Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2009 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MOHAWK INDUSTRIES, INC. v. CARPENTER

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 08–678. Argued October 5, 2009—Decided December 8, 2009

When respondent Norman Carpenter informed the human resources

department of his employer, petitioner Mohawk Industries, Inc., that

the company employed undocumented immigrants, he was unaware

that Mohawk stood accused in a pending class action—the Williams

case—of conspiring to drive down its legal employees’ wages by know

ingly hiring undocumented workers. Mohawk directed Carpenter to

meet with the company’s retained counsel in Williams, who allegedly

pressured Carpenter to recant his statements. When he refused,

Carpenter maintains in this unlawful termination suit, Mohawk fired

him under false pretenses. In granting Carpenter’s motion to compel

Mohawk to produce information concerning his meeting with re

tained counsel and the company’s termination decision, the District

Court agreed with Mohawk that the requested information was pro

tected by the attorney-client privilege, but concluded that Mohawk

had implicitly waived the privilege through its disclosures in the Wil

liams case. The court declined to certify its order for interlocutory

appeal, and the Eleventh Circuit dismissed Mohawk’s appeal for lack

of jurisdiction, holding, inter alia, that the District Court’s ruling did

not qualify as an immediately appealable collateral order under

Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, because a

discovery order implicating the attorney-client privilege can be ade

quately reviewed on appeal from final judgment.

Held: Disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege do not

qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine.

Pp. 4–13.

(a) Courts of Appeals “have jurisdiction of appeals from all final de

cisions of the district courts.” 28 U. S. C. §1291. “Final decisions”

encompass not only judgments that “terminate an action,” but also a

2 MOHAWK INDUSTRIES, INC. v. CARPENTER

Syllabus

“small class” of prejudgment orders that are “collateral to” an action’s

merits and “too important” to be denied immediate review, Cohen,

supra, at 545–546. “That small category includes only decisions that

are . . . effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in

the underlying action.” Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514

U. S. 35, 42. The decisive consideration in determining whether a

right is effectively unreviewable is whether delaying review until the

entry of final judgment “would imperil a substantial public interest”

or “some particular value of a high order.” Will v. Hallock, 546 U. S.

345, 352–353. In making this determination, the Court does not en

gage in an “individualized jurisdictional inquiry,” Coopers & Lybrand

v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 473, but focuses on “the entire category to

which a claim belongs,” Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct,

Inc., 511 U. S. 863, 868. If the class of claims, taken as a whole, can

be adequately vindicated by other means, “the chance that the litiga

tion at hand might be speeded, or a ‘particular injustic[e]’ averted,”

does not provide a basis for §1291 jurisdiction. Ibid. Pp. 4–6.

(b) Effective appellate review of disclosure orders adverse to the at

torney-client privilege can be had by means other than collateral or

der appeal, including postjudgment review. Appellate courts can

remedy the improper disclosure of privileged material in the same

way they remedy a host of other erroneous evidentiary rulings: by va

cating an adverse judgment and remanding for a new trial in which

the protected material and its fruits are excluded from evidence.

Moreover, litigants confronted with a particularly injurious or novel

privilege ruling have several potential avenues of immediate review

apart from collateral order appeal. First, a party may ask the district

court to certify, and the court of appeals to accept, an interlocutory

appeal involving “a controlling question of law” the prompt resolution

of which “may materially advance the ultimate termination of the

litigation.” §1292(b). Second, in extraordinary circumstances where

a disclosure order works a manifest injustice, a party may petition

the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus. Cheney v. United States

Dist. Court for D. C., 542 U. S. 367, 380. Another option is for a party

to defy a disclosure order and incur court-imposed sanctions that,

e.g., “direc[t] that the matters embraced in the order or other desig

nated facts be taken as established,” “prohibi[t] the disobedient party

from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses,” or

“strik[e] pleadings in whole or in part.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37(b)(2).

Alternatively, when the circumstances warrant, a district court may

issue a contempt order against a noncomplying party, who can then

appeal directly from that ruling, at least when the contempt citation

can be characterized as a criminal punishment. See, e.g., Church of

Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U. S. 9, 18, n. 11. These es

Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2009) 3

Syllabus

tablished appellate review mechanisms not only provide assurances

to clients and counsel about the security of their confidential commu

nications; they also go a long way toward addressing Mohawk’s con

cern that, absent collateral order appeals of adverse attorney-client

privilege rulings, some litigants may experience severe hardship.

