Opinion

In Re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads

  • 623 F.3d 1200
  • 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 21253
  • 2010 WL 4026802
Court
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Filed
Oct 15, 2010
Status
Published
On the bench
Loken, Melloy, Shepherd
Cited by
213 cases
Authority
More cited than 51.6%

recognizing that Twombly, which was not intended to create an “insurmountable hurdle,” only requires a degree of specificity that is achievable without the use of unavailable confidential documents, and observing that: “If plaintiffs must allege that the defendant violated a particular FDA-approved specification before discovery, then it is difficult to appreciate how any plaintiff will ever be able to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”

How later courts described this case

  • recognizing that Twombly, which was not intended to create an “insurmountable hurdle,” only requires a degree of specificity that is achievable without the use of unavailable confidential documents, and observing that: “If plaintiffs must allege that the defendant violated a particular FDA-approved specification before discovery, then it is difficult to appreciate how any plaintiff will ever be able to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”
  • explaining that the plaintiffs had not identified specific federal requirements in the PMA that were not satisfied and that formed the basis for a manufacturing defect that harmed the plaintiff, and holding that the plaintiffs’ contention that they did not have access to the PMA to make such an allegation came too late
  • holding that a claim that the defendant was required to give “additional warnings” beyond those approved by the FDA was “precisely the type of state requirement that is ‘different from or in addition to’ the federal requirement and therefore preempted” (quoting Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330 )
  • explaining that “[t]he plaintiff must be suing for conduct that violates the FDCA (or else his claim is expressly preempted by § 360k(a)), but the plaintiff must not be suing because the conduct violates the FDCA (such a claim would be impliedly preempted under Buckman).”

Written by the judges who cited it.

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by Houston v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (2013)

    The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Bryant is distinguishable. 623 F.3d at 1207-1208.
    District Court, D. CaliforniaJul 30, 2013Read it

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-2290

___________

In re: Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis *

Leads Products Liability Litigation, *

------------------------------------------------ *

Anna Bryant, et al., *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Medtronic, Inc., et al., *

*

Defendant - Appellee. *

------------------------------------------------ *

Product Liability Advisory Council, *

*

Amicus on Behalf of Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: April 12, 2010

Filed: October 15, 2010

___________

Before LOKEN, MELLOY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

Defendant Medtronic, Inc., designed, manufactured, and sold the Sprint Fidelis

Lead, a wire that delivers signals that allow an implantable cardiac defibrillator to

detect an abnormal heart rhythm and deliver a shock to help the heart return to an

appropriate rhythm. After Medtronic recalled the product in October 2007, Anna

Bryant and other patients with implanted Sprint Fidelis Leads filed suits across the

country against Medtronic and its affiliates (collectively, Medtronic) asserting tort and

breach of warranty claims for injuries allegedly caused by the defective leads. The

cases were transferred to the District of Minnesota for pretrial proceedings by the

Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.

Plaintiffs filed a Master Consolidated Complaint seeking damages and equitable

relief on behalf of “all Plaintiffs who had Sprint Fidelis Leads implanted,” asserting

some twenty distinct state law causes of action including failure to warn, defective

design and manufacturing, breach of express warranty, and fraud. Applying the

preemption principles of Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008), and the

pleading principles of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the

district court1 granted Medtronic’s motion to dismiss and denied Plaintiffs’ post-

judgment motions for recusal and for leave to file an amended complaint. Plaintiffs

appeal these rulings. We affirm.

I. Background

In the Medical Device Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic

Act (“MDA”), Congress authorized the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to

regulate the safety and effectiveness of medical devices. The Sprint Fidelis Lead was

a Class III device, one that presents a potentially unreasonable risk of injuring patients

or that is used to sustain life. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,

518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996). Before a new Class III device may be marketed, the

manufacturer must assure the FDA through a rigorous Pre-Market Approval (“PMA”)

process that the device is safe and effective. Once the product is approved, the

manufacturer may not change its design, manufacturing process, labeling, or other

1

The HONORABLE RICHARD H. KYLE, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota.

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attributes that would affect safety or effectiveness without filing a PMA Supplement.

21 C.F.R. § 814.39(a). The PMA Supplement is reviewed using the same standard as

the original PMA. See generally Riegel, 552 U.S. at 315-19.

