Ayers v. Belmontes

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2006 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

AYERS, ACTING WARDEN v. BELMONTES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 05–493. Argued October 3, 2006—Decided November 13, 2006

In the penalty phase of respondent’s capital murder trial, he introduced

mitigating evidence to show, inter alia, that he would lead a con

structive life if incarcerated rather than executed, testifying that he

had done so during a previous incarceration, when he had embraced

Christianity. Two prison chaplains and his Christian sponsors from

that time testified on his behalf, and the parties’ closing arguments

discussed this mitigating evidence and how the jury should consider

it. The trial judge told the jury to consider “[a]ny other circumstance

which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a le

gal excuse for the crime,” an instruction known as “factor (k)” under

California’s then-applicable statutory scheme. Respondent was sen

tenced to death. He contended, on direct review and in federal ha

beas proceedings, that factor (k) and the trial court’s other instruc

tions barred the jury from considering his forward-looking mitigation

evidence in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to present all

mitigating evidence in capital sentencing proceedings. The Federal

District Court denied relief, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. On re

consideration in light of Brown v. Payton, 544 U. S. 133, the Ninth

Circuit again invalidated respondent’s sentence.

Held: The factor (k) instruction is consistent with the constitutional

right to present mitigating evidence in capital sentencing proceed

ings. Pp. 4–16.

(a) This Court has previously found that factor (k) does not pre

clude consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence, such as

mitigating evidence about a defendant’s precrime background and

character, Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370, 377–378, 386, or post-

crime rehabilitation, Brown v. Payton, supra, at 135–136, and found

the proper inquiry to be “whether there is a reasonable likelihood

2 AYERS v. BELMONTES

Syllabus

that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that

prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence,”

Boyde, supra, at 380. Pp. 4–6.

(b) That inquiry applies here. Like Payton, this case involves for

ward-looking evidence and comes to the Court on federal habeas pro

ceedings, but unlike Payton, it was filed before the effective date of

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).

The Ninth Circuit distinguished Payton on this ground, but erred in

finding a “reasonable probability” that the jury did not consider evi

dence of respondent’s future potential. 414 F. 3d 1094, 1138. Pp. 6–

16.

(1) The Circuit adopted a narrow and unrealistic interpretation

of factor (k), ruling that “this instruction allows the jury to consider

evidence that bears upon the commission of the crime by the defen

dant and excuses or mitigates his culpability for the offense,” 414

F. 3d 1094, 1134. As Boyde and Payton explain, the jury is directed

“to consider any other circumstance that might excuse the crime.”

Boyde, supra, at 382. Just as precrime background and character

(Boyde) and postcrime rehabilitation (Payton) may “extenuat[e] the

gravity of the crime,” so may some likelihood of future good conduct

count as a circumstance tending to make a defendant less deserving

of the death penalty. The Ninth Circuit failed to heed the full import

of Payton’s holding, which is significant even where AEDPA is inap

plicable. Moreover, since respondent sought to extrapolate future

behavior from precrime conduct, his mitigation theory was more

analogous to the good-character evidence Boyde found to fall within

factor (k)’s purview. Pp. 6–8.

(2) This Court’s interpretation of factor (k) is the one most consis

tent with the evidence presented to the jury, the parties’ closing ar

guments, and the trial court’s other instructions. It is improbable

that the jury believed that the parties were engaged in an exercise in

futility when respondent presented extensive forward-looking evi

dence in open court. Both prosecution and defense arguments as

sumed the evidence was relevant. The prosecutor’s remarks that the

evidence was weak and his opinion about the weight it should be

given confirmed to the jury that it should analyze respondent’s future

potential. Respondent’s personal pleas were consistent with a trial in

which the jury would assess his future prospects in determining what

sentence to impose. This analysis is confirmed by defense counsel’s

closing arguments. The trial court’s other instructions make it quite

implausible that the jury would deem itself foreclosed from consider

ing respondent’s full case in mitigation. The judge told the jury to

consider all of the evidence, which included respondent’s forward-

looking mitigation case. The sharp contrast between the aggravation

Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

Syllabus

instruction (only enumerated factors could be considered) and the

mitigation one (listed factors were merely examples) also made clear

that the jury was to take a broad view of mitigating evidence. In con

cluding otherwise, the Ninth Circuit cited juror queries as evidence of

confusion. Assuming that interpretation is correct, the court’s con

clusion that a juror likely ignored forward-looking evidence presup

poses what it purports to establish, namely, that forward-looking evi

dence could not fall within factor (k). Pp. 8–16.

