Opinion

Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

  • 555 U.S. 7
  • 21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 547
  • 77 U.S.L.W. 4001
  • 39 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20279
  • 67 ERC (BNA) 1225
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
Nov 12, 2008
Status
Published
On the bench
Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, Breyer, Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter
Cited by
12,635 cases
Authority
More cited than 96.7%

Questioned by ALLIANCE FOR WILD ROCKIES v. Cottrell, 613 F.3d 960 (2010)

explaining the judicial role in determining preemption as ’ Even if a statute was ambiguous as to complete preemption, the presumption against preemption would override any agency interpretation to the contrary. See Pharm. Rsch. & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 , 681 n.4 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (“[T]he presumption against pre-emption should ordinarily prevent a court from concluding that the state law is pre-empted.”). 20 “independent” from agency conclusions, even those issued in binding form

How later courts described this case

  • explaining the judicial role in determining preemption as ’ Even if a statute was ambiguous as to complete preemption, the presumption against preemption would override any agency interpretation to the contrary. See Pharm. Rsch. & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 , 681 n.4 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (“[T]he presumption against pre-emption should ordinarily prevent a court from concluding that the state law is pre-empted.”). 20 “independent” from agency conclusions, even those issued in binding form
  • holding that, even where a likelihood of success on the merits is established, a mere “possibility” of irreparable injury is insufficient to warrant preliminary injunctive relief, because “[ijssuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with [the Supreme Court’s] characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief’
  • stating that in order to obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) the plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in the plaintiffs favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest
  • holding that, where the Navy’s most senior officers underscored the threat posed by enemy submarines and the need for extensive sonar training to counter this threat, plaintiffs who had claimed that the sonar was causing serious injuries to some marine mammals were not entitled to a preliminary injunction restricting the training

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Questioned by ALLIANCE FOR WILD ROCKIES v. Cottrell, 613 F.3d 960 (2010)

    The majority opinion in Winter did not, however, explicitly discuss the continuing validity of the "sliding scale" approach to preliminary injunctions employed by this circuit and others.
    Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitJul 28, 2010Read it
  • Questioned by Pamlab, LLC v. Macoven Pharmaceuticals, LLC, 881 F. Supp. 2d 470 (2012)

    In Winter, the Supreme Court cast some doubt on the continuing viability of “serious questions” prong of this standard, which “permits a district court to grant a preliminary injunction in situations where it cannot determine with certainty that the moving party is more likely than not to prevail on the merits of the underlying claims, but where the costs outweigh th
    District Court, S.D. New YorkJun 29, 2012Read it
  • Questioned by Davis v. Billington, 76 F. Supp. 3d 59 (2014)

    555 U.S. 7, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008), to cast doubt on the continued validity of the sliding-scale approach.
    District Court, District of ColumbiaDec 19, 2014Read it
  • Questioned by Qualcomm Inc. v. Compal Elecs., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 3d 905 (2017)

    Winter 's holding, therefore, called into question the "continuing validity of the 'sliding scale' approach to preliminary injunctions" long employed by the Ninth Circuit.
    District Court, S.D. CaliforniaSep 7, 2017Read it
  • Questioned by Mott Thoroughbred Stables, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 87 F. Supp. 3d 237 (2015)

    555 U.S. 7, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008), to cast doubt on the continued validity of the sliding-scale approach.
    District Court, District of ColumbiaApr 8, 2015Read it

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by Buzz Bee Toys, Inc. v. Swimways Corp., 20 F. Supp. 3d 483 (2014)

    ” Id. Plaintiff argues that Winter is distinguishable because “that case did not involve trademark or trade dress or intellectual property.
    District Court, D. New JerseyMay 15, 2014Read it

The opinion

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2008 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

WINTER, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, ET AL. v NATU-

RAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 07–1239. Argued October 8, 2008—Decided November 12, 2008

Antisubmarine warfare is one of the Navy’s highest priorities. The

Navy’s fleet faces a significant threat from modern diesel-electric

submarines, which are extremely difficult to detect and track because

they can operate almost silently. The most effective tool for identify

ing submerged diesel-electric submarines is active sonar, which emits

pulses of sound underwater and then receives the acoustic waves that

echo off the target. Active sonar is a complex technology, and sonar

operators must undergo extensive training to become proficient in its

use.

This case concerns the Navy’s use of “mid-frequency active” (MFA)

sonar during integrated training exercises in the waters off southern

California (SOCAL). In these exercises, ships, submarines, and air

craft train together as members of a “strike group.” Due to the im

portance of antisubmarine warfare, a strike group may not be certi

fied for deployment until it demonstrates proficiency in the use of

active sonar to detect, track, and neutralize enemy submarines.

The SOCAL waters contain at least 37 species of marine mammals.

The plaintiffs—groups and individuals devoted to the protection of

marine mammals and ocean habitats—assert that MFA sonar causes

serious injuries to these animals. The Navy disputes that claim, not

ing that MFA sonar training in SOCAL waters has been conducted

for 40 years without a single documented sonar-related injury to any

marine mammal. Plaintiffs sued the Navy, seeking declaratory and

injunctive relief on the grounds that the training exercises violated

the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) and other

federal laws; in particular, plaintiffs contend that the Navy should

have prepared an environmental impact statement (EIS) before con

2 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE

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Syllabus

ducting the latest round of SOCAL exercises.

The District Court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting the

Navy from using MFA sonar during its training exercises. The Court

of Appeals held that this injunction was overbroad and remanded to

the District Court for a narrower remedy. The District Court then

entered another preliminary injunction, imposing six restrictions on

the Navy’s use of sonar during its SOCAL training exercises. As

relevant to this case, the injunction required the Navy to shut down

MFA sonar when a marine mammal was spotted within 2,200 yards

of a vessel, and to power down sonar by 6 decibels during conditions

known as “surface ducting.”

The Navy then sought relief from the Executive Branch. The

Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) authorized the Navy to im

plement “alternative arrangements” to NEPA compliance in light of

“emergency circumstances.” The CEQ allowed the Navy to continue

its training exercises under voluntary mitigation procedures that the

Navy had previously adopted.

The Navy moved to vacate the District Court’s preliminary injunc

tion in light of the CEQ’s actions. The District Court refused to do so,

and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals held that

there was a serious question whether the CEQ’s interpretation of the

“emergency circumstances” regulation was lawful, that plaintiffs had

carried their burden of establishing a “possibility” of irreparable in

jury, and that the preliminary injunction was appropriate because

the balance of hardships and consideration of the public interest fa

vored the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals emphasized that any

negative impact of the injunction on the Navy’s training exercises

was “speculative,” and determined that (1) the 2,200-yard shutdown

zone was unlikely to affect naval operations, because MFA sonar sys

tems are often shut down during training exercises; and (2) the

power-down requirement during surface ducting conditions was not

unreasonable, because such conditions are rare and the Navy has

previously certified strike groups not trained under these conditions.

Held: The preliminary injunction is vacated to the extent challenged by

the Navy. The balance of equities and the public interest—which

were barely addressed by the District Court—tip strongly in favor of

the Navy. The Navy’s need to conduct realistic training with active

sonar to respond to the threat posed by enemy submarines plainly

outweighs the interests advanced by the plaintiffs. Pp. 10–24.

(a) The lower courts held that when a plaintiff demonstrates a

strong likelihood of success on the merits, a preliminary injunction

may be entered based only on a “possibility” of irreparable harm.

The “possibility” standard is too lenient. This Court’s frequently reit

erated standard requires plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief to dem

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) 3

Syllabus

onstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunc

tion.

Even if plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable in

jury, such injury is outweighed by the public interest and the Navy’s

interest in effective, realistic training of its sailors. For the same

reason, it is unnecessary to address the lower courts’ holding that

plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success on the merits.

Pp. 10–14.

(b) A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never

awarded as of right. In each case, courts must balance the competing

claims of injury and consider the effect of granting or withholding the

requested relief, paying particular regard to the public consequences.

Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S. 305, 312. Military interests

do not always trump other considerations, and the Court has not held

that they do, but courts must give deference to the professional

judgment of military authorities concerning the relative importance

of a particular military interest. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U. S.

503, 507.

Here, the record contains declarations from some of the Navy’s

most senior officers, all of whom underscored the threat posed by en

emy submarines and the need for extensive sonar training to counter

this threat. Those officers emphasized that realistic training cannot

be accomplished under the two challenged restrictions imposed by

the District Court—the 2,200-yard shutdown zone and the power

down requirement during surface ducting conditions. The use of

MFA sonar under realistic conditions during training exercises is

clearly of the utmost importance to the Navy and the Nation. The

Court does not question the importance of plaintiffs’ ecological, scien

tific, and recreational interests, but it concludes that the balance of

equities and consideration of the overall public interest tip strongly

in favor of the Navy. The determination of where the public interest

lies in this case does not strike the Court as a close question. Pp. 14–

16.

(c) The lower courts’ justifications for entering the preliminary in

junction are not persuasive. Pp. 16–21.

(1) The District Court did not give serious consideration to the

balance of equities and the public interest. The Court of Appeals did

consider these factors and conclude that the Navy’s concerns about

the preliminary injunction were “speculative.” But that is almost al

ways the case when a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to alter a defen

dant’s conduct. The lower courts failed properly to defer to senior

Navy officers’ specific, predictive judgments about how the prelimi

nary injunction would reduce the effectiveness of the Navy’s SOCAL

training exercises. Pp. 16–17.

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Syllabus

(2) The District Court abused its discretion by requiring the

Navy to shut down MFA sonar when a marine mammal is spotted

within 2,200 yards of a sonar-emitting vessel. The Court of Appeals

concluded that the zone would not be overly burdensome because ma

rine mammal sightings during training exercises are relatively rare.

But regardless of the frequency of such sightings, the injunction will

increase the radius of the shutdown zone from 200 to 2,200 yards,

which expands its surface area by a factor of over 100. Moreover, be

cause training scenarios can take several days to develop, each addi

tional shutdown can result in the loss of several days’ worth of train

ing. The Court of Appeals also concluded that the shutdown zone

would not be overly burdensome because the Navy had shut down

MFA sonar several times during prior exercises when marine mam

mals were spotted well beyond the Navy’s self-imposed 200-yard

zone. But the court ignored undisputed evidence that these volun

tary shutdowns only occurred during tactically insignificant times.

Pp. 18–20.

(3) The District Court also abused its discretion by requiring the

Navy to power down MFA sonar by 6 decibels during significant sur

face ducting conditions. When surface ducting occurs, active sonar

becomes more useful near the surface, but less effective at greater

depths. Diesel-electric submariners are trained to take advantage of

these distortions to avoid being detected by sonar. The Court of Ap

peals concluded that the power-down requirement was reasonable

because surface ducting occurs relatively rarely, and the Navy has

previously certified strike groups that did not train under such condi

tions. This reasoning is backwards. Given that surface ducting is

both rare and unpredictable, it is especially important for the Navy to

be able to train under these conditions when they occur. Pp. 20–21.