In December 1993, the FDA granted Medtronic premarket approval for the

Transvene Lead System. Progressively smaller leads, such as the Sprint Quattro, were

later approved in a series of PMA Supplements. In June 2004, the FDA approved a

PMA Supplement for the Sprint Fidelis Lead. Patients with implanted Sprint Fidelis

Leads began suffering unnecessary shocks. Dr. Robert G. Hauser of the Minneapolis

Heart Institute and his colleagues investigated patient complaints, published a report

finding that the Sprint Fidelis Lead was more likely to fracture than other types of

leads, met with Medtronic to voice their concerns, and advised the FDA of those

concerns. Despite knowing the leads were unsafe, Plaintiffs allege,2 Medtronic

undertook a vigorous defense of its product that included sending a “Dear Doctor”

letter to practitioners asserting that failures may be the result of improper surgical

technique and assuring doctors that the Sprint Fidelis Leads performed as well as other

Medtronic leads.

In May 2007, Medtronic applied for a PMA Supplement approving design and

manufacturing changes to the Sprint Fidelis Leads without, Plaintiffs allege, advising

FDA of the high rate of failures. A PMA Supplement was approved in July.

Medtronic continued to sell previously manufactured Sprint Fidelis Leads, “finally”

filed 120 adverse event reports in September, and suspended sales in early October,

but doctors continued to implant Sprint Fidelis Leads. Not until October 15, 2007, did

Medtronic announce a world-wide recall of the Sprint Fidelis Lead. Soon after, the

FDA announced a Class I recall, the most serious type of medical device recall. These

product liability lawsuits followed.

2

For purposes of reviewing Medtronic’s motion to dismiss, we assume that facts

pleaded in Plaintiffs’ Master Consolidated Complaint are true. Zutz v. Nelson, 601

F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir. 2010).

-3-

The MDA contains an express preemption provision: no State “may establish

or continue in effect with respect to a device . . . any requirement (1) which is

different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the

device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other

matter included in a requirement applicable to the device.” 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).3 In

Riegel, the Court held that, for § 360k(a) preemption purposes, (i) FDA pre-market

approval is “federal safety review” that results in federal “requirements” specific to

the approved device, and (ii) common law product liability claims result in “state

requirements” that are preempted to the extent they relate to the safety and

effectiveness of the device and are “different from, or in addition to,” the federal

requirements established by PMA approval. 552 U.S. at 322-24. However, the Court

noted, § 360k “does not prevent a State from providing a damages remedy for claims

premised on a violation of FDA regulations; the state duties in such a case ‘parallel,’

rather than add to, federal requirements.” Id. at 330.

The MDA also provides that all actions to enforce FDA requirements “shall be

by and in the name of the United States,” 21 U.S.C. § 337(a). In Buckman Co. v.

Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 349 n.4 (2001), the Court construed § 337(a)

as barring suits by private litigants “for noncompliance with the medical device

provisions.” Read together -

Riegel and Buckman create a narrow gap through which a plaintiff’s

state-law claim must fit if it is to escape express or implied preemption.

The plaintiff must be suing for conduct that violates the FDCA (or else

his claim is expressly preempted by § 360k(a)), but the plaintiff must not

be suing because the conduct violates the FDCA (such a claim would be

impliedly preempted under Buckman).

3

The term “relates to” reflects Congress’s “intent to pre-empt a large area of

state law.” Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 548 (2008).

-4-

Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 777 (D. Minn. 2009). The contours of the

parallel claim exception were not addressed in Riegel and are as-yet ill-defined.

Medtronic moved to dismiss the Master Consolidated Complaint, arguing that

the claims were preempted by § 360k(a). The district court granted the motion,

holding all claims preempted. In re Medtronic, Inc. Sprint Fidelis Leads Prods. Liab.

Litig., 592 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (D. Minn. 2009) (“Medtronic Leads”). Plaintiffs’

product liability claims (design defect, manufacturing defect, failure to warn, breach

of warranty, and fraud, among others) unquestionably relate to the safety or

effectiveness of the Sprint Fidelis Lead. Thus, the crucial question on appeal is

whether these claims are parallel claims that avoid preemption because they would not

impose state requirements “different from or in addition to” the federal requirements

established by PMA approval of the Sprint Fidelis Lead.4

II. Parallel Claim Issues

A. Failure to Warn and Related Claims. In the Master Consolidated

Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that Medtronic failed to adequately warn consumers of

“known defects” and that the Sprint Fidelis Leads presented an unreasonably

dangerous risk beyond what the ordinary consumer would reasonably expect. These

claims are preempted by § 360k. The FDA’s PMA approval includes specific

language for Class III device labels and warnings. Plaintiffs did not allege that

Medtronic modified or failed to include FDA-approved warnings. Rather, they

alleged that, by reason of state law, Medtronic was required to give additional

4

In opposing Medtronic’s motion to dismiss in the district court, Plaintiffs’ lead

argument was that Medtronic lost its federal preemption defense when the Sprint

Fidelis Leads were recalled. Plaintiffs briefed this issue on appeal but did not press

it at oral argument. We reject the contention for the reasons stated by the district

court. Medtronic Leads, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 1155-56.

