not knowing whether 24 an individual was armed is a factor that could allow an officer to reasonably fear for her safety
How later courts described this case
- not knowing whether 24 an individual was armed is a factor that could allow an officer to reasonably fear for her safety
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 21 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
THOMAS EDWARD DESKINS, No. 09-35519
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:08-cv-05127-RBL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CITY OF BREMERTON,
Defendant,
and
KRISTA HEDSTROM, a Washington
State Trooper, as an individual,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 14, 2010
Seattle, Washington
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Before: RYMER and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and HART, Senior District
Judge.**
Thomas Deskins appeals the summary judgment on his claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Krista Hedstrom. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
I
Hedstrom’s decision to stop Deskins was reasonable. She observed him
driving continuously in the left lane on a two-lane divided highway in violation of
RCW 46.61.100, which Washington categorizes as a “traffic infraction,” see RCW
46.63.020. See also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 808, 810 (1996) (“As a
general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police
have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”).
II
We also agree with the district court that Hedstrom is entitled to qualified
immunity with respect to Deskins’s arrest. No clearly established law would have
alerted a reasonable officer that she lacked probable cause to arrest Deskins for
**
The Honorable William T. Hart, Senior United States District Judge
for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
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obstruction under RCW 9A.76.020 when he ignored several commands and was
slow in responding to others.
III
Nor did Hedstrom use excessive force. She could reasonably fear for her
safety as she was alone with Deskins on a dark highway with little traffic; he failed
to remain in his vehicle, despite Hedstrom’s instructions; his behavior from the
initial encounter on was unusual; he was much larger than Hedstrom; and she did
not know whether Deskins was armed or not. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 396 (1989); see also Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994). She
also had no way of knowing whether Deskins had a hearing problem. But even if
Hedstrom’s conduct were unconstitutional, the law was not clearly established that
drawing a weapon in the circumstances amounted to excessive force. Compare
Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002). Hedstrom is thus
entitled to qualified immunity.
AFFIRMED.
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