(4) The Navy has previously taken voluntary measures to ad

dress concerns about marine mammals, and has chosen not to chal

lenge four other restrictions imposed by the District Court in this

case. But that hardly means that other, more intrusive restrictions

pose no threat to preparedness for war. The Court of Appeals noted

that the Navy could return to the District Court to seek modification

of the preliminary injunction if it actually resulted in an inability to

train. The Navy is not required to wait until it is unable to train suf

ficient forces for national defense before seeking dissolution of the

preliminary injunction. By then it may be too late. P. 21.

(d) This Court does not address the underlying merits of plaintiffs’

claims, but the foregoing analysis makes clear that it would also be

an abuse of discretion to enter a permanent injunction along the

same lines as the preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs’ ultimate legal

claim is that the Navy must prepare an EIS, not that it must cease

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) 5

Syllabus

sonar training. There is accordingly no basis for enjoining such train

ing pending preparation of an EIS—if one is determined to be re

quired—when doing so is credibly alleged to pose a serious threat to

national security. There are many other remedial tools available, in

cluding declaratory relief or an injunction specifically tailored to

preparation of an EIS, that do not carry such dire consequences.

Pp. 21–23.

518 F. 3d 658, reversed; preliminary injunction vacated in part.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SCALIA,

KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed an opinion

concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which STEVENS, J., joined

as to Part I. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER,

J., joined.

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 07–1239

_________________

DONALD C. WINTER, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,

ET AL., PETITIONERS v. NATURAL RESOURCES

DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[November 12, 2008]

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the

Court.

“To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual

means of preserving peace.” 1 Messages and Papers of the

Presidents 57 (J. Richardson comp. 1897). So said George

Washington in his first Annual Address to Congress, 218

years ago. One of the most important ways the Navy

prepares for war is through integrated training exercises

at sea. These exercises include training in the use of

modern sonar to detect and track enemy submarines,

something the Navy has done for the past 40 years. The

plaintiffs complained that the Navy’s sonar training pro

gram harmed marine mammals, and that the Navy should

have prepared an environmental impact statement before

commencing its latest round of training exercises. The

Court of Appeals upheld a preliminary injunction impos

ing restrictions on the Navy’s sonar training, even though

that court acknowledged that “the record contains no

evidence that marine mammals have been harmed” by the

Navy’s exercises. 518 F. 3d 658, 696 (CA9 2008).

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Opinion of the Court

The Court of Appeals was wrong, and its decision is

reversed.

I

The Navy deploys its forces in “strike groups,” which are

groups of surface ships, submarines, and aircraft centered

around either an aircraft carrier or an amphibious assault

ship. App. to Pet. for Cert. (Pet. App.) 316a–317a. Seam

less coordination among strike-group assets is critical.

Before deploying a strike group, the Navy requires exten

sive integrated training in analysis and prioritization of

threats, execution of military missions, and maintenance

of force protection. App. 110–111.

Antisubmarine warfare is currently the Pacific Fleet’s

top war-fighting priority. Pet. App. 270a–271a. Modern

diesel-electric submarines pose a significant threat to

Navy vessels because they can operate almost silently,

making them extremely difficult to detect and track.

Potential adversaries of the United States possess at least

300 of these submarines. App. 571.

The most effective technology for identifying submerged

diesel-electric submarines within their torpedo range is

active sonar, which involves emitting pulses of sound

underwater and then receiving the acoustic waves that

echo off the target. Pet. App. 266a–267a, 274a. Active

sonar is a particularly useful tool because it provides both

the bearing and the distance of target submarines; it is

also sensitive enough to allow the Navy to track enemy

submarines that are quieter than the surrounding marine

environment.1 This case concerns the Navy’s use of “mid

frequency active” (MFA) sonar, which transmits sound

——————

1 In contrast, passive sonar “listens” for sound waves but does not

introduce sound into the water. Passive sonar is not effective for

tracking diesel-electric submarines because those vessels can operate

almost silently. Passive sonar also has a more limited range than

active sonar, and cannot identify the exact location of an enemy subma

rine. Pet. App. 266a–271a.

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) 3

Opinion of the Court

waves at frequencies between 1 kHz and 10 kHz.

Not surprisingly, MFA sonar is a complex technology,

and sonar operators must undergo extensive training to

become proficient in its use. Sonar reception can be af

fected by countless different factors, including the time of

day, water density, salinity, currents, weather conditions,

and the contours of the sea floor. Id., at 278a–279a.

When working as part of a strike group, sonar operators

must be able to coordinate with other Navy ships and

planes while avoiding interference. The Navy conducts

regular training exercises under realistic conditions to

ensure that sonar operators are thoroughly skilled in its

use in a variety of situations.

The waters off the coast of southern California (SOCAL)

are an ideal location for conducting integrated training

exercises, as this is the only area on the west coast that is

relatively close to land, air, and sea bases, as well as

amphibious landing areas. App. 141–142. At issue in this

case are the Composite Training Unit Exercises and the

Joint Tactical Force Exercises, in which individual naval

units (ships, submarines, and aircraft) train together as

members of a strike group. A strike group cannot be

certified for deployment until it has successfully completed

the integrated training exercises, including a demonstra

tion of its ability to operate under simulated hostile condi

tions. Id., at 564–565. In light of the threat posed by

enemy submarines, all strike groups must demonstrate

proficiency in antisubmarine warfare. Accordingly, the

SOCAL exercises include extensive training in detecting,

tracking, and neutralizing enemy submarines. The use of

MFA sonar during these exercises is “mission-critical,”

given that MFA sonar is the only proven method of identi

fying submerged diesel-electric submarines operating on

battery power. Id., at 568–571.

Sharing the waters in the SOCAL operating area are at

least 37 species of marine mammals, including dolphins,

4 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE

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Opinion of the Court

whales, and sea lions. The parties strongly dispute the

extent to which the Navy’s training activities will harm

those animals or disrupt their behavioral patterns. The

Navy emphasizes that it has used MFA sonar during

training exercises in SOCAL for 40 years, without a single

documented sonar-related injury to any marine mammal.

The Navy asserts that, at most, MFA sonar may cause

temporary hearing loss or brief disruptions of marine

mammals’ behavioral patterns.

The plaintiffs are the Natural Resources Defense Coun

cil, Jean-Michael Cousteau (an environmental enthusiast

and filmmaker), and several other groups devoted to the

protection of marine mammals and ocean habitats. They

contend that MFA sonar can cause much more serious

injuries to marine mammals than the Navy acknowledges,

including permanent hearing loss, decompression sick

ness, and major behavioral disruptions. According to the

plaintiffs, several mass strandings of marine mammals

(outside of SOCAL) have been “associated” with the use of

active sonar. They argue that certain species of marine

mammals—such as beaked whales—are uniquely suscep

tible to injury from active sonar; these injuries would not

necessarily be detected by the Navy, given that beaked

whales are “very deep divers” that spend little time at the

surface.

II

The procedural history of this case is rather compli

cated. The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972

(MMPA), 86 Stat. 1027, generally prohibits any individual

from “taking” a marine mammal, defined as harassing,

hunting, capturing, or killing it. 16 U. S. C. §§1362(13),

1372(a). The Secretary of Defense may “exempt any ac

tion or category of actions” from the MMPA if such actions

are “necessary for national defense.” §1371(f)(1). In Janu

ary 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense—acting for the

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) 5

Opinion of the Court

Secretary—granted the Navy a 2-year exemption from the

MMPA for the training exercises at issue in this case. Pet.

App. 219a–220a. The exemption was conditioned on the

Navy adopting several mitigation procedures, including:

(1) training lookouts and officers to watch for marine

mammals; (2) requiring at least five lookouts with binocu

lars on each vessel to watch for anomalies on the water

surface (including marine mammals); (3) requiring aircraft

and sonar operators to report detected marine mammals

in the vicinity of the training exercises; (4) requiring re

duction of active sonar transmission levels by 6 dB if a

marine mammal is detected within 1,000 yards of the bow

of the vessel, or by 10 dB if detected within 500 yards; (5)

requiring complete shutdown of active sonar transmission

if a marine mammal is detected within 200 yards of the

vessel; (6) requiring active sonar to be operated at the

“lowest practicable level”; and (7) adopting coordination

and reporting procedures. Id., at 222a–230a.

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),

83 Stat. 852, requires federal agencies “to the fullest ex

tent possible” to prepare an environmental impact state

ment (EIS) for “every . . . major Federal actio[n] signifi

cantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”

42 U. S. C. §4332(2)(C) (2000 ed.). An agency is not re

quired to prepare a full EIS if it determines—based on a

shorter environmental assessment (EA)—that the pro

posed action will not have a significant impact on the

environment. 40 CFR §§1508.9(a), 1508.13 (2007).

In February 2007, the Navy issued an EA concluding

that the 14 SOCAL training exercises scheduled through

January 2009 would not have a significant impact on the

environment. App. 226–227. The EA divided potential

injury to marine mammals into two categories: Level A

harassment, defined as the potential destruction or loss of

biological tissue (i.e., physical injury), and Level B har

assment, defined as temporary injury or disruption of

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Opinion of the Court

behavioral patterns such as migration, feeding, surfacing,

and breeding. Id., at 160–161.

The Navy’s computer models predicted that the SOCAL

training exercises would cause only eight Level A harass

ments of common dolphins each year, and that even these

injuries could be avoided through the Navy’s voluntary

mitigation measures, given that dolphins travel in large

pods easily located by Navy lookouts. Id., at 176–177, 183.

The EA also predicted 274 Level B harassments of beaked

whales per year, none of which would result in permanent

injury. Id., at 185–186. Beaked whales spend little time

at the surface, so the precise effect of active sonar on these

mammals is unclear. Erring on the side of caution, the

Navy classified all projected harassments of beaked

whales as Level A. Id., at 186, 223. In light of its conclu

sion that the SOCAL training exercises would not have a

significant impact on the environment, the Navy deter

mined that it was unnecessary to prepare a full EIS. See

40 CFR §1508.13.

Shortly after the Navy released its EA, the plaintiffs

sued the Navy, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief

on the grounds that the Navy’s SOCAL training exercises

violated NEPA, the Endangered Species Act of 1973

(ESA), and the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972

(CZMA).2 The District Court granted plaintiffs’ motion for

a preliminary injunction and prohibited the Navy from

using MFA sonar during its remaining training exercises.

