Smith v. Spisak

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2009 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SMITH, WARDEN v. SPISAK

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 08–724. Argued October 13, 2009—Decided January 12, 2010

After the Ohio courts sentenced respondent Spisak to death and denied

his claims on direct appeal and collateral review, he filed a federal

habeas petition claiming that, at his trial’s penalty phase, (1) the in

structions and verdict forms unconstitutionally required the jury to

consider in mitigation only those factors that it unanimously found to

be mitigating, see Mills v. Maryland, 486 U. S. 367, and (2) his coun

sel’s inadequate closing argument deprived him of effective assis

tance of counsel, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668. The

District Court denied the petition, but the Sixth Circuit accepted both

arguments and ordered relief.

Held:

1. Because the state court’s upholding of the mitigation jury in

structions and forms was not “contrary to, or . . . an unreasonable ap

plication of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by [this]

Court,” 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1), the Sixth Circuit was barred from

reaching a contrary decision. The Court of Appeals erred in holding

that the instructions and forms contravened Mills, in which this

Court held that the jury instructions and verdict forms at issue vio

lated the Constitution because, read naturally, they told the jury that

it could not find a particular circumstance to be mitigating unless all

12 jurors agreed that the mitigating circumstance had been proved to

exist, 486 U. S., at 380–381, 384. Even assuming that Mills sets

forth the pertinent “clearly established Federal law” for reviewing the

state-court decision in this case, the instructions and forms used here

differ significantly from those in Mills: They made clear that, to rec

ommend a death sentence, the jury had to find unanimously that

each of the aggravating factors outweighed any mitigating circum

stances, but they did not say that the jury had to determine the exis

2 SMITH v. SPISAK

Syllabus

tence of each individual mitigating factor unanimously. Nor did they

say anything about how—or even whether—the jury should make in

dividual determinations that each particular mitigating circumstance

existed. They focused only on the overall question of balancing the

aggravating and mitigating factors, and they repeatedly told the jury

to consider all relevant evidence. Thus, the instructions and verdict

forms did not clearly bring about, either through what they said or

what they implied, the constitutional error in the Mills instructions.

Pp. 2–9.

2. Similarly, the state-court decision rejecting Spisak’s ineffective

assistance-of-counsel claim was not “contrary to, or . . . an unreason

able application” of the law “clearly established” in Strickland.

§2254(d)(1). To prevail on this claim, Spisak must show, inter alia,

that there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unpro

fessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been differ

ent.” Strickland, supra, at 694. Even assuming that the closing ar

gument was inadequate in the respects claimed by Spisak, this Court

finds no “reasonable probability” that a better closing argument

without these defects would have made a significant difference. Any

different, more adequate closing argument would have taken place in

the following context: Spisak’s defense at the trial’s guilt phase con

sisted of an effort by counsel to show that Spisak was not guilty by

reason of insanity. Counsel, apparently hoping to demonstrate

Spisak’s mentally defective condition, called him to the stand, where

he freely admitted committing three murders and two other shoot

ings and repeatedly expressed an intention to commit further mur

ders if given the opportunity. In light of this background and for the

following reasons, the assumed closing argument deficiencies do not

raise the requisite reasonable probability of a different result but for

the deficient closing. First, since the sentencing phase took place

immediately after the guilt phase, the jurors had fresh in their minds

the government’s extensive and graphic evidence regarding the kill

ings, Spisak’s boastful and unrepentant confessions, and his threats

to commit further violent acts. Second, although counsel did not

summarize the mitigating evidence in great detail, he did refer to it,

and the defense experts’ more detailed testimony regarding Spisak’s

mental illness was also fresh in the jurors’ minds. Third, Spisak does

not describe what other mitigating factors counsel might have men

tioned; all those he proposes essentially consist of aspects of the

“mental defect” factor that the defense experts described. Finally, in

light of counsel’s several appeals to the jurors’ sense of humanity, it

is unlikely that a more explicit or elaborate appeal for mercy could

have changed the result, either alone or together with the foregoing

circumstances. The Court need not reach Spisak’s claim that

Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 3

Syllabus

§2254(d)(1) does not apply to his claim, because it would reach the

same conclusion even on de novo review. Pp. 9–16.

512 F. 3d 852, reversed.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,

C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, ALITO, and SO-

TOMAYOR, JJ., joined, and in which STEVENS, J., joined as to Part III.

STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the

judgment.

Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 08–724

_________________

KEITH SMITH, WARDEN, PETITIONER v. FRANK G.

SPISAK, JR.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[January 12, 2010]

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

Frank G. Spisak, Jr., the respondent, was convicted in

an Ohio trial court of three murders and two attempted

murders. He was sentenced to death. He filed a habeas

corpus petition in federal court, claiming that constitu

tional errors occurred at his trial. First, Spisak claimed

that the jury instructions at the penalty phase unconstitu

tionally required the jury to consider in mitigation only

those factors that the jury unanimously found to be miti

gating. See Mills v. Maryland, 486 U. S. 367 (1988).

Second, Spisak claimed that he suffered significant harm

as a result of his counsel’s inadequate closing argument at

the penalty phase of the proceeding. See Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). The Federal Court of

Appeals accepted these arguments and ordered habeas

relief. We now reverse the Court of Appeals.

I

In 1983, an Ohio jury convicted Spisak of three murders

and two attempted murders at Cleveland State University

in 1982. The jury recommended, and the judge imposed, a

death sentence. The Ohio courts denied Spisak’s claims,

2 SMITH v. SPISAK

Opinion of the Court

both on direct appeal and on collateral review. State v.