414 F. 3d 1094, reversed and remanded.

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,

C. J., and SCALIA, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a

concurring opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a

dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ.,

joined.

Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 05–493

_________________

ROBERT L. AYERS, JR., ACTING WARDEN, PETI-

TIONER v. FERNANDO BELMONTES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[November 13, 2006]

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Fernando Belmontes, the respondent here, was tried in

1982 in the Superior Court of the State of California in

and for the County of San Joaquin. A jury returned a

verdict of murder in the first degree and then determined

he should be sentenced to death. The issue before us

concerns a jury instruction in the sentencing phase.

The trial court, following the statute then in effect,

directed the jury, with other instructions and in a context

to be discussed in more detail, to consider certain specific

factors either as aggravating or mitigating. The trial

court further instructed the jury to consider “[a]ny other

circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime

even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.” App.

184. Under the then-applicable statutory scheme this

general or catchall factor was codified at Cal. Penal Code

Ann. §190.3 (k) (West 1988); and it is referred to as “factor

(k).”

Belmontes contended, on direct review, in state collat

eral proceedings, and in the federal habeas proceedings

giving rise to this case, that factor (k) and the trial court’s

2 AYERS v. BELMONTES

Opinion of the Court

other instructions barred the jury from considering his

forward-looking mitigation evidence—specifically evidence

that he likely would lead a constructive life if incarcerated

instead of executed. The alleged limitation, in his view,

prevented the jury from considering relevant mitigation

evidence, in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to

present all mitigating evidence in capital sentencing

proceedings. See, e.g., Penry v. Johnson, 532 U. S. 782, 797

(2001); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U. S. 1, 4–5, 8 (1986);

Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 112 (1982). The Cali

fornia Supreme Court, affirming the judgment and sen

tence, rejected this contention and other challenges.

People v. Belmontes, 45 Cal. 3d 744, 799–802, 819, 755 P. 2d

310, 341–343, 355 (1988).

In February 1994, after exhausting state remedies,

respondent filed an amended federal habeas petition. The

United States District Court for the Eastern District of

California denied relief, App. to Pet. for Cert. 140a–141a,

145a, but a divided panel of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in relevant part,

Belmontes v. Woodford, 350 F. 3d 861, 908 (2003). Over

the dissent of eight judges, the Court of Appeals denied

rehearing en banc. Belmontes v. Woodford, 359 F. 3d 1079

(2004). This Court granted certiorari, vacated the judg

ment, and remanded for further consideration in light of

Brown v. Payton, 544 U. S. 133 (2005). Brown v. Belmon

tes, 544 U. S. 945 (2005). On remand, a divided panel

again invalidated respondent’s sentence; it distinguished

Payton on the grounds that the Antiterrorism and Effec

tive Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214,

though applicable in that case, does not apply here. Bel-

montes v. Brown, 414 F. 3d 1094, 1101–1102 (2005). Over

yet another dissent, the Court of Appeals again denied

rehearing en banc. Belmontes v. Stokes, 427 F. 3d 663

(2005). We granted certiorari, 547 U. S. ___ (2006), and

now reverse.

Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

Opinion of the Court

I

The evidence at trial showed that in March 1981, while

burglarizing a home where two accomplices had attended

a party, respondent unexpectedly encountered 19-year-old

Steacy McConnell. Respondent killed her by striking her

head 15 to 20 times with a steel dumbbell bar. Respon

dent had armed himself with the dumbbell bar before

entering the victim’s home. See Belmontes, 45 Cal. 3d, at

760–764, 755 P. 2d, at 315–317.

In the sentencing phase of his trial Belmontes intro

duced mitigating evidence to show, inter alia, that he

would make positive contributions to society in a struc

tured prison environment. Respondent testified that,

during a previous term under the California Youth Au

thority (CYA), he had behaved in a constructive way,

working his way to the number two position on a fire crew

in the CYA fire camp in which he was incarcerated. App.

