Chambers v. United States

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2008 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

CHAMBERS v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 06–11206. Argued November 10, 2008—Decided January 13, 2009

The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) imposes a 15-year mandatory

prison term on a felon unlawfully in possession of a firearm who has

three prior convictions for committing certain drug crimes or “a vio

lent felony,” 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(1), defined as a crime punishable by

more than one year’s imprisonment that, inter alia, “involves conduct

that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,”

§924(e)(2)(B)(ii). At petitioner Chambers’ sentencing for being a felon

in possession of a firearm, the Government sought ACCA’s 15-year

mandatory prison term. Chambers disputed one of his prior convic

tions—failing to report for weekend confinement—as falling outside

the ACCA definition of “violent felony.” The District Court treated

the failure to report as a form of what the relevant state statute calls

“escape from [a] penal institution,” and held that it qualified as a

“violent felony” under ACCA. The Seventh Circuit agreed.

Held: Illinois’ crime of failure to report for penal confinement falls out

side the scope of ACCA’s “violent felony” definition. Pp. 3–8.

(a) For purposes of ACCA’s definitions, it is the generic crime that

counts, not how the crime was committed on a particular occasion.

Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575, 602. This categorical ap

proach requires courts to choose the right category, and sometimes

the choice is not obvious. The nature of the behavior that likely un

derlies a statutory phrase matters in this respect. The state statute

at issue places together in a single section several different kinds of

behavior, which, as relevant here, may be categorized either as fail

ure to report for detention or as escape from custody. Failure to re

port is a separate crime from escape. Its underlying behavior differs

from the more aggressive behavior underlying escape, and it is listed

separately in the statute’s title and body and is of a different felony

2 CHAMBERS v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

class than escape. At the same time, the statutory phrases setting

forth the various kinds of failure to report describe roughly similar

forms of behavior, thus constituting a single category. Consequently,

for ACCA purposes, the statute contains at least two separate crimes,

escape and failure to report. Pp. 3–5.

(b) The “failure to report” crime does not satisfy ACCA’s “violent

felony” definition. Although it is punishable by imprisonment ex

ceeding one year, it satisfies none of the other parts of the definition.

Most critically, it does not “involv[e] conduct that presents a serious

potential risk of physical injury to another.” Conceptually speaking,

the crime amounts to a form of inaction, and there is no reason to be

lieve that an offender who fails to report is otherwise doing some

thing that poses a serious potential risk of physical injury. The Gov

ernment’s argument that a failure to report reveals the offender’s

special, strong aversion to penal custody—pointing to 3 state and

federal cases over 30 years in which individuals shot at officers at

tempting to recapture them—is unconvincing. Even assuming the

relevance of violence that may occur long after an offender fails to re

port, the offender’s aversion to penal custody is beside the point. The

question is whether such an offender is significantly more likely than

others to attack or resist an apprehender, thereby producing a seri

ous risk of physical injury. Here a United States Sentencing Com

mission report, showing no violence in 160 federal failure-to-report

cases over 2 recent years, helps provide a negative answer. The three

reported cases to which the Government points do not show the con

trary. Simple multiplication (2 years versus 30 years; federal alone

versus federal-plus-state) suggests that they show only a statistically

insignificant risk of physical violence. And the Government provides

no other empirical information. Pp. 5–8.

473 F. 3d 724, reversed and remanded.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,

C. J., and STEVENS, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ.,

joined. ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which

THOMAS, JJ., joined.

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 06–11206

_________________

DEONDERY CHAMBERS, PETITIONER v. UNITED

STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[January 13, 2009]

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question before us is whether a “failure to report”

for penal confinement is a “ ‘violent felony’ ” within the

terms of the Armed Career Criminal Act. 18 U. S. C.

§924(e). We hold that it is not.

I

The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) imposes a 15

year mandatory prison term on an individual convicted of

being a felon in possession of a firearm if that individual

has “three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a

serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions

different from one another.” §924(e)(1). ACCA defines a

“violent felony” as a “crime punishable by imprisonment

for a term exceeding one year” that also either

“(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force against the person of

another; or

“(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use

of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that pre

sents a serious potential risk of physical injury to an

2 CHAMBERS v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

other.” §924(e)(2)(B).

Clause (ii), ACCA’s so-called residual clause, is at issue

here.