The court held that plaintiffs had “demonstrated a prob

ability of success” on their claims under NEPA and the

CZMA. Pet. App. 207a, 215a. The court also determined

that equitable relief was appropriate because, under Ninth

——————

2 The CZMA states that federal agencies taking actions “that affec[t]

any land or water use or natural resources of the coastal zone” shall

carry out these activities “in a manner which is consistent to the

maximum extent practicable with the enforceable policies of approved

State management programs.” 16 U. S. C. §1456(c)(1)(A).

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) 7

Opinion of the Court

Circuit precedent, plaintiffs had established at least a

“ ‘possibility’ ” of irreparable harm to the environment. Id.,

at 217a. Based on scientific studies, declarations from

experts, and other evidence in the record, the District

Court concluded that there was in fact a “near certainty”

of irreparable injury to the environment, and that this

injury outweighed any possible harm to the Navy. Id., at

217a–218a.

The Navy filed an emergency appeal, and the Ninth

Circuit stayed the injunction pending appeal. 502 F. 3d

859, 865 (2007). After hearing oral argument, the Court of

Appeals agreed with the District Court that preliminary

injunctive relief was appropriate. The appellate court

concluded, however, that a blanket injunction prohibiting

the Navy from using MFA sonar in SOCAL was overbroad,

and remanded the case to the District Court “to narrow its

injunction so as to provide mitigation conditions under

which the Navy may conduct its training exercises.” 508

F. 3d 885, 887 (2007).

On remand, the District Court entered a new prelimi

nary injunction allowing the Navy to use MFA sonar only

as long as it implemented the following mitigation meas

ures (in addition to the measures the Navy had adopted

pursuant to its MMPA exemption): (1) imposing a 12-mile

“exclusion zone” from the coastline; (2) using lookouts to

conduct additional monitoring for marine mammals; (3)

restricting the use of “helicopter-dipping” sonar; (4) limit

ing the use of MFA sonar in geographic “choke points”; (5)

shutting down MFA sonar when a marine mammal is

spotted within 2,200 yards of a vessel; and (6) powering

down MFA sonar by 6 dB during significant surface duct

ing conditions, in which sound travels further than it

otherwise would due to temperature differences in adja

cent layers of water. 530 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118–1121

(CD Cal. 2008). The Navy filed a notice of appeal, chal

lenging only the last two restrictions.

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Opinion of the Court

The Navy then sought relief from the Executive Branch.

The President, pursuant to 16 U. S. C. §1456(c)(1)(B),

granted the Navy an exemption from the CZMA. Section

1456(c)(1)(B) permits such exemptions if the activity in

question is “in the paramount interest of the United

States.” The President determined that continuation of

the exercises as limited by the Navy was “essential to

national security.” Pet. App. 232a. He concluded that

compliance with the District Court’s injunction would

“undermine the Navy’s ability to conduct realistic training

exercises that are necessary to ensure the combat effec

tiveness of . . . strike groups.” Ibid.

Simultaneously, the Council on Environmental Quality

(CEQ) authorized the Navy to implement “alternative

arrangements” to NEPA compliance in light of “emergency

circumstances.” See 40 CFR §1506.11.3 The CEQ deter

mined that alternative arrangements were appropriate

because the District Court’s injunction “create[s] a signifi

cant and unreasonable risk that Strike Groups will not be

able to train and be certified as fully mission capable.”

Pet. App. 238a. Under the alternative arrangements,

the Navy would be permitted to conduct its training exer

cises under the mitigation procedures adopted in con-

junction with the exemption from the MMPA. The CEQ

also imposed additional notice, research, and reporting

requirements.

In light of these actions, the Navy then moved to vacate

the District Court’s injunction with respect to the 2,200

yard shutdown zone and the restrictions on training in

——————

3 That provision states in full: “Where emergency circumstances make

it necessary to take an action with significant environmental impact

without observing the provisions of these regulations, the Federal

agency taking the action should consult with the Council about alterna

tive arrangements. Agencies and the Council will limit such arrange

ments to actions necessary to control the immediate impacts of the

emergency. Other actions remain subject to NEPA review.”

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) 9

Opinion of the Court

surface ducting conditions. The District Court refused to

do so, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1216 (2008), and the Court of Ap

peals affirmed. The Ninth Circuit held that there was a

serious question regarding whether the CEQ’s interpreta

tion of the “emergency circumstances” regulation was

lawful. Specifically, the court questioned whether there

was a true “emergency” in this case, given that the Navy

has been on notice of its obligation to comply with NEPA

from the moment it first planned the SOCAL training

exercises. 518 F. 3d, at 681. The Court of Appeals con

cluded that the preliminary injunction was entirely pre

dictable in light of the parties’ litigation history. Ibid.

The court also held that plaintiffs had established a likeli

hood of success on their claim that the Navy was required

to prepare a full EIS for the SOCAL training exercises.

Id., at 693. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the District

Court’s holding that the Navy’s EA—which resulted in a

finding of no significant environmental impact—was

“cursory, unsupported by cited evidence, or unconvincing.”

Ibid.4

The Court of Appeals further determined that plaintiffs

had carried their burden of establishing a “possibility” of

irreparable injury. Even under the Navy’s own figures,

the court concluded, the training exercises would cause

564 physical injuries to marine mammals, as well as

170,000 disturbances of marine mammals’ behavior. Id.,

at 696. Lastly, the Court of Appeals held that the balance

of hardships and consideration of the public interest

weighed in favor of the plaintiffs. The court emphasized

that the negative impact on the Navy’s training exercises

was “speculative,” since the Navy has never before oper

ated under the procedures required by the District Court.

——————

4 The Ninth Circuit’s discussion of the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success

was limited to their NEPA claims. The court did not discuss claims

under the CZMA or ESA.

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Id., at 698–699. In particular, the court determined that:

(1) the 2,200-yard shutdown zone imposed by the District

Court was unlikely to affect the Navy’s operations, be

cause the Navy often shuts down its MFA sonar systems

during the course of training exercises; and (2) the power

down requirement during significant surface ducting

conditions was not unreasonable because such conditions

are rare, and the Navy has previously certified strike

groups that had not trained under such conditions. Id., at

699–702. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the District

Court’s preliminary injunction struck a proper balance

between the competing interests at stake.

We granted certiorari, 554 U. S. __ (2008), and now

reverse and vacate the injunction.

III

A

A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must estab

lish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is

likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of prelimi

nary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor,

and that an injunction is in the public interest. See Munaf

v. Geren, 553 U. S. __, __ (2008) (slip op., at 12); Amoco

Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U. S. 531, 542 (1987);

Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S. 305, 311–312

(1982).

The District Court and the Ninth Circuit concluded that

plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the merits

of their NEPA claim. The Navy strongly disputes this

determination, arguing that plaintiffs’ likelihood of suc

cess is low because the CEQ reasonably concluded that

“emergency circumstances” justified alternative arrange

ments to NEPA compliance. 40 CFR §1506.11. Plaintiffs’

briefs before this Court barely discuss the ground relied

upon by the lower courts—that the plain meaning of

“emergency circumstances” does not encompass a court

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) 11

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order that was “entirely predictable” in light of the parties’

litigation history. 518 F. 3d, at 681. Instead, plaintiffs

contend that the CEQ’s actions violated the separation of

powers by readjudicating a factual issue already decided

by an Article III court. Moreover, they assert that the

CEQ’s interpretations of NEPA are not entitled to defer

ence because the CEQ has not been given statutory au

thority to conduct adjudications.

The District Court and the Ninth Circuit also held that

when a plaintiff demonstrates a strong likelihood of pre

vailing on the merits, a preliminary injunction may be

entered based only on a “possibility” of irreparable harm.

Id., at 696–697; 530 F. Supp. 2d, at 1118 (quoting Faith

Center Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F. 3d

891, 906 (CA9 2007); Earth Island Inst. v. United States

Forest Serv., 442 F. 3d 1147, 1159 (CA9 2006)). The lower

courts held that plaintiffs had met this standard because

the scientific studies, declarations, and other evidence in

the record established to “a near certainty” that the Navy’s

training exercises would cause irreparable harm to the

environment. 530 F. Supp. 2d, at 1118.

The Navy challenges these holdings, arguing that plain

tiffs must demonstrate a likelihood of irreparable injury—

not just a possibility—in order to obtain preliminary relief.

On the facts of this case, the Navy contends that plaintiffs’

alleged injuries are too speculative to give rise to irrepara

ble injury, given that ever since the Navy’s training pro

gram began 40 years ago, there has been no documented

case of sonar-related injury to marine mammals in

SOCAL. And even if MFA sonar does cause a limited

number of injuries to individual marine mammals, the

Navy asserts that plaintiffs have failed to offer evidence of

species-level harm that would adversely affect their scien

tific, recreational, and ecological interests. For their part,

plaintiffs assert that they would prevail under any formu

lation of the irreparable injury standard, because the

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District Court found that they had established a “near

certainty” of irreparable harm.

We agree with the Navy that the Ninth Circuit’s “possi

bility” standard is too lenient. Our frequently reiterated

standard requires plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief to

demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the ab

sence of an injunction. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95,

103 (1983); Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 415

U. S. 423, 441 (1974); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488,

502 (1974); see also 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane,

Federal Practice and Procedure §2948.1, p. 139 (2d ed.

1995) (hereinafter Wright & Miller) (applicant must dem

onstrate that in the absence of a preliminary injunction,

“the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm before a

decision on the merits can be rendered”); id., at 155 (“a

preliminary injunction will not be issued simply to prevent

the possibility of some remote future injury”). Issuing a

preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of ir

reparable harm is inconsistent with our characterization

of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may

only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is

entitled to such relief. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U. S.

968, 972 (1997) (per curiam).

It is not clear that articulating the incorrect standard

affected the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of irreparable harm.

Although the court referred to the “possibility” standard,

and cited Circuit precedent along the same lines, it af

firmed the District Court’s conclusion that plaintiffs had

established a “ ‘near certainty’ ” of irreparable harm. 518

F. 3d, at 696–697. At the same time, however, the nature

of the District Court’s conclusion is itself unclear. The

District Court originally found irreparable harm from

sonar-training exercises generally. But by the time of the

District Court’s final decision, the Navy challenged only

two of six restrictions imposed by the court. See supra, at

7–8. The District Court did not reconsider the likelihood

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) 13

Opinion of the Court

of irreparable harm in light of the four restrictions not

challenged by the Navy. This failure is significant in light

of the District Court’s own statement that the 12-mile

exclusion zone from the coastline—one of the unchallenged

mitigation restrictions—“would bar the use of MFA sonar

in a significant portion of important marine mammal

habitat.” 530 F. Supp. 2d, at 1119.