44–45, 53. About that time he had embraced Christianity

and entered into a Christian sponsorship program. He

admitted that initially he participated in this program to

spend time away from the camp. Later, after forming a

good relationship with the married couple who were his

Christian sponsors, he pursued a more religious life and

was baptized. Although his religious commitment lapsed

upon his release from the CYA, he testified that he would

once again turn to religion whenever he could rededicate

himself fully to it. Id., at 46–48, 53–55. Finally, he an

swered in the affirmative when asked if he was “prepared

to contribute in anyway [he] can to society if [he was] put

in prison for the rest of [his] life.” Id., at 58.

Respondent’s former CYA chaplain testified at the

sentencing hearing that respondent’s conversion appeared

genuine. The chaplain, describing respondent as “sal

vageable,” expressed hope that respondent would contrib

ute to prison ministries if given a life sentence. Id., at 79–

83. An assistant chaplain similarly testified that, based

4 AYERS v. BELMONTES

Opinion of the Court

on past experience, respondent likely would be adept at

counseling other prisoners to avoid the mistakes he had

made when they leave prison. Id., at 95–96. And respon

dent’s Christian sponsors testified he was like a son to

them and had been a positive influence on their own son.

They also indicated he had participated in various activi

ties at their church. Id., at 99–103, 110–114.

After respondent presented his mitigating evidence, the

parties made closing arguments discussing respondent’s

mitigating evidence and how the jury should consider it.

Respondent was also allowed to provide his own state

ment. The trial judge included in his instructions the

disputed factor (k) language, an instruction that has since

been amended, see Cal. Jury Instr., Crim., No. 8.85(k)

(2005).

II

In two earlier cases this Court considered a constitu

tional challenge to the factor (k) instruction. See Brown v.

Payton, supra; Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370 (1990).

In Boyde, the Court rejected a claim that factor (k), with its

focus on circumstances “‘extenuat[ing] the gravity of the

crime,’ ” precluded consideration of mitigating evidence

unrelated to the crime, such as evidence of the defendant’s

background and character. Id., at 377–378, 386. The

“proper inquiry,” the Court explained, “is whether there is a

reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the chal

lenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration

of constitutionally relevant evidence.” Id., at 380. Since the

defendant in Boyde “had an opportunity through factor (k)

to argue that his background and character ‘extenuated’ or

‘excused’ the seriousness of the crime,” the Court saw “no

reason to believe that reasonable jurors would resist the

view, ‘long held by society,’ that in an appropriate case such

evidence would counsel imposition of a sentence less than

death.” Id., at 382 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302,

Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 5

Opinion of the Court

319 (1989)). During the sentencing phase in Boyde, more

over, the defense had presented extensive evidence regard

ing background and character, so construing factor (k) to

preclude consideration of that evidence would have required

the jurors not only to believe that “the court’s instructions

transformed all of this ‘favorable testimony into a virtual

charade,’ ” 494 U. S., at 383 (quoting California v. Brown,

479 U. S. 538, 542 (1987)), but also to disregard another

instruction requiring the jury to “ ‘consider all of the evidence

which has been received during any part of the trial of this

case,’ ” 494 U. S., at 383.

In Payton, the Court again evaluated arguments that

factor (k) barred consideration of constitutionally relevant

evidence—this time, evidence relating to postcrime reha

bilitation, rather than precrime background and charac

ter. See 544 U. S., at 135–136. Payton did not come to

this Court, as had Boyde, on direct review, but rather by

federal habeas petition subject to AEDPA. Relief was

available only if “the state court’s adjudication of the claim

‘resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.’ ” Payton, supra, at 141 (quoting 28 U. S. C.