The limited benefits of applying “the blunt, categorical instrument of

§1291 collateral order appeal” to privilege-related disclosure orders

simply cannot justify the likely institutional costs, Digital Equip

ment, supra, at 883, including unduly delaying the resolution of dis

trict court litigation and needlessly burdening the courts of appeals,

cf. Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U. S. 198, 209. Pp. 6–12.

(c) The admonition that the class of collaterally appealable orders

must remain “narrow and selective in its membership,” Will, supra,

at 350, has acquired special force in recent years with the enactment

of legislation designating rulemaking, “not expansion by court deci

sion,” as the preferred means for determining whether and when pre

judgment orders should be immediately appealable, Swint, supra, at

48. Any further avenue for immediate appeal of adverse attorney

client privilege rulings should be furnished, if at all, through rule

making, with the opportunity for full airing it provides. Pp. 12–13.

541 F. 3d 1048, affirmed.

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,

C. J., and STEVENS, SCALIA, KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and ALITO,

JJ., joined, and in which THOMAS, J., joined, as to Part II–C. THOMAS,

J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2009) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 08–678

_________________

MOHAWK INDUSTRIES, INC., PETITIONER v.

NORMAN CARPENTER

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[December 8, 2009]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 1291 of the Judicial Code confers on federal

courts of appeals jurisdiction to review “final decisions of

the district courts.” 28 U. S. C. §1291. Although “final

decisions” typically are ones that trigger the entry of

judgment, they also include a small set of prejudgment

orders that are “collateral to” the merits of an action and

“too important” to be denied immediate review. Cohen v.

Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546

(1949). In this case, petitioner Mohawk Industries, Inc.,

attempted to bring a collateral order appeal after the

District Court ordered it to disclose certain confidential

materials on the ground that Mohawk had waived the

attorney-client privilege. The Court of Appeals dismissed

the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

The question before us is whether disclosure orders

adverse to the attorney-client privilege qualify for imme

diate appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Agreeing

with the Court of Appeals, we hold that they do not.

Postjudgment appeals, together with other review mecha

nisms, suffice to protect the rights of litigants and pre

2 MOHAWK INDUSTRIES, INC. v. CARPENTER

Opinion of the Court

serve the vitality of the attorney-client privilege.

I

In 2007, respondent Norman Carpenter, a former shift

supervisor at a Mohawk manufacturing facility, filed suit

in the United States District Court for the Northern Dis

trict of Georgia, alleging that Mohawk had terminated

him in violation of 42 U. S. C. §1985(2) and various Geor

gia laws. According to Carpenter’s complaint, his termi

nation came after he informed a member of Mohawk’s

human resources department in an e-mail that the com

pany was employing undocumented immigrants. At the

time, unbeknownst to Carpenter, Mohawk stood accused

in a pending class-action lawsuit of conspiring to drive

down the wages of its legal employees by knowingly hiring

undocumented workers in violation of federal and state

racketeering laws. See Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc.,

No. 4:04–cv–00003–HLM (ND Ga., Jan. 6, 2004). Com

pany officials directed Carpenter to meet with the com

pany’s retained counsel in the Williams case, and counsel

allegedly pressured Carpenter to recant his statements.

When he refused, Carpenter alleges, Mohawk fired him

under false pretenses. App. 57a–64a.

After learning of Carpenter’s complaint, the plaintiffs in

the Williams case sought an evidentiary hearing to ex

plore Carpenter’s allegations. In its response to their

motion, Mohawk described Carpenter’s accusations as

“pure fantasy” and recounted the “true facts” of Carpen

ter’s dismissal. Id., at 208a. According to Mohawk, Car

penter himself had “engaged in blatant and illegal mis

conduct” by attempting to have Mohawk hire an

undocumented worker. Id., at 209a. The company “com

menced an immediate investigation,” during which re

tained counsel interviewed Carpenter. Id., at 210a. Be

cause Carpenter’s “efforts to cause Mohawk to circumvent

federal immigration law” “blatantly violated Mohawk

Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2009) 3

Opinion of the Court

policy,” the company terminated him. Ibid.

As these events were unfolding in the Williams case,

discovery was underway in Carpenter’s case. Carpenter

filed a motion to compel Mohawk to produce information

concerning his meeting with retained counsel and the

company’s termination decision. Mohawk maintained that

the requested information was protected by the attorney

client privilege.

The District Court agreed that the privilege applied to

the requested information, but it granted Carpenter’s

motion to compel disclosure after concluding that Mohawk

had implicitly waived the privilege through its representa

tions in the Williams case. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a.

