a physician who lost a six-figure salary when his employment contract with a hospital was terminated was not entitled to temporary injunctive relief, even if his reputation was 20 damaged and he was forced to relocate to find suitable employment, because the harm he suffered could be compensated by money damages
How later courts described this case
- a physician who lost a six-figure salary when his employment contract with a hospital was terminated was not entitled to temporary injunctive relief, even if his reputation was 20 damaged and he was forced to relocate to find suitable employment, because the harm he suffered could be compensated by money damages
- physician was not entitled to a temporary restraining order preventing his termination; alleged harm from loss of his salary and possible necessity of moving to find other employment could be recouped in a court of law by a favorable judgment and an award of damages
- doctor could not demonstrate irreparable harm, despite claim that he stood to lose a $100,000 per year job, because any harm could be adequately compensated by money damages or addressed in a court of law
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Doe v. ARKANSAS DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES, 357 Ark. 413 (2004)
Doe and Roe argue that Kreutzer and Unity Hospital are distinguishable, in that they are not confronted with the loss of a single job, but instead face the inability to work at any long-term-care facility in the State, "effectively stripping them of their certification as certified nursing assistants."[3] They also assert that they are not just losing their jobs, but they are also being f
The opinion
Richard L. Mays, Justice.
After appellant was notified that his contract of employment with Boone County Hospital would be terminated, he sought a temporary restraining order in chancery court. The chancery court refused to grant the restraining order because it found that appellant would suffer no irreparable harm from the proposed discharge. We affirm.
On April 18, 1980, appellant, Dr. D. W. Kreutzer, the pathologist and director of the laboratory of the Boone County Hospital since 1971, was informed by letter that the Board of Governors of the Hospital had voted to terminate his contract, effective 60 days from the date of notice. Appellant’s contract provided a salary of $100,000 and authorized termination of the contract by either party upon 60 days written notice to the other. Appellant complained to the Board that the decision to discharge him had been made in executive session without notice to him in violation of the Arkansas County Government Code, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 17-3101 et seq (Repl. 1980), and the Freedom of Information Act, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 12-2801 et seq (Repl. 1979). He requested the Board to hold a public hearing on the reasons for his discharge and buttressed his request by submitting supporting petitions signed by various community members. Although a letter was sent to appellant on May 8, 1980 generally outlining the reasons for the Board’s decision, the Board refused to hold a public hearing. On June 19, 1980, one day prior to the effective date of his discharge, appellant filed a complaint in chancery court alleging illegal termination of his contract and seeking to temporarily enjoin the Board from discharging him until the merits of his claim could be determined, he alleged that unless the Board was temporarily enjoined, his professional reputation, future employment opportunities and ability to care for his patients would be irreparably harmed. After a brief hearing, the chancellor denied the interlocutory relief and this appeal followed.
The issuance of a temporary restraining order is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be reversed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. Spitzer v. Barnhill, 237 Ark. 525 , 374 S.W. 2d 811 (1964), Ark. R. Civ. P. 52. Essential to the issuance of a temporary restraining order is a finding that a failure to isue it will result in irreparable harm to the applicant. Ark. R. Civ. P. 65. Harm is normally only considered irreparable when it cannot be adequately compensated by money damages or redressed in a court of law. State Police Commission v. Davidson, 252 Ark. 137 , 477 S.W. 2d 852 (1972).
Appellant contends that the chancellor's finding that he had not made a sufficient showing of irreparable harm to justify issuance of a temporary restraining order is clearly erroneous. He alleges harm from the loss of his S 100,000 a year salary and from the possibility that he might be forced to move to another community to find suitable employment. He argues that the chances of obtaining acceptable employment, even if he relocates, will be significantly diminished because of alleged harm to his professional reputation. He then somehow concludes that these circumstances mandate a finding of irreparable harm and the issuance of a restraining order temporarily enjoining his discharge. We could not more forcefully disagree. These arguments are available anytime an employment contract is terminated. The chancellor need not indulge in speculation about appellant’s future employment opportunities in deciding the legal question here. No ground is lost by a denial of the interlocutory order which cannot be recouped in a court of law by a favorable judgment and an award of money damages.
Affirmed.