§2254(d)(1)). Although the prosecutor in Payton had

argued to the jury—incorrectly—that factor (k) did not

permit consideration of postcrime rehabilitation evidence,

this Court concluded that the California Supreme Court

reasonably applied Boyde in finding no Eighth Amend

ment violation. 544 U. S., at 142, 146–147. Accepting the

prosecutor’s reading would have required “the surprising

conclusion that remorse could never serve to lessen or

excuse a crime.” Id., at 142. Furthermore, countering any

misimpression created by the prosecution’s argument, the

defense in Payton had presented extensive evidence and

argument regarding a postcrime religious conversion and

other good behavior. The trial court had instructed the

6 AYERS v. BELMONTES

Opinion of the Court

jury to consider all evidence admitted “ ‘during any part of

the trial in this case, except as you may be hereafter in

structed,’ ” and the prosecution itself “devoted substantial

attention to discounting [the postcrime evidence’s] impor

tance as compared to the aggravating factors.” Id., at

145–146. Hence, the state court in Payton could reasona

bly have concluded that, as in Boyde, there was no reason

able likelihood that the jury understood the instruction to

preclude consideration of the postcrime mitigation evi

dence it had heard. 544 U. S., at 147.

III

As the Court directed in Boyde, we inquire “whether

there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the

challenged instruction in a way that prevents the considera

tion of constitutionally relevant evidence.” 494 U. S., at

380. Here, as in Payton, respondent argues that factor (k)

prevented the jury from giving effect to his forward-

looking evidence. And, as in Payton, respondent’s case

comes to this Court in federal habeas proceedings collater

ally attacking the state court’s ruling. Unlike in Payton,

however, the federal petition in this case was filed before

AEDPA’s effective date. AEDPA and its deferential stan

dards of review are thus inapplicable. See Woodford v.

Garceau, 538 U. S. 202, 210 (2003). The Court of Appeals

distinguished Payton on this ground. See 414 F. 3d, at

1101–1102. It was mistaken, however, to find a “reason

able probability” that the jury did not consider respon

dent’s future potential. Id., at 1138.

A

The Court of Appeals erred by adopting a narrow and,

we conclude, an unrealistic interpretation of factor (k).

“Most naturally read,” the Court of Appeals reasoned,

“this instruction allows the jury to consider evidence that

bears upon the commission of the crime by the defendant

Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 7

Opinion of the Court

and excuses or mitigates his culpability for the offense.”

Id., at 1134. As both Boyde and Payton explain, however,

this interpretation is too confined. “The instruction did

not . . . limit the jury’s consideration to ‘any other circum

stance of the crime which extenuates the gravity of the

crime.’ The jury was directed to consider any other cir

cumstance that might excuse the crime.” Boyde, supra, at

382; see also Payton, supra, at 141–142. And just as pre-

crime background and character (Boyde) and postcrime

rehabilitation (Payton) may “extenuat[e] the gravity of the

crime,” so may some likelihood of future good conduct

count as a circumstance tending to make a defendant less

deserving of the death penalty. Cf. Skipper, 476 U. S., at

4–5 (explaining that while inferences regarding future

conduct do not “relate specifically to [a defendant’s] culpa

bility for the crime he committed,” those inferences are

“ ‘mitigating’ in the sense that they might serve ‘as a basis

for a sentence less than death’ ” (quoting Lockett v. Ohio,

438 U. S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion))).

The Court of Appeals failed to heed the full import of

Payton’s holding, a holding that has significance even

where AEDPA is inapplicable. Payton indicated that

reading factor (k) to preclude consideration of postcrime

evidence would require “the surprising conclusion that

remorse could never serve to lessen or excuse a crime.”

544 U. S., at 142. So, too, would it be counterintuitive if a

defendant’s capacity to redeem himself through good

works could not extenuate his offense and render him less

deserving of a death sentence.

In any event, since respondent sought to extrapolate

future behavior from precrime conduct, his mitigation

theory was more analogous to the good-character evidence

examined in Boyde and held to fall within factor (k)’s

purview. See 494 U. S., at 381 (describing the evidence at

issue as including evidence of the defendant’s “strength of

character”). Both types of evidence suggest the crime

8 AYERS v. BELMONTES

Opinion of the Court

stemmed more from adverse circumstances than from an

irredeemable character. See 414 F. 3d, at 1141–1142

(O’Scannlain, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part); cf. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U. S. 350, 369 (1993) (not

ing that the “forward-looking” future-dangerousness in

quiry “is not independent of an assessment of personal

culpability”).