The court declined to certify its order for interlocutory

appeal under 28 U. S. C. §1292(b). But, recognizing “the

seriousness of its [waiver] finding,” it stayed its ruling to

allow Mohawk to explore other potential “avenues to

appeal . . . , such as a petition for mandamus or appealing

this Order under the collateral order doctrine.” App. to

Pet. for Cert. 52a.

Mohawk filed a notice of appeal and a petition for a writ

of mandamus to the Eleventh Circuit. The Court of Ap

peals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction under 28

U. S. C. §1291, holding that the District Court’s ruling did

not qualify as an immediately appealable collateral order

within the meaning of Cohen, 337 U. S. 541. “Under

Cohen,” the Court of Appeals explained, “an order is ap

pealable if it (1) conclusively determines the disputed

question; (2) resolves an important issue completely sepa

rate from the merits of the action; and (3) is effectively

unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” 541 F. 3d

1048, 1052 (2008) (per curiam). According to the court,

the District Court’s waiver ruling satisfied the first two of

these requirements but not the third, because “a discovery

order that implicates the attorney-client privilege” can be

adequately reviewed “on appeal from a final judgment.”

4 MOHAWK INDUSTRIES, INC. v. CARPENTER

Opinion of the Court

Ibid. The Court of Appeals also rejected Mohawk’s man

damus petition, finding no “clear usurpation of power or

abuse of discretion” by the District Court. Id., at 1055.

We granted certiorari, 555 U. S. __ (2009), to resolve a

conflict among the Circuits concerning the availability of

collateral appeals in the attorney-client privilege context.1

II

A

By statute, Courts of Appeals “have jurisdiction of ap

peals from all final decisions of the district courts of the

United States, . . . except where a direct review may be

had in the Supreme Court.” 28 U. S. C. §1291. A “final

decisio[n]” is typically one “by which a district court disas

sociates itself from a case.” Swint v. Chambers County

Comm’n, 514 U. S. 35, 42 (1995). This Court, however,

“has long given” §1291 a “practical rather than a technical

construction.” Cohen, 337 U. S., at 546. As we held in

Cohen, the statute encompasses not only judgments that

“terminate an action,” but also a “small class” of collateral

rulings that, although they do not end the litigation, are

appropriately deemed “final.” Id., at 545–546. “That

small category includes only decisions that are conclusive,

that resolve important questions separate from the merits,

and that are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the

——————

1 Three Circuits have permitted collateral order appeals of attorney

client privilege rulings. See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation,

479 F. 3d 1078, 1087–1088 (CA9 2007); United States v. Philip Morris

Inc., 314 F. 3d 612, 617–621 (CADC 2003); In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.

3d 954, 957–964 (CA3 1997). The remaining Circuits to consider the

question have found such orders nonappealable. See, e.g., Boughton v.

Cotter Corp., 10 F. 3d 746, 749–750 (CA10 1993); Texaco Inc. v. Louisi

ana Land & Exploration Co., 995 F. 2d 43, 44 (CA5 1993); Reise v.

Board of Regents, 957 F. 2d 293, 295 (CA7 1992); Chase Manhattan

Bank, N. A. v. Turner & Newall, PLC, 964 F. 2d 159, 162–163 (CA2

1992); Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp., 940 F. 2d 642, 643–644 (CA

Fed. 1991).

Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2009) 5

Opinion of the Court

final judgment in the underlying action.” Swint, 514

U. S., at 42.

In applying Cohen’s collateral order doctrine, we have

stressed that it must “never be allowed to swallow the

general rule that a party is entitled to a single appeal, to

be deferred until final judgment has been entered.” Digi

tal Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S. 863,

868 (1994) (citation omitted); see also Will v. Hallock, 546

U. S. 345, 350 (2006) (“emphasizing [the doctrine’s] mod

est scope”). Our admonition reflects a healthy respect for

the virtues of the final-judgment rule. Permitting piece

meal, prejudgment appeals, we have recognized, under

mines “efficient judicial administration” and encroaches

upon the prerogatives of district court judges, who play a

“special role” in managing ongoing litigation. Firestone

Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U. S. 368, 374 (1981);

see also Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U. S. 424,

436 (1985) (“[T]he district judge can better exercise [his or

her] responsibility [to police the prejudgment tactics of

litigants] if the appellate courts do not repeatedly inter

vene to second-guess prejudgment rulings”).