Spisak, 36 Ohio St. 3d 80, 521 N. E. 2d 800 (1988) (per

curiam); State v. Spisak, No. 67229, 1995 WL 229108

(Ohio App., 8th Dist., Cuyahoga Cty., Apr. 13, 1995); State

v. Spisak, 73 Ohio St. 3d 151, 652 N. E. 2d 719 (1995) (per

curiam).

Spisak then sought a federal writ of habeas corpus.

Among other claims, he argued that the sentencing phase

of his trial violated the U. S. Constitution for the two

reasons we consider here. The District Court denied his

petition. Spisak v. Coyle, Case No. 1:95CV2675 (ND Ohio,

Apr. 18, 2003), App. to Pet. for Cert. 95a. But the Court of

Appeals accepted Spisak’s two claims, namely, his mitiga

tion instruction claim and his ineffective-assistance-of

counsel claim. Spisak v. Mitchell, 465 F. 3d 684, 703–706,

708–711 (CA6 2006). The Court of Appeals consequently

ordered the District Court to issue a conditional writ of

habeas corpus forbidding Spisak’s execution. Id., at 715–

716.

The State of Ohio then sought certiorari in this Court.

We granted the petition and vacated the Court of Appeals’

judgment. Hudson v. Spisak, 552 U. S. 945 (2007). We

remanded the case for further consideration in light of two

recent cases in which this Court had held that lower fed

eral courts had not properly taken account of the defer

ence federal law grants state-court determinations on

federal habeas review. Ibid.; see 28 U. S. C. §2254(d);

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U. S. 70 (2006); Schriro v. Landri

gan, 550 U. S. 465 (2007). On remand, the Sixth Circuit

reinstated its earlier opinion. Spisak v. Hudson, 512 F. 3d

852, 853–854 (2008). The State again sought certiorari.

We again granted the petition. And we now reverse.

II

Spisak’s first claim concerns the instructions and verdict

forms that the jury received at the sentencing phase of his

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Opinion of the Court

trial. The Court of Appeals held the sentencing instruc

tions unconstitutional because, in its view, the instruc

tions, taken together with the forms, “require[d]” juror

“unanimity as to the presence of a mitigating factor”—

contrary to this Court’s holding in Mills v. Maryland,

supra. 465 F. 3d, at 708. Since the parties do not dispute

that the Ohio courts “adjudicated” this claim, i.e., they

considered and rejected it “on the merits,” the law permits

a federal court to reach a contrary decision only if the

state-court decision “was contrary to, or involved an un

reasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). Unlike the Court of

Appeals, we conclude that Spisak’s claim does not satisfy

this standard.

The parties, like the Court of Appeals, assume that

Mills sets forth the pertinent “clearly established Federal

law.” While recognizing some uncertainty as to whether

Mills was “clearly established Federal law” for the purpose

of reviewing the Ohio Supreme Court’s opinion, we shall

assume the same. Compare Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S.

362, 390 (2000) (STEVENS, J., for the Court) (applicable

date for purposes of determining whether “Federal law” is

“established” is when the “state-court conviction became

final”), with id., at 412 (O’Connor, J., for the Court) (appli

cable date is “the time of the relevant state-court deci

sion”); see State v. Spisak, 36 Ohio St. 3d 80, 521 N. E. 2d

800 (decided Apr. 13, 1988), cert. denied, 489 U. S. 1071

(decided Mar. 6, 1989); Mills v. Maryland, supra (decided

June 6, 1988).

A

The rule the Court set forth in Mills is based on two

well-established principles. First, the Constitution forbids

imposition of the death penalty if the sentencing judge or

jury is “ ‘ “precluded from considering, as a mitigating

4 SMITH v. SPISAK

Opinion of the Court

factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and

any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant

proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” ’ ” 486

U. S., at 374 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104,

110 (1982), in turn quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586,

604 (1978) (plurality opinion)). Second, the sentencing

judge or jury “ ‘ may not refuse to consider or be precluded

from considering “any relevant mitigating evidence.” ’ ”

Mills, 486 U. S., at 374–375 (quoting Skipper v. South

Carolina, 476 U. S. 1, 4 (1986), in turn quoting Eddings,

supra, at 114).

Applying these principles, the Court held that the jury

instructions and verdict forms at issue in the case violated

the Constitution because, read naturally, they told the

jury that it could not find a particular circumstance to be

mitigating unless all 12 jurors agreed that the mitigating

circumstance had been proved to exist. Mills, 486 U. S., at

380–381, 384. If, for example, the defense presents evi

dence of three potentially mitigating considerations, some

jurors may believe that only the first is mitigating, some

only the second, and some only the third. But if even one

of the jurors believes that one of the three mitigating

considerations exists, but that he is barred from consider

ing it because the other jurors disagree, the Court held,

the Constitution forbids imposition of the death penalty.

See id., at 380, 384; see also McKoy v. North Carolina, 494

U. S. 433, 442–443 (1990) (“Mills requires that each juror

be permitted to consider and give effect to . . . all mitigat

ing evidence in deciding . . . whether aggravating circum

stances outweigh mitigating circumstances . . . ”). Because

the instructions in Mills would have led a reasonable juror

to believe the contrary, the Court held that the sentencing

proceeding violated the Constitution. 486 U. S., at 374–

375.

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5

Opinion of the Court

B

In evaluating the Court of Appeals’ determination here,

we have examined the jury instructions and verdict forms

at issue in Mills and compared them with those used in

the present case. In the Mills sentencing phase, the trial

judge instructed the jury to fill out a verdict form that had

three distinct parts. Section I set forth a list of 10 specific

aggravating circumstances next to which were spaces

where the jury was to mark “yes” or “no.” Just above the

list, the form said:

“Based upon the evidence we unanimously find that

each of the following aggravating circumstances which

is marked ‘yes’ has been proven . . . and each aggra

vating circumstance which is marked ‘no’ has not been

proven . . . .” 486 U. S., at 384–385 (emphasis added;

internal quotation marks omitted).

