Opinion

Texas Gas Transmissions, LLC v. Butler County Board of Commissioners

  • 625 F.3d 973
  • 174 Oil & Gas Rep. 413
  • 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 22598
  • 2010 WL 4259790
Court
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Filed
Oct 29, 2010
Status
Published
On the bench
Gibbons, Griffin, Dowd
Cited by
1 cases
Authority
More cited than 46.5%

The opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 10a0336p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

_________________

X

Plaintiff-Appellant, -

TEXAS GAS TRANSMISSIONS, LLC,

-

-

-

No. 09-3743

v.

,

>

BUTLER COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS; -

-

-

GREGORY JOLIVETTE, CHARLES FURMON,

-

MICHAEL FOX, Butler County

Commissioners; BUTLER COUNTY, OHIO; -

-

Defendants-Appellees. -

HUT-1-LLC,

-

N

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati.

No. 06-00440—Susan J. Dlott, Chief District Judge.

Argued: April 29, 2010

Decided and Filed: October 29, 2010

Before: GIBBONS and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges; DOWD, Senior District Judge.*

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Wilson G. Weisenfelder, Jr., RENDIGS, FRY, KIELY & DENNIS,

Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. C. J. Schmidt, III, WOOD & LAMPING LLP,

Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Wilson G. Weisenfelder, Jr., Lynne

Marie Longtin, RENDIGS, FRY, KIELY & DENNIS, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant.

C. J. Schmidt, III, WOOD & LAMPING LLP, Cincinnati, Ohio, Roger S. Gates,

BUTLER COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE, Hamilton, Ohio, Thomas L. Cuni,

Mark A. Wilder, CUNI, FERGUSON & LeVAY CO., L.P.A., Cincinnati, Ohio, for

Appellees.

*

The Honorable David D. Dowd, Jr., Senior United States District Judge for the Northern District

of Ohio, sitting by designation.

1

No. 09-3743 Texas Gas Transmissions, LLC v. Butler County Page 2

Bd. of Comm’rs, et al.

_________________

OPINION

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PER CURIAM. This case concerns the impact of Butler County’s proposed

improvement to Princeton Road on two 26-inch subterranean gas pipelines owned by

Texas Gas. The pipelines intersect the road and, in part, run underneath Butler County’s

66-foot wide right-of-way on Princeton Road. The improvement will accommodate the

traffic caused by the construction of a new residential subdivision and require the

strengthening or removal of Texas Gas’s underground pipelines. The majority of the

improvement will take place within Butler County’s 66-foot wide right-of-way, but a

portion will occur alongside the right-of-way in an area where Texas Gas has a property

interest superior to that of Butler County. Before the district court, the parties brought

competing claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking a declaration of the

priority of their respective property interests and of Butler County’s authority to order

Texas Gas to strengthen or remove the pipelines underneath Princeton Road at the

company’s expense.

After a bench trial, the district court granted Butler County declaratory relief and

entered an order providing, in relevant part for this appeal, that: (1) Butler County had

a 66-foot wide right-of-way that was superior to Texas Gas’s pipeline easements; (2) the

planned improvements to Princeton Road are not an unreasonable interference with

Texas Gas’s easements; and (3) Ohio Revised Code § 5547.03 granted Butler County

the authority to order Texas Gas to strengthen or remove the pipelines at its own

expense. Texas Gas timely appealed, arguing that the district court improperly

interpreted Ohio Revised Code § 5547.03 and that the district court’s order authorized

an unconstitutional taking of its superior interest in the land running alongside Butler

County’s right-of-way.

At oral argument, it became apparent that the dispute between the parties is a

narrow one. Texas Gas emphasized that it is not appealing the district court’s settlement

No. 09-3743 Texas Gas Transmissions, LLC v. Butler County Page 3

Bd. of Comm’rs, et al.

of the competing property claims within the 66-foot wide Princeton Road right-of-way.

