Babler v. Futhey

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 10a0265p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

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JOHN W. BABLER; VICTOR BAFFONI; JAMES

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R. CUMBY; JOHN D. FITZGERALD;

CONSTANTINO A. IANNONE, -

Plaintiffs-Appellees, -

No. 09-4455

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v.

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MALCOLM B. FUTHEY, JR., Individually and

in his official capacity; EXECUTIVE BOARD OF -

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THE UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION; JAMES

capacity; JOHN RISCH, Individually and in his -

HUSTON, Individually and in his official

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official capacity; JOSEPH BODA, JR., -

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Individually and in his official capacity;

official capacity; KEVIN GORING, Individually -

STEPHEN T. DAWSON, Individually and in his

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and in his official capacity, -

Defendants-Appellants. -

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.

No. 08-00912—John R. Adams, District Judge.

Argued: June 15, 2010

Decided and Filed: August 25, 2010

Before: SILER and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges; REEVES, District Judge.*

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: Joseph Guerrieri, Jr., GUERRIERI, CLAYMAN, BARTOS & PARCELLI,

P.C., Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Joyce Goldstein, GOLDSTEIN GRAGEL,

LLC, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Joseph Guerrieri, Jr., Elizabeth A.

*

The Honorable Danny C. Reeves, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of

Kentucky, sitting by designation.

1

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Roma, Jeffrey A. Bartos, GUERRIERI, CLAYMAN, BARTOS & PARCELLI, P.C.,

Washington, D.C., Charles R. Both, LAW OFFICES OF CHARLES R. BOTH,

Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Joyce Goldstein, Gina Fraternali, GOLDSTEIN

GRAGEL, LLC, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellees.

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OPINION

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SILER, Circuit Judge. This appeal is brought under the Labor-Management

Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (“LMRDA”). Defendants

Malcolm B. Futhey, Jr., the United Transportation Union (“UTU”) Executive Board,

James Huston, John Risch, Joseph Boda, Jr., Stephen T. Dawson, and Kevin Goring

(collectively “Defendants”) appeal the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction

in favor of Plaintiffs John W. Babler, Victor Baffoni, James R. Cumby, and Constantino

A. Iannone (collectively “Plaintiffs”).1 Because we conclude that the district court did

not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

The UTU is a labor union representing the operating employees of freight and

passenger railways. This litigation arises out of a power struggle among UTU

international officers relating to the UTU’s proposed merger with the Sheet Metal

Workers International Association (“SMWIA”). In 2004, Paul Thompson became the

international president of the UTU. Upon taking office, Thompson explored the

possibility of merging the UTU with another labor union in an effort to bolster its

bargaining strength and political influence. The UTU ultimately entered into

negotiations with the SMWIA. In June 2007, Thompson presented a proposed merger

agreement between the UTU and the SMWIA at the UTU’s regional meeting. The

merger agreement stated that the two entities would merge to become the International

Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail, and Transportation Workers (“SMART”).

1

Plaintiff John D. Fitzgerald is not a party to this appeal.

No. 09-4455 Babler, et al. v. Futhey, et al. Page 3

SMART would have a new constitution which would essentially be the SMWIA’s

constitution with the UTU’s constitution appended and would be governed by officers

from both of the former unions. The UTU’s board of directors listened to Thompson’s

presentation and voted to submit the merger agreement to the UTU membership for their

approval in accordance with the UTU constitution.

Pursuant to the merger agreement and the UTU’s constitution, the proposed

merger and the SMART constitution had to be approved by the UTU membership. The

UTU constitution stipulates that the membership be provided with copies, by mail, of

any agreements or merger documents that they were asked to ratify in a referendum. The

UTU membership received an initial email that summarized the merger agreement and

a later mailing that contained the merger agreement, supporting materials, and

instructions for telephone and electronic voting. The UTU constitution and the SMWIA

constitution were not included in the mailing sent to the UTU members, but both were

posted on the UTU’s website throughout the voting period. Although it was referred to

in the merger agreement, a final version of the SMART constitution was not provided

to the UTU membership before the merger was voted on. The merger was ultimately

approved on a vote of 8,625 to 3,472.

From August 13 to August 17, 2007, the UTU held its quadrennial convention,

where UTU international officers were elected and amendments to the UTU constitution

were considered. In anticipation of the merger being consummated, the UTU’s election

process was modified. Rather than electing the customary fifteen international vice

presidents, only nine international vice presidents were elected at the convention. The

UTU membership also chose a new international president, assistant president, general

secretary and treasurer, and national legislative director. These officers were to become

SMART vice presidents when the merger was consummated.

On December 3, 2007, Dale Edward Michael, John R. Hasenauer, Roy G.

Arnold, and Jimmy D. Eubanks (collectively “Michael Plaintiffs”) filed suit against

Thompson and the UTU in the Southern District of Illinois, claiming that the pending

merger with the SMWIA was unlawful because the UTU membership was not given

No. 09-4455 Babler, et al. v. Futhey, et al. Page 4

sufficient information with which to evaluate the implications of the merger. The

Michael Plaintiffs sought declaratory and emergency injunctive relief. The case was

later transferred to the Northern District of Ohio, where the UTU is headquartered.

Shortly after the suit was filed, the officers who were elected at the UTU

convention took office, with Futhey succeeding Thompson as international president.

The Michael Plaintiffs petitioned the district court to substitute Futhey for Thompson as

a defendant. Futhey had previously indicated that he was favorably disposed to the

Michael Plaintiffs’ position as he had submitted a declaration on their behalf and

expressed opposition to the merger process. In reaction to this motion, John W. Babler,

Victor Baffoni, Roy G. Boling, James R. Cumby, John D. Fitzgerald, Constantino A.

Iannone, and James M. Brunkenhoefer (collectively “Babler Plaintiffs”)–all of whom

supported the merger–moved to intervene in the case because they were concerned that

Futhey would not defend the merger against the Michael Plaintiffs’ claims. The district

court ultimately substituted Futhey for Thompson and granted the Babler Plaintiffs’

motion to intervene.

On June 26, 2008, the district court granted the Michael Plaintiffs’ motion for a

preliminary injunction to restrain the UTU from consummating the merger with the

SMWIA. This preliminary injunction was appealed to the Sixth Circuit. On December

22, 2009, our court issued three separate opinions, with the court reaching the result of

reversing the district court’s grant of the preliminary injunction and dismissing the

action.

While the appeal in the Michael litigation was pending, several union members

filed internal union charges against the Babler Plaintiffs. The charges brought against

the Babler Plaintiffs alleged violations of the UTU constitution and included a request

that the Babler Plaintiffs have their UTU membership revoked. At the time these

charges were filed, Babler, Baffoni, Boling, Cumby, Fitzgerald, and Iannone held elected

union office as international vice presidents and members of the board of directors.

Brunkenhoefer held the elected office of national legislative director and also served on

No. 09-4455 Babler, et al. v. Futhey, et al. Page 5

the board of directors. The Babler Plaintiffs claim that, at the time, they represented a

voting majority of the board of directors.

In response to the internal union charges and pursuant to the LMRDA, the Babler

Plaintiffs filed this suit against Futhey, the UTU Executive Board and its members, and

the UTU members who filed the internal union charges against them. On January 12,

2009, the Babler Plaintiffs filed their initial motion for injunctive relief to preclude the

UTU executive board from conducting an internal union trial, alleging that the charges

were retaliatory and would violate the LMRDA by chilling free speech and preventing

union members’ free participation in litigation. On February 2, 2009, the district court

denied the Babler Plaintiffs’ initial motion for a preliminary injunction without prejudice

to renewing the motion after the conclusion of the disciplinary trial.

The executive board held the internal union trial in February and May 2009.2 On

July 10, 2009, the executive board issued its opinion, finding that Plaintiffs, acting as

officers of the UTU, had violated Articles 16, 18, 23, and 28 of the UTU’s constitution.

Articles 16 outlines the duties of the international president. The executive board found

that Plaintiffs violated Article 16 by seeking to usurp the international president’s

authority by acting in conjunction with the SMWIA to oppose his policies with respect

to the merger. Article 18 outlines the duties of international vice presidents. The

executive board found that Plaintiffs violated Article 18 by failing to carry out

presidential directives and taking a different position than the international president in

the Michael litigation. Article 23 outlines the duties of the board of directors, which

include the power to consider and implement plans of unification, affiliation, or merger

with another labor union. The executive board found that Plaintiffs violated Article 23

by exceeding their authority to determine UTU policy in connection with the merger.

Article 28 prohibits UTU officers, members, and subordinate bodies from resorting to

civil courts until all appeals have been made in accordance with the UTU constitution.