Section II set forth a list of eight potentially mitigating

circumstances (seven specific circumstances and the

eighth designated as “other”) next to which were spaces

where the jury was to mark “yes” or “no.” Just above the

list the form said:

“Based upon the evidence we unanimously find that

each of the following mitigating circumstances which

is marked ‘yes’ has been proven to exist . . . and each

mitigating circumstance marked ‘no’ has not been

proven . . . .” Id., at 387 (emphasis added; internal

quotation marks omitted).

Section III set forth the overall balancing question, along

with spaces for the jury to mark “yes” or “no.” It said:

“Based on the evidence we unanimously find that it

has been proven . . . that the mitigating circumstances

marked ‘yes’ in Section II outweigh the aggravating

circumstances marked ‘yes’ in Section I.” Id., at 388–

389 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omit

6 SMITH v. SPISAK

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ted).

Explaining the forms, the judge instructed the jury with

an example. He told the jury that it should mark “ ‘yes’ ”

on the jury form if it “ ‘unanimously’ ” concluded that an

aggravating circumstance had been proved. Id., at 378.

Otherwise, he said, “ ‘of course you must answer no.’ ”

Ibid. (emphasis deleted). These instructions, together

with the forms, told the jury to mark “yes” on Section II’s

list of mitigating factors only if the jury unanimously

concluded that the particular mitigating factor had been

proved, and to consider in its weighing analysis in Section

III only those mitigating factors marked “yes” in Section

II. Thus, as this Court found, the jury was instructed that

it could consider in the ultimate weighing of the aggravat

ing and mitigating evidence only the mitigating factors

that the jury had unanimously found to exist. See id., at

380–381.

The instructions and jury forms in this case differ sig

nificantly from those in Mills. The trial judge instructed

the jury that the aggravating factors they would consider

were the specifications that the jury had found proved

beyond a reasonable doubt at the guilt phase of the trial—

essentially, that each murder was committed in a course of

conduct including the other crimes, and, for two of the

murders, that the murder was committed with the intent

to evade apprehension or punishment for another offense.

8 Tr. 2967–2972 (July 19, 1983).

He then explained the concept of a “mitigating factor.”

After doing so, he listed examples, including that “the

defendant because of a mental disease or defect . . . lacked

substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his

conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of

the law.” Id., at 2972–2973. The court also told the jury

that it could take account of “any other” mitigating consid

eration it found “relevant to the issue of whether the

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Opinion of the Court

defendant should be sentenced to death.” Id., at 2973.

And he instructed the jury that the State bore the burden

of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating

circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors. Id., at

2965.

With respect to “the procedure” by which the jury should

reach its verdict, the judge told the jury only the following:

“[Y]ou, the trial jury, must consider all of the relevant

evidence raised at trial, the evidence and testimony

received in this hearing and the arguments of counsel.

From this you must determine whether, beyond a rea

sonable doubt, the aggravating circumstances, which

[Spisak] has been found guilty of committing in the

separate counts are sufficient to outweigh the mitigat

ing factors present in this case.

“If all twelve members of the jury find by proof be

yond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circum

stance in each separate count outweighs the mitigat

ing factors, then you must return that finding to the

Court.

. . . . .

“On the other hand, if after considering all of the

relevant evidence raised at trial, the evidence and the

testimony received at this hearing and the arguments

of counsel, you find that the State failed to prove be

yond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circum

stances which [Spisak] has been found guilty of com

mitting in the separate counts outweigh the

mitigating factors, you will then proceed to determine

which of two possible life imprisonment sentences to

recommend to the Court.” Id., at 2973–2975.

The judge gave the jury two verdict forms for each ag

gravating factor. The first of the two forms said:

“ ‘We the jury in this case . . . do find beyond a reason

able doubt that the aggravating circumstance . . . was

8 SMITH v. SPISAK

Opinion of the Court

sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors present

in this case.

“ ‘We the jury recommend that the sentence of death

be imposed . . . .’ ” Id., at 2975–2976.

The other verdict form read:

“ ‘We the jury . . . do find that the aggravating circum

stances . . . are not sufficient to outweigh the mitiga

tion factors present in this case.

“ ‘We the jury recommend that the defendant . . . be

sentenced to life imprisonment . . . .’ ” Id., at 2976.

The instructions and forms made clear that, to recom

mend a death sentence, the jury had to find, unanimously

and beyond a reasonable doubt, that each of the aggravat

ing factors outweighed any mitigating circumstances. But

the instructions did not say that the jury must determine

the existence of each individual mitigating factor unani

mously. Neither the instructions nor the forms said any

thing about how—or even whether—the jury should make

individual determinations that each particular mitigating

circumstance existed. They focused only on the overall

balancing question. And the instructions repeatedly told

the jury to “conside[r] all of the relevant evidence.” Id., at

2974. In our view the instructions and verdict forms did

not clearly bring about, either through what they said or

what they implied, the circumstance that Mills found

critical, namely,

“a substantial possibility that reasonable jurors, upon

receiving the judge’s instructions in this case, and in

attempting to complete the verdict form as instructed,

well may have thought they were precluded from con

sidering any mitigating evidence unless all 12 jurors

agreed on the existence of a particular such circum

stance.” 486 U. S., at 384.

We consequently conclude that that the state court’s deci

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Opinion of the Court

sion upholding these forms and instructions was not “con

trary to, or . . . an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States” in Mills. 28 U. S. C.

§2254(d)(1).