-5-

warnings, precisely the type of state requirement that is “different from or in addition

to” the federal requirement and therefore preempted. See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330.

Even if federal law allowed Medtronic to provide additional warnings, as

Plaintiffs alleged, any state law imposing an additional requirement is preempted by

§ 360k. “Where a federal requirement permits a course of conduct and the state makes

it obligatory, the state’s requirement is in addition to the federal requirement and thus

is preempted.” McMullen v. Medtronic, Inc., 421 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir. 2005), cert.

denied, 547 U.S. 1003 (2006). Plaintiffs’ reliance on Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct.

1187 (2009), for a contrary rule is unavailing. Wyeth turned on implied conflict

preemption, not express preemption, because Congress did not extend the express

preemption for medical devices in § 360k to prescription drugs. Id. at 1200.

Plaintiffs further alleged that Medtronic was negligent in continuing to sell the

original version of the Sprint Fidelis Lead after it had received FDA approval to sell

a modified version. However, as the FDA did not prohibit Medtronic from continuing

to sell the unmodified lead, a state requirement to that effect would be “different from

or in addition to” the federal requirement and preempted under § 360k. Finally,

Plaintiffs alleged that Medtronic failed to provide the FDA with sufficient information

and did not timely file adverse event reports, as required by federal regulations. As

the district court concluded, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 1161, these claims are simply an

attempt by private parties to enforce the MDA, claims foreclosed by § 337(a) as

construed in Buckman, 531 U.S. at 349, 353. See Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp.,

669 F. Supp. 2d 701, 710-12 (S.D. Miss. 2009).

B. Design Defect Claims. The Master Consolidated Complaint alleged that

Medtronic designed the Sprint Fidelis Leads “in a dangerous and defective condition”

and “in a manner violative of the [MDA].” Absent concrete allegations that the

product sold by Medtronic was not the product design approved in the PMA

Supplement, these are not parallel claims. Rather, they are attacks on the risk/benefit

-6-

analysis that led the FDA to approve an inherently dangerous Class III device. Such

claims are expressly preempted by § 360k. See Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d

902, 913-14 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1020 (1998). “State tort law that

requires a manufacturer’s [Class III device] to be safer, but hence less effective, than

the model the FDA has approved disrupts the federal scheme.” Riegel, 552 U.S. at

325.

C. Manufacturing Defect Claims. Plaintiffs assert that the Sprint Fidelis

Leads were defectively manufactured because Medtronic used unreliable direct

resistence spot welding to affix the device’s cables to electrodes. Count II of the

Master Consolidated Complaint further alleged that “facilities or controls used by

[Medtronic] in the manufacture, packing, storage, or installation of the Sprint Fidelis

Leads were not in conformity with applicable requirements” of the MDA. In

opposing Medtronic’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs explained to the district court that

the referenced “applicable requirements” were FDA Current Good Manufacturing

Practices (“CGMPs”) found in the Quality System Regulations applicable to all

medical devices. See 21 C.F.R. Part 820.

The district court concluded that Plaintiffs’ general allegations of failure to

comply with CGMPs -- practices that FDA has described as “an umbrella quality

system” providing “general objectives” for all device manufacturers -- do not save

these claims from preemption under § 360k because Plaintiffs failed to identify any

specific federal requirement in the PMA approval for the Sprint Fidelis Leads that

forms the basis for an unpreempted parallel claim. By contrast, the court noted, the

plaintiff in Rollins v. St. Jude Medical, 583 F. Supp. 2d 790, 799-800 (W.D. La.

2008), alleged that the Class III device manufacturer failed to comply with the

device’s specific PMA requirements. As a result, the court concluded, 592 F. Supp.

2d at 1157-59, Plaintiffs failed to allege a parallel manufacturing defect claim with the

detail required by Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide

the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions,

-7-

and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”). Accord

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009).