The justification for immediate appeal must therefore be

sufficiently strong to overcome the usual benefits of defer

ring appeal until litigation concludes. This requirement

finds expression in two of the three traditional Cohen

conditions. The second condition insists upon “important

questions separate from the merits.” Swint, 514 U. S., at

42 (emphasis added). More significantly, “the third Cohen

question, whether a right is ‘adequately vindicable’ or

‘effectively reviewable,’ simply cannot be answered with

out a judgment about the value of the interests that would

be lost through rigorous application of a final judgment

requirement.” Digital Equipment, 511 U. S., at 878–879.

That a ruling “may burden litigants in ways that are only

imperfectly reparable by appellate reversal of a final

district court judgment . . . has never sufficed.” Id., at 872.

6 MOHAWK INDUSTRIES, INC. v. CARPENTER

Opinion of the Court

Instead, the decisive consideration is whether delaying

review until the entry of final judgment “would imperil a

substantial public interest” or “some particular value of a

high order.” Will, 546 U. S., at 352–353.

In making this determination, we do not engage in an

“individualized jurisdictional inquiry.” Coopers & Ly

brand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 473 (1978). Rather, our

focus is on “the entire category to which a claim belongs.”

Digital Equipment, 511 U. S., at 868. As long as the class

of claims, taken as a whole, can be adequately vindicated

by other means, “the chance that the litigation at hand

might be speeded, or a ‘particular injustic[e]’ averted,”

does not provide a basis for jurisdiction under §1291. Ibid.

(quoting Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U. S. 517, 529

(1988) (alteration in original)).

B

In the present case, the Court of Appeals concluded that

the District Court’s privilege-waiver order satisfied the

first two conditions of the collateral order doctrine—

conclusiveness and separateness—but not the third—

effective unreviewability. Because we agree with the

Court of Appeals that collateral order appeals are not

necessary to ensure effective review of orders adverse to

the attorney-client privilege, we do not decide whether the

other Cohen requirements are met.

Mohawk does not dispute that “we have generally de

nied review of pretrial discovery orders.” Firestone, 449

U. S., at 377; see also 15B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Coo

per, Federal Practice and Procedure §3914.23, p. 123 (2d

ed. 1992) (hereinafter Wright & Miller) (“[T]he rule re

mains settled that most discovery rulings are not final”).

Mohawk contends, however, that rulings implicating the

attorney-client privilege differ in kind from run-of-the-mill

discovery orders because of the important institutional

interests at stake. According to Mohawk, the right to

Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2009) 7

Opinion of the Court

maintain attorney-client confidences—the sine qua non of

a meaningful attorney-client relationship—is “irreparably

destroyed absent immediate appeal” of adverse privilege

rulings. Brief for Petitioner 23.

We readily acknowledge the importance of the attorney

client privilege, which “is one of the oldest recognized

privileges for confidential communications.” Swidler &

Berlin v. United States, 524 U. S. 399, 403 (1998). By

assuring confidentiality, the privilege encourages clients

to make “full and frank” disclosures to their attorneys,

who are then better able to provide candid advice and

effective representation. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449

U. S. 383, 389 (1981). This, in turn, serves “broader public

interests in the observance of law and administration of

justice.” Ibid.

The crucial question, however, is not whether an inter

est is important in the abstract; it is whether deferring

review until final judgment so imperils the interest as to

justify the cost of allowing immediate appeal of the entire

class of relevant orders. We routinely require litigants to

wait until after final judgment to vindicate valuable

rights, including rights central to our adversarial system.

See, e.g., Richardson-Merrell, 472 U. S., at 426 (holding an

order disqualifying counsel in a civil case did not qualify

for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine);

Flanagan v. United States, 465 U. S. 259, 260 (1984)

(reaching the same result in a criminal case, notwith

standing the Sixth Amendment rights at stake). In Digi

tal Equipment, we rejected an assertion that collateral

order review was necessary to promote “the public policy

favoring voluntary resolution of disputes.” 511 U. S., at

881. “It defies common sense,” we explained, “to maintain

that parties’ readiness to settle will be significantly damp

ened (or the corresponding public interest impaired) by a

rule that a district court’s decision to let allegedly barred

litigation go forward may be challenged as a matter of

8 MOHAWK INDUSTRIES, INC. v. CARPENTER

Opinion of the Court

right only on appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff’s

favor.” Ibid.

We reach a similar conclusion here. In our estimation,

postjudgment appeals generally suffice to protect the

rights of litigants and assure the vitality of the attorney

client privilege. Appellate courts can remedy the improper

disclosure of privileged material in the same way they

remedy a host of other erroneous evidentiary rulings: by

vacating an adverse judgment and remanding for a new

trial in which the protected material and its fruits are

excluded from evidence.