We add that the Court of Appeals found the jury in

structions unconstitutional for an additional reason, that

the instructions “require[d] the jury to unanimously reject

a death sentence before considering other sentencing

alternatives.” 465 F. 3d, at 709 (citing Maples v. Coyle,

171 F. 3d 408, 416–417 (CA6 1999)). We have not, how

ever, previously held jury instructions unconstitutional for

this reason. Mills says nothing about the matter. Neither

the parties nor the courts below referred to Beck v. Ala

bama, 447 U. S. 625 (1980), or identified any other prece

dent from this Court setting forth this rule. Cf. Jones v.

United States, 527 U. S. 373, 379–384 (1999) (rejecting an

arguably analogous claim). But see post, at 3–5 (STEVENS,

J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). What

ever the legal merits of the rule or the underlying verdict

forms in this case were we to consider them on direct

appeal, the jury instructions at Spisak’s trial were not

contrary to “clearly established Federal law.” 28 U. S. C.

§2254(d)(1).

III

Spisak’s second claim is that his counsel’s closing argu

ment at the sentencing phase of his trial was so inade

quate as to violate the Sixth Amendment. To prevail,

Spisak must show both that “counsel’s representation fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness,” Strick

land, 466 U. S., at 688, and that there is a “reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,

the result of the proceeding would have been different,”

id., at 694.

The Ohio Supreme Court held that Spisak’s claim was

10 SMITH v. SPISAK

Opinion of the Court

“not well-taken on the basis of our review of the record.”

State v. Spisak, 36 Ohio St. 3d, at 82, 521 N. E. 2d, at 802

(citing, inter alia, Strickland, supra). The District Court

concluded that counsel did a constitutionally adequate job

and that “[t]here simply is not a reasonable probability

that, absent counsel’s alleged errors, the jury would have

concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating

circumstances did not warrant death.” Spisak v. Coyle,

App. to Pet. for Cert. 204a. The Court of Appeals, how

ever, reached a contrary conclusion. It held that counsel’s

closing argument, measured by “ ‘an objective standard of

reasonableness,’ ” was inadequate, and it asserted that “a

reasonable probability exists ” that adequate representa

tion would have led to a different result. 465 F. 3d, at 703,

706 (quoting Strickland, supra, at 688). Responding to the

State’s petition for certiorari, we agreed to review the

Court of Appeals’ terse finding of a “reasonable probabil

ity” that a more adequate argument would have changed a

juror’s vote.

In his closing argument at the penalty phase, Spisak’s

counsel described Spisak’s killings in some detail. He

acknowledged that Spisak’s admiration for Hitler inspired

his crimes. He portrayed Spisak as “sick,” “twisted,” and

“demented.” 8 Tr. 2896 (July 19, 1983). And he said that

Spisak was “never going to be any different.” Ibid. He

then pointed out that all the experts had testified that

Spisak suffered from some degree of mental illness. And,

after a fairly lengthy and rambling disquisition about his

own decisions about calling expert witnesses and prepar

ing them, counsel argued that, even if Spisak was not

legally insane so as to warrant a verdict of not guilty by

reason of insanity, he nonetheless was sufficiently men

tally ill to lessen his culpability to the point where he

should not be executed. Counsel also told the jury that,

when weighing Spisak’s mental illness against the “sub

stantial” aggravating factors present in the case, id., at

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2924, the jurors should draw on their own sense of “pride”

for living in “a humane society” made up of “a humane

people,” id., at 2897–2900, 2926–2928. That humanity,

he said, required the jury to weigh the evidence “fairly”

and to be “loyal to that oath” the jurors had taken to up

hold the law. Id., at 2926.

Spisak and his supporting amici say that this argument

was constitutionally inadequate because: (1) It overly

emphasized the gruesome nature of the killings; (2) it

overly emphasized Spisak’s threats to continue his crimes;

(3) it understated the facts upon which the experts based

their mental illness conclusions; (4) it said little or nothing

about any other possible mitigating circumstance; and (5)

it made no explicit request that the jury return a verdict

against death.

We assume for present purposes that Spisak is correct

that the closing argument was inadequate. We neverthe

less find no “reasonable probability” that a better closing

argument without these defects would have made a sig

nificant difference.

Any different, more adequate closing argument would

have taken place in the following context: Spisak admitted

that he had committed three murders and two other shoot

ings. Spisak’s defense at the guilt phase of the trial con

sisted of an effort by counsel to show that Spisak was not

guilty by reason of insanity. And counsel, apparently

hoping to demonstrate Spisak’s mentally defective condi

tion, called him to the stand.

Spisak testified that he had shot and killed Horace

Rickerson, Timothy Sheehan, and Brian Warford. He also

admitted that he had shot and tried to kill John Har

daway, and shot at Coletta Dartt. He committed these

crimes, he said, because he was a follower of Adolf Hitler,

who was Spisak’s “spiritual leader” in a “war” for “sur

vival” of “the Aryan people.” 4 id., at 1343–1344, 1396

(July 5, 1983). He said that he had purchased guns and

12 SMITH v. SPISAK

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stockpiled ammunition to further this war. Id., at 1406–

1408. And he had hoped to “create terror” at Cleveland

State University, because it was “one of the prime targets”

where the “Jews and the system . . . are brainwashing the

youth.” Id., at 1426–1428.