We also find it pertinent that this is not a case in which

the defendant is conducting a new type of activity with

completely unknown effects on the environment. When

the Government conducts an activity, “NEPA itself does

not mandate particular results.” Robertson v. Methow

Valley Citizens Council, 490 U. S. 332, 350 (1989). In

stead, NEPA imposes only procedural requirements to

“ensur[e] that the agency, in reaching its decision, will

have available, and will carefully consider, detailed infor

mation concerning significant environmental impacts.”

Id., at 349. Part of the harm NEPA attempts to prevent in

requiring an EIS is that, without one, there may be little if

any information about prospective environmental harms

and potential mitigating measures. Here, in contrast, the

plaintiffs are seeking to enjoin—or substantially restrict—

training exercises that have been taking place in SOCAL

for the last 40 years. And the latest series of exercises

were not approved until after the defendant took a “hard

look at environmental consequences,” id., at 350 (quoting

Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390, 410, n. 21 (1976)

(internal quotation marks omitted)), as evidenced by the

issuance of a detailed, 293-page EA.

As explained in the next section, even if plaintiffs have

shown irreparable injury from the Navy’s training exer

cises, any such injury is outweighed by the public interest

and the Navy’s interest in effective, realistic training of its

sailors. A proper consideration of these factors alone

requires denial of the requested injunctive relief. For the

same reason, we do not address the lower courts’ holding

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that plaintiffs have also established a likelihood of success

on the merits.

B

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy

never awarded as of right. Munaf, 553 U. S., at __ (slip

op., at 12). In each case, courts “must balance the compet

ing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each

party of the granting or withholding of the requested

relief.” Amoco Production Co., 480 U. S., at 542. “In

exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should

pay particular regard for the public consequences in em

ploying the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Romero-

Barcelo, 456 U. S., at 312; see also Railroad Comm’n of

Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, 500 (1941). In this

case, the District Court and the Ninth Circuit significantly

understated the burden the preliminary injunction would

impose on the Navy’s ability to conduct realistic training

exercises, and the injunction’s consequent adverse impact

on the public interest in national defense.

This case involves “complex, subtle, and professional

decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and

control of a military force,” which are “essentially profes

sional military judgments.” Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U. S.

1, 10 (1973). We “give great deference to the professional

judgment of military authorities concerning the relative

importance of a particular military interest.” Goldman v.

Weinberger, 475 U. S. 503, 507 (1986). As the Court em

phasized just last Term, “neither the Members of this

Court nor most federal judges begin the day with briefings

that may describe new and serious threats to our Nation

and its people.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U. S. __, __

(2008) (slip op., at 68).

Here, the record contains declarations from some of the

Navy’s most senior officers, all of whom underscored the

threat posed by enemy submarines and the need for ex

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) 15

Opinion of the Court

tensive sonar training to counter this threat. Admiral

Gary Roughead—the Chief of Naval Operations—stated

that during training exercises:

“It is important to stress the ship crews in all dimen

sions of warfare simultaneously. If one of these train

ing elements were impacted—for example, if effective

sonar training were not possible—the training value

of the other elements would also be degraded . . . .”

Pet. App. 342a.

Captain Martin May—the Third Fleet’s Assistant Chief

of Staff for Training and Readiness—emphasized that the

use of MFA sonar is “mission-critical.” App. 570–571. He

described the ability to operate MFA sonar as a “highly

perishable skill” that must be repeatedly practiced under

realistic conditions. Id., at 577. During training exercises,

MFA sonar operators learn how to avoid sound-reducing

“clutter” from ocean floor topography and environmental

conditions; they also learn how to avoid interference and

how to coordinate their efforts with other sonar operators

in the strike group. Id., at 574. Several Navy officers

emphasized that realistic training cannot be accomplished

under the two challenged restrictions imposed by the

District Court—the 2,200-yard shutdown zone and the

requirement that the Navy power down its sonar systems

during significant surface ducting conditions. See, e.g.,

Pet. App. 333a (powering down in presence of surface

ducting “unreasonably prevent[s] realistic training”); id.,

at 356a (shutdown zone would “result in a significant,

adverse impact to realistic training”). We accept these

officers’ assertions that the use of MFA sonar under realis

tic conditions during training exercises is of the utmost

importance to the Navy and the Nation.

These interests must be weighed against the possible

harm to the ecological, scientific, and recreational inter

ests that are legitimately before this Court. Plaintiffs

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have submitted declarations asserting that they take

whale watching trips, observe marine mammals underwa

ter, conduct scientific research on marine mammals, and

photograph these animals in their natural habitats.

Plaintiffs contend that the Navy’s use of MFA sonar will

injure marine mammals or alter their behavioral patterns,

impairing plaintiffs’ ability to study and observe the

animals.

While we do not question the seriousness of these inter

ests, we conclude that the balance of equities and consid

eration of the overall public interest in this case tip

strongly in favor of the Navy. For the plaintiffs, the most

serious possible injury would be harm to an unknown

number of the marine mammals that they study and

observe. In contrast, forcing the Navy to deploy an inade

quately trained antisubmarine force jeopardizes the safety

of the fleet. Active sonar is the only reliable technology for

detecting and tracking enemy diesel-electric submarines,

and the President—the Commander in Chief—has deter

mined that training with active sonar is “essential to

national security.” Pet. App. 232a.

The public interest in conducting training exercises with

active sonar under realistic conditions plainly outweighs

the interests advanced by the plaintiffs. Of course, mili

tary interests do not always trump other considerations,

and we have not held that they do. In this case, however,

the proper determination of where the public interest lies

does not strike us as a close question.

C

1. Despite the importance of assessing the balance of

equities and the public interest in determining whether to

grant a preliminary injunction, the District Court ad

dressed these considerations in only a cursory fashion.

The court’s entire discussion of these factors consisted of

one (albeit lengthy) sentence: “The Court is also satisfied

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) 17

Opinion of the Court

that the balance of hardships tips in favor of granting an

injunction, as the harm to the environment, Plaintiffs, and

public interest outweighs the harm that Defendants would

incur if prevented from using MFA sonar, absent the use

of effective mitigation measures, during a subset of their

regular activities in one part of one state for a limited

period.” Id., at 217a–218a. As the prior Ninth Circuit

panel in this case put it, in staying the District Court’s

original preliminary injunction, “[t]he district court did

not give serious consideration to the public interest fac

tor.” 502 F. 3d, at 863. The District Court’s order on

remand did nothing to cure this defect, but simply re

peated nearly verbatim the same sentence from its previ

ous order. Compare 530 F. Supp. 2d, at 1118, with Pet.

App. 217a–218a. The subsequent Ninth Circuit panel

framed its opinion as reviewing the District Court’s exer

cise of discretion, 518 F. 3d, at 697–699, but that discre

tion was barely exercised here.

The Court of Appeals held that the balance of equities

and the public interest favored the plaintiffs, largely based

on its view that the preliminary injunction would not in

fact impose a significant burden on the Navy’s ability to

conduct its training exercises and certify its strike groups.

Id., at 698–699. The court deemed the Navy’s concerns

about the preliminary injunction “speculative” because the

Navy had not operated under similar procedures before.

Ibid. But this is almost always the case when a plaintiff

seeks injunctive relief to alter a defendant’s conduct. The

lower courts failed properly to defer to senior Navy offi

cers’ specific, predictive judgments about how the prelimi

nary injunction would reduce the effectiveness of the

Navy’s SOCAL training exercises. See Wright & Miller

§2948.2, at 167–68 (“The policy against the imposition of

judicial restraints prior to an adjudication of the merits

becomes more significant when there is reason to believe

that the decree will be burdensome”).

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2. The preliminary injunction requires the Navy to shut

down its MFA sonar if a marine mammal is detected

within 2,200 yards of a sonar-emitting vessel. The Ninth

Circuit stated that the 2,200-yard shutdown zone would

not be overly burdensome because sightings of marine

mammals during training exercises are relatively rare.

But regardless of the frequency of marine mammal sight

ings, the injunction will greatly increase the size of the

shutdown zone. Pursuant to its exemption from the

MMPA, the Navy agreed to reduce the power of its MFA

sonar at 1,000 yards and 500 yards, and to completely

turn off the system at 200 yards. Pet. App. 222a–230a.

The District Court’s injunction does not include a gradu

ated power-down, instead requiring a total shutdown of

MFA sonar if a marine mammal is detected within 2,200

yards of a sonar-emitting vessel. There is an exponential

relationship between radius length and surface area (Area

= π r2). Increasing the radius of the shutdown zone from

200 to 2,200 yards would accordingly expand the surface

area of the shutdown zone by a factor of over 100 (from

125,664 square yards to 15,205,308 square yards).

The lower courts did not give sufficient weight to the

views of several top Navy officers, who emphasized that

because training scenarios can take several days to de

velop, each additional shutdown can result in the loss of

several days’ worth of training. Id., at 344a. Limiting the

number of sonar shutdowns is particularly important

during the Joint Tactical Force Exercises, which usually

last for less than two weeks. Ibid. Admiral Bird ex

plained that the 2,200-yard shutdown zone would cause

operational commanders to “lose awareness of the tactical

situation through the constant stopping and starting of

MFA [sonar].” Id., at 332a; see also id., at 356a (“It may

take days to get to the pivotal attack in antisubmarine

warfare, but only minutes to confound the results upon

which certification is based”). Even if there is a low likeli

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Opinion of the Court

hood of a marine mammal sighting, the preliminary in

junction would clearly increase the number of disruptive

sonar shutdowns the Navy is forced to perform during its

SOCAL training exercises.

The Court of Appeals also concluded that the 2,200-yard

shutdown zone would not be overly burdensome because

the Navy had shut down MFA sonar 27 times during its

eight prior training exercises in SOCAL; in several of

these cases, the Navy turned off its sonar when marine

mammals were spotted well beyond the Navy’s self

imposed 200-yard shutdown zone. 518 F. 3d, at 700, n. 65.

Admiral Locklear—the Commander of the Navy’s Third

Fleet—stated that any shutdowns beyond the 200-yard

zone were voluntary avoidance measures that likely took

place at tactically insignificant times; the Ninth Circuit

discounted this explanation as not supported by the re

cord. Ibid. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Ap

peals ignored key portions of Admiral Locklear’s declara

tion, in which he stated unequivocally that commanding

officers “would not shut down sonar until legally required

to do so if in contact with a submarine.” Pet. App. 354a–

355a. Similarly, if a commanding officer is in contact with

a target submarine, “the CO will be expected to continue

to use active sonar unless another ship or helicopter can

gain contact or if regulatory reasons dictate otherwise.”

Id., at 355a. The record supports the Navy’s contention

that its shutdowns of MFA sonar during prior training

exercises only occurred during tactically insignificant

times; those voluntary shutdowns do not justify the Dis

trict Court’s imposition of a mandatory 2,200-yard shut

down zone.

