Benefield v. C.O. McDowall

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

PUBLISH

MAR 5 2001

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

LONNIE BENEFIELD,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 00-1097

C.O. McDOWALL, in her individual

and official capacities,

Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

(D.C. No. 98-S-739)

Lonnie Benefield, pro se.

Thomas L. Strickland, U.S. Attorney, and Martha A. Paluch, Assistant U.S.

Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before EBEL , KELLY , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.

KELLY , Circuit Judge.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Defendant-Appellant C. O. McDowall appeals the district court’s ruling

denying her qualified immunity in this action brought by Plaintiff-Appellee

Lonnie Benefield pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal

Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Specifically, Ms. McDowall contends

that the district court erred in denying her motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint

alleging that she had labeled him a “snitch,” thus exposing him to harm at the

hands of other inmates. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, see

Johnson v. Jones , 515 U.S. 304, 311-12 (1995), and we affirm.

I.

On April 1, 1998, Plaintiff, while incarcerated at the United States

Penitentiary in Florence, Colorado, 1

filed his original complaint against Warden

Joel H. Knowles, Correctional Officer McDowall, and a Bureau of Prisons

employee, Mr. Feltz. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he was disciplined

and placed in administrative segregation in January 1998 by Mr. Knowles and Mr.

Feltz, based on false charges brought by Ms. McDowall. On May 4, 1998, the

district court dismissed the claims against Mr. Knowles and Mr. Feltz as legally

1

Plaintiff subsequently was transferred to the United States Penitentiary in

Atlanta, Georgia in late 1998.

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frivolous and ordered Plaintiff to file an amended complaint identifying and

clarifying his claims against Defendant McDowall.

On September 1, 1998, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging that

Ms. McDowall labeled him a “snitch” to other inmates, conspired to have him

attacked or killed by other inmates because of his reputation as a snitch, and filed

a false incident report resulting in his discipline and placement in administrative

segregation. Ms. McDowall filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against

her in her official capacity based on sovereign immunity, and to dismiss

Plaintiff’s claims against her in her individual capacity for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted and on qualified immunity grounds.

On December 10, 1999, the magistrate judge recommended that Ms.

McDowall’s motion be granted as to Plaintiff’s claims against her in her official

capacity, but denied as to Plaintiff’s claims against her in her individual capacity.

In so recommending, the magistrate judge relied on this court’s decision in

Northington v. Marin , 102 F.3d 1564 (10th Cir. 1996), to find that labeling a

prisoner a snitch violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights under the Eighth

Amendment, and that the law was clearly established in this circuit at the time the

alleged offense occurred. Following consideration of the objections of both

parties and de novo review, the district court issued an order adopting the

recommendations of the magistrate judge. In its order, the district court

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concluded that Plaintiff’s allegation that Ms. McDowall deliberately exposed him

to harm at the hands of other inmates by labeling him a snitch stated an Eighth

Amendment violation which “[a]t this stage of the proceedings . . . survives

[McDowall’s] assertion of qualified immunity.” Aplt. Br., Att. 1 at 5. For the

following reasons, we agree.

II.

A denial of qualified immunity that accepts the plaintiff’s version of the

facts and concludes that given those facts, the defendant violated clearly

established law is immediately appealable because it presents for appellate review

an abstract legal issue, rather than a mere factual dispute. Johnson v. Martin , 195

F.3d 1208, 1214-15 (10th Cir. 1999). We review the denial of a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss de novo, applying the same standard as the district court.

Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind , 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir.

1999). “We accept the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and

construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Ramirez v. Dep’t of

Corrections , 222 F.3d 1238, 1240 (10th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). A

complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) “unless it appears beyond

doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief.” Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 45-46

(1957)). We no longer apply a “heightened pleading standard” to Plaintiff’s

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complaint even though Ms. McDowall has asserted a defense of qualified

immunity. See Currier v. Doran, Nos. 99-2287, 99-2288, 2000 WL 202045, at

(10th Cir. Mar. 1, 2001). The issue before us is whether the allegations in the

complaint establish the violation of a constitutional right, and if so, whether that

right was clearly established. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991).

III.

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff asserted that Ms. McDowall put him in

danger of attack or even death at the hands of other inmates by circulating rumors

that he was a snitch and by showing other inmates a letter he allegedly wrote,

indicating that he was giving information to the prison investigations staff.

He further alleged that Ms. McDowall fabricated an incident report accusing

Plaintiff of engaging in a sexual act, resulting in his placement in administrative

segregation. 2

“[P]rison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the

hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (citation

omitted, alteration in original). “A prison official’s deliberate indifference to a

substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.” Id.

2

This latter claim was dismissed by the district court as failing to state a

claim. Plaintiff does not appeal this decision.

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at 828 (internal quotations omitted). In Farmer , the Supreme Court clarified the

“deliberate indifference” standard, explicitly rejecting a purely objective test and

holding that the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard has a

subjective component. Id. at 837. A prison official who “knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety” is deliberately indifferent

for these purposes. Id. Therefore, in order to establish a cognizable Eighth

Amendment claim for failure to protect, a plaintiff “must show that he is

incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” the

objective component, and that the prison official was deliberately indifferent to

his safety, the subjective component. Id. at 834; see also Northington , 102 F.3d

at 1567.