Spisak then said that in February 1982 he had shot

Rickerson, who was black, because Rickerson had made a

sexual advance on Spisak in a university bathroom. He

expressed satisfaction at having “eliminated that particu

lar threat . . . to me and to the white race.” 5 id., at 1511

(July 7, 1983). In June he saw a stranger, John Har

daway, on a train platform and shot him seven times

because he had been looking for a black person to kill as

“blood atonement” for a recent crime against two white

women. 4 id., at 1416 (July 5, 1983). He added that he

felt “good” after shooting Hardaway because he had “ac

complished something,” but later felt “[k]ind of bad” when

he learned that Hardaway had survived. Id., at 1424–

1425. In August 1982, Spisak shot at Coletta Dartt be

cause, he said, he heard her “making some derisive re

marks about us,” meaning the Nazi Party. Id., at 1432–

1435. Later that August, he shot and killed Timothy

Sheehan because he “thought he was one of those Jewish

professors . . . that liked to hang around in the men’s room

and seduce and pervert and subvert the young people that

go there.” 5 id., at 1465–1466 (July 7, 1983). Spisak

added that he was “sorry about that” murder because he

later learned Sheehan “wasn’t Jewish like I thought he

was.” Ibid. And three days later, while on a “search and

destroy mission,” he shot and killed Brian Warford, a

young black man who “looked like he was almost asleep”

in a bus shelter, to fulfill his “duty” to “inflict the maxi

mum amount of casualties on the enemies.” Id., at 1454–

1455, 1478.

Spisak also testified that he would continue to commit

similar crimes if he had the chance. He said about War

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Opinion of the Court

ford’s murder that he “didn’t want to get caught that time

because I wanted to be able to do it again and again and

again and again.” Id., at 1699 (July 8, 1983). In a letter

written to a friend, he called the murders of Rickerson and

Warford “the finest thing I ever did in my whole life” and

expressed a wish that he “had a human submachine gun

right now so I could exterminate” black men “and watch

them scream and twitch in agony.” Id., at 1724–1725.

And he testified that, if he still had his guns, he would

escape from jail, “go out and continue the war I started,”

and “continue to inflict the maximum amount of damage

on the enemies as I am able to do.” Id., at 1780–1781.

The State replied by attempting to show that Spisak

was lying in his testimony about the Nazi-related motives

for these crimes. The State contended instead that the

shootings were motivated by less unusual purposes, such

as robbery. See id., at 1680, 1816–1818.

The defense effort to show that Spisak was not guilty by

reason of insanity foundered when the trial judge refused

to instruct the jury to consider that question and excluded

expert testimony regarding Spisak’s mental state. The

defense’s expert witness, Dr. Oscar Markey, had written a

report diagnosing Spisak as suffering from a “schizotypal

personality disorder” and an “atypical psychotic disorder,”

and as, at times, “unable to control his impulses to as

sault.” 6 id., at 1882–1883, 1992 (July 11, 1983). His

testimony was somewhat more ambiguous during a voir

dire, however. On cross-examination, he conceded that he

could not say Spisak failed Ohio’s sanity standard at the

time of the murders. After Markey made the same conces

sion before the jury, the court granted the prosecution’s

renewed motion to exclude Markey’s testimony and in

structed the jury to disregard the testimony that it heard.

And the court excluded the defense’s proffered reports

from other psychologists and psychiatrists who examined

Spisak, because none of the reports said that Spisak met

14 SMITH v. SPISAK

Opinion of the Court

the Ohio insanity standard at the time of the crimes. Id.,

at 1898–1899, 1911–1912, 1995; id., at 2017, 2022 (July

12, 1983).

During the sentencing phase of the proceedings, defense

counsel called three expert witnesses, all of whom testified

that Spisak suffered from some degree of mental illness.

Dr. Sandra McPherson, a clinical psychologist, said that

Spisak suffered from schizotypal and borderline personal

ity disorders characterized by bizarre and paranoid think

ing, gender identification conflict, and emotional instabil

ity. She added that these defects “substantially impair his

ability to conform himself” to the law’s requirements. 8

id., at 2428–2429, 2430–2441 (July 16, 1983). Dr. Kurt

Bertschinger, a psychiatrist, testified that Spisak suffered

from a schizotypal personality disorder and that “mental

illness does impair his reason to the extent that he has

substantial inability to know wrongfulness, or substantial

inability to refrain.” Id., at 2552–2556. Dr. Markey,

whose testimony had been stricken at the guilt phase,

again testified and agreed with the other experts’ diagno

ses. Id., at 2692–2693, 2712–2713 (July 18, 1983).

In light of this background and for the following rea

sons, we do not find that the assumed deficiencies in

defense counsel’s closing argument raise “a reasonable

probability that,” but for the deficient closing, “the result

of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland,

466 U. S., at 694. We therefore cannot find the Ohio

Supreme Court’s decision rejecting Spisak’s ineffective

assistance-of-counsel claim to be an “unreasonable appli

cation” of the law “clearly established” in Strickland.

§2254(d)(1).

First, since the sentencing phase took place immediately

following the conclusion of the guilt phase, the jurors had

fresh in their minds the government’s evidence regarding

the killings—which included photographs of the dead

bodies, images that formed the basis of defense counsel’s

Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 15

Opinion of the Court

vivid descriptions of the crimes—as well as Spisak’s boast

ful and unrepentant confessions and his threats to commit

further acts of violence. We therefore do not see how a

less descriptive closing argument with fewer disparaging

comments about Spisak could have made a significant

difference.

Similarly fresh in the jurors’ minds was the three de

fense experts’ testimony that Spisak suffered from mental

illness. The jury had heard the experts explain the spe

cific facts upon which they had based their conclusions, as

well as what they had learned of his family background

and his struggles with gender identity. And the jury had

heard the experts draw connections between his mental

illness and the crimes. We do not see how it could have

made a significant difference had counsel gone beyond his

actual argument—which emphasized mental illness as a

mitigating factor and referred the jury to the experts’

testimony—by repeating the facts or connections that the

experts had just described.