Indeed, Texas Gas does not dispute that Butler County has a superior interest within that

area and may order it to strengthen or remove the pipelines. On the other hand, counsel

for Butler County stated expressly that the County is not asking us to affirm the district

court’s judgment to the extent it authorizes the County to order Texas Gas to strengthen

or remove the portions of its pipelines outside of the County’s right-of-way. Counsel

indicated that so long as the County may act within its right-of-way, we “don’t even

have to reach” the issue of its rights outside that area. In essence, Butler County wants

the authority to act within its right-of-way, to which Texas Gas has no objection, and

Texas Gas wants to prevent Butler County from ordering it to alter the pipelines outside

of the County’s right-of-way, to which Butler County has no objection.

At oral argument, counsel for Texas Gas insisted that the issue before the court

on appeal was the correctness of the district court’s decision with respect to the area

outside the right of way in which Texas Gas has the superior interest. To analyze this

issue properly, we must closely examine the district court’s opinion. The operative

language of the declaratory judgment does not specify that it applies to the area outside

the right of way as well as the area within it. Yet clearly the opinion as a whole

interprets the statute to allow Butler County to direct Texas Gas to remove or reinforce

its pipelines at Texas Gas’s expense. Clearly, also, the opinion denies Texas Gas an

injunction and thus permits the project to go forward. And as a practical matter, going

forward with the project and paying for removal or reinforcement of the pipelines

involve portions of the pipelines that are both within and outside the right of way. The

district court unmistakably avoided any issues that Texas Gas might raise through resort

to state remedies, as well as issues that might be raised in a Takings Clause claim made

after state remedies were exhausted. And in fact, the district court recognized that Texas

Gas “may” be entitled to partial compensation to the extent the pipelines are affected by

the new berm, which is the area outside the right of way.

Texas Gas has effectively abandoned any effort to challenge the district court’s

application of Ohio Revised Code § 5547.03, except on constitutional grounds. Given

No. 09-3743 Texas Gas Transmissions, LLC v. Butler County Page 4

Bd. of Comm’rs, et al.

Texas Gas’s concessions with respect to the district court’s order generally and its failure

to challenge its underpinnings with respect to Butler County’s entitlement to go forward,

it appears to us that we lack jurisdiction over any remaining issues in this appeal. It is

well-settled that a plaintiff alleging an unconstitutional taking of private property by a

government entity must first exhaust available state remedies, regardless of the nature

of the taking. River City Capital, LP v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, Clermont Cnty., Ohio,

491 F.3d 301, 302 (6th Cir. 2007). Although a Takings Clause claim paired with

42 U.S.C. § 1983 appears to present a clear basis for federal question jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1331, “the Supreme Court has ruled that constitutional takings claims are

not ripe for federal court review until state compensation procedures, assuming they

exist and are adequate, have been exhausted.” Id. at 306 (discussing Williamson County

Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985)).

Before exercising jurisdiction over a Takings Clause claim, a federal court must ensure

that the relevant state compensation procedures are “reasonable, certain, and adequate.”

Id. at 307 (citations omitted). This Court has held unambiguously that Ohio affords such

a procedure through an action for mandamus to compel a government entity to institute

appropriation proceedings against the private property owner. Id. (citing Coles v.

Granville, 448 F.3d 853, 865 (6th Cir. 2006)). This procedure, as set forth in sections

163.01 to 163.22 of the Ohio Revised Code, must be followed regardless of whether a

physical or regulatory taking is at issue. Id. Texas Gas concedes that it has not

instituted any such proceedings in state court. “Ripeness is more than a mere procedural

question; it is determinative of jurisdiction. If a claim is unripe, federal courts lack

subject matter jurisdiction and the complaint must be dismissed.” Bigelow v. Mich.

Dep’t of Natural Res., 970 F.2d 154, 157 (6th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). A federal

court must determine whether a claim is ripe for review, “even if neither party has raised

this issue.” Id.

Because we lack jurisdiction to consider whether Butler County’s actions

constitute a taking of property for which just compensation must be provided, we

dismiss Texas Gas’s appeal as it relates to those issues. In all other respects, we affirm.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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