Wilkins v. Gaddy

Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 1

Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

JAMEY L. WILKINS v. OFFICER GADDY

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08–10914. Decided February 22, 2010

PER CURIAM.

In Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U. S. 1, 4 (1992), this

Court held that “the use of excessive physical force against

a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment

[even] when the inmate does not suffer serious injury.” In

this case, the District Court dismissed a prisoner’s exces

sive force claim based entirely on its determination that

his injuries were “de minimis.” Because the District

Court’s approach, affirmed on appeal, is at odds with

Hudson’s direction to decide excessive force claims based

on the nature of the force rather than the extent of the

injury, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the judg

ment is reversed.

I

In March 2008, petitioner Jamey Wilkins, a North

Carolina state prisoner, filed suit in the United States

District Court for the Western District of North Carolina

pursuant to 42 U. S. C. §1983. Wilkins’ pro se complaint

alleged that, on June 13, 2007, he was “maliciously and

sadistically” assaulted “[w]ithout any provocation” by a

corrections officer, respondent Gaddy.1 App. to Pet. for

Cert. C–4. According to the complaint, Gaddy, apparently

angered by Wilkins’ request for a grievance form,

“snatched [Wilkins] off the ground and slammed him onto

the concrete floor.” Ibid. Gaddy “then proceeded to punch,

kick, knee and choke [Wilkins] until another officer had to

——————

1 The materials in the record do not disclose Gaddy’s full name.

2 WILKINS v. GADDY

Per Curiam

physically remove him from [Wilkins].” Ibid. Wilkins

further alleged that, “[a]s a result of the excessive force

used by [Gaddy], [he] sustained multiple physical injuries

including a bruised heel, lower back pain, increased blood

pressure, as well as migraine headaches and dizziness”

and “psychological trauma and mental anguish including

depression, panic attacks and nightmares of the assault.”

Ibid.

The District Court, on its own motion and without a

response from Gaddy, dismissed Wilkins’ complaint for

failure to state a claim. Citing Circuit precedent, the court

stated that, “[i]n order to state an excessive force claim

under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish

that he received more than a de minimus [sic] injury.” No.

3:08–cv–00138 (WD NC, Apr. 16, 2008), pp. 1, 2 (citing

Taylor v. McDuffie, 155 F. 3d 479, 483 (CA4 1998); Riley v.

Dorton, 115 F. 3d 1159, 1166 (CA4 1997) (en banc); foot

note omitted). According to the court, Wilkins’ alleged

injuries were no more severe than those deemed de mini

mis in the Circuit’s Taylor and Riley decisions. Indeed,

the court noted, Wilkins nowhere asserted that his inju

ries had required medical attention.

In a motion for reconsideration, Wilkins stated that he

was unaware that the failure to allege medical treatment

might prejudice his claim. He asserted that he had been

prescribed, and continued to take, medication for his

headaches and back pain, as well as for depression. And

he attached medical records purporting to corroborate his

injuries and course of treatment.

Describing reconsideration as “an extraordinary rem

edy,” the court declined to revisit its previous ruling. No.

3:08–cv–00138 (WD NC, Aug. 25, 2008), p. 1. The medical

records, the court observed, indicated that some of Wil

kins’ alleged injuries “were pre-existing conditions.” Id.,

at 3. Wilkins had sought treatment for high blood pres

sure and mental health issues even before the assault.

Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 3

Per Curiam

The court acknowledged that Wilkins received an X ray

after the incident “to examine his ‘bruised heel,’ ” but it

“note[d] that bruising is generally considered a de mini

mus [sic] injury.” Id., at 4. The court similarly character

ized as de minimis Wilkins’ complaints of back pain and

headaches. The court denied Wilkins leave to amend his

complaint. In a summary disposition, the Court of Ap

peals affirmed “for the reasons stated by the district

court.” No. 08–7881 (CA4, Jan. 23, 2009).

II

In requiring what amounts to a showing of significant

injury in order to state an excessive force claim, the

Fourth Circuit has strayed from the clear holding of this

Court in Hudson. Like Wilkins, the prisoner in Hudson

filed suit under §1983 alleging that corrections officers

had used excessive force in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. Evidence indicated that the officers had

punched Hudson in the mouth, eyes, chest, and stomach

without justification, resulting in “minor bruises and

swelling of his face, mouth, and lip” as well as loosened

teeth and a cracked partial dental plate. 503 U. S., at 4.

A Magistrate Judge entered judgment in Hudson’s favor,

but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed,

holding that an inmate must prove “a significant injury” in

order to state an excessive force claim. Hudson v. McMil

lian, 929 F. 2d 1014, 1015 (1990) (per curiam). According

to the Court of Appeals, Hudson’s injuries, which had not

required medical attention, were too “minor” to warrant

relief. Ibid.