Lastly, the Ninth Circuit stated that a 2,200-yard shut

down zone was feasible because the Navy had previously

adopted a 2,000-meter zone for low-frequency active (LFA)

sonar. The Court of Appeals failed to give sufficient

weight to the fact that LFA sonar is used for long-range

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detection of enemy submarines, and thus its use and

shutdown involve tactical considerations quite different

from those associated with MFA sonar. See App. 508

(noting that equating MFA sonar with LFA sonar “is

completely misleading and is like comparing 20 degrees

Fahrenheit to 20 degrees Celsius”).

3. The Court of Appeals also concluded that the Navy’s

training exercises would not be significantly affected by

the requirement that it power down MFA sonar by 6 dB

during significant surface ducting conditions. Again, we

think the Ninth Circuit understated the burden this re

quirement would impose on the Navy’s ability to conduct

realistic training exercises.

Surface ducting is a phenomenon in which relatively

little sound energy penetrates beyond a narrow layer near

the surface of the water. When surface ducting occurs,

active sonar becomes more useful near the surface but less

useful at greater depths. Pet. App. 299a–300a. Diesel

electric submariners are trained to take advantage of

these distortions to avoid being detected by sonar. Id., at

333a.

The Ninth Circuit determined that the power-down

requirement during surface ducting conditions was

unlikely to affect certification of the Navy’s strike groups

because surface ducting occurs relatively rarely, and the

Navy has previously certified strike groups that did not

train under such conditions. 518 F. 3d, at 701–702. This

reasoning is backwards. Given that surface ducting is

both rare and unpredictable, it is especially important for

the Navy to be able to train under these conditions when

they occur. Admiral Bird explained that the 6 dB power

down requirement makes the training less valuable be

cause it “exposes [sonar operators] to unrealistically lower

levels of mutual interference caused by multiple sonar

systems operating together by the ships within the Strike

Group.” Pet. App. 281a (footnote omitted). Although a 6

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Opinion of the Court

dB reduction may not seem terribly significant, decibels

are measured on a logarithmic scale, so a 6 dB decrease in

power equates to a 75% reduction. Id., at 284a–285a.

4. The District Court acknowledged that “ ‘the imposi

tion of these mitigation measures will require the Navy to

alter and adapt the way it conducts antisubmarine war

fare training—a substantial challenge. Nevertheless,

evidence presented to the Court reflects that the Navy has

employed mitigation measures in the past, without sacri

ficing training objectives.’ ” 527 F. Supp. 2d, at 1238.

Apparently no good deed goes unpunished. The fact that

the Navy has taken measures in the past to address con

cerns about marine mammals—or, for that matter, has

elected not to challenge four additional restrictions im

posed by the District Court in this case, see supra, at 7–

8—hardly means that other, more intrusive restrictions

pose no threat to preparedness for war.

The Court of Appeals concluded its opinion by stating

that “the Navy may return to the district court to request

relief on an emergency basis” if the preliminary injunction

“actually result[s] in an inability to train and certify suffi

cient naval forces to provide for the national defense.” 518

F. 3d, at 703. This is cold comfort to the Navy. The Navy

contends that the injunction will hinder efforts to train

sonar operators under realistic conditions, ultimately

leaving strike groups more vulnerable to enemy subma

rines. Unlike the Ninth Circuit, we do not think the Navy

is required to wait until the injunction “actually result[s]

in an inability to train . . . sufficient naval forces for the

national defense” before seeking its dissolution. By then it

may be too late.

IV

As noted above, we do not address the underlying merits

of plaintiffs’ claims. While we have authority to proceed to

such a decision at this point, see Munaf, 553 U. S., at __

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(slip op., at 13–14), doing so is not necessary here. In

addition, reaching the merits is complicated by the fact

that the lower courts addressed only one of several issues

raised, and plaintiffs have largely chosen not to defend the

decision below on that ground.5

At the same time, what we have said makes clear that it

would be an abuse of discretion to enter a permanent

injunction, after final decision on the merits, along the

same lines as the preliminary injunction. An injunction is

a matter of equitable discretion; it does not follow from

success on the merits as a matter of course. Romero-

Barcelo, 456 U. S., at 313 (“a federal judge sitting as chan

cellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction

for every violation of law”).

The factors examined above—the balance of equities

and consideration of the public interest—are pertinent in

assessing the propriety of any injunctive relief, prelimi

nary or permanent. See Amoco Production Co., 480 U. S.,

——————

5 The bulk of JUSTICE GINSBURG’s dissent is devoted to the merits.

For the reasons stated, we find the injunctive relief granted in this case

an abuse of discretion, even if plaintiffs are correct on the underlying

merits. As to the injunction, the dissent barely mentions the Navy’s

interests. Post, at 11. We find that those interests, and the docu

mented risks to national security, clearly outweigh the harm on the

other side of the balance.

We agree with much of JUSTICE BREYER’s analysis, post, at 3–9

(opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part), but disagree with

his conclusion that the modified conditions imposed by the stay order

should remain in force until the Navy completes its EIS, post, at 9–11.

The Court is reviewing the District Court’s imposition of the prelimi

nary injunction; once we conclude, as JUSTICE BREYER does, post, at 9,

that the preliminary injunction should be vacated, the stay order is no

longer pertinent. A stay is a useful tool for managing the impact of

injunctive relief pending further appeal, but once the Court resolves the

merits of the appeal, the stay ceases to be relevant. See 518 F. 3d 704,

706 (CA9 2008) (“the partial stay . . . shall remain in effect until final

disposition by the Supreme Court”). Unexamined conditions imposed

by the stay order are certainly no basis for what would be in effect the

entry of a new preliminary injunction by this Court.

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Opinion of the Court

at 546, n. 12 (“The standard for a preliminary injunction is

essentially the same as for a permanent injunction with

the exception that the plaintiff must show a likelihood of

success on the merits rather than actual success”). Given

that the ultimate legal claim is that the Navy must pre

pare an EIS, not that it must cease sonar training, there is

no basis for enjoining such training in a manner credibly

alleged to pose a serious threat to national security. This

is particularly true in light of the fact that the training

has been going on for 40 years with no documented epi

sode of harm to a marine mammal. A court concluding

that the Navy is required to prepare an EIS has many

remedial tools at its disposal, including declaratory relief

or an injunction tailored to the preparation of an EIS

rather than the Navy’s training in the interim. See, e.g.,

Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 466 (1974) (“Congress

plainly intended declaratory relief to act as an alternative

to the strong medicine of the injunction”). In the mean

time, we see no basis for jeopardizing national security, as

the present injunction does. Plaintiffs confirmed at oral

argument that the preliminary injunction was “the whole

ball game,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 33, and our analysis of the

propriety of preliminary relief is applicable to any perma

nent injunction as well.

* * *

President Theodore Roosevelt explained that “the only

way in which a navy can ever be made efficient is by prac

tice at sea, under all the conditions which would have to

be met if war existed.” President’s Annual Message, 42

Cong. Rec. 67, 81 (1907). We do not discount the impor

tance of plaintiffs’ ecological, scientific, and recreational

interests in marine mammals. Those interests, however,

are plainly outweighed by the Navy’s need to conduct

realistic training exercises to ensure that it is able to

neutralize the threat posed by enemy submarines. The

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District Court abused its discretion by imposing a 2,200

yard shutdown zone and by requiring the Navy to power

down its MFA sonar during significant surface ducting

conditions. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is re

versed, and the preliminary injunction is vacated to the

extent it has been challenged by the Navy.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) 1

Opinion of BREYER, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 07–1239

_________________

DONALD C. WINTER, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,

ET AL., PETITIONERS v. NATURAL RESOURCES

DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[November 12, 2008]

JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins as

to Part I, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

As of December 2006, the United States Navy planned

to engage in a series of 14 antisubmarine warfare training

exercises off the southern California coast. The Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., and others (hereinafter

NRDC) brought this case in Federal District Court claim

ing that the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969

(NEPA) requires the Navy to prepare an environmental

impact statement (EIS) (assessing the impact of the exer

cises on marine mammals) prior to its engaging in the

exercises. As the case reaches us, the District Court has

found that the NRDC will likely prevail on its demand for

an EIS; the Navy has agreed to prepare an EIS; the Dis

trict Court has forbidden the Navy to proceed with the

exercises unless it adopts six mitigating measures; and the

Navy has agreed to adopt all but two of those measures.

The controversy between the parties now concerns the

two measures that the Navy is unwilling to adopt. The

first concerns the “shutdown zone,” a circle with a ship at

the center within which the Navy must try to spot marine

mammals and shut down its sonar if one is found. The

controverted condition would enlarge the radius of that

circle from about one-tenth of a mile (200 yards) to one

2 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE

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Opinion of BREYER, J.

and one-quarter mile (2,200 yards). The second concerns

special ocean conditions called “surface ducting condi

tions.” The controverted condition would require the

Navy, when it encounters any such condition, to diminish

the sonar’s power by 75%. The Court of Appeals affirmed

the District Court order that contained these two condi

tions. 518 F. 3d 658, 703 (CA9 2008).

I

We must now decide whether the District Court was

legally correct in forbidding the training exercises unless

the Navy implemented the two controverted conditions.

In doing so, I assume, like the Court, that the NRDC will

prevail on its demand for an EIS. (Indeed, the Navy is in

the process of preparing one.) And, I would ask whether,

in imposing these conditions, the District Court properly

“balance[d the] harms.” See, e.g., Amoco Production Co. v.

Gambell, 480 U. S. 531, 545 (1987).

Respondents’ (hereinafter plaintiffs) argument favor

ing the District Court injunction is a strong one. As JUS-

TICE GINSBURG well points out, see post, at 4–5 (dissenting

opinion), the very point of NEPA’s insistence upon the

writing of an EIS is to force an agency “carefully” to “con

sider . . . detailed information concerning significant envi

ronmental impacts,” while “giv[ing] the public the assur

ance that the agency ‘has indeed considered

environmental concerns in its decisionmaking process.’ ”

Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U. S.

332, 349 (1989). NEPA seeks to assure that when Gov

ernment officials consider taking action that may affect

the environment, they do so fully aware of the relevant

environmental considerations. An EIS does not force them

to make any particular decision, but it does lead them to

take environmental considerations into account when they

decide whether, or how, to act. Id., at 354. Thus, when a

decision to which EIS obligations attach is made without

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) 3

Opinion of BREYER, J.

the informed environmental consideration that NEPA

requires, much of the harm that NEPA seeks to prevent

has already taken place. In this case, for example, the

absence of an injunction means that the Navy will proceed

with its exercises in the absence of the fuller consideration

of environmental effects that an EIS is intended to bring.

The absence of an injunction thereby threatens to cause

the very environmental harm that a full preaction EIS

might have led the Navy to avoid (say, by adopting the two

additional mitigation measures that the NRDC proposes).