II

The petitioner, Deondery Chambers, pleaded guilty to a

charge of being a felon unlawfully in possession of a fire

arm. §922(g). At sentencing the Government asked the

District Court to apply ACCA’s 15-year mandatory prison

term because, in its view, three of Chambers’ prior convic

tions qualified as an ACCA “serious drug offense” or “vio

lent felony.” Chambers conceded that two of his prior

convictions, namely a 1998 conviction for robbery and

aggravated battery and a 1999 drug crime conviction, fell

within ACCA’s definitions. But he disputed the Govern

ment’s claim as to a third conviction. That third convic

tion arose out of Chambers’ sentence for his 1998 robbery

and battery offense. The sentence required Chambers to

report to a local prison for 11 weekends of incarceration.

He failed to report for weekend confinement on four occa

sions, and was later convicted of the crime of “fail[ing] to

report to a penal institution.” Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720,

§5/31–6(a) (West Supp. 2008).

The District Court treated the “failure to report” as a

form of what the relevant Illinois statute calls “escape

from [a] penal institution,” ibid., and held that the crime

qualified as a “violent felony” under ACCA. The Court of

Appeals agreed. 473 F. 3d 724 (CA7 2007). In light of

disagreement among the Circuits as to whether failure to

report for imprisonment falls within the scope of ACCA’s

definition of “violent felony,” we granted certiorari. Com

pare United States v. Winn, 364 F. 3d 7, 12 (CA1 2004)

(failure to report is a “violent felony”), with United States

v. Piccolo, 441 F. 3d 1084, 1088 (CA9 2006) (failure to

report is not a “violent felony”).

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009)

3

Opinion of the Court

III

We initially consider the classification of the crime. In

ordinary speech, words such as “crime” and “felony” can

refer not only to a generic set of acts, say, burglary in

general, but also to a specific act committed on a particu

lar occasion, say the burglary that the defendant engaged

in last month. We have made clear, however, that, for

purposes of ACCA’s definitions, it is the generic sense of

the word “felony” that counts. Taylor v. United States, 495

U. S. 575, 602 (1990); see also Shepard v. United States,

544 U. S. 13, 16–17 (2005). The statute’s defining lan

guage, read naturally, uses “felony” to refer to a crime as

generally committed. And by so construing the statute,

one avoids the practical difficulty of trying to ascertain at

sentencing, perhaps from a paper record mentioning only

a guilty plea, whether the present defendant’s prior crime,

as committed on a particular occasion, did or did not in

volve violent behavior. See id., at 20–21. Thus, to deter

mine, for example, whether attempted burglary is a “vio

lent felony,” we have had to examine, not the unsuccessful

burglary the defendant attempted on a particular occa

sion, but the generic crime of attempted burglary. James

v. United States, 550 U. S. 192, 204–206 (2007).

This categorical approach requires courts to choose the

right category. And sometimes the choice is not obvious.

The nature of the behavior that likely underlies a statu

tory phrase matters in this respect. Where Massachu

setts, for example, placed within a single, separately

numbered statutory section (entitled “Breaking and enter

ing at night,” Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 266, §16 (West

2008)) burglary of a “building, ship, vessel or vehicle,” this

Court found that the behavior underlying, say, breaking

into a building, differs so significantly from the behavior

underlying, say, breaking into a vehicle, that for ACCA

purposes a sentencing court must treat the two as differ

ent crimes. See Shepard, supra, at 16–17; see also Taylor,

4 CHAMBERS v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

supra, at 598.

The Illinois statute now before us, like the Massachu

setts statute, places together in a single numbered statu

tory section several different kinds of behavior. It sepa

rately describes those behaviors as (1) escape from a penal

institution, (2) escape from the custody of an employee of a

penal institution, (3) failing to report to a penal institu

tion, (4) failing to report for periodic imprisonment, (5)

failing to return from furlough, (6) failing to return from

work and day release, and (7) failing to abide by the terms

of home confinement. Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, §5/31–6(a);

see Appendix A, infra. We know from the state-court

information in the record that Chambers pleaded guilty to

“knowingly fail[ing] to report” for periodic imprisonment

“to the Jefferson County Jail, a penal institution.” App.

68; see Shepard, supra, at 25 (sentencing court may look,

for example, to charging document, plea agreement, jury

instructions, or transcript of plea colloquy to determine

crime at issue). But we must decide whether for ACCA

purposes a failure to report counts as a separate crime.

Unlike the lower courts, we believe that a failure to

report (as described in the statutory provision’s third,

fourth, fifth, and sixth phrases) is a separate crime, differ

ent from escape (the subject matter of the statute’s first

and second phrases), and from the potentially less serious

failure to abide by the terms of home confinement (the

subject of the final phrase). The behavior that likely

underlies a failure to report would seem less likely to

involve a risk of physical harm than the less passive, more

aggressive behavior underlying an escape from custody.

