Opinion

Aaron v. Shelley

  • 624 F.3d 882
  • 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23412
  • 2010 WL 4541796
Court
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Filed
Nov 12, 2010
Status
Published
Author
Loken
On the bench
Loken, Hansen, Benton
Cited by
11 cases
Authority
More cited than 87.3%

involving an interlocutory appeal of district court’s denial of summary judgment on issue of qualified immunity

How later courts described this case

  • involving an interlocutory appeal of district court’s denial of summary judgment on issue of qualified immunity

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-3554

___________

Rizelle Aaron, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

William Shelley; Gregory Rozenski, * Eastern District of Arkansas.

individually and in their official *

capacities as police officers, *

*

Defendants - Appellants. *

___________

Submitted: September 22, 2010

Filed: November 12, 2010

___________

Before LOKEN, HANSEN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

Rizelle Aaron, a part time police officer for the City of England, Arkansas, who

was no longer being paid due to budget cuts, saw what he believed to be four

individuals engaged in a drug deal in a park in the City of Jacksonville, where his

children played. Aaron approached and forcefully told the four individuals to produce

the drugs. They produced crack cocaine, a small amount of marijuana, and four

Vicodin pills. Aaron obtained their names, addresses, and phone numbers; called to

request that Jacksonville police come to the park; and flagged down the passing car

of a Pulaski County Deputy Sheriff. Jacksonville police quickly came to the scene.

After an investigation, the details of which are clouded by material fact disputes, the

Jacksonville officers allowed the suspected drug offenders -- described in the ensuing

police reports as “victims” -- to leave without being charged. The police then arrested

Aaron for impersonating a police officer, and for false imprisonment and terroristic

threatening of the suspected drug offenders. A few days later, Jacksonville police

received a letter from the City of England confirming that Aaron was a part time

police officer, as he had told them at the scene. All charges against Aaron were

subsequently nolle prossed.

Aaron then commenced this damage action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

Jacksonville police officers William Shelley and Gregory Rozenski in their individual

and official capacities, and the City of Jacksonville. Defendants moved for summary

judgment. The district court1 dismissed the claims against the City and the official

capacity claims against the police officers but denied the officers qualified immunity

on Aaron’s Fourth Amendment individual capacity claims that he was arrested

without probable cause. Aaron v. Shelley, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (E.D. Ark. 2010).

The officers appeal, arguing they are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law

because their versions of the disputed facts show they had arguable probable cause to

arrest. Like the district court, we must construe the facts in the light most favorable

to Aaron. Walker v. City of Pine Bluff, 414 F.3d 989, 991 (8th Cir. 2005).

An interlocutory order denying qualified immunity is immediately appealable

“to the extent that it turns on an issue of law.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530

(1985). If the order turns on issues of fact, rather than an “abstract issue of law,” we

lack jurisdiction over the appeal because the decision is not a final order immediately

appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313-

18 (1995). We always have jurisdiction to consider our jurisdiction.

1

The Honorable Brian S. Miller, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas.

-2-

In denying the officers summary judgment based on qualified immunity, the

district court carefully explained the material disputed facts which, when viewed most

favorably to Aaron, would permit a reasonable jury to find that the officers lacked

objectively reasonable probable cause to arrest Aaron on each of the three charges.

On appeal, for the most part ignoring facts favorable to Aaron, including a recording

of the dialogue between police officers and Aaron immediately prior to his arrest, the

officers argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law because,

at the time of the arrest, there was arguable probable cause to arrest if they believed

everything reported by the four “victims,” and disbelieved everything Aaron told

them. As we see it, the most clearly established laws in sight are the well-settled

summary judgment and qualified immunity principles violated by this contention.

The appeal does not pass muster under Johnson v. Jones and is therefore dismissed.

See, e.g., Mahamed v. Anderson, 612 F.3d 1084 (8th Cir. 2010); Levan v. George,

604 F.3d 366, 369-70 (7th Cir. 2010). If we reached the merits, we would summarily

affirm.

The appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

______________________________

-3-

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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