Consequently, if the exercises are to continue, conditions

designed to mitigate interim environmental harm may

well be appropriate.

On the other hand, several features of this case lead

me to conclude that the record, as now before us, lacks

adequate support for an injunction imposing the two

controverted requirements. First, the evidence of need for

the two special conditions is weak or uncertain. The record

does show that the exercises as the Navy originally pro

posed them could harm marine mammals. The District

Court found (based on the Navy’s study of the matter) that

the exercises might cause 466 instances of Level A harm

and 170,000 instances of Level B harm. App. to Pet. for

Cert. 196a–197a. (The environmental assessment (EA)

actually predicted 564 instances of Level A harm. See

App. 223–224.) The study defines Level A injury as “any

act that injures or has the significant potential to injure a

marine mammal or marine mammal stock in the wild”

through “destruction or loss of biological tissue,” whether

“slight to severe.” Id., at 160. It defines Level B harm as

“ ‘any act that disturbs or is likely to disturb a marine

mammal . . . by causing disruption of natural behavioral

patterns including, but not limited to, migration, surfac

ing, nursing, breeding, feeding, or sheltering to a point

where such behaviors are abandoned or significantly

altered’ ” and describes it as a “short term” and “tempo

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Opinion of BREYER, J.

rary” “disturbance.” Id., at 161, 175.

The raw numbers seem large. But the parties argue

about the extent to which they mean likely harm. The

Navy says the classifications and estimates err on the side

of caution. (When in doubt about the amount of harm to a

mammal, the study assumed the harm would qualify as

Level A harassment. Id., at 200.) The Navy also points

out that, by definition, mammals recover from Level B

injuries, often very quickly. It notes that, despite 40 years

of naval exercises off the southern California coast, no

injured marine mammal has ever been found. App. to Pet.

for Cert. 274a–275a. (It adds that dolphins often swim

alongside the ships. Id., at 290, 346.) At the same time,

plaintiffs point to instances where whales have been found

stranded. They add that scientific studies have found a

connection between those beachings and the Navy’s use of

sonar, see, e.g., App. 600–602, and the Navy has even

acknowledged one stranding where “U. S. Navy mid

frequency sonar has been identified as the most plausible

contributory source to the stranding event,” id., at 168.

Given the uncertainty the figures create in respect to

the harm caused by the Navy’s original training plans, it

would seem important to have before us at least some

estimate of the harm likely avoided by the Navy’s decision

not to contest here four of the six mitigating conditions

that the District Court ordered. Without such evidence, it

is difficult to assess the relevant harm—that is, the envi

ronmental harm likely caused by the Navy’s exercises with

the four uncontested mitigation measures (but without the

two contested mitigation measures) in place.

Second, the Navy has filed multiple affidavits from

Navy officials explaining in detail the seriousness of the

harm that the delay associated with completion of this EIS

(approximately one year) would create in respect to the

Navy’s ability to maintain an adequate national defense.

See generally App. to Pet. for Cert. 260a–357a. Taken by

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) 5

Opinion of BREYER, J.

themselves, those affidavits make a strong case for the

proposition that insistence upon the two additional miti

gating conditions would seriously interfere with necessary

defense training.

The affidavits explain the importance of training in

antisubmarine warfare, id., at 263a; the need to use active

sonar to detect enemy submarines, id., at 266a–267a, App.

566; the complexity of a training exercise involving sonar,

App. to Pet. for Cert. 343a; the need for realistic conditions

when training exercises take place, id., at 299a–300a,

App. 566; the “cascading” negative “effect” that delay in

one important aspect of a set of coordinated training exer

cises has upon the Navy’s ability “to provide combat ready

forces,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 343a; the cost and disruption

that would accompany the adoption of the two additional

mitigating conditions that the NRDC seeks, ibid.; the

Navy’s resulting inability adequately to train personnel,

id., at 278a; the effectiveness of the mammal-protecting

measures that the Navy has taken in the past, id., at

285a–298a; and the reasonable likelihood that the mitigat

ing conditions to which it has agreed will prove adequate,

id., at 296a.

Third, and particularly important in my view, the

District Court did not explain why it rejected the Navy’s

affidavit-supported contentions. In its first opinion enjoin

ing the use of sonar, the District Court simply stated:

“The Court is . . . satisfied that the balance of hard

ships tips in favor of granting an injunction, as the

harm to the environment, Plaintiffs, and public inter

est outweighs the harm that Defendants would incur

if prevented from using [mid-frequency active (MFA)]

sonar, absent the use of effective mitigation measures,

during a subset of their regular activities in one part

of one state for a limited period.” Id., at 217a–218a.

Following remand from the Court of Appeals, the District

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Opinion of BREYER, J.

Court simply repeated, word for word, this same state

ment. It said:

“The Court is . . . satisfied that the balance of hard

ships tips in favor of granting an injunction, as the

harm to the environment, Plaintiffs, and public inter

est outweighs the harm that Defendants would incur

(or the public interest would suffer) if Defendants

were prevented from using MFA sonar, absent the use

of effective mitigation measures, during a subset of

their regular activities in one part of one state for a

limited period.” 530 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118 (CD Cal.

2008).

With respect to the imposition of the 2,200 yard shutdown

zone, the District Court noted evidence of the harm that

MFA sonar poses to marine mammals, and then concluded

that “[t]he Court therefore is persuaded that while the

2200 yard shutdown requirement may protect marine

mammals from the harshest of sonar-related conse

quences, it represents a minimal imposition [on] the

Navy’s training exercises.” Id., at 1119. The District

Court did not there explain the basis for that conclusion.

With respect to the imposition of the surface ducting

condition, the District Court said nothing about the Navy’s

interests at all. Id., at 1120–1121.

While a District Court is often free simply to state its

conclusion in summary fashion, in this instance neither

that conclusion, nor anything else I have found in the

District Court’s opinion, answers the Navy’s documented

claims that the two extra conditions the District Court

imposed will, in effect, seriously interfere with its ability

to carry out necessary training exercises.

The first condition requires the Navy to reduce the

power of its sonar equipment by 75% when the ship en

counters a condition called “surface ducting” that occurs

when the presence of layers of water of different tempera

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) 7

Opinion of BREYER, J.

ture make it unusually difficult for sonar operators to

determine whether a diesel submarine is hiding below.

Rear Admiral John Bird, an expert in submarine warfare,

made clear that the 75% power-reduction requirement was

equivalent to forbidding any related training. App. to Pet.

for Cert. 297a. But he says in paragraph 52 of his declara

tion: “Training in surface ducting conditions is critical to

effective training because sonar operators need to learn

how sonar transmissions are altered due to surface duct

ing and how submarines may take advantage of them.”

Id., at 299a–300a. The District Court, as far as I can tell,

did not even acknowledge in its opinion the Navy’s as

serted interest in being able to train under these condi

tions. 530 F. Supp. 2d, at 1120–1121.

The second condition requires the Navy to expand the

sonar “shutdown” area surrounding a ship (i.e., turn off

the sonar if a mammal is spotted in the area) from a circle

with a radius of about one-tenth of a mile to a circle with a

radius of about one mile and a quarter. Both sides agree

that this requirement will lead to more shutdowns. Admi

ral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, states in

paragraph 12 of his declaration that this expanded zone

requirement “will result in increased interruptions to

training exercises, . . . vastly increas[ing] the risk of negat

ing training effectiveness, preventing strike group certifi

cation, and disrupting carefully orchestrated deployment

plans to meet world-wide operational commitments.” App.

to Pet. for Cert. 344a. Again, I can find nothing in the

District Court’s opinion that specifically explains why this

is not so. 530 F. Supp. 2d, at 1119–1120.

Fourth, the Court of Appeals sought, through its own

thorough examination of the record, to supply the missing

explanations. But those explanations are not sufficient.

In respect to the surface ducting conditions, the Court of

Appeals rejected the Navy’s contentions on the ground

that those conditions are “rar[e],” and the Navy has certi

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Opinion of BREYER, J.

fied trainings that did not involve any encounter with

those conditions. 518 F. 3d, at 701–702. I am not certain,

however, why the rarity of the condition supports the

District Court’s conclusion. Rarity argues as strongly for

training when the condition is encountered as it argues for

the contrary.

In respect to the expansion of the “shutdown” area,

the Court of Appeals noted that (1) the Navy in earlier

exercises had shut down its sonar when marine mammals

were sited within about one-half a mile, (2) the Navy has

used a larger shutdown area when engaged in exercises

with lower frequency sonar equipment, and (3) foreign

navies have used larger shutdown areas. Id., at 699–701,

and nn. 63, 67. But the Navy’s affidavits state that (1)

earlier shutdowns when marine mammals were spotted at

farther distances “likely occurred during tactically insig

nificant times,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 356a, (2) ships with

low frequency sonar (unlike the sonar here at issue) have

equipment that makes it easier to monitor the larger area,

particularly by significantly reducing the number of moni

toring personnel necessarily involved, and (3) foreign navy

experience is not relevant given the potentially different

military demands upon those navies, App. 508–509.

Finally, the Court of Appeals, mirroring a similar

District Court suggestion in the language I have quoted,

says that “the exercises in southern California are only a

subset of the Navy’s training activities involving active

sonar.” 518 F. 3d, at 702. It adds that the Navy’s study

“shows the Navy is still able to conduct its exercises in

alternative locations, in reduced number, or through

simulation.” Ibid., n. 69. The Court of Appeals, however,

also concluded that the study “provides reasonably de

tailed justifications for why the Southern California Oper

ating Area is uniquely suited to these exercises, and dem

onstrates that the Navy would suffer a certain hardship if

the considered alternatives were employed instead.” Ibid.

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) 9

Opinion of BREYER, J.

Fifth, when the Court of Appeals first heard this case

following the District Court’s imposition of a broad, abso

lute injunction, it held that any injunction must be crafted

so that the Navy could continue its training exercises.

Noting that the Navy had, in the past, been able to use

mitigation measures to “reduce the harmful effects of its

active sonar,” it “vacate[d] the stay and remand[ed] this

matter to the district court to narrow its injunction so as

to provide mitigation conditions under which the Navy

may conduct its training exercises.” 508 F. 3d 885, 887

(CA9 2007) (emphasis added). For the reasons just stated,

neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals has

explained why we should reject the Navy’s assertions that

it cannot effectively conduct its training exercises under

the mitigation conditions imposed by the District Court.

I would thus vacate the preliminary injunction im

posed by the District Court to the extent it has been chal

lenged by the Navy. Neither the District Court nor the

Court of Appeals has adequately explained its conclusion

that the balance of the equities tips in favor of plaintiffs.

Nor do those parts of the record to which the parties have

pointed supply the missing explanation.

