explaining that, under California law, a “plea of nolo contendere ‘is the functional 3 equivalent of a guilty plea’”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that, under California law, a “plea of nolo contendere ‘is the functional 3 equivalent of a guilty plea’”
- “A plea of nolo contendere ‘is the functional equivalent of a guilty plea.’ ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 09-50559
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. D.C. No.
2:08-cr-00121-JSL-1
DANTE KENYON ANDERSON,
OPINION
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
J. Spencer Letts, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 3, 2010*
Pasadena, California
Filed November 16, 2010
Before: Harry Pregerson, Kenneth F. Ripple,** and
Susan P. Graber, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam Opinion
*The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
**The Honorable Kenneth F. Ripple, Senior Judge, United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
18557
18558 UNITED STATES v. ANDERSON
COUNSEL
Sean Kennedy, Federal Public Defender, Michael Tanaka,
Deputy Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles, California, for
the plaintiff-appellant.
UNITED STATES v. ANDERSON 18559
André Birotte Jr., United States Attorney, Christine C. Ewell,
Assistant United States Attorney, Shawn J. Nelson, Assistant
United States Attorney, Los Angeles, California, for the
defendant-appellee.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
The United States appeals the district court’s dismissal of
Defendant-Appellee Dante Anderson’s indictment for being a
felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). The court concluded that the defendant’s two
predicate felony convictions were insufficient to support a
federal indictment because each resulted from a plea of nolo
contendere in a California state court and, therefore, did not
conclusively establish Anderson’s guilt.
[1] Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) prohibits possession of a
firearm by “any person . . . who has been convicted in any
court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year.” “What constitutes a conviction of such
a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the
jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a)(20); accord United States v. Valerio, 441 F.3d 837,
839 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Under the federal felon in possession
statute, state law controls on whether a person has a ‘convic-
tion,’ . . . .”).
[2] The California Penal Code, section 1016(3), provides
that “[t]he legal effect of [a nolo contendere] plea, to a crime
punishable as a felony, shall be the same as that of a plea of
guilty for all purposes.” A plea of nolo contendere “is the
functional equivalent of a guilty plea.” People v. Whitfield, 54
Cal. Rptr. 2d 370, 377 (Ct. App. 1996).
18560 UNITED STATES v. ANDERSON
[3] The district court’s holding was clearly erroneous. Sec-
tion 922(g)(1) requires only that the defendant was “convict-
ed” of a previous felony, as defined by the jurisdiction in
which the proceedings were held. California law treats a plea
of nolo contendere as equivalent to a guilty plea. Thus,
Anderson’s nolo contendere pleas resulted in convictions, and
either conviction was sufficient to qualify as a predicate fel-
ony.
[4] The district court’s dismissal of the indictment under
§ 922(g)(1) is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.