See Begay v. United States, 553 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip

op., at 7). Moreover, the statute itself not only lists escape

and failure to report separately (in its title and its body)

but also places the behaviors in two different felony

classes (Class Two and Class Three) of different degrees of

seriousness. See Appendix A, infra.

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 5

Opinion of the Court

At the same time, we believe the statutory phrases

setting forth various kinds of failure to report (or to re

turn) describe roughly similar forms of behavior. Each is

characterized by a failure to present oneself for detention

on a specified occasion. All amount to variations on a

single theme. For that reason we consider them as to

gether constituting a single category. Cf. James, supra, at

207–209 (determining that where separately listed behav

iors pose a similar degree of risk, sentencing courts may

consider all listed behaviors as a single crime). We conse

quently treat the statute for ACCA purposes as containing

at least two separate crimes, namely escape from custody

on the one hand, and a failure to report on the other.

Failure to abide by home confinement terms—potentially

the least serious of the offenses—is not at issue here.

IV

We now must consider whether the “failure to report”

crime satisfies ACCA’s “violent felony” definition. It

clearly satisfies the first part of that definition, for it is a

“crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding

one year.” 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B). But it satisfies none

of the other parts. It does not have “as an element the

use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force

against the person of another.” §924(e)(2)(B)(i). It does

not consist of “burglary, arson, or extortion,” or “involv[e]

use of explosives.” §924(e)(2)(B)(ii). And, more critically

for present purposes, it does not “ ‘involve conduct that

presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to

another.’ ” See Begay, 553 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2–4);

id., at ___ (slip op., at 6) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judg

ment) (treating serious risk of physical injury to another

as critical definitional factor); id., at ___ (slip op., at 2)

(ALITO, J., dissenting) (same).

Conceptually speaking, the crime amounts to a form of

inaction, a far cry from the “purposeful, ‘violent,’ and

6 CHAMBERS v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

‘aggressive’ conduct” potentially at issue when an offender

uses explosives against property, commits arson, burgles a

dwelling or residence, or engages in certain forms of extor

tion. Cf. id., at ___ (slip op., at 7). While an offender who

fails to report must of course be doing something at the

relevant time, there is no reason to believe that the some

thing poses a serious potential risk of physical injury. Cf.

James, 550 U. S., at 203–204. To the contrary, an indi

vidual who fails to report would seem unlikely, not likely,

to call attention to his whereabouts by simultaneously

engaging in additional violent and unlawful conduct.

The Government argues that a failure to report reveals

the offender’s special, strong aversion to penal custody.

And it points to three cases arising over a period of 30

years in which reported opinions indicate that individuals

shot at officers attempting to recapture them. See United

States v. Eaglin, 571 F. 2d 1069, 1072 (CA9 1977); State v.

Johnson, 245 S. W. 3d 288, 291 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); State

v. Jones, 96 Wash. App. 369, 371–372, 979 P. 2d 898, 899

(1999). But even if we assume for argument’s sake the

relevance of violence that may occur long after an offender

fails to report, we are not convinced by the Government’s

argument. The offender’s aversion to penal custody, even

if special, is beside the point. The question is whether

such an offender is significantly more likely than others to

attack, or physically to resist, an apprehender, thereby

producing a “serious potential risk of physical injury.”

§924(e)(2)(B)(ii). And here a United States Sentencing

Commission report helps provide a conclusive, negative

answer. See Report on Federal Escape Offenses in Fiscal

Years 2006 and 2007, p. 6 (Nov. 2008) (hereinafter Com

mission’s Report), reprinted in part in Appendix B, infra.

See also 473 F. 3d, at 727 (Posner, J.) (urging that such

research be done).

The Commission’s Report identifies every federal case in

2006 or 2007 in which a federal sentencing court applied

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 7

Opinion of the Court

the Sentencing Guideline, “Escape, Instigating or Assist

ing Escape,” 1 United States Sentencing Commission,

Guidelines Manual §2P1.1 (Nov. 2008), and in which

sufficient detail was provided, say, in the presentence

report, about the circumstances of the crime to permit

analysis. The analysis included calculation of the likeli

hood that violence would accompany commission of the

escape or the offender’s later apprehension.

Of 414 such cases, 160 involved a failure to report either

for incarceration (42) or for custody after having been

temporarily released (118). Commission’s Report 7; see

also Appendix B, infra. Of these 160 cases, none at all

involved violence—not during commission of the offense

itself, not during the offender’s later apprehension—

although in 5 instances (3.1%) the offenders were armed.