Nor does Spisak tell us what other mitigating factors

counsel might have mentioned. All those he proposes

essentially consist of aspects of the “mental defect” factor

that the defense experts described.

Finally, in light of counsel’s several appeals to the ju

rors’ sense of humanity—he used the words “humane

people” and “humane society” 10 times at various points in

the argument—we cannot find that a more explicit or

more elaborate appeal for mercy could have changed the

result, either alone or together with the other circum

stances just discussed. Thus, we conclude that there is not

a reasonable probability that a more adequate closing

argument would have changed the result, and that the

Ohio Supreme Court’s rejection of Spisak’s claim was not

“contrary to, or . . . an unreasonable application of” Strick

land. 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1).

Spisak contends that the deferential standard of review

16 SMITH v. SPISAK

Opinion of the Court

under §2254(d)(1) should not apply to this claim because

the Ohio Supreme Court may not have reached the ques

tion whether counsel’s closing argument caused Spisak

prejudice. That is, the Ohio Supreme Court’s summary

rejection of this claim did not indicate whether that court

rested its conclusion upon a finding (1) that counsel was

not ineffective, or (2) that a better argument would not

have made a difference, or (3) both. See State v. Spisak,

36 Ohio St. 3d, at 82, 521 N. E. 2d, at 802. Spisak argues

that, under these circumstances, a federal court should

not defer to a state court that may not have decided a

question, but instead should decide the matter afresh.

Lower federal courts have rejected arguments similar to

Spisak’s. See, e.g., Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F. 3d 330, 334–

335 (CA7 1997); see also Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U. S. 225,

231, 237 (2000) (applying the §2254(d) standard in case

involving a state court’s summary denial of a claim,

though not a Strickland claim, and without full briefing

regarding whether or how §2254(d) applied to a summary

decision); Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F. 3d 597, 605–606

(CA3 2002) (Alito, J.) (relying on Weeks in holding that

§2254(d) applies where a state court denies a claim on the

merits without giving any indication how it reached its

decision); see generally 2 R. Hertz & J. Liebman, Federal

Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure §32.2, pp. 1574–

1579 (5th ed. 2005 and 2008 Supp.). However, we need

not decide whether deference under §2254(d)(1) is re

quired here. With or without such deference, our conclu

sion is the same.

For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit is reversed.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 1

Opinion of STEVENS, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 08–724

_________________

KEITH SMITH, WARDEN, PETITIONER v. FRANK G.

SPISAK, JR.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

[January 12, 2010]

JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in part and concurring in

the judgment.

In my judgment the Court of Appeals correctly con

cluded that two errors that occurred during Spisak’s trial

violated clearly established federal law. First, the jury

instructions impermissibly required that the jury unani

mously reject a death sentence before considering other

sentencing options. Second, the closing argument of

Spisak’s counsel was so egregious that it was constitution

ally deficient under any standard. Nevertheless, for the

reasons set forth in Part III of the Court’s opinion, ante, at

11–15, I agree that these errors did not prejudice Spisak

and thus he is not entitled to relief.

I

The jury instructions given during Spisak’s penalty

phase, described in the Court’s opinion, ante, at 6–8, are

fairly read to require the jury first to consider whether the

death penalty is warranted—i.e., whether the aggravating

factors outweigh the mitigating factors—before moving on

to consider whether instead a lesser penalty—i.e., one of

two available life sentences—is appropriate. Consistent

with Ohio law at the time of Spisak’s trial,1 the jury was

——————

1 Ohio no longer uses the type of jury instructions at issue in this

case. In 1996 the Ohio Supreme Court instructed that “[i]n Ohio, a

2 SMITH v. SPISAK

Opinion of STEVENS, J.

told that it must reach its decision unanimously. The jury

was not instructed on the consequence of their failure to

agree unanimously that Spisak should be sentenced to

death. Spisak and the Court of Appeals both described

these instructions as “acquittal first” because they would

have led a reasonable jury to believe that it first had to

“acquit” the defendant of death—unanimously—before it

could give effect to a lesser penalty.

Following its prior decision in Davis v. Mitchell, 318

F. 3d 682 (CA6 2003), in which it struck down “virtually

identical” jury instructions, Spisak v. Mitchell, 465 F. 3d

684, 710 (CA6 2006), the Court of Appeals concluded that

the instructions given during Spisak’s penalty phase were

impermissible because they “require[d] the jury to unani

mously reject a death sentence before considering other

sentencing alternatives,” id., at 709. In Davis, the court

had explained that an instruction that requires a capital

jury to “first unanimously reject the death penalty before

it can consider a life sentence . . . precludes the individual

jury from giving effect to mitigating evidence . . . .” 318

F. 3d, at 689. The source of this constitutional infirmity,

the court decided, was our decision in Mills v. Maryland,

——————

solitary juror may prevent a death penalty recommendation by finding

that the aggravating circumstances in the case do not outweigh the

mitigating factors. Jurors from this point forward should be so in

structed.” State v. Brooks, 75 Ohio St. 3d 148, 162, 661 N. E. 2d 1030,

1042. Although the Brooks decision signaled a change in Ohio’s capital

jury instructions, it was not a change in state law: One juror had the

power to prevent a death penalty recommendation before Brooks. See

State v. Springer, 63 Ohio St. 3d 167, 172, 586 N. E. 2d 96, 100 (1992)

(holding that an offender must be sentenced to life if the penalty-phase

jury deadlocks). Thus, consistent with our view that “accurate sentenc

ing information is an indispensable prerequisite to a [jury’s] determina

tion of whether a defendant shall live or die,” Gregg v. Georgia, 428

U. S. 153, 190 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and STEVENS,

JJ.), the Ohio high court laudably improved upon the accuracy of Ohio

capital jury instructions in Brooks.

Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 3

Opinion of STEVENS, J.

486 U. S. 367 (1988). For the reasons cogently examined

in JUSTICE BREYER’s opinion, ante, at 5–9, I agree that

Mills does not clearly establish that the instructions at

issue were unconstitutional. But, in my view, our decision

in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625 (1980), does.2

In Beck we held that the death penalty may not be

imposed “when the jury was not permitted to consider a

verdict of guilt of a lesser included non-capital offense, and

when the evidence would have supported such a verdict.”

Id., at 627 (internal quotation marks omitted). At that

time, the Alabama death penalty statute had been “consis

tently construed to preclude any lesser included offense

instructions in capital cases.” Id., at 629, n. 3. Thus, the

Alabama jury was “given the choice of either convicting

the defendant of the capital crime, in which case it [was]

required to impose the death penalty, or acquitting him,

thus allowing him to escape all penalties for his alleged

participation in the crime.” Id., at 628–629. Because of

the unique features of Alabama’s capital punishment

system,3 Beck’s jury believed that either it had to convict

Beck, thus sending him to his death, or acquit him, thus

setting him free. The jury was not presented with the

“third option” of convicting him of a noncapital offense,

thus ensuring that he would receive a substantial pun

ishment but not receive the death penalty. Id., at 642.

We concluded that the false choice before the jury—death

——————

2 Notably, Beck substantially predates Spisak’s trial and thus my

application of Beck obviates any discussion on when federal law is

established for Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

purposes, see ante, at 3. Regardless, in accordance with the view I

expressed in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 379–380 (2000) (opinion

of STEVENS, J.), I would conclude that our decision in Mills, decided

before Spisak’s conviction became final, is also available to him.

3 Under Alabama law, the judge conducts a separate penalty-phase

proceeding after the jury has returned a conviction on a capital offense.

Beck, 447 U. S., at 629. Thus, the jury reasonably believed that its

verdict would set the defendant’s punishment at death.

4 SMITH v. SPISAK

Opinion of STEVENS, J.

or acquit—“introduce[d] a level of uncertainty and unreli

ability into the factfinding process that cannot be tolerated

in a capital case.” Id., at 643. In other words,

“the difficulty with the Alabama statute is that it in

terjects irrelevant considerations into the factfinding

process, diverting the jury’s attention from the central

issue of whether the State has satisfied its burden of

proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

is guilty of a capital crime. Thus, on the one hand, the

unavailability of the third option of convicting on a

lesser included offense may encourage the jury to con

vict for an impermissible reason—its belief that the

defendant is guilty of some serious crime and should

be punished. On the other hand, the apparently

mandatory nature of the death penalty may encour

age it to acquit for an equally impermissible reason—

that, whatever his crime, the defendant does not de

serve death.” Id., at 642–643.

Although Beck dealt with guilt-phase instructions, the

reach of its holding is not so limited. The “third option” we

discussed in Beck was, plainly, a life sentence. Moreover,

the unusual features of the Alabama capital sentencing

scheme collapsed the guilt and penalty phases before the

jury (but not before the judge). Our concern in Beck was

that presenting the jury with only two options—death or

no punishment—introduced a risk of arbitrariness and

error into the deliberative process that the Constitution

could not abide in the capital context. See Spaziano v.

Florida, 468 U. S. 447, 455 (1984) (“The goal of the Beck

rule, in other words, is to eliminate the distortion of the

factfinding process that is created when the jury is forced

into an all-or-nothing choice between capital murder and

innocence”). We held, therefore, that the jury must be

given a meaningful opportunity to consider and embrace

the equivalent of a life-sentence when the evidence sup

Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 5

Opinion of STEVENS, J.

ports such an option.

The acquittal-first jury instructions used during

Spisak’s penalty phase interposed before the jury the same

false choice that our holding in Beck prohibits. By requir

ing Spisak’s jury to decide first whether the State had met

its burden with respect to the death sentence, and to reach

that decision unanimously, the instructions deprived the

jury of a meaningful opportunity to consider the third

option that was before it, namely, a life sentence. Indeed,

these instructions are every bit as pernicious as those at

issue in Beck because they would have led individual

jurors (falsely) to believe that their failure to agree might

have resulted in a new trial and that, in any event, they

could not give effect to their determination that a life

sentence was appropriate unless and until they had first

convinced each of their peers on the jury to reject the

death sentence.

Admittedly, Spisak has never identified Beck as the

source of the constitutional infirmity at issue in this case,

nor did the courts below cite or rely upon it. But Spisak

has consistently pressed his argument in terms that are

wholly consistent with Beck. On direct appeal he con

tended, for example, that he:

“was severely prejudiced by the erroneous jury forms

because the jurors were never informed of what would

happen if they were unable to reach a unanimous de

cision. That may have led to irreparable speculation

that if they failed to agree, Frank Spisak would be

freed or have a new trial or sentencing hearing. Such

improper speculation may have led those not in

agreement with death to go along with a majority.

The jury should have been instructed that if they were

unable to unanimously agree to death they must re

turn a verdict of one of the life sentences or in the al

ternative, the court would impose a life sentence.”

6 SMITH v. SPISAK

Opinion of STEVENS, J.

Exh. 28D, 16 Record 391 (Brief for Supreme Court of

Ohio).

The untenable choice Spisak describes is perfectly analo

gous to the quandary, discussed above, that we described

in Beck. See also 447 U. S., at 644 (“It is extremely doubt

ful that juries will understand the full implications of a

mistrial or will have any confidence that their choice of the

mistrial option will ultimately lead to the right result.