On appeal, Plaintiffs primarily argue that the district court’s application of

Twombly in this case held them to an impossible pleading standard because the

FDA’s specific federal manufacturing requirements are set forth in the agency’s PMA

approval files that are accessible, without discovery, only to Medtronic and to the

FDA. This argument -- which focuses on the timing of the preemption ruling -- would

have considerable force in a case where a specific defective Class III device injured

a consumer, and the plaintiff did not have access to the specific federal requirements

in the PMA prior to commencing the lawsuit. Compare Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores,

Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 598 (8th Cir. 2009) (while plaintiffs “must offer sufficient factual

allegations to show that he or she is not merely engaged in a fishing expedition or

strike suit, we must also take account of their limited access to crucial information.”).5

But that is not the case Plaintiffs presented to the district court. Plaintiffs

alleged that state law entitles every person who has an implanted Sprint Fidelis Lead

to damages (for emotional distress) and to equitable relief (monitoring or implanting

of a replacement device) because all Sprint Fidelis Leads have an unreasonably high

risk of fracture failure. In the district court, Plaintiffs conceded that the PMA

Supplement doubtless authorized the use of spot welding, and they specifically

disclaimed the need for discovery in opposing Medtronic’s motion to dismiss. Thus,

5

At oral argument, Medtronic argued Plaintiffs’ claims fail because the FDA did

not find any violation of federal requirements. Without question, a prior FDA

enforcement action is relevant to whether a plaintiff has adequately pleaded a parallel

claim against a Class III device manufacturer. See Purcel v. Advanced Bionics Corp.,

2008 WL 3874713 at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2008). But the absence of FDA

enforcement does not preclude the assertion of parallel claims and therefore is relevant

only at the summary judgment stage or at trial.

-8-

as pleaded and argued, the manufacturing defect claims are not parallel, they are a

frontal assault on the FDA’s decision to approve a PMA Supplement after weighing

the product’s benefits against its inherent risks. On this record, the district court

properly concluded these claims are preempted.

At oral argument, Plaintiffs posited a hypothetical case in which the plaintiffs

could not know without discovery that every Class III device was defectively

manufactured because the PMA approval required 400 degree welds but the

manufacturer used a 300 degree welding process. This hypothetical well illustrates

the care that courts must exercise in applying Riegel’s parallel claim principle at the

pleading stage, particularly to manufacturing defect claims. But here, Plaintiffs

simply failed to adequately plead that Medtronic violated a federal requirement

specific to the FDA’s PMA approval of this Class III device. The district court did

not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider the dismissal order

and grant their belated request for discovery to see if they could find such a

requirement. Medtronic Leads, 2009 WL 294353 at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 5, 2009).

III. Breach of Express Warranty Claims

In the Master Consolidated Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged the breach of express

warranties that Sprint Fidelis Leads “were safe, effective, fit and proper for their

intended use.” The district court concluded that these claims are preempted because

“the safety and effectiveness of the leads are matters solely for the FDA, and because

the FDA determined that the leads were safe and effective.” Medtronic Leads, 592

F. Supp. 2d at 1164. On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that express warranties are not state

“requirements” preempted by § 360k because “the ‘requirement[s]’ imposed by an

express warranty claim are not ‘imposed under State law,’ but by the warrantor.”

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 525 (1992) (plurality opinion)

(emphasis in original).

-9-

Though Cipollone construed a different, narrower express preemption

provision, the opinion suggests that breach of express warranty claims are not

expressly preempted by § 360k. See In re Medtronic, Inc. Implantable Defibrillators

Litig., 465 F. Supp. 2d 886, 898 (D. Minn. 2006); contra Parker v. Stryker Corp., 584

F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303 (D. Colo. 2008). However, we need not decide that issue. To

succeed on the express warranty claim asserted in this case, Plaintiffs must persuade

a jury that Sprint Fidelis Leads were not safe and effective, a finding that would be

contrary to the FDA’s approval of the PMA Supplement. A state common law claim

is preempted if it “actually conflicts with the federal requirement -- either because

compliance with both is impossible, or because the state requirement stands as an

obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of

Congress.” Lohr, 518 U.S. at 507 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quotations and citations

omitted). The MDA in § 360k expressly prohibits States from imposing requirements

“in addition to” federal requirements. The district court correctly concluded that this

express warranty claim interferes with the FDA’s regulation of Class III medical

devices and is therefore conflict preempted. See Gomez v. St. Jude Medical Daig

Div., Inc., 442 F.3d 919, 932 (5th Cir. 2006); cf. Pet Quarters, Inc. v. Depository Trust

& Clearing Corp., 559 F.3d 772, 780-81 (8th Cir. 2009).