The executive board found that Plaintiffs improperly resorted to opposing the

2

Fitzgerald resigned prior to the commencement of the internal union appeal.

No. 09-4455 Babler, et al. v. Futhey, et al. Page 6

international president’s policy decision in court rather than first pursuing any appeal

rights they may have had within the union.

The executive board’s key findings are summarized as follows in its opinion:

On January 1, 2008, Mike Futhey took office and determined that the

Michael litigation should be settled and that the membership should have

a new ratification vote after the negotiation of the SMART

Constitution. . . . Despite the newly announced UTU policy, on January

16, 2008, you filed a Motion to Intervene in the Michael case. . . . Under

Article 28 of the UTU Constitution, you should not have resorted to the

Court in opposition to President Futhey’s policy. . . . As officers, you

were obliged to pursue your appeal rights within the Union before

proceeding to the Court. Each of you knew or should have known that

taking a position in federal court contrary to the President of our union

and dealing directly with another union without the consent of the

President went far beyond your free speech rights or ability to

dissent. . . . The crux of this matter is your incorrect interpretation of the

UTU Constitution. . . . Only the President may interpret the Constitution.

Your persistent effort to expand your role under Article 23 and to usurp

the proper prerogatives of the President make evident your failure to

faithfully carry forward the policy of the UTU. . . . Each of you violated

your oath of office in failing to carry out Presidential directives, and as

officers, not as members, taking a position different than that of the

President and the UTU both with the SMWIA and in litigation.

Moreover, by taking money from SMWIA to litigate against your own

union as officers, you are not fulfilling your fiduciary duty and oath of

undivided loyalty to the UTU.

The executive board was careful to stipulate that its decision should not be

construed as restricting a member’s right to challenge and debate a policy of the Union.

Rather, the executive board indicated that only officers were under a heightened

obligation to fully support the policies of the UTU as articulated by the international

president. Having determined that Plaintiffs had violated the UTU constitution, the

executive board removed them from their elected offices. The UTU filled Plaintiffs’

positions by elevating a number of assistant vice presidents.

On July 17, 2009, Plaintiffs renewed their motion for a preliminary injunction.

The district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion and ordered the UTU to restore Plaintiffs

to their union offices. Defendants then filed this timely appeal.

No. 09-4455 Babler, et al. v. Futhey, et al. Page 7

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court reviews a district court’s decision regarding a preliminary injunction

for an abuse of discretion. USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 98

(6th Cir. 1982). The district court considers and balances four factors in making its

decision: “(1) whether the plaintiff[s] [have] established a substantial likelihood or

probability of success on the merits; (2) whether there is a threat of irreparable harm to

the plaintiff[s]; (3) whether issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to

others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by granting injunctive relief.”

Hamilton’s Bogarts, Inc. v. Michigan, 501 F.3d 644, 649 (6th Cir. 2007). Under this

standard, the court reviews the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual

findings for clear error. Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke

Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 541 (6th Cir. 2007). The district court’s determination regarding

the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits is a question of law and is reviewed de

novo. Id. “However, the district court’s ultimate determination as to whether the four

preliminary injunction factors weigh in favor of granting or denying preliminary

injunctive relief is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

We will analyze the preliminary injunction factors to determine whether the

district court’s balancing of these factors constituted an abuse of discretion.3 See

Hamilton’s Bogarts, Inc., 501 F.3d at 649.

A. Probability of Success on the Merits

“The LMRDA was the product of congressional concern with widespread abuses

of power by union leadership.” Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Assoc. v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347,

352 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). Title I of the LMRDA, the “Bill of

Rights” for union members, was “designed to guarantee every union member equal

voting rights, rights of free speech and assembly, and a right to sue.” United

3

Defendants’ argument that the district court committed legal error by applying the wrong legal

standard is not supported by the record.

No. 09-4455 Babler, et al. v. Futhey, et al. Page 8

Steelworkers of Am. v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 109 (1982). These provisions of the

LMRDA were calculated to provide “enlarged protection for members of unions

paralleling certain rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.” Finnegan v. Leu, 456

U.S. 431, 435 (1982). In providing these protections, “Congress sought to further the

basic objective of the LMRDA: ‘ensuring that unions [are] democratically governed and

responsive to the will of their memberships.’” Lynn, 488 U.S. at 352 (quoting Finnegan,

456 U.S. at 436).

Plaintiffs allege that, by discharging them from their elected union offices, the

UTU executive board chilled their free speech rights, guaranteed by 29 U.S.C.