Dismissing such relief as inadequate, Mohawk empha

sizes that the attorney-client privilege does not merely

“prohibi[t] use of protected information at trial”; it pro

vides a “right not to disclose the privileged information in

the first place.” Brief for Petitioner 25. Mohawk is un

doubtedly correct that an order to disclose privileged

information intrudes on the confidentiality of attorney

client communications. But deferring review until final

judgment does not meaningfully reduce the ex ante incen

tives for full and frank consultations between clients and

counsel.

One reason for the lack of a discernible chill is that, in

deciding how freely to speak, clients and counsel are

unlikely to focus on the remote prospect of an erroneous

disclosure order, let alone on the timing of a possible

appeal. Whether or not immediate collateral order ap

peals are available, clients and counsel must account for

the possibility that they will later be required by law to

disclose their communications for a variety of reasons—for

example, because they misjudged the scope of the privi

lege, because they waived the privilege, or because their

communications fell within the privilege’s crime-fraud

exception. Most district court rulings on these matters

involve the routine application of settled legal principles.

They are unlikely to be reversed on appeal, particularly

Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2009) 9

Opinion of the Court

when they rest on factual determinations for which appel

late deference is the norm. See, e.g., Richardson-Merrell,

472 U. S., at 434 (“Most pretrial orders of district judges

are ultimately affirmed by appellate courts.”); Reise v.

Board of Regents, 957 F. 2d 293, 295 (CA7 1992) (noting

that “almost all interlocutory appeals from discovery

orders would end in affirmance” because “the district court

possesses discretion, and review is deferential”). The

breadth of the privilege and the narrowness of its excep

tions will thus tend to exert a much greater influence on

the conduct of clients and counsel than the small risk that

the law will be misapplied.2

Moreover, were attorneys and clients to reflect upon

their appellate options, they would find that litigants

confronted with a particularly injurious or novel privilege

ruling have several potential avenues of review apart from

collateral order appeal. First, a party may ask the district

court to certify, and the court of appeals to accept, an

interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §1292(b). The

preconditions for §1292(b) review—“a controlling question

of law,” the prompt resolution of which “may materially

advance the ultimate termination of the litigation”—are

most likely to be satisfied when a privilege ruling involves

a new legal question or is of special consequence, and

district courts should not hesitate to certify an interlocu

tory appeal in such cases. Second, in extraordinary cir

cumstances—i.e., when a disclosure order “amount[s] to a

judicial usurpation of power or a clear abuse of discretion,”

or otherwise works a manifest injustice—a party may

petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus.

Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for D. C., 542 U. S.

367, 390 (2004) (citation and internal quotation marks

——————

2 Perhaps the situation would be different if district courts were sys

tematically underenforcing the privilege, but we have no indication

that this is the case.

10 MOHAWK INDUSTRIES, INC. v. CARPENTER

Opinion of the Court

omitted); see also Firestone, 449 U. S., at 378–379, n. 13.3

While these discretionary review mechanisms do not

provide relief in every case, they serve as useful “safety

valve[s]” for promptly correcting serious errors. Digital

Equipment, 511 U. S., at 883.

Another long-recognized option is for a party to defy a

disclosure order and incur court-imposed sanctions. Dis

trict courts have a range of sanctions from which to

choose, including “directing that the matters embraced in

the order or other designated facts be taken as established

for purposes of the action,” “prohibiting the disobedient

party from supporting or opposing designated claims or

defenses,” or “striking pleadings in whole or in part.” Fed.

Rule Civ. Proc. 37(b)(2)(i)–(iii). Such sanctions allow a

party to obtain postjudgment review without having to

reveal its privileged information. Alternatively, when the

circumstances warrant it, a district court may hold a

noncomplying party in contempt. The party can then

appeal directly from that ruling, at least when the con

tempt citation can be characterized as a criminal punish

ment. See, e.g., Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United

States, 506 U. S. 9, 18, n. 11 (1992); Firestone, 449 U. S., at

377; Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323, 328

(1940); see also Wright & Miller §3914.23, at 140–155.

These established mechanisms for appellate review not

only provide assurances to clients and counsel about the

security of their confidential communications; they also go

a long way toward addressing Mohawk’s concern that,

absent collateral order appeals of adverse attorney-client

privilege rulings, some litigants may experience severe

hardship. Mohawk is no doubt right that an order to

disclose privileged material may, in some situations, have

——————

3 Mohawk itself petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for a writ of manda

mus. See supra, at 3–4. It has not asked us to review the Court of

Appeals’ denial of that relief.

Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2009) 11

Opinion of the Court

implications beyond the case at hand. But the same can

be said about many categories of pretrial discovery orders

for which collateral order appeals are unavailable. As

with these other orders, rulings adverse to the privilege

vary in their significance; some may be momentous, but

others are more mundane. Section 1292(b) appeals, man

damus, and appeals from contempt citations facilitate

immediate review of some of the more consequential at

torney-client privilege rulings. Moreover, protective or

ders are available to limit the spillover effects of disclosing

sensitive information. That a fraction of orders adverse to

the attorney-client privilege may nevertheless harm indi

vidual litigants in ways that are “only imperfectly repara

ble” does not justify making all such orders immediately

appealable as of right under §1291. Digital Equipment,

511 U. S., at 872.

In short, the limited benefits of applying “the blunt,

categorical instrument of §1291 collateral order appeal” to

privilege-related disclosure orders simply cannot justify

the likely institutional costs. Id., at 883. Permitting

parties to undertake successive, piecemeal appeals of all

adverse attorney-client rulings would unduly delay the

resolution of district court litigation and needlessly burden

the Courts of Appeals. See Wright & Miller §3914.23, at

123 (“Routine appeal from disputed discovery orders

would disrupt the orderly progress of the litigation, swamp

the courts of appeals, and substantially reduce the district

court’s ability to control the discovery process.”); cf. Cun

ningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U. S. 198, 209 (1999)

(expressing concern that allowing immediate appeal as of

right from orders fining attorneys for discovery violations

would result in “the very sorts of piecemeal appeals and

concomitant delays that the final judgment rule was de

signed to prevent”). Attempting to downplay such con

cerns, Mohawk asserts that the three Circuits in which

the collateral order doctrine currently applies to adverse

12 MOHAWK INDUSTRIES, INC. v. CARPENTER

Opinion of the Court

privilege rulings have seen only a trickle of appeals. But

this may be due to the fact that the practice in all three

Circuits is relatively new and not yet widely known. Were

this Court to approve collateral order appeals in the attor

ney-client privilege context, many more litigants would

likely choose that route. They would also likely seek to

extend such a ruling to disclosure orders implicating many

other categories of sensitive information, raising an array

of line-drawing difficulties.4

C

In concluding that sufficiently effective review of ad

verse attorney-client privilege rulings can be had without

resort to the Cohen doctrine, we reiterate that the class of

collaterally appealable orders must remain “narrow and

selective in its membership.” Will, 546 U. S., at 350. This

admonition has acquired special force in recent years with

the enactment of legislation designating rulemaking, “not

expansion by court decision,” as the preferred means for

determining whether and when prejudgment orders

should be immediately appealable. Swint, 514 U. S., at

48. Specifically, Congress in 1990 amended the Rules

Enabling Act, 28 U. S. C. §2071 et seq., to authorize this

Court to adopt rules “defin[ing] when a ruling of a district

court is final for the purposes of appeal under section

1291.” §2072(c). Shortly thereafter, and along similar

lines, Congress empowered this Court to “prescribe rules,

in accordance with [§2072], to provide for an appeal of an

interlocutory decision to the courts of appeals that is not

——————

4 Participating as amicus curiae in support of respondent Carpenter,

the United States contends that collateral order appeals should be

available for rulings involving certain governmental privileges “in light

of their structural constitutional grounding under the separation of

powers, relatively rare invocation, and unique importance to govern

mental functions.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28. We

express no view on that issue.

Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2009) 13

Opinion of the Court

otherwise provided for under [§1292].” §1292(e). These

provisions, we have recognized, “warran[t] the Judiciary’s

full respect.” Swint, 514 U. S., at 48; see also Cunning

ham, 527 U. S., at 210.

Indeed, the rulemaking process has important virtues.

It draws on the collective experience of bench and bar, see

28 U. S. C. §2073, and it facilitates the adoption of meas

ured, practical solutions. We expect that the combination

of standard postjudgment appeals, §1292(b) appeals,

mandamus, and contempt appeals will continue to provide

adequate protection to litigants ordered to disclose mate

rials purportedly subject to the attorney-client privilege.

Any further avenue for immediate appeal of such rulings

should be furnished, if at all, through rulemaking, with

the opportunity for full airing it provides.