Thus, they could have no assurance that a second trial

would end in the conviction of the defendant on a lesser

included offense” (footnote omitted)). Spisak and the

Court of Appeals both correctly assailed the jury instruc

tions at issue in this case, but in my view Beck provides

the proper basis in clearly established federal law to con

clude the instructions were unconstitutional.

II

Petitioner defends Spisak’s counsel’s closing argument

as a reasonable strategic decision “to draw the sting out of

the prosecution’s argument and gain credibility with the

jury by conceding the weaknesses of his own case.” Brief

for Petitioner 37. I agree that such a strategy is generally

a reasonable one and, indeed, was a reasonable strategy

under the difficult circumstances of this case. Even

Spisak concedes that his counsel “faced an admittedly

difficult case in closing argument in the penalty phase.”

Brief for Respondent 43. But, surely, a strategy can be

executed so poorly as to render even the most reasonable

of trial tactics constitutionally deficient under Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). And this is such a

case.

It is difficult to convey how thoroughly egregious coun

sel’s closing argument was without reproducing it in its

entirety. The Court’s assessment of the closing as

“lengthy and rambling” and its brief description of its

content, see ante, at 10, does not accurately capture the

Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 7

Opinion of STEVENS, J.

catastrophe of counsel’s failed strategy. Suffice it to say

that the argument shares far more in common with a

prosecutor’s closing than with a criminal defense attor

ney’s. Indeed, the argument was so outrageous that it

would have rightly subjected a prosecutor to charges of

misconduct. See Brief for Steven Lubet et al. as Amici

Curiae 15–16 (observing that counsel’s closing argument

“would have been improper even coming from the prosecu

tor”). A few examples are in order.

Presumably to take the “sting” out of the prosecution’s

case, Brief for Petitioner 37, counsel described his client’s

acts in vivid detail to the jury:

“[Y]ou can smell almost the blood. You can smell, if

you will, the urine. You are in a bathroom, and it is

death, and you can smell the death . . . and you can

feel, the loneliness of that railroad platform . . . and

we can all know the terror that [the victim] felt when

he turned and looked into those thick glasses and

looked into the muzzle of a gun that kept spitting out

bullets . . . And we can see a relatively young man cut

down with so many years to live, and we could re

member his widow, and we certainly can remember

looking at his children . . . There are too many family

albums. There are too many family portraits dated

1982 that have too many empty spaces. And there is

too much terror left in the hearts of those that we call

lucky.”4 465 F. 3d, at 704–795 (internal quotation

——————

4 To make matters worse, these graphic and emotionally charged

descriptions of Spisak’s crimes were irrelevant under state law even for

purposes of the State’s case for aggravating circumstances. See State v.

Wogenstahl, 75 Ohio St. 3d 344, 356, 662 N. E. 2d 311, 322 (1996)

(“[T]he nature and circumstances of the offense may only enter into the

statutory weighing process on the side of mitigation”); see also State v.

Johnson, 24 Ohio St. 3d 87, 93, 494 N. E. 2d 1061, 1066 (1986) (explain

ing that statutory aggravating circumstances should be narrowly

construed); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2929.04(A) (2006) (identifying 10

8 SMITH v. SPISAK

Opinion of STEVENS, J.

marks omitted).

Presumably to “gain credibility” with the jury, Brief of

Petitioner 37, counsel argued that his client deserved no

sympathy for his actions:

“Sympathy, of course, is not part of your considera

tion. And even if it was, certainly, don’t look to him

for sympathy, because he demands none. And, ladies

and gentlemen, when you turn and look at Frank

Spisak, don’t look for good deeds, because he has done

none. Don’t look for good thoughts, because he has

none. He is sick, he is twisted. He is demented, and

he is never going to be any different.” 465 F. 3d, at

705 (internal quotation marks omitted).

And then the strategy really broke down: At no point

did counsel endeavor to direct his negative statements

about his client toward an express appeal for leniency.5

On the contrary, counsel concluded by telling the jury that

“whatever you do, we are going to be proud of you,” ibid.

(internal quotation marks omitted), which I take to mean

that, in counsel’s view, “either outcome, death or life,

would be a valid conclusion,” ibid.

Spisak’s crimes, and the seemingly unmitigated hatred

motivating their commission, were truly awful. But that

does not excuse a lawyer’s duty to represent his client

within the bounds of prevailing professional norms. The

mere fact that counsel, laudably, may have had a “strat

egy” to build rapport with the jury and lessen the impact

of the prosecution’s case, does not excuse counsel’s utter

——————

aggravating circumstances but not including heinous circumstances of

offense).

5 Counsel did attempt to appeal to the jury’s sense of humanity, per

haps implicitly suggesting that humane people do not condemn others,

especially those with mental illness, to death. App. to Pet. for Cert.

339a–341a. But counsel never requested a life sentence on behalf of his

client.

Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 9

Opinion of STEVENS, J.

failure to achieve either of these objectives through his

closing argument. In short, counsel’s argument grossly

transgressed the bounds of what constitutionally compe

tent counsel would have done in a similar situation.

III

Notwithstanding these two serious constitutional errors,

I agree with the Court that these errors do not entitle

Spisak to relief. As JUSTICE BREYER’s discussion in Part

III makes vividly clear, see ante, at 11–14, Spisak’s own

conduct alienated and ostracized the jury, and his crimes

were monstrous. In my judgment even the most skillful of

closing arguments—even one befitting Clarence Darrow—

would not have created a reasonable probability of a dif

ferent outcome in this case. Similarly, in light of Spisak’s

conduct before the jury and the gravity of the aggravating

circumstances of the offense, the instructional error was

also harmless because it did not have a substantial and

injurious effect on this record, Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507

U. S. 619, 623 (1993).

Accordingly, I concur in the judgment and concur in the

Court’s discussion of prejudice in Part III of its opinion.