IV. Denial of Leave to Amend

Following the district court’s dismissal of their claims and denial of their

motion to reconsider, Plaintiffs moved for leave to file an 85-page Revised Amended

Master Consolidated Complaint. The district court denied the motion because (i)

Plaintiffs did not seek leave to amend before the adverse dismissal ruling, (ii) many

of the allegedly newly-discovered facts were available before they filed the Master

Consolidated Complaint, and (iii) “even if not untimely the Court would deny

Plaintiffs’ Motion because the proposed amendments would be futile.” Medtronic

Leads, 2009 WL 1361313 at *1-2 (D. Minn. May 12, 2009). Plaintiffs appeal that

ruling. We review denial of leave to amend for an abuse of discretion, but the legal

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conclusions underlying a determination of futility are reviewed de novo. In re NVE

Corp. Sec. Litig., 527 F.3d 749, 752 (8th Cir. 2008).

Post-dismissal motions to amend are disfavored. United States ex rel Roop v.

Hypoguard USA, Inc., 559 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2009). The untimeliness factor is

particularly acute in this case because Plaintiffs did not seek leave to amend until after

they failed to persuade the district court to reconsider its dismissal order. On the

merits of their motion, though the proposed amended complaint added more factual

details, it again alleged no violation of a specific federal requirement. The amended

complaint continued to allege that every person with an implanted Sprint Fidelis Lead

is entitled to damages and equitable relief, the frontal assault on the FDA’s PMA

approval that resulted in the district court’s dismissal. After careful review of the

proposed amended complaint, we agree with the district court’s futility ruling; the

court did not abuse its discretion in denying the post-judgment motion to amend. See

Briehl v. General Motors Corp., 172 F.3d 623, 629-30 (8th Cir. 1999).

V. The Recusal issue

More than one year after the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation

consolidated and transferred what became hundreds of cases to Judge Kyle for pretrial

purposes, two months after Judge Kyle dismissed the Master Consolidated Complaint,

and one month after he denied the motion to reconsider, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for

Recusal based upon the fact that Judge Kyle’s son, Richard Kyle, Jr., is a shareholder

at Fredrikson & Byron, a Minneapolis law firm that represents Medtronic in other

matters. Fredrikson & Byron did not represent Medtronic in any matter relating to the

Sprint Fidelis Leads. Mr. Kyle Jr. has a criminal defense practice and has never

worked on a case on behalf of Medtronic. Judge Kyle denied the motion after

thoroughly reviewing the governing law, the facts relevant to the recusal issue, and

the “prudential considerations” militating against recusal. Medtronic Leads, 601 F.

Supp. 2d 1120 (D. Minn. 2009). Plaintiffs appeal that ruling.

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Plaintiffs knew, or with due diligence could have known, that Medtronic is a

significant client of Fredrikson & Byron, and that Judge Kyle’s son is a shareholder

of the firm, before the Judicial Panel transferred this litigation to Judge Kyle. Thus,

the recusal motion was untimely. It was also a device “interposed for suspect tactical

and strategic reasons” following the district court’s adverse rulings. In re Kansas

Public Employees Retirement System, 85 F.3d 1353, 1360 (8th Cir. 1996). As the

grant of such a belated motion would have serious adverse effects on the efficient use

of judicial resources and the administration of justice, “on this basis alone, the district

court’s . . . denial of the recusal motion is affirmed.” Tri-State Fin., LLC v. Lovald,

525 F.3d 649, 654 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 630 (2008). We reject,

summarily, Plaintiffs’ additional contention that Judge Kyle’s response to press

inquiries concerning the recusal motion would cause a reasonable person to question

his impartiality in these proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Cf. White v. Nat’l

Football League, 585 F.3d 1129, 1138-41 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Fortier,

242 F.3d 1224, 1229-30 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 979 (2001).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Medtronic’s motion to file an

oversized 28(j) letter is granted.

MELLOY, Circuit Judge, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part.

I.

I concur with the majority except as to the dismissal of the manufacturing-

defect claim and the related issues of the denial of the plaintiff's discovery request and

motion to amend. On these issues, I would reverse and remand for limited discovery

and the opportunity to amend the master consolidated complaint.

I would hold the specificity requirements of Twombly must be applied in a

practical manner that recognizes the parties' relative access to information necessary

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to articulate claims with specificity. Here, as described by the majority and

determined by the district court, the parallel state claim that may escape preclusion

under § 360k requires the plaintiffs to prove Medtronic failed to manufacture the

Sprint Fidelis Leads in compliance with the requirements set forth in the confidential

PMA and supplemental PMAs. To apply Twombly rigidly without permitting

discovery as to these documents effectively creates an impossible-to-achieve

specificity requirement. I do not believe the Court intended Twombly to create this

type of insurmountable hurdle. Rather, I believe the application of Twombly must be

pragmatic. Here, that means requiring only a degree of specificity that may be

achieved without use of the confidential documents. After discovery—an interrelated

issue discussed below—a court reasonably and consistently with Twombly may

demand more from plaintiffs in the articulation of their claims.