Ibid. The upshot is that the study strongly supports the

intuitive belief that failure to report does not involve a

serious potential risk of physical injury.

The three reported cases to which the Government

points do not show the contrary. The Sentencing Commis

sion culled its 160 instances from a set of federal sentences

imposed over a period of 2 years. The Government appar

ently culled its three examples from a set of state and

federal sentences imposed over a period of 30 years. Com

pare Eaglin, supra (CA9 1977) with Johnson, supra (Mo.

Ct. App. 2008). Given the larger set, the presence of three

instances of violence is consistent with the Commission’s

data. Simple multiplication (2 years versus 30 years;

federal alone versus federal-plus-state) suggests that they

show only a small risk of physical violence (less than one

in several thousand). And the Government provides no

other empirical information.

For these reasons we conclude that the crime here at

issue falls outside the scope of ACCA’s definition of “vio

lent felony.” §924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The judgment of the Court

of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for pro

8 CHAMBERS v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

ceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 9

Appendix A to opinionCourt Court

Opinion of the of the

APPENDIX A TO OPINION OF THE COURT

“Escape; failure to report to a penal institution or to report

for periodic imprisonment.

“A person convicted of a felony, adjudicated a

delinquent minor for the commission of a felony

offense under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, or

charged with the commission of a felony who

intentionally escapes from any penal institution or

from the custody of an employee of that institution

commits a Class 2 felony; however, a person convicted

of a felony or adjudicated a delinquent minor for the

commission of a felony offense under the Juvenile

Court Act of 1987 who knowingly fails to report to a

penal institution or to report for periodic

imprisonment at any time or knowingly fails to return

from furlough or from work and day release or who

knowingly fails to abide by the terms of home

confinement is guilty of a Class 3 felony.” Ill. Comp.

Stat., ch. 720, §5/31–6(a) (West Supp. 2008).

10 CHAMBERS v. UNITED STATES

Appendix B to opinionCourt Court

Opinion of the of the

APPENDIX B TO OPINION OF THE COURT

Report on Federal Escape Offenses in Fiscal Years 2006

and 2007, p. 7, fig. 1 (Nov. 2008).*

Leaving Leaving Leaving Fail Fail

Secure Law Nonse ing to ing to

Cus Enforce- cure Report Re

tody ment Custody turn

Custody

Number 64 13 177 42 118

of Cases

Force 10 1 (7.7%) 3 (1.7%) 0 0

(15.6%) (0.0%) (0.0%)

Danger 20 1 (7.7%) 4 (2.3%) 3 2

ous (31.3%) (7.1%) (1.7%)

Weapon

Injury 7 2 3 (1.7%) 0 0

(10.9%) (15.4%) (0.0%) (0.0%)

——————

* Cases can fall into more than one category. For example, one case

could involve both force and injury. Such a case would be represented

in the table for force and also for injury. Therefore, the reader should

not aggregate the numbers in any column.

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 1

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 06–11206

_________________

DEONDERY CHAMBERS, PETITIONER v. UNITED

STATES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[January 13, 2009]

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins,

concurring in the judgment.

As I have previously explained, I believe that the

Court’s approach in Begay, like its approach in this case,

“cannot be reconciled with the statutory text.” Begay v.

United States, 553 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 1)

(dissenting opinion). I nonetheless recognize that “stare

decisis in respect to statutory interpretation has ‘special

force,’ ” John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552

U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 8), and I am sympathetic

to the majority’s efforts to provide a workable interpreta

tion of the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal

Act (ACCA), while retaining the “categorical approach”

that we adopted in Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575,

602 (1990). In light of Taylor and Begay, I agree that this

case should be remanded for resentencing. I write sepa

rately, however, to emphasize that only Congress can

rescue the federal courts from the mire into which ACCA’s

draftsmanship and Taylor’s “categorical approach” have

pushed us.

In 1986, when Congress enacted ACCA’s residual

clause, 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(2)(B)(ii), few could have fore

seen the difficulties that lay ahead.1 Only four months

——————

1 Congress originally enacted ACCA in 1984. See §1802, 93 Stat.

2 CHAMBERS v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

before Congress framed the residual clause, this Court

upheld a state sentencing provision that imposed a man

datory minimum sentence where the judge found by a

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant visibly

possessed a firearm during the commission of certain

felonies (including robbery). See McMillan v. Pennsyl

vania, 477 U. S. 79 (1986). Legislating against the back

ground of McMillan, Congress may have assumed that

ACCA’s residual clause would similarly require federal

sentencing judges to determine whether the particular

facts of a particular case triggered a mandatory minimum

sentence.