Reversing the Court of Appeals, this Court rejected the

notion that “significant injury” is a threshold requirement

for stating an excessive force claim. The “core judicial

inquiry,” we held, was not whether a certain quantum of

injury was sustained, but rather “whether force was ap

plied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore disci

4 WILKINS v. GADDY

Per Curiam

pline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” 503

U. S., at 7; see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U. S. 312, 319–

321 (1986). “When prison officials maliciously and sadisti

cally use force to cause harm,” the Court recognized, “con

temporary standards of decency always are violated . . .

whether or not significant injury is evident. Otherwise,

the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical pun

ishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting

less than some arbitrary quantity of injury.” Hudson, 503

U. S., at 9; see also id., at 13–14 (Blackmun, J., concurring

in judgment) (“The Court today appropriately puts to rest

a seriously misguided view that pain inflicted by an exces

sive use of force is actionable under the Eighth Amend

ment only when coupled with ‘significant injury,’ e.g.,

injury that requires medical attention or leaves perma

nent marks”).

This is not to say that the “absence of serious injury” is

irrelevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry. Id., at 7.

“[T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor

that may suggest ‘whether the use of force could plausibly

have been thought necessary’ in a particular situation.”

Ibid. (quoting Whitley, 475 U. S., at 321). The extent of

injury may also provide some indication of the amount of

force applied. As we stated in Hudson, not “every malevo

lent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of

action.” 503 U. S., at 9. “The Eighth Amendment’s prohi

bition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments necessarily

excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses

of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a

sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Ibid. (some

internal quotation marks omitted). An inmate who com

plains of a “push or shove” that causes no discernible

injury almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force

claim. Ibid. (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F. 2d 1028,

1033 (CA2 1973)).

Injury and force, however, are only imperfectly corre

Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 5

Per Curiam

lated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts. An in

mate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose

his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely be

cause he has the good fortune to escape without serious

injury. Accordingly, the Court concluded in Hudson that

the supposedly “minor” nature of the injuries “provide[d]

no basis for dismissal of [Hudson’s] §1983 claim” because

“the blows directed at Hudson, which caused bruises,

swelling, loosened teeth, and a cracked dental plate, are

not de minimis for Eighth Amendment purposes.” 503

U. S., at 10.

The allegations made by Wilkins in this case are quite

similar to the facts in Hudson, and the District Court’s

analysis closely resembles the approach Hudson dis

avowed. Wilkins alleged that he was punched, kicked,

kneed, choked, and body slammed “maliciously and sadis

tically” and “[w]ithout any provocation.” Dismissing Wil

kins’ action sua sponte, the District Court did not hold that

this purported assault, which allegedly left Wilkins with a

bruised heel, back pain, and other injuries requiring medi

cal treatment, involved de minimis force. Instead, the

court concluded that Wilkins had failed to state a claim

because “he simply has not alleged that he suffered any

thing more than de minimus [sic] injury.” No. 3:08–cv–

00138 (WD NC, Apr. 16, 2008), at 2.

In giving decisive weight to the purportedly de minimis

nature of Wilkins’ injuries, the District Court relied on two

Fourth Circuit cases. See Riley, 115 F. 3d, at 1166–1168;

Taylor, 155 F. 3d, at 483–485. Those cases, in turn, were

based upon the Fourth Circuit’s earlier decision in Nor

man v. Taylor, 25 F. 3d 1259 (1994) (en banc), which

approved the practice of using injury as a proxy for force.

According to the Fourth Circuit, Hudson “does not fore

close and indeed is consistent with [the] view . . . that,

absent the most extraordinary circumstances, a plaintiff

cannot prevail on an Eighth Amendment excessive force

6 WILKINS v. GADDY

Per Curiam

claim if his injuries are de minimis.” 25 F. 3d, at 1263.

The Fourth Circuit’s strained reading of Hudson is not

defensible. This Court’s decision did not, as the Fourth

Circuit would have it, merely serve to lower the injury

threshold for excessive force claims from “significant” to

“non-de minimis”—whatever those ill-defined terms might

mean. Instead, the Court aimed to shift the “core judicial

inquiry” from the extent of the injury to the nature of the

force—specifically, whether it was nontrivial and “was

applied . . . maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”

503 U. S., at 7. To conclude, as the District Court did

here, that the absence of “some arbitrary quantity of

injury” requires automatic dismissal of an excessive force

claim improperly bypasses this core inquiry. Id., at 9.2

——————

2 MostCircuits to consider the issue have rejected the Fourth Cir

cuit’s de minimis injury requirement. See, e.g., Wright v. Goord, 554

F. 3d 255, 269–270 (CA2 2009) (“[O]ur Court has reversed summary

dismissals of Eighth Amendment claims of excessive force even where

the plaintiff’s evidence of injury was slight . . . . [T]he absence of any

significant injury to [the plaintiff] does not end the Eighth Amendment

inquiry, for our standards of decency are violated even in the absence of

such injury if the defendant’s use of force was malicious or sadistic”);

Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F. 3d 641, 648–649 (CA3 2002) (“[T]he Eighth

Amendment analysis must be driven by the extent of the force and the

circumstances in which it is applied; not by the resulting injuries. . . .