Regarding the discovery request and the motion to amend, I would hold, in the

context of the present case, that it was an abuse of discretion to deny the request and

motion. I emphasize that the requested discovery would be quite limited and impose

virtually no burden on the defendants. What the plaintiffs seek, in fact, they already

possess in redacted form: the PMA and supplemental PMAs. What they require is an

unredacted copy of these clearly identified documents that undisputedly rest in the

possession of the FDA and Medtronic. This case does not raise the specter of

burdensome and speculative discovery proceedings as referenced in Twombly and

bears no resemblance to the discovery-related parade of horribles described with

rhetorical flare in the defendant's brief. The plaintiffs here do not seek a fishing

expedition in order to discover possible claims, and they have not asked for anything

resembling a protracted and expensive discovery process.

The defendants argue the plaintiffs did not ask for discovery until after the

district court's initial grant of the motion to dismiss. The majority states the plaintiffs

disclaimed the need for discovery and concludes with no discussion that the district

court did not abuse its discretion "in denying . . . [the plaintiff's] belated request for

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discovery." I disagree. Early in this matter, at least one attorney had strongly urged

the court to allow discovery. Later, the plaintiffs represented in a status conference

that discovery would not be needed unless the motion rested on information outside

the pleadings. By applying Twombly in a manner that requires the plaintiffs to first

obtain PMAs and specifically articulate claims through reference to deviations from

manufacturing requirements as set forth in the PMAs, the district court necessarily

brought the PMAs into the case. Doing so advanced the motion to dismiss beyond the

mere pleadings. Accordingly, I view the record as showing that the plaintiffs had

indicated discovery would be needed in this exact situation.

Unfortunately, the plaintiffs did not know until after the district court dismissed

their complaint that the viability of their manufacturing-defect claims at the pleading

stage would rest wholly upon the contents of the PMAs. When this disputed legal

issue was clarified through the district court's application of Twombly in its

preemption decision, plaintiffs sought the opportunity to review the documents that

were made outcome determinative by the district court's dismissal order. Only review

of these documents could empower the plaintiffs to amend their pleadings in a manner

consistent with the district court's interpretation of the preemption/parallel claim

doctrine.

The combination of the rigid application of Twombly and the now-articulated

parallel claim exception to § 360k preemption have, in these cases, led to the dismissal

of over two hundred potentially meritorious lawsuits on a technicality. I view this as

unjust in this evolving and complex area of the law. It is particularly inappropriate

where all that is required to avoid this result is the grant of a request for focused

discovery that will involve truly de minimis costs. In some case, concerns for

efficient case administration may dictate a result like that reached today. Efficiency

cannot rule the day, however, when plaintiffs seek only the disclosure of clearly

identified documents undisputedly held by the defendants.

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II.

Supplemental PMAs impose requirements specific to individual devices based

on manufacturers’ submissions to the FDA. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 323. “And while the

FDA does not require that a device allowed to enter the market as a substantial

equivalent take any particular form for any particular reason, the FDA requires a

device that has received premarket approval to be made with almost no deviations

from the specifications in its approval application, for the reason that the FDA has

determined that the approved form provides a reasonable assurance of safety and

effectiveness.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also 21 C.F.R.

§ 814.80 ("A device may not be manufactured, packaged, stored, labeled, distributed,

or advertised in a manner that is inconsistent with any conditions to approval specified

in the PMA approval order for the device."); id. § 820.70(a) ("Each manufacturer shall

develop, conduct, control, and monitor production processes to ensure that a device

conforms to its specifications.").

The plaintiffs allege (mostly in their amended master complaint) that they were

injured because the Sprint Fidelis Leads failed to conform to the device's

specifications. At a general level, this is a classic example of a "parallel" state-law

claim because the plaintiffs' claim does not seek relief based on some duty or

requirement specific to the Sprint Fidelis Leads beyond what is imposed by federal

law. The district court recognized this type of claim as a "back door for plaintiffs"

that was left open by Riegel. See generally Miller v. DuPuy Spine, Inc., 638 F. Supp.