* * *

In sum, we conclude that the collateral order doctrine

does not extend to disclosure orders adverse to the attor

ney-client privilege. Effective appellate review can be had

by other means. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of

the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2009) 1

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 08–678

_________________

MOHAWK INDUSTRIES, INC., PETITIONER v.

NORMAN CARPENTER

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

[December 8, 2009]

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in part and concurring in

the judgment.

I concur in the judgment and in Part II–C of the Court’s

opinion because I wholeheartedly agree that “Congress’s

designation of the rulemaking process as the way to define

or refine when a district court ruling is ‘final’ and when an

interlocutory order is appealable warrants the Judiciary’s

full respect.” Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514

U. S. 35, 48 (1995); ante, at 13 (quoting Swint, supra;

citing Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U. S. 198,

210 (1999)). It is for that reason that I do not join the

remainder of the Court’s analysis.

The scope of federal appellate jurisdiction is a matter

the Constitution expressly commits to Congress, see Art. I,

§8, cl. 9, and that Congress has addressed not only in 28

U. S. C. §§1291 and 1292, but also in the Rules Enabling

Act amendments to which the Court refers. See ante, at

12–13 (citing §§2072–2074). The Court recognizes that

these amendments “designat[e] rulemaking, ‘not expan

sion by court decision,’ as the preferred means of deter

mining whether and when prejudgment orders should be

2 MOHAWK INDUSTRIES, INC. v. CARPENTER

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

immediately appealable.” Ante, at 12 (quoting Swint,

supra, at 48). Because that designation is entitled to our

full respect, and because the privilege order here is not on

all fours with orders we previously have held to be appeal

able under the collateral order doctrine, see Cohen v.

Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), I

would affirm the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment on the

ground that any “avenue for immediate appeal” beyond

the three avenues addressed in the Court’s opinion must

be left to the “rulemaking process.” Ante, at 13; see ante,

at 9–12 (discussing certification under 28 U. S. C.

§1292(b), petitions for mandamus, and appeals from con

tempt orders).

We need not, and in my view should not, further justify

our holding by applying the Cohen doctrine, which

prompted the rulemaking amendments in the first place.

In taking this path, the Court needlessly perpetuates a

judicial policy that we for many years have criticized and

struggled to limit. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S.

___, ___ (2009) (slip op., at 8); Will v. Hallock, 546 U. S.

345, 349 (2006); Sell v. United States, 539 U. S. 166, 177

(2003); Cunningham, supra, at 210; Digital Equipment

Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U. S. 863, 884 (1994);

Swint, supra, at 48; Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U. S.

495, 498–501 (1989); Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486

U. S. 517, 527 (1988). The Court’s choice of analysis is the

more ironic because applying Cohen to the facts of this

case requires the Court to reach conclusions on, and thus

potentially prejudice, the very matters it says would bene

fit from “the collective experience of bench and bar” and

the “opportunity for full airing” that rulemaking provides.

Ante, at 13.

“Finality as a condition of review is an historic charac

teristic of federal appellate procedure” that was incorpo

rated in the first Judiciary Act and that Congress itself

has “departed from only when observance of it would

Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2009) 3

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

practically defeat the right to any review at all.” Cobble

dick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323, 324–325 (1940). Until

1949, this Court’s view of the appellate jurisdiction statute

reflected this principle and the statute’s text. See, e.g.,

Catlin v. United States, 324 U. S. 229, 233 (1945) (holding

that §128 of the Judicial Code (now 28 U. S. C. §1291)

limits review to decisions that “en[d] the litigation on the

merits and leav[e] nothing for the court to do but execute

the judgment”). Cohen changed all that when it an

nounced that a “small class” of collateral orders that do

not meet the statutory definition of finality nonetheless

may be immediately appealable if they satisfy certain

criteria that show they are “too important to be denied

review.” 337 U. S., at 546.

Cohen and the early decisions applying it allowed §1291

appeals of interlocutory orders concerning the posting of a

bond, see id., at 545–547, the attachment of a vessel in

admiralty, see Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombi

ana Del Caribe, S. A., 339 U. S. 684, 688–689 (1950), and

the imposition of notice costs in a class action, see Eisen v.

Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U. S. 156, 170–172 (1974). As

the Court’s opinion notes, later decisions sought to narrow

Cohen lest its exception to §1291 “ ‘ swallow’ ” the final

judgment rule. Ante, at 5 (quoting Digital Equipment,

supra, at 868); see generally Coopers & Lybrand v. Live

say, 437 U. S. 463, 467–468 (1978). The Court has ad

hered to that narrowing approach, principally by raising

the bar on what types of interests are “important enough”

to justify collateral order appeals. See, e.g., Will, supra, at

352–353 (explaining that an interlocutory order typically

will be “important” enough to justify Cohen review only

where “some particular value of a high order,” such as

“honoring the separation of powers, preserving the effi

ciency of government . . . , [or] respecting a State’s digni

tary interests,” is “marshaled in support of the interest in

avoiding trial” and the Court determines that denying

4 MOHAWK INDUSTRIES, INC. v. CARPENTER

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

review would “imperil” that interest); Digital Equipment,

supra, at 878–879 (noting that appealability under Cohen

turns on a “judgment about the value of the interests that

would be lost through rigorous application of a final judg

ment requirement,” and that an interest “qualifies as

‘important’ in Cohen’s sense” if it is “weightier than the

societal interests advanced by the ordinary operation of

final judgment principles”). As we recognized last Term,

however, our attempts to contain the Cohen doctrine have

not all been successful or persuasive. See Ashcroft, supra,

at ___ (slip op., at 8) (“[A]s a general matter, the collateral

order doctrine may have expanded beyond the limits

dictated by its internal logic and the strict application of

the criteria set out in Cohen”). In my view, this case pre

sents an opportunity to improve our approach.

The privilege interest at issue here is undoubtedly

important, both in its own right and when compared to

some of the interests (e.g., in bond and notice-cost rulings)

we have held to be appealable under Cohen. Accordingly,

the Court’s Cohen analysis does not rest on the privilege

order’s relative unimportance, but instead on its effective

reviewability after final judgment. Ante, at 8–12. Al

though I agree with the Court’s ultimate conclusion, I see

two difficulties with this approach. First, the Court em

phasizes that the alternative avenues of review it dis

cusses (which did not prove adequate in this case) would

be adequate where the privilege ruling at issue is “particu

larly injurious or novel.” Ante, at 9. If that is right, and it

seems to me that it is, then the opinion raises the question

why such avenues were not also adequate to address the

orders whose unusual importance or particularly injurious

nature we have held justified immediate appeal under

Cohen. See, e.g., Sell, supra, at 177. Second, the facts of

this particular case seem in several respects to undercut

the Court’s conclusion that the benefits of collateral order

review “cannot justify the likely institutional costs.” Ante,

Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2009) 5

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

at 11.* The Court responds that these case-specific argu

ments miss the point because the focus of the Cohen

analysis is whether the “entire category” or “class of

claims” at issue merits appellate review under the collat

eral order doctrine. Ante, at 6 (internal quotation marks

omitted). That is exactly right, and illustrates what in

creasingly has bothered me about making this kind of

appealability determination via case-by-case adjudication.

The exercise forces the reviewing court to subordinate the

realities of each case before it to generalized conclusions

about the “likely” costs and benefits of allowing an excep

tion to the final judgment rule in an entire “class of cases.”

The Court concedes that Congress, which holds the consti

tutional reins in this area, has determined that such value

judgments are better left to the “collective experience of

bench and bar” and the “opportunity for full airing” that

rulemaking provides. Ante, at 13. This determination is

entitled to our full respect, in deed as well as in word.

Accordingly, I would leave the value judgments the Court

makes in its opinion to the rulemaking process, and in so

doing take this opportunity to limit—effectively, predicta

bly, and in a way we should have done long ago—the

——————

* The Court concludes, for example, that in most cases final judgment

review of an erroneous privilege ruling will suffice to vindicate the

injured party’s rights because the appellate court can vacate the

adverse judgment and remand for a new trial in which the protected

material is excluded. Ante, at 8. But this case appears to involve one of

the (perhaps rare) situations in which final judgment review might not

be sufficient because it is a case in which the challenged order already

has had “implications beyond the case at hand,” namely, in the sepa

rate class action in Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., No. 4:04–CV–

0003–HLM (ND Ga.). Ante, at 11. The Court also concludes that the

“likely institutional costs” of allowing collateral order review would

outweigh its benefits because, inter alia, such review would “needlessly

burden the Courts of Appeals.” Ibid. But as the Court concedes, it

must speculate on this point because the three Circuits that allow

Cohen appeals of privilege rulings have not been overwhelmed. See

ante, at 12.

6 MOHAWK INDUSTRIES, INC. v. CARPENTER

Opinion of THOMAS, J.

doctrine that, with a sweep of the Court’s pen, subordi

nated what the appellate jurisdiction statute says to what

the Court thinks is a good idea.