury failed to convict the defendants of a number of other charges related to the merchant

applications. Specifically, the jury acquitted the defendants of making false statements to a bank, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014.

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of the merchant, but the record clearly indicates that the merchant bank is at the very

least integral to the transfer—it debits the card holder’s account and credits someone.55

Therefore, if Berkeley’s merchant accounts had been terminated, the merchant banks

would no longer have made transfers on the company’s behalf. As a number of

witnesses testified, without the chargeback scheme, the company’s merchant accounts

would have been terminated. Thus, a rea

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United States v. Warshak · 631 F.3d 266 | Frix