There is no dispute that the law in this circuit addressing this issue was

well-established at the time of defendant’s conduct. In Northington , we

specifically held that labeling an inmate a snitch satisfies the Farmer standard,

and constitutes deliberate indifference to the safety of that inmate. Northington,

102 F.3d at 1567. Other circuits have also recognized that labeling an inmate a

snitch has the potential for great harm and may violate constitutional guarantees.

See Valandingham v. Bojorquez , 866 F.2d 1135, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 1989)

(reversing grant of summary judgment for defendants where inmate produced

evidence tending to show prison officials called him a snitch in order to subject

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him to life-threatening retaliation by other inmates); Harmon v. Berry , 728 F.2d

1407, 1409 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (holding that claim that prison officials

labeled inmate a snitch, thereby exposing him to inmate retaliation, could not be

dismissed before service); Gullatte v. Potts , 654 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 1981)

(remanding Eighth Amendment snitch claim to determine whether defendant knew

or should have known danger associated with snitch label and whether defendant

took reasonable steps to protect inmate from that danger); see also Reece v.

Groose , 60 F.3d 487, 488 (8th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that reputation as a snitch

places inmate “at a substantial risk of injury at [other inmates’] hands”).

Therefore, if we accept as true Plaintiff’s allegations that Ms. McDowall labeled

him a snitch, that the label was communicated to other inmates, and that she was

aware of the obvious danger associated with a reputation as a snitch, clearly

established law provides that Ms. McDowall violated Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights under the Eighth Amendment.

The government attempts to distinguish Northington by arguing that it turns

on the fact that the inmate actually was assaulted after being labeled a snitch.

E.g. Aplt Br. at 8; see also Dawes v. Walker, No. 99-252, 2000 WL 109374, at * 5

(2d Cir. Feb. 8, 2001) . According to the government, “extreme deprivations are

required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim,” Aplt. Br. at 13 (quoting

Hudson v. McMillian , 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)), and the mere risk of harm by other

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inmates is insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim. Further, absent

physical attacks or threats by other inmates, the government contends that

labeling an inmate a snitch is merely “an assertion of verbal harassment.” Aplt.

Br. at 13. The government relies upon a line of Seventh Circuit cases holding

that “psychological injury” caused by living in fear of other inmates is not

compensable under the Eighth Amendment. See Doe v. Welborn , 110 F.3d 520,

523-24 (7th Cir. 1997); Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 272-73 (7th Cir. 1996).

Suffering physical assaults while in prison is not “part of the penalty that

criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Rhodes v. Chapman ,

452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Thus, our holding is not inconsistent with the Hudson

Court’s statements that “extreme deprivations” are required for a conditions-of-

confinement claim and that “routine discomfort” or deliberate indifference to non-

serious medical needs will not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. In order to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth

Amendment violation, an inmate must therefore show “that he is incarcerated

under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at

834 (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that the Eighth Amendment does

not reach official conduct that “is sure or very likely to cause” serious injury at

the hands of other inmates. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (“We

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have great difficulty agreeing that prison authorities may not be deliberately

indifferent to an inmate’s current health problems but may ignore a condition of

confinement that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless

suffering the next week or month or year.”); accord Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d

559, 572 (10th Cir. 1980) (“[A]n inmate does have a right to be reasonably

protected from constant threats of violence and sexual assaults from other

inmates. Moreover, he does not need to wait until he is actually assaulted before

obtaining relief.”) (citations omitted); Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889, 890

(4th Cir. 1973) (same). The government’s argument that the mere risk of harm is

insufficient to establish the objective component of an Eighth Amendment

violation is precisely the position taken by the dissent in Helling v. McKinney.

See 509 U.S. at 37 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

There is no question that damages are possible where an inmate has been

assaulted due to being labeled as a snitch. Northington, 102 F.3d at 1567. The

more difficult question is whether damages will lie in the absence of physical

injury. Though injunctive relief will surely lie, see Helling, 509 U.S. at 33, we

believe that a violation of the Eighth Amendment does not turn on the type relief

sought. 3 Moreover, we are in accord with Justice Blackmun’s views in Hudson v.

3

The government does not argue that damages are barred by 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(e), which provides that a federal civil action may not be brought by an

(continued...)

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McMillian, 503 U.S. at 16-17 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment), that the

Eighth Amendment may be implicated not only to physical injury, but also by the

infliction of psychological harm. The actual extent of any physical injury, threats

or psychological injury is pertinent in proving a substantial risk of serious harm.

At this point, construing Plaintiff’s pro se pleadings liberally, see Hall v.

Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991), we hold that the district court was

correct in finding the Plaintiff’s allegations sufficient to survive Ms. McDowall’s

motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity.

AFFIRMED.

3

(...continued)

inmate “for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior

showing of physical injury.” See Perkins v. Kansas Dep’t of Corrections, 165

F.3d 803, 808 n.6 (10th Cir. 1999) (suggesting that § 1997e(e) would not bar

nominal or punitive damages in a constitutional tort case).

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