II

Nonetheless, as the Court of Appeals held when it

first considered this case, the Navy’s past use of mitigation

conditions makes clear that the Navy can effectively train

under some mitigation conditions. In the ordinary course,

I would remand so the District Court could, pursuant to

the Court of Appeals’ direction, set forth mitigation condi

tions that will protect the marine wildlife while also ena

bling the Navy to carry out its exercises. But, at this

point, the Navy has informed us that this set of exercises

will be complete by January, at the latest, and an EIS will

likely be complete at that point, as well. Thus, by the time

the District Court would have an opportunity to impose

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Opinion of BREYER, J.

new conditions, the case could very well be moot.

In February of this year, the Court of Appeals stayed

the injunction imposed by the District Court—but only

pending this Court’s resolution of the case. The Court of

Appeals concluded that “[i]n light of the short time before

the Navy is to commence its next exercise, the importance

of the Navy’s mission to provide for the national defense

and the representation by the Chief of Naval Operations

that the district court’s preliminary injunction in its cur

rent form will ‘unacceptably risk’ effective training and

strike group certification and thereby interfere with his

statutory responsibility . . . to ‘organiz[e], train[], and

equip[] the Navy,’ ” interim relief was appropriate, and the

court then modified the two mitigation conditions at issue.

518 F. 3d 704, 705 (CA9 2008).

With respect to the 2,200 yard shutdown zone, it

required the Navy to suspend its use of the sonar if a

marine mammal is detected within 2,200 yards, except

when sonar is being used at a “critical point in the exer

cise,” in which case the amount by which the Navy must

power down is proportional to the mammal’s proximity to

the sonar. Id., at 705–706 (internal quotation marks

omitted). With respect to surface ducting, the Navy is

only required to shut down sonar altogether when a ma

rine mammal is detected within 500 meters and the

amount by which it is otherwise required to power down is

again proportional to the mammal’s proximity to the sonar

source. Id., at 705–706. The court believed these condi

tions would permit the Navy to go forward with its immi

nently planned exercises while at the same time minimiz

ing the harm to marine wildlife.

In my view, the modified conditions imposed by the

Court of Appeals in its February stay order reflect the best

equitable conditions that can be created in the short time

available before the exercises are complete and the EIS is

ready. The Navy has been training under these conditions

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) 11

Opinion of BREYER, J.

since February, so allowing them to remain in place will,

in effect, maintain what has become the status quo.

Therefore, I would modify the Court of Appeals’ February

29, 2008, order so that the provisional conditions it con

tains remain in place until the Navy’s completion of an

acceptable EIS.

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) 1

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 07–1239

_________________

DONALD C. WINTER, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,

ET AL., PETITIONERS v. NATURAL RESOURCES

DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[November 12, 2008]

JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER joins,

dissenting.

The central question in this action under the National

Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) was whether

the Navy must prepare an environmental impact state

ment (EIS). The Navy does not challenge its obligation to

do so, and it represents that the EIS will be complete in

January 2009—one month after the instant exercises

conclude. If the Navy had completed the EIS before tak

ing action, as NEPA instructs, the parties and the public

could have benefited from the environmental analysis—

and the Navy’s training could have proceeded without

interruption. Instead, the Navy acted first, and thus

thwarted the very purpose an EIS is intended to serve. To

justify its course, the Navy sought dispensation not from

Congress, but from an executive council that lacks author

ity to countermand or revise NEPA’s requirements. I

would hold that, in imposing manageable measures to

mitigate harm until completion of the EIS, the District

Court conscientiously balanced the equities and did not

abuse its discretion.

I

In December 2006, the Navy announced its intent to

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GINSBURG, J., dissenting

prepare an EIS to address the potential environmental

effects of its naval readiness activities in the Southern

California (SOCAL) Range Complex. See 71 Fed. Reg.

76639 (2006). These readiness activities include expan

sion and intensification of naval training, as well as re

search, development, and testing of various systems and

weapons. Id., at 76639, 76640. The EIS process is under

way, and the Navy represents that it will be complete in

January 2009. Brief for Petitioners 11; Tr. of Oral Arg. 11.

In February 2007, seeking to commence training before

completion of the EIS, the Navy prepared an Environ

mental Assessment (EA) for the 14 exercises it planned to

undertake in the interim. See App. L to Pet. for Cert.

235a.1 On February 12, the Navy concluded the EA with a

finding of no significant impact. App. 225–226. The same

day, the Navy commenced its training exercises. Id., at

227 (“The Proposed Action is hereby implemented.”).

On March 22, 2007, the Natural Resources Defense

Council (NRDC) filed suit in the U. S. District Court for

the Central District of California, seeking declaratory and

injunctive relief based on the Navy’s alleged violations of

NEPA and other environmental statutes. As relevant

here, the District Court determined that NRDC was likely

to succeed on its NEPA claim and that equitable principles

warranted preliminary relief. On August 7, 2007, the

court enjoined the Navy’s use of mid-frequency active

(MFA) sonar during the 11 remaining exercises at issue.

On August 31, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir

cuit stayed the injunction pending disposition of the

Navy’s appeal, and the Navy proceeded with two more

exercises. In a November 13 order, the Court of Appeals

——————

1 An EA is used “for determining whether to prepare” an EIS. De

partment of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U. S. 752, 757 (2004)

(quoting 40 CFR §1508.9(a) (2003)); see ante, at 5. By definition, an EA

alone does not satisfy an agency’s obligation under NEPA if the effects

of a proposed action require preparation of a full EIS.

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) 3

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

vacated the stay, stating that NRDC had shown “a strong

likelihood of success on the merits” and that preliminary

injunctive relief was appropriate. 508 F. 3d 885, 886

(2007). The Court of Appeals remanded, however, in

structing the District Court to provide mitigation meas

ures under which the Navy could conduct its remaining

exercises.

On remand, the District Court received briefing from

both parties. In addition, the court “toured the USS Mil

ius at the naval base in San Diego, California, to improve

its understanding of the Navy’s sonar training procedures

and the feasibility of the parties’ proposed mitigation

measures. Counsel for both [parties] were present.” 530

F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1112 (2008). On January 3, 2008, the

District Court entered a modified preliminary injunction

imposing six mitigation measures. The court revised the

modified injunction slightly on January 10 in response to

filings by the Navy, and four days later, denied the Navy’s

application for a stay pending appeal.

On the following day, January 15, the Council on Envi

ronmental Quality (CEQ), an advisory body within the

Executive Office of the President, responded to the Navy’s

request for “alternative arrangements” for NEPA compli

ance. App. L to Pet. for Cert. 233a. The “arrangements”

CEQ set out purported to permit the Navy to continue its

training without timely environmental review. Id., at

241a–247a. The Navy accepted the arrangements on the

same day. App. 228.

The Navy then filed an emergency motion in the Court

of Appeals requesting immediate vacatur of the District

Court’s modified injunction. CEQ’s action, the Navy

urged, eliminated the injunction’s legal foundation. In the

alternative, the Navy sought a stay of two aspects of the

injunction pending its appeal: the 2,200-yard mandatory

shutdown zone and the power-down requirement in sig

nificant surface ducting conditions, see ante, at 7–8.

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GINSBURG, J., dissenting

While targeting in its stay application only two of the six

measures imposed by the District Court, the Navy explic

itly reserved the right to challenge on appeal each of the

six mitigation measures. Responding to the Navy’s emer

gency motion, the Court of Appeals remanded the matter

to allow the District Court to determine in the first in

stance the effect of the intervening executive action.

Pending its own consideration of the Navy’s motion, the

District Court stayed the injunction, and the Navy con

ducted its sixth exercise.

On February 4, after briefing and oral argument, the

District Court denied the Navy’s motion. The Navy ap

pealed, reiterating its position that CEQ’s action elimi

nated all justification for the injunction. The Navy also

argued that vacatur of the entire injunction was required

irrespective of CEQ’s action, in part because the “condi

tions imposed, in particular the 2,200 yard mandatory

shutdown zone and the six decibel (75%) power-down in

significant surface ducting conditions, severely degrade

the Navy’s training.” Brief for Appellants in No. 08–55054

(CA9), p. 15. In the February 29 decision now under

review, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s

judgment. 518 F. 3d 658, 703 (2008). The Navy has con

tinued training in the meantime and plans to complete its

final exercise in December 2008.

As the procedural history indicates, the courts below

determined that an EIS was required for the 14 exercises.

The Navy does not challenge that decision in this Court.

Instead, the Navy defends its failure to complete an EIS

before launching the exercises based upon CEQ’s “alterna

tive arrangements”—arrangements the Navy sought and

obtained in order to overcome the lower courts’ rulings. As

explained below, the Navy’s actions undermined NEPA

and took an extraordinary course.

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) 5

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

II

NEPA “promotes its sweeping commitment” to environ

mental integrity “by focusing Government and public

attention on the environmental effects of proposed agency

action.” Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490

U. S. 360, 371 (1989). “By so focusing agency attention,

NEPA ensures that the agency will not act on incomplete

information, only to regret its decision after it is too late to

correct.” Ibid.

The EIS is NEPA’s core requirement. Department of

Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U. S. 752, 757

(2004). This Court has characterized the requirement as

“action-forcing.” Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U. S. 347, 350

(1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). Environmental

concerns must be “integrated into the very process of

agency decisionmaking” and “interwoven into the fabric of

agency planning.” Id., at 350–351. In addition to discuss

ing potential consequences, an EIS must describe poten

tial mitigation measures and alternatives to the proposed

course of action. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens

Council, 490 U. S. 332, 351–352 (1989) (citing 40 CFR

§§1508.25(b), 1502.14(f), 1502.16(h), 1505.2(c) (1987)).

The EIS requirement “ensures that important effects will

not be overlooked or underestimated only to be discovered

after resources have been committed or the die otherwise

cast.” 490 U. S., at 349.

“Publication of an EIS . . . also serves a larger informa

tional role.” Ibid. It demonstrates that an agency has

indeed considered environmental concerns, and “perhaps

more significantly, provides a springboard for public com

ment.” Ibid. At the same time, it affords other affected

governmental bodies “notice of the expected consequences

and the opportunity to plan and implement corrective

measures in a timely manner.” Id., at 350.

In light of these objectives, the timing of an EIS is criti

cal. CEQ regulations instruct agencies to “integrate the

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GINSBURG, J., dissenting

NEPA process with other planning at the earliest possible

time to insure that planning and decisions reflect envi

ronmental values.” 40 CFR §1501.2 (1987). An EIS must

be prepared “early enough so that it can serve practically

as an important contribution to the decisionmaking proc

ess and will not be used to rationalize or justify decisions

already made.” Andrus, 442 U. S., at 351–352, n. 3 (quot

ing 40 CFR §1502.5 (1979)).