2d 1226, 1230 (D. Nev. 2009) ("Only a departure from such FDA-approved

specifications could conceivably escape preemption. . . ."). In general, plaintiffs

attempting to the fit into this narrow category nearly always rely on the

manufacturer’s submissions to the FDA.6

6

The Sixth Circuit, pre-Twombly, explained that a manufacturer’s submissions

to the FDA are critical to discerning what requirements are applicable to a medical

device:

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The present plaintiffs do not allege how the Sprint Fidelis Leads failed to

conform to FDA-approved specifications. Instead, they assert that they "cannot

specify the requirements because filings with the FDA are confidential."7 Thus, the

discovery issue on appeal is intertwined with the question of the sufficiency of the

pleadings. The question with regard to the motion to dismiss, therefore, is whether

the plaintiffs must allege that the Sprint Fidelis Leads violated a particular and

confidential FDA-approved specification.

The district court held that the plaintiffs' "conclusory allegation" about FDA-

approved specifications "fails to pass muster." I view this holding as failing to take

into account the practical difficulties inherent in situations, like this, where the

"crucial information . . . tend[s] systematically to be in the sole possession of the

It is true that in granting approval for a Class III device, the FDA does

not set forth the reasons justifying its decision. Impliedly, however, the

FDA has relied upon both the PMA submission approved for the original

Class III device and the PMA Supplement providing specific information

on the proposed modification in question. These specific submissions

form the basis of the FDA’s approval of the PMA Supplement. Thus, we

conclude the specific requirements applicable to the Model 4004M

include the entire relevant PMA and accompanying PMA Supplement,

rather than certain portions thereof. In the case of the Model 4004M,

then, the information submitted to and approved by the FDA in both the

Model 4003 PMA and as modified by the Model 4004M PMA

Supplement comprise the specific federal requirements applicable to

Medtronic’s Model 4004M pacemaker lead.

Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216, 228 (6th Cir. 2000).

7

Federal regulations provide that the information about a PMA applicant’s

"[m]anufacturing methods or processes, including quality control procedures"

generally are not available for public disclosure unless that information has been

previously disclosed to the public. 21 C.F.R. § 814.9(h)(1).

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defendants . . . ." Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 598 (8th Cir. 2009)

(describing a similar information imbalance in certain ERISA actions). In Braden, our

court reversed a dismissal on the pleadings and called for "careful and holistic

evaluation of . . . factual allegations" where defendants were in sole possession of

facts necessary to state claims with particularity. In my view, this "careful and holistic

evaluation" should accommodate the possibility of limited discovery when the subject

matter at hand makes clear that the discovery burden will be slight.

In Hofts v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 597 F. Supp. 2d 830, 838 (S.D. Ind.

2009), for example, the court refused to use Twombly to cut off manufacturing-defect

claims articulated in a manner almost identical to those in the present case. There, in

fact, the court commented on the district court's order from the present case,

suggesting that it is "an unusually stringent application of Twombly and Rule 8 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at the motion to dismiss stage." Id. The court

explained:

Manufacturing defect claims are not subject, for example, to the

"particularity" pleading requirements of Rule 9. By way of comparison,

in Lohr, the Supreme Court reversed dismissal of similar claims, even

though “the precise contours of their theory of recovery have not yet

been defined,” because it was clear that the plaintiffs allegations "may

include claims that Medtronic has, to the extent that they exist, violated

FDA regulations." 518 U.S. at 495.

Id. In Hofts, the plaintiff “brought claims premised on Howmedica’s alleged failure

to manufacture the [device] in accordance with the PMA issued by the FDA." Id.

Ultimately, that court held the allegations—virtually identical to the present

allegations—sufficient to state a claim.

I agree with the court in Hofts because its pragmatic approach does not turn

Twombly into an insurmountable hurdle for plaintiffs. Importantly, submissions to

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the FDA for PMAs and supplemental PMAs are confidential, and, as in the present

case, redacted copies obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests are not

always adequate to supply plaintiffs with the manufacturing requirements critical to

articulate a non-preempted claim. If plaintiffs must allege that the defendant violated

a particular FDA-approved specification before discovery, then it is difficult to

appreciate how any plaintiff will ever be able to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. In

essence, application of Twombly in this manner eliminates the remaining exception

to § 360k preemption.

