Walker v. Scott

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-10278

Summary Calendar

STEPHEN CLAYTON WALKER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

WAYNE SCOTT, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF

CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, Official

and Individual Capacity; THOMAS BAKER, Official and

Individual Capacity; ELVIS HIGHTOWER, Official and

Individual Capacity; STATE OF TEXAS, a Municipal Corpor-

ation; RICKY NEWMAN, Official and Individual Capacity;

DAVID COLE, Official and Individual Capacity; JOHN DOE,

1-5; JANE DOE, 1-5,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

(3:97-CV-1044-H)

March 8, 1999

Before POLITZ, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Stephen Clayton Walker appeals adverse judgments in his 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 actions against the State of Texas and four Texas corrections officials

arising out of his confinement in the Hutchins State Jail Facility. For the reasons

*

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

assigned we affirm the dismissals under the eleventh amendment and the

adverse summary judgment.

Background

Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, Walker sued the State of Texas

and the several officials in their official and individual capacities, alleging that

while an inmate in the Hutchins facility in 1995 the temperatures therein

exceeded 115 degrees, there was poor ventilation, and sewerage seeped into the

living quarters, attracting insects. He alleged that because of these conditions

he developed severe rashes on his body and became nauseated and dizzy. He

further alleged that the defendants were aware of these conditions and willfully

disregarded his rights in failing to correct them.

The court dismissed the claims against the State of Texas and the

defendants in their official capacities based on eleventh amendment immunity.1

The individual defendants sought and secured summary judgment, dismissing

the claims against them personally, for failure of proof that they had been

deliberately indifferent to Walker’s conditions of confinement. Walker timely

appealed.

Analysis

Walker first contends that the district court erred in dismissing the action

against the state and against the individuals in their official capacity. We do not

1

Walker attempted to appeal the district court’s order of dismissal; a panel of this

court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the dismissal of the

defendants did not qualify as an appealable final judgment. Walker v. Scott,

No. 97-11151 (5th Cir. April 15, 1998).

2

agree. The eleventh amendment bars federal court suits against states by private

citizens except where a state has waived its immunity, or where Congress, in

implementing its legislation clearly has abrogated the states’ immunity.2 Texas

has not waived its immunity from suit in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions, 3 nor has

Congress abrogated immunity of the states in enacting this legislation.4 Further,

because claims against state employees in their official capacity are considered

claims against their office, these claims are barred for the same reasons. 5

Walker next contends that the district court erred in granting defendants

summary judgment in their individual capacities. Specifically, he contends that

he presented sufficient competent evidence of an eighth amendment violation

to withstand summary judgment. Our review of the record and the briefs,

however, persuades that the district court correctly granted summary judgment.

One seeking to establish a violation of the eighth amendment’s duty to provide

humane conditions of confinement must show both a serious deprivation and a

sufficiently culpable state of mind of the prison authorities.6 A sufficiently

culpable mindset exists only when a prison official is deliberately indifferent to

the deprivation, i.e., has subjective knowledge of and disregards an excessive

2

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445

(1976).

3

Brandley v. Keeshan, 64 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1995).

4

Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).

5

Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).

6

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).

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risk to inmate health and safety.7 The summary judgment record contains no

competent evidence that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference

toward Walker’s conditions of confinement.

We likewise find no merit in Walker’s claims that the trial court erred by

acting without providing notice, by disallowing discovery, and by denying him

an opportunity to amend his complaint. The record reflects that Walker was

given notice and an opportunity to respond to the motion for summary judgment

but opted otherwise, and that he never requested discovery. As to the denial of

amending the complaint, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the court’s

refusal to permit Walker to amend his complaint for the second time in order to

add unidentified parties.8

Finally, we reject as frivolous Walker’s contentions that the clerk of court

failed to enter defaults against two defendants and that the court erred in

assessing attorney’s fees against him. The clerk entered the requested defaults

and the court has not assessed fees against Walker.

The judgments appealed are AFFIRMED.

7

Farmer.

8

See, e.g., Halbert v. City of Sherman, Texas, 33 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 1994).

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