§ 411(a)(2), and retaliated against them for exercising their right to sue, guaranteed by

29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4). Defendants counter that the disciplinary proceedings were a

reasonable exercise of the union’s authority to adopt and enforce reasonable rules,

pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2), and to require members to exhaust reasonable hearing

procedures, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4).4

29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) provides, in pertinent part:

Every member of any labor organization shall have the right . . . to

express any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at meetings of

the labor organization his views, . . . upon any business properly before

the meeting, subject to the organization’s established and reasonable

rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings: Provided, That nothing

herein shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organization to

adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every

member toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining

4

Defendants’ argument that the executive board’s disciplinary action is entitled to judicial

deference if it is supported by “some evidence” misapplies that standard of review. In Int’l Bhd. of

Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers, and Helpers v. Hardeman, the Supreme Court

concluded that the “full and fair hearing” provision of 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) requires “the charging party

to provide some evidence at the disciplinary hearing to support the charges made.” 401 U.S. 233, 246

(1971). The “some evidence” standard of review is applied when, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5), a due

process or sufficiency of the evidence challenge is made to a union disciplinary proceeding. See id.; see

also Mayle v. Laborer’s Int’l Union of N. Am., 866 F.2d 144, 146 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[U]nion discipline is

presumed lawful so long as the charging party presents ‘some evidence’ that the member has committed

the charged offense.”). This case does not present a due process challenge to the UTU disciplinary

proceedings; rather, Plaintiffs claim that the disciplinary proceedings were invalid because they violated

the free-speech and right-to-sue provisions of the LMRDA. Consequently, the “some evidence” standard

is inapplicable to this case. See Lynn, 488 U.S. at 353-55 (noting that the Supreme Court did not apply

the “some evidence” standard in that case).

No. 09-4455 Babler, et al. v. Futhey, et al. Page 9

from conduct that would interfere with its performance of its legal or

contractual obligations.

29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) provides, in pertinent part:

No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to

institute an action in any court . . . irrespective of whether or not the labor

organization or its officers are named as defendants or respondents in

such action or proceeding . . . : Provided, That any such member may be

required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a

four-month lapse of time) within such organization, before instituting

legal or administrative proceedings against such organizations or any

officer thereof: And provided further, That no interested employer or

employer association shall directly or indirectly finance, encourage, or

participate in, except as a party, any such action, proceeding, appearance,

or petition.

In Finnegan, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the discharge

of appointed union officials by the union president, following his election over the

candidate supported by the appointed officials, violated the LMRDA. 456 U.S. at 432.

The Supreme Court concluded that the overriding objective of the LMRDA was to

promote union democracy and that it was not intended to address the issue of union

patronage. Id. at 442. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the discharge of a

union employee from an appointed office did not violate the LMRDA. Id.

However, in Lynn, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether removal

of an elected union official, in retaliation for statements he made at a union meeting in

opposition to a dues increase sought by the union trustee, violated the LMRDA. 488

U.S. at 349. Distinguishing Finnegan, the Supreme Court reasoned that the

consequences of removing an elected official from office are much different than the

consequences of removing an appointed official. Id. at 355.

To begin with, when an elected official . . . is removed from his post, the

union members are denied the representative of their choice. . . .

Furthermore, the potential chilling effect on Title I free speech rights is

more pronounced when elected officials are discharged. Not only is the

fired official likely to be chilled in the exercise of his own free speech

rights, but so are the members who voted for him.

No. 09-4455 Babler, et al. v. Futhey, et al. Page 10

Id. Moreover, the overriding objective of the LMRDA, to promote union democracy,

would be thwarted if union members “concluded that one challenged the union’s

hierarchy, if at all, at one’s peril.” Id. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the

retaliatory removal of an elected union official from office stated a cause of action under

the LMRDA. Id.

In this case, the executive board’s disciplinary opinion boils down to an

indictment of Plaintiffs for taking a different position in litigation than the international

president with respect to the merger. The factual similarity between this case and Lynn

suggests that Plaintiffs have a high probability of success on the merits. Both cases

involve elected union officers who were discharged for opposing union policies.