The basic principle I would apply recognizes, simply and fairly, that a plaintiff's

pleading burden should be commensurate with the amount of information available

to them. This is not an unorthodox approach. See Michaels Bldg. Co. v. Ameritrust

Co., N.A., 848 F.2d 674, 680 (6th Cir. 1988) ("Courts have held that the [Rule 9(b)

particularity requirement] may be relaxed where information is only within the

opposing party's knowledge. Especially in a case in which there has been no

discovery, courts have been reluctant to dismiss the action where the facts underlying

the claims are within the defendant's control.") (internal citations omitted). Most of

the arguments that would militate against this approach rely upon the risk that

discovery will create unnecessary burdens for defendants and permit unworthy

plaintiffs to file frivolous suits merely to fish for possible claims. See, e.g., United

States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke's Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 559 (8th Cir. 2006)

(rejecting a request for discovery in the context of a qui tam action and rejecting a

request to relax Rule 9(b)'s heightened particularity requirements for pleading fraud

claims, noting, "The reluctance of courts to permit qui tam relators to use discovery

to meet the requirements of Rule 9(b) reflects, in part, a concern that a qui tam

plaintiff, who has suffered no injury in fact, may be particularly likely to file suit as

a pretext to uncover unknown wrongs." (quoting United States ex rel. Karvelas v.

Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220, 231 (1st Cir. 2004)) (emphasis added)). I

fail to appreciate how these concerns relate in any manner to the present case, where

all that is needed through discovery is an unredacted copy of the PMAs, where at least

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some of the plaintiffs have suffered actual and serious injuries, and where other

plaintiffs are at heightened risk for future medical intervention.

Regarding the district court's discovery ruling in particular, some additional

facts are helpful to provide the full context for this matter. The defendants argue that

the plaintiffs shifted positions following the district court's initial dismissal of their

claims and now seek discovery after having expressly disavowed any need for

discovery. I view this as an inaccurate description of the case. The plaintiffs had

sought the PMA documents through FOIA requests, but according to them, "the

documents the FDA produced were too heavily redacted to provide the specifications

that the district court required." The plaintiffs moved to compel production of

unredacted documents or to amend the protective order to allow the FDA to produce

the documents without redaction. A magistrate judge denied the plaintiffs' motion.

One day later, the district court issued its order dismissing all claims with prejudice

and staying all proceedings pending appeal. The plaintiffs filed a letter asking the

district court "to clarify that their time to object to [the magistrate judge's] Order is

stayed along with the rest of this case." The district court ordered that the stay of

proceedings includes the time for the plaintiffs to object to the magistrate judge's order

on compelling unredaction of the FDA documents. Thus, the magistrate judge's

discovery order is not ripe for appeal.

During a status conference on January 28, 2009, plaintiffs' counsel indicated

that they intended to seek leave to file a motion to amend the master consolidated

complaint. According to the district court, "Plaintiffs argued strenuously that they are

entitled to discovery before moving to amend . . . ." The district court denied

discovery. The district court, in denying leave to amend and pursue discovery,

suggested that the plaintiffs were unclear about the scope of discovery and how they

believed the material will help them. However, the order itself demonstrates that the

court was aware that the plaintiffs specifically sought to discover the specifications

contained in the Sprint Fidelis Leads' PMAs. Indeed, the plaintiffs have sufficiently

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alleged that the Leads were defective, they have discovered violations of other FDA

requirements, but they cannot allege a violation of an FDA-approved specification

without access to Medtronic’s submissions. This is far from"play[ing] Court-

sanctioned roulette, hoping that they will hit the discovery 'jackpot' and uncover facts

to support their claims," as suggested by the district court and as echoed by the

defendants.

The defendants note that the district court stated "Plaintiffs' lead counsel made

clear from the outset of this case that no discovery was necessary in order to resolve

the preemption issue." The majority also makes this point. In fact, the district court

rejected the plaintiffs' attempt to explain the statement in an earlier status conference

stating "counsel is attempting to engage in revisionist history by suggesting that he left

open the door for discovery at the initial status conference."

Discussing the motion to dismiss, however, counsel did not disavow the need

for discovery if the motion was "going to be some sort of broader motion that pulls

in information outside of the pleadings." The attorney who made this statement was

subsequently appointed lead attorney, but he was not lead attorney at the time he made

the statement. Another attorney at the same conference suggested, presciently, that

discovery was necessary on the manufacturing-defect issues in order to establish an

exception to Riegel—and he even said that he could be sued for legal malpractice for

failing to request such discovery. All of these circumstances lead me to believe that

Plaintiffs’ account of the scheduling conference was not so “revisionist,” and also that

it was improper for the district court to rely on this exchange to deprive Plaintiffs of

discovery that is seemingly necessary for them to state a claim that will avoid federal

preemption.

Finally, regarding the motion for leave to amend, I do not present an exhaustive

analysis. I note only that I can find no suggestion of bad faith by the plaintiffs or

prejudice to the defendants associated with granting leave to amend. Accordingly, for

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the reasons set forth above, I would hold denial of the motion for leave to amend and

the request for discovery was an abuse of discretion.

______________________________

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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