[D]e minimis injuries do not necessarily establish de minimis force”);

Oliver v. Keller, 289 F. 3d 623, 628 (CA9 2002) (rejecting the view “that

to support an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim a prisoner must

have suffered from the excessive force a more than de minimis physical

injury” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. LaVallee,

439 F. 3d 670, 687 (CA10 2006) (same).

The Fifth Circuit has sometimes used language indicating agreement

with the Fourth Circuit’s approach. See, e.g., Gomez v. Chandler, 163

F. 3d 921, 924 (1999) (“[T]o support an Eighth Amendment excessive

force claim a prisoner must have suffered from the excessive force a

more than de minimis injury”). But see Brown v. Lippard, 472 F. 3d

384, 386 (2006) (“This Court has never directly held that injuries must

reach beyond some arbitrary threshold to satisfy an excessive force

claim”). Even in the Fifth Circuit, however, Wilkins likely would have

Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 7

Per Curiam

In holding that the District Court erred in dismissing

Wilkins’ complaint based on the supposedly de minimis

nature of his injuries, we express no view on the underly

ing merits of his excessive force claim. In order to prevail,

Wilkins will ultimately have to prove not only that the

assault actually occurred but also that it was carried out

“maliciously and sadistically” rather than as part of “a

good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.” Ibid.

Moreover, even if Wilkins succeeds, the relatively modest

nature of his alleged injuries will no doubt limit the dam

ages he may recover.

* * *

The petition for certiorari and the motion for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The judgment of

the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

——————

survived dismissal for failure to state a claim because that court’s

precedents have classified the sort of injuries alleged here as non-de

minimis. See, e.g., ibid. (permitting a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment

excessive force claim to proceed to trial where evidence indicated that

the prisoner suffered “one-centimeter abrasions on both his left knee

and left shoulder, pain in his right knee, and tenderness around his left

thumb,” as well as “back problems”); Gomez, 163 F. 3d, at 922 (refusing

to grant summary judgment on de minimis injury grounds where the

prisoner alleged “physical pain [and] bodily injuries in the form of cuts,

scrapes, [and] contusions to the face, head, and body”).

Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 1

THOMAS, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

JAMEY L. WILKINS v. OFFICER GADDY

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08–10914. Decided February 22, 2010

JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom Justice Scalia joins, con

curring in the judgment.

I agree with the Court that the Fourth Circuit’s Eighth

Amendment analysis is inconsistent with Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U. S. 1 (1992). But I continue to believe

that Hudson was wrongly decided. Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U. S. 89, 95 (2007) (dissenting opinion); Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U. S. 825, 858 (1994) (opinion concurring in

judgment); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U. S. 25, 37 (1993)

(dissenting opinion); Hudson, supra, at 17 (dissenting

opinion).

“At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, the

word ‘punishment’ referred to the penalty imposed for the

commission of a crime.” Helling, supra, at 38 (THOMAS, J.,

dissenting). The Court adhered to this understanding

until 1976, when it declared in Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U. S. 97, that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause

also extends to prison conditions not imposed as part of a

criminal sentence. See generally Hudson, supra, at 18–20

(THOMAS, J., dissenting); Farmer, supra, at 861 (THOMAS,

J., concurring in judgment). To limit this abrupt expan

sion of the Clause, the Court specified that its new inter

pretation of the Eighth Amendment should not extend to

every deprivation a prisoner suffers, but instead should

apply “only [to] that narrow class of deprivations involving

‘serious’ injury inflicted by prison officials acting with a

culpable state of mind.” Hudson, supra, at 20 (THOMAS,

J., dissenting) (citing Estelle, supra, at 106); see generally

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U. S. 294, 298 (1991).

2 WILKINS v. GADDY

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

Hudson, however, discarded the requirement of serious

injury. Building upon Estelle’s mislaid foundation, the

Court concluded that force, rather than injury, is the

relevant inquiry, and that a prisoner who alleges excessive

force at the hands of prison officials and suffers nothing

more than de minimis injury can state a claim under the

Eighth Amendment. Hudson thus turned the Eighth

Amendment into “a National Code of Prison Regulation,”

503 U. S., at 28 (THOMAS, J., dissenting); Farmer, 511

U. S., at 859 (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment), with

“federal judges [acting as] superintendents of prison condi

tions nationwide,” id., at 860. Although neither the Con

stitution nor our precedents require this result, no party

to this case asks us to overrule Hudson. Accordingly, I

concur in the Court’s judgment.