Although Lynn involved a violation of the LMRDA’s free-speech provision and this case

involves both alleged violations of the LMRDA’s free-speech and right-to-sue

provisions, the principles articulated in Lynn are equally applicable in both contexts. See

Gilvin v. Fire, 259 F.3d 749, 759-60 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Although Lynn itself involved

§ 101(a)(2), there is no reason to suspect that its principles are not equally applicable to

§ 101(a)(4).”). Moreover, the executive board’s reasoning that, as UTU officers,

Plaintiffs had a special duty to support the policies of the international president even

if they might have personally opposed those policies, contravenes the Supreme Court’s

reasoning in Lynn. See Lynn, 488 U.S. at 355 (“[T]he potential chilling effect on Title

I free speech rights is more pronounced when elected officials are discharged. Not only

is the fired official likely to be chilled in the exercise of his own free speech rights, but

so are the members who voted for him.”). The LMRDA was intended to promote union

democracy, with all of its inefficiencies, and not centralized union governance, with all

of its advantages. See id. (“[D]emocracy would be assured only if union members are

free to discuss union policies and criticize leadership without fear of reprisal.” (quoting

Sadlowski, 457 U.S. at 112)).

The overarching context of Plaintiffs’ removal from their elected offices is the

power struggle within the UTU international leadership set off by the district court’s

preliminary injunction of the merger in the Michael litigation. This power struggle is

No. 09-4455 Babler, et al. v. Futhey, et al. Page 11

essentially a constitutional crisis regarding the division of power between the

international president and the board of directors as it relates to mergers. Both sides

have reasonable arguments in this debate. Article 16 of the UTU constitution provides

the international president with broad authority to set UTU policy. However, Article 23

is the only constitutional provision that mentions mergers, and it gives the board of

directors authority to consider and implement plans of merger with another labor union.

The UTU constitutional provisions for extraordinary situations divide power between

the international president and the board of directors. Under Article 16, the international

president has authority to “interpret all laws of the organization, decide all questions

arising there from, and decide all other controversies not provided for under the existing

laws of the organization, subject to appeal to the Board of Directors.” Similarly, Article

38 states that “[t]he International President, with the approval of the Board of Directors,

may take such action as may be deemed necessary to meet situations not covered in this

Constitution.”

The executive board attempted to resolve this constitutional crisis by ruling that

it is an offense, punishable by removal from office, for international vice presidents, who

also happened to represent a voting majority of the board of directors, to take a position

different from that of the international president. It is well established that courts are

reluctant “to substitute their judgment for that of union officials in the interpretation of

the union’s constitution, and will interfere only where the official’s interpretation is not

fair or reasonable.” Vestal v. Hoffa, 451 F.2d 706, 709 (6th Cir. 1971). However, in the

novel context of a disputed merger, it is unfair and unreasonable to employ disciplinary

proceedings to resolve a fairly close question regarding the proper allocation of power

among UTU international officers. This is the type of abuse of power by union

leadership that the LMRDA was passed to remedy. See Lynn, 488 U.S. at 352.

That Plaintiffs were retaliated against for exercising their LMRDA rights is

clearly evidenced by the executive board’s justification for its disciplinary actions. For

example, the executive board cannot plausibly claim that it was simply exercising the

union’s prerogative under 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) to adopt and enforce reasonable rules

No. 09-4455 Babler, et al. v. Futhey, et al. Page 12

governing the responsibilities of its members. Unlike Sadlowski, where a rule enacted

by a union to prohibit candidates for union office from accepting campaign contributions

from nonmembers did not violate 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2), this case does not involve a

clear violation of a pre-existing union rule. See Sadlowski, 457 U.S. at 104-05, 121; see

also 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (noting that “reasonable rules” must also be “established”).

Rather, the executive board removed Plaintiffs from elected offices after determining,

in a post hoc interpretation of rather vague constitutional provisions, that Plaintiffs had

unconstitutionally usurped the authority of the international president. Moreover, it was

cynical for the executive board to discipline Plaintiffs on charges of dual unionism for

accepting financial assistance for litigation expenses from the SMWIA when the UTU

was in the midst of a merger with the SMWIA, especially because there is no clear

prohibition against or definition of dual unionism in the UTU constitution. See 29

U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (noting that another union is not an “interested employer or employer

association”). Finally, it was disingenuous for the executive board to discipline

Plaintiffs for failing to pursue their internal appeal rights before proceeding to federal

court. There was nothing for Plaintiffs to internally appeal. Indeed, Plaintiffs did not

initiate the Michael litigation; rather, they intervened in the litigation to defend the

merger after other UTU members initiated a suit to enjoin the consummation of the

merger. Thus, the executive board’s disciplinary action against Plaintiffs is not entitled

to deference because it was not a fair or reasonable exercise of the union’s disciplinary

authority. See Lynn, 488 U.S. at 355; Vestal, 451 F.2d at 709.