But history took a different track. In Taylor, the Court

held that ACCA requires “the sentencing court to look only

to the fact that the defendant had been convicted of crimes

falling within certain categories, and not to the facts

underlying the prior convictions.” 495 U. S., at 600. Thus,

we held that sentencing judges should apply a “categorical

approach” to determine whether an underlying state

offense meets the “generic” definition of burglary that this

Court—not Congress—created. Id., at 598. The Court

justified its decision with a 10-page discussion of ACCA’s

purpose and legislative history, id., at 581–590; see also

id., at 603 (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring

in judgment) (criticizing the Court’s approach), and ex

plained that its conclusion was necessary to undo “an

inadvertent casualty [in ACCA’s] complex drafting proc

ess,” id., at 589–590.

ACCA’s clarity has been the true inadvertent casualty.

——————

2185, 18 U. S. C. App. §1202(a) (1982 ed. and Supp. II) (repealed in

1986 by Firearms Owner’s Protection Act, §104(b), 100 Stat. 459). That

statute, however, applied a mandatory sentencing enhancement to only

two predicate felonies—robbery and burglary—which the statute

expressly defined. 18 U. S. C. App. §§1202(c)(8)–(9) (1982 ed., Supp. II).

Congress did not add the undefined “otherwise clause” until 1986. See

Career Criminals Amendment Act of 1986, §1402, 100 Stat. 3207–39.

Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 3

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

After almost two decades with Taylor’s “categorical ap

proach,” only one thing is clear: ACCA’s residual clause is

nearly impossible to apply consistently. Indeed, the “cate

gorical approach” to predicate offenses has created numer

ous splits among the lower federal courts,2 the resolution

of which could occupy this Court for years. What is worse

is that each new application of the residual clause seems

to lead us further and further away from the statutory

text. Today’s decision, for example, turns on little more

than a statistical analysis of a research report prepared by

the United States Sentencing Commission. Ante, at 6–7;

10 (App. B).

At this point, the only tenable, long-term solution is for

——————

2 For example, the lower courts have split over whether it is a “violent

felony” under ACCA’s residual clause to commit rape, compare United

States v. Sawyers, 409 F. 3d 732 (CA6 2005) (statutory rape not cate

gorically violent), with United States v. Williams, 120 F. 3d 575 (CA5

1997) (inducement of minor to commit sodomy violent), and United

States v. Thomas, 231 Fed. Appx. 765 (CA9 2007) (all rape violent);

retaliate against a government officer, compare United States v. Mont

gomery, 402 F. 3d 482 (CA5 2005) (not violent), with Sawyers, supra

(violent); attempt or conspire to commit burglary, compare United

States v. Fell, 511 F. 3d 1035 (CA10 2007) (even after James v. United

States, 550 U. S. 192 (2007), and even where statute requires an overt

act, conspiracy to commit burglary not violent), with United States v.

Moore, 108 F. 3d 878 (CA8 1997) (attempted burglary violent if statute

requires proof of overt act); carry a concealed weapon, compare United

States v. Whitfield, 907 F. 2d 798 (CA8 1990) (not violent), with United

States v. Hall, 77 F. 3d 398 (CA11 1996) (violent); and possess a sawed

off shotgun as a felon, compare United States v. Amos, 501 F. 3d 524

(CA6 2007) (not violent), with United States v. Bishop, 453 F. 3d 30

(CA1 2006) (violent). Compare also United States v. Sanchez-Garcia,

501 F. 3d 1208 (CA10 2007) (unauthorized use of a motor vehicle not a

“violent felony” under 18 U. S. C. §16(b), which closely resembles

ACCA’s residual clause), with United States v. Reliford, 471 F. 3d 913

(CA8 2006) (automobile tampering violent under ACCA’s residual

clause), and United States v. Galvan-Rodriguez, 169 F. 3d 217 (CA5

1999) (per curiam) (unauthorized use of a motor vehicle a “violent

felony” under §16(b)).

4 CHAMBERS v. UNITED STATES

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment

Congress to formulate a specific list of expressly defined

crimes that are deemed to be worthy of ACCA’s sentencing

enhancement. That is the approach that Congress took in

1984, when it applied ACCA to two enumerated and ex

pressly defined felonies. See n. 1, supra. And that ap

proach is the only way to right ACCA’s ship.