The Navy’s publication of its EIS in this case, scheduled

to occur after the 14 exercises are completed, defeats

NEPA’s informational and participatory purposes. The

Navy’s inverted timing, it bears emphasis, is the very

reason why the District Court had to confront the question

of mitigation measures at all. Had the Navy prepared a

legally sufficient EIS before beginning the SOCAL exer

cises, NEPA would have functioned as its drafters in

tended: The EIS process and associated public input might

have convinced the Navy voluntarily to adopt mitigation

measures, but NEPA itself would not have impeded the

Navy’s exercises. See Public Citizen, 541 U. S., at 756,

769, n. 2 (noting that NEPA does not mandate particular

results, but rather establishes procedural requirements

with a “focus on improving agency decisionmaking”).

The Navy had other options. Most importantly, it could

have requested assistance from Congress. The Govern

ment has sometimes obtained congressional authorization

to proceed with planned activities without fulfilling

NEPA’s requirements. See, e.g., Floyd D. Spence National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L.

106–398, §317, 114 Stat. 1654A–57 (exempting the mili

tary from preparing a programmatic EIS for low-level

flight training); 42 U. S. C. §10141(c) (exempting the

Environmental Protection Agency from preparing an EIS

for the development of criteria for handling spent nuclear

fuel and high-level radioactive waste); 43 U. S. C. §1652(d)

(exempting construction of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) 7

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

from further NEPA compliance).

Rather than resorting to Congress, the Navy “sought

relief from the Executive Branch.” Ante, at 8. On January

10, 2008, the Navy asked CEQ, adviser to the President, to

approve alternative arrangements for NEPA compliance

pursuant to 40 CFR §1506.11 (1987). App. L to Pet. for

Cert. 233a; see ante, at 8, n. 3. The next day, the Navy

submitted supplementary material to CEQ, including the

Navy’s EA and after-action reports, the District Court’s

orders, and two analyses by the National Marine Fisheries

Service (NMFS). App. L to Pet. for Cert. 237a–238a.

Neither the Navy nor CEQ notified NRDC, and CEQ did

not request or consider any of the materials underlying

the District Court orders it addressed.

Four days later, on January 15, the Chairman of CEQ

issued a letter to the Secretary of the Navy. Repeating the

Navy’s submissions with little independent analysis, the

letter stated that the District Court’s orders posed risks to

the Navy’s training exercises. See id., at 238a (“You have

explained that the training restrictions set forth in the . . .

injunctive orders prevent the Navy from providing Strike

Groups with adequate proficiency training and create a

substantial risk of precluding certification of the Strike

Groups as combat ready.”).

The letter continued:

“Discussions between our staffs, your letter and sup

porting documents, and the classified declaration and

briefings I have received, have clearly determined

that the Navy cannot ensure the necessary training to

certify strike groups for deployment under the terms

of the injunctive orders. Based on the record support

ing your request . . . CEQ has concluded that the Navy

must be able to conduct the [exercises] . . . in a time

frame that does not provide sufficient time to com

plete an EIS. Therefore, emergency circumstances

8 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE

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are present for the nine exercises and alternative ar

rangements for compliance with NEPA under CEQ

regulation 40 C.F.R. §1506.11 are warranted.” Id., at

240a.

The alternative arrangements CEQ set forth do not

vindicate NEPA’s objectives. The arrangements provide

for “public participation measures,” which require the

Navy to provide notices of the alternative arrangements.

Id., at 242a. The notices must “seek input on the process

for reviewing post-exercise assessments” and “include an

offer to meet jointly with Navy representatives . . . and

CEQ to discuss the alternative arrangements.” Id., at

242a–243a. The alternative arrangements also describe

the Navy’s existing research and mitigation efforts. Id., at

243a–247a.

CEQ’s hasty decision on a one-sided record is no substi

tute for the District Court’s considered judgment based on

a two-sided record.2 More fundamentally, even an exem

plary CEQ review could not have effected the short circuit

the Navy sought. CEQ lacks authority to absolve an

agency of its statutory duty to prepare an EIS. NEPA

established CEQ to assist and advise the President on

environmental policy, 42 U. S. C. §4342, and a 1977 Ex

ecutive Order charged CEQ with issuing regulations to

federal agencies for implementation of NEPA’s procedural

provisions, Exec. Order No. 11991, 3 CFR 123 (1977

Comp.). This Court has recognized that CEQ’s regulations

are entitled to “substantial deference,” Robertson, 490

U. S., at 355, and §1506.11 indicates that CEQ may play

——————

2 The District Court may well have given too spare an explanation for

the balance of hardships in issuing its injunction of August 7, 2007.

The court cured any error in this regard, however, when it closely

examined each mitigation measure in issuing the modified injunction of

January 3, 2008. The Court of Appeals, too, conducted a detailed

analysis of the record.

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) 9

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

an important consultative role in emergency circum

stances, but we have never suggested that CEQ could

eliminate the statute’s command. If the Navy sought to

avoid its NEPA obligations, its remedy lay in the Legisla

tive Branch. The Navy’s alternative course—rapid, self

serving resort to an office in the White House—is surely

not what Congress had in mind when it instructed agen

cies to comply with NEPA “to the fullest extent possible.”

42 U. S. C. §4332.3

III

A

Flexibility is a hallmark of equity jurisdiction. “The

essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the

Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the

necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than

rigidity has distinguished it.” Weinberger v. Romero-

Barcelo, 456 U. S. 305, 312 (1982) (quoting Hecht Co. v.

Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329 (1944)). Consistent with eq

uity’s character, courts do not insist that litigants uni

formly show a particular, predetermined quantum of

probable success or injury before awarding equitable

relief. Instead, courts have evaluated claims for equitable

relief on a “sliding scale,” sometimes awarding relief based

on a lower likelihood of harm when the likelihood of suc

cess is very high. 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane,

Federal Practice and Procedure §2948.3, p. 195 (2d ed.

1995). This Court has never rejected that formulation,

and I do not believe it does so today.

Equity’s flexibility is important in the NEPA context.

Because an EIS is the tool for uncovering environmental

——————

3 On the same day that CEQ issued its letter, the President granted

the Navy an exemption from the requirements of the Coastal Zone

Management Act of 1972 (CZMA) pursuant to 16 U. S. C.

§1456(c)(1)(B). That exemption, expressly authorized by the CZMA,

does not affect NRDC’s NEPA claim.

10 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE

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harm, environmental plaintiffs may often rely more heav

ily on their probability of success than the likelihood of

harm. The Court is correct that relief is not warranted

“simply to prevent the possibility of some remote future

injury.” Ante, at 12 (quoting Wright & Miller, supra,

§2948.1, at 155). “However, the injury need not have been

inflicted when application is made or be certain to occur; a

strong threat of irreparable injury before trial is an ade

quate basis.” Wright & Miller, supra, §2948.1, at 155–156

(footnote omitted). I agree with the District Court that

NRDC made the required showing here.

B

The Navy’s own EA predicted substantial and irrepara

ble harm to marine mammals. Sonar is linked to mass

strandings of marine mammals, hemorrhaging around the

brain and ears, acute spongiotic changes in the central

nervous system, and lesions in vital organs. E.g., App.

600–602; 360–362; 478–479. As the Ninth Circuit noted,

the EA predicts that the Navy’s “use of MFA sonar in the

SOCAL exercises will result in 564 instances of physical

injury including permanent hearing loss (Level A harass

ment) and nearly 170,000 behavioral disturbances (Level

B harassment), more than 8,000 of which would also

involve temporary hearing loss.” 518 F. 3d, at 696; see

App. 223–224. Within those totals,

“the EA predicts 436 Level A harassments of Cuvier’s

beaked whales, of which, according to NOAA, as few

as 1,121 may exist in California, Oregon and Wash

ington combined. Likewise, the EA predicts 1,092

Level B harassments of bottlenose dolphins, of which

only 5,271 may exist in the California Coastal and

Offshore stocks.” 518 F. 3d, at 691–692.

The majority acknowledges the lower courts’ findings,

ante, at 9, but also states that the EA predicted “only eight

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2008) 11

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

Level A harassments of common dolphins each year” and

“274 Level B harassments of beaked whales per year, none

of which would result in permanent injury,” ante, at 6.

Those numbers do not fully capture the EA’s predictions.

The EA classified the harassments of beaked whales as

Level A, not Level B. The EA does indeed state that

“modeling predicts non-injurious Level B exposures.” App.

185. But, as the majority correctly notes, ante, at 6, the

EA also states that “all beaked whale exposures are

counted as Level A,” App. 185. The EA counted the pre

dicted exposures as Level A “[b]y Navy policy developed in

conjunction with NMFS.” Id., at 200. The record reflects

“the known sensitivity of these species to tactical sonar,”

id., at 365 (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admini

stration letter), and as the majority acknowledges, beaked

whales are difficult to study, ante, at 6. Further, as the

Ninth Circuit noted, “the EA . . . maintained that the

methodology used was based on the ‘best available sci

ence.’ ” 518 F. 3d, at 669.4

In my view, this likely harm—170,000 behavioral dis

turbances, including 8,000 instances of temporary hearing

loss; and 564 Level A harms, including 436 injuries to a

beaked whale population numbering only 1,121—cannot

be lightly dismissed, even in the face of an alleged risk to

the effectiveness of the Navy’s 14 training exercises.

There is no doubt that the training exercises serve critical

interests. But those interests do not authorize the Navy to

——————

4 The majority reasons that the environmental harm deserves less

weight because the training exercises “have been taking place in

SOCAL for the last 40 years,” such that “this is not a case in which the

defendant is conducting a new type of activity with completely un

known effects on the environment.” Ante, at 13. But the EA explains

that the proposed action is not a continuation of the “status quo train

ing.” App. 128. Instead, the EA is based on the Navy’s proposal to

employ a “surge” training strategy, ibid., in which the commander

“would have the option to conduct two concurrent major range events,”

id., at 124.

12 WINTER v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE

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GINSBURG, J., dissenting

violate a statutory command, especially when recourse to

the Legislature remains open. “Of course, military inter

ests do not always trump other considerations, and we

have not held that they do.” Ante, at 16.

In light of the likely, substantial harm to the environ

ment, NRDC’s almost inevitable success on the merits of

its claim that NEPA required the Navy to prepare an EIS,

the history of this litigation, and the public interest, I

cannot agree that the mitigation measures the District

Court imposed signal an abuse of discretion. Cf. Amoco

Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U. S. 531, 545 (1987)

(“Environmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be

adequately remedied by money damages and is often

permanent or at least of long duration, i.e., irreparable. If

such injury is sufficiently likely, therefore, the balance of

harms will usually favor the issuance of an injunction to

protect the environment.”).

For the reasons stated, I would affirm the judgment of

the Ninth Circuit.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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