The factual similarities between this case and Lynn are compelling. The

executive board’s decision to remove Plaintiffs from their elected offices for intervening

in the Michael litigation and opposing the international president’s policies is the type

of anti-democratic action the LMRDA was intended to remedy. Thus, Plaintiffs have

a high probability of success on the merits of their LMRDA claims.

No. 09-4455 Babler, et al. v. Futhey, et al. Page 13

B. Threat of Irreparable Harm to Plaintiffs

The district court identified the following threats of harm to Plaintiffs caused by

their removal from office by the executive board: (1) monetary loss; (2) loss of

reputation and goodwill within the union; and (3) the chilling effect on Plaintiffs’

willingness to exercise their LMRDA rights. “The key word in this consideration is

irreparable. Mere injuries, however substantial in terms of money, time and energy

necessarily expended in the absence of a stay, are not enough. The possibility that

adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the

ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.”

Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Lost wages are readily compensable and do not constitute irreparable harm. Id.

at 90-91. The threat of irreparable harm as a result of loss of reputation and goodwill

appears genuine, but it is difficult to assess based on the record. See id. at 91.

Nevertheless, the potential chilling effect on the guarantees of free speech and the right

to sue provided in the LMRDA constitutes a clear threat of irreparable harm to the

Plaintiffs. See Lynn, 488 U.S. at 353-55. Thus, the district court did not clearly err in

finding that Plaintiffs face a threat of irreparable harm.

C. Substantial Harm to Others

The district court determined that the preliminary injunction would not constitute

a hardship to those individuals who filled Plaintiffs’ offices after they were discharged,

because they would not have had a reasonable expectancy of holding the office of

international vice president. It also determined that preliminarily enjoining the executive

board’s actions would undermine the UTU’s right to govern itself and protect its

membership. Nevertheless, the district court ultimately concluded that the harm to

Defendants was outweighed by the threat of substantial harm to UTU members caused

by the potential chilling effect on their willingness to exercise their LMRDA rights. See

id.

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The harm to the UTU’s governing institutions is real. A preliminary injunction

tends to undermine the legitimacy of the executive board; it calls into question the

division of authority among the UTU’s international leaders, and it highlights the

deficiencies of the UTU’s governing bodies to effectively deal with an organizational

crisis. With that said, the harm to the legitimacy of the executive board appears to be

well deserved. Moreover, the identified harms to the UTU organization are of the

variety that carry the potential of being a precursor of constructive organizational

change. At any rate, the district court did not clearly err in determining that the harm to

Defendants and others is outweighed by the threat of substantial harm to UTU members

caused by the potential chilling effect on their willingness to exercise their LMRDA

rights. See id. at 355.

D. The Public Interest

The district court did not making any clear factual findings regarding whether the

public interest would be served by granting injunctive relief, but it did conclude a risk

of harm to the union, or to the public, pales in comparison with the risk to Plaintiffs’

individual rights. The overarching public interests at stake in this dispute are the policies

that the courts should: (1) abstain from interfering with the internal management of labor

unions, and (2) protect fundamental rights of individual labor union members as set forth

in the LMRDA. See Sewell v. Grand Lodge of the Int’l Assoc. of Machinists &

Aerospace Workers, 445 F.2d 545, 546 (5th Cir. 1971). Based on the facts of this case,

the public interest weighs in favor of protecting Plaintiffs’ individual rights as set forth

in the LMRDA.

E. Balancing Preliminary Injunction Factors

Plaintiffs have a high probability of success on the merits of their LMRDA

claims. The threat of irreparable harm to Plaintiffs, including the potential chilling effect

on the guarantees of free speech and the right to sue provided in the LMRDA, is clear

cut and strongly weighs in favor of granting preliminary injunctive relief. The harm to

Defendants and others is outweighed by the threat of substantial harm caused by the

No. 09-4455 Babler, et al. v. Futhey, et al. Page 15

potential chilling effect on UTU members’ willingness to exercise their LMRDA rights.

The public interest weighs in favor of protecting Plaintiffs’ individual rights over

noninterference with the internal management of the UTU. Thus, the district court did

not abuse its discretion in granting Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.

AFFIRMED.