B

Our interpretation of factor (k) is the one most consis

tent with the evidence presented to the jury, the parties’

closing arguments, and the other instructions provided by

the trial court. Each of these will be discussed in turn.

As the Court of Appeals recognized, future-conduct

evidence was central to the mitigation case presented by

the defense. See 414 F. 3d, at 1134. Indeed, although the

defense also adduced evidence of a troubled upbringing,

respondent testified that he could not use his difficult life

“as a crutch to say I am in a situation right now, I’m here

now because of that.” App. 40. Given this assertion, and

considering the extensive forward-looking evidence pre

sented at sentencing—evidence including testimony from

two prison chaplains, respondent’s church sponsors, and

respondent himself—the jurors could have disregarded

respondent’s future potential only if they drew the

unlikely inference that “the court’s instructions trans

formed all of this ‘favorable testimony into a virtual cha

rade,’ ” Boyde, supra, at 383 (quoting Brown, 479 U. S., at

542). It is improbable the jurors believed that the parties

were engaging in an exercise in futility when respondent

presented (and both counsel later discussed) his mitigat

ing evidence in open court.

Arguments by the prosecution and the defense assumed

the evidence was relevant. The prosecutor initially dis

cussed the various factors that were to guide the jury. He

referred to factor (k) as “a catchall.” App. 153. He then

Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 9

Opinion of the Court

discussed respondent’s religious experience in some detail.

With respect to whether this experience fit within factor

(k), he indicated: “I’m not sure it really fits in there. I’m

not sure it really fits in any of them. But I think it ap

pears to be a proper subject of consideration.” Id., at 154.

These seemingly contradictory statements are explained

by the prosecutor’s following comments.

The prosecutor suggested (quite understandably on the

record) that respondent’s religious evidence was weak. He

stated: “You know, first of all, it’s no secret that the evi

dence upon which the defendant’s religious experience

rests is somewhat shaky.” Ibid. He also opined that the

experience had to be taken “with a grain of salt.” Id., at

155. The jury would have realized that, when the prosecu

tor suggested respondent’s religious experience did not fit

within factor (k), he was discussing the persuasiveness of

the evidence, not the jury’s ability to consider it. After all,

he thought religion was “a proper subject of considera

tion.” Id., at 154.

The prosecutor then discussed how the jury should

weigh respondent’s “religious awakening”:

“I suppose you can say it would be appropriate be

cause—in this fashion: The defendant may be of value

to the community later. You recall the people talking

about how he would have the opportunity to work

with other prisoners in prison. And I think that value

to the community is something that you have to weigh

in. There’s something to that.

“On the other hand, the fact that someone has relig

ion as opposed to someone doesn’t should be no

grounds for either giving or withholding life. I mean

let’s turn it around and look at the other side of the

coin. Suppose someone said he didn’t belong to a

church and didn’t talk to a minister. Would that man

deserve to die merely because of that? So if he says he

10 AYERS v. BELMONTES

Opinion of the Court

has religion, does he deserve the other penalty, life? I

don’t think that that should be an influencing factor

at all in that respect. I don’t think the law contem

plates that and I don’t think it’s right.” Id., at 155.

These remarks confirmed to the jury that it should

analyze respondent’s future potential, his future “value to

the community.” Ibid. This is what respondent himself

wanted it to do. And while the prosecutor commented that

the law did not contemplate jury consideration of respon

dent’s religious conversion, respondent did not argue that

the jury should consider the mere fact that he had discov

ered religion. Rather, as manifested by his arguments on

appeal, respondent wanted to use this religious evidence

to demonstrate his future “value to the community,” not to

illustrate his past religious awakening. Nothing the

prosecutor said would have convinced the jury that it was

forbidden from even considering respondent’s religious

conversion, though surely the jury could discount it; and

nothing the prosecutor said would have led the jury to

think it could not consider respondent’s future potential,

especially since he indicated that this is exactly what the

jury had “to weigh” in its deliberation. Ibid.

After the prosecutor concluded his arguments, the trial

judge allowed respondent to speak on his own behalf.

Respondent, while not showing any remorse, suggested

that life imprisonment offered “an opportunity to achieve

goals and try to better yourself.” Id., at 163. He also

stated: “I myself would really like to have my life and try

to improve myself.” Id., at 164. Respondent’s personal

pleas were consistent with a trial in which the jury would

assess his future prospects in determining what sentence

to impose.

Defense counsel’s closing arguments confirm this analy

sis. To be sure, commenting on the mitigating evidence,

he initially indicated: “I’m not going to insult you by tell

Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 11

Opinion of the Court

ing you I think [the mitigating evidence] excuses in any

way what happened here. That is not the reason I asked

these people to come in.” Id., at 166. Read in context

defense counsel’s remarks did not imply the jury should

ignore the mitigating evidence. Rather, conforming to the

dichotomy within factor (k) itself, his remarks merely

distinguished between a legal excuse and an extenuating

circumstance. Cf. Cal. Penal Code Ann. §190.3(k) (“[a]ny

other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the

crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime”).

That defense counsel did, in fact, want the jury to take

into account respondent’s future potential became mani

fest near the end of his argument. He suggested that the

“people who came in here [and] told you about [respon

dent]” provided the jury with “a game plan” for what

respondent could do with his life. App. 170. He continued:

“We’re just suggesting the tip of the iceberg because who

knows in 20, 30, 40, 50 years what sorts of things he can

do, as he fits into the system, as he learns to set his goals,

to contribute something in whatever way he can.” Ibid.

This would have left the jury believing it could and should

contemplate respondent’s potential.

Other instructions from the trial court make it quite

implausible that the jury would deem itself foreclosed

from considering respondent’s full case in mitigation.

Before enumerating specific factors for consideration—

factors including the circumstances of the crime, the de

fendant’s age, and “[t]he presence or absence of any prior

felony conviction,” id., at 184, as well as the factor (k)

catchall—the judge told the jury: “In determining which

penalty is to be imposed on the defendant you shall con

sider all of the evidence which has been received during

any part of the trial of this case, except as you may be

hereafter instructed.” Id., at 183. After listing the factors,

he indicated:

12 AYERS v. BELMONTES

Opinion of the Court

“After having heard all of the evidence and after

having heard and considered the arguments of coun

sel, you shall consider, take into account and be

guided by the applicable factors of aggravating and

mitigating circumstances upon which you have been

instructed.

“If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances

outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall im

pose a sentence of death. However, if you determine

that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the ag

gravating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence

of confinement in the state prison for life without the

possibility of parole.” Id., at 185.

The judge then gave a supplemental instruction regard

ing aggravating and mitigating factors:

“I have previously read to you the list of aggravat

ing circumstances which the law permits you to con

sider if you find that any of them is established by the

evidence. These are the only aggravating circum

stances that you may consider. You are not allowed to

take account of any other facts or circumstances as

the basis for deciding that the death penalty would be

an appropriate punishment in this case.

“However, the mitigating circumstances which I

have read for your consideration are given to you

merely as examples of some of the factors that you

may take into account as reasons for deciding not to

impose a death penalty or a death sentence upon Mr.

Belmontes. You should pay careful attention to each

of these factors. Any one of them standing alone may

support a decision that death is not the appropriate

punishment in this case.” Id., at 185–186.

Given the evidence and arguments presented to the

jury, these instructions eliminate any reasonable likeli

hood that a juror would consider respondent’s future

Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 13

Opinion of the Court

prospects to be beyond the bounds of proper consideration.

The judge told the jury to consider “all of the evidence,”

and “all of the evidence” included respondent’s forward-

looking mitigation case. While the judge did end his broad

command to appraise all the evidence with the qualifier

“except as you may be hereafter instructed,” id., at 183, he

did not later instruct the jury that it should disregard

respondent’s future potential in prison. The jury could not

fairly read the limitation in the instruction to apply to

respondent’s central mitigation theory. By contrast, in

response to a juror’s question, the trial judge specifically

instructed the jury not to consider whether respondent

could receive psychiatric treatment while in prison.

The sharp contrast between the court’s instruction on

aggravation (that only enumerated factors could be con

sidered) and its instruction on mitigation (that listed

factors were “merely . . . examples,” id., at 186) made it

clear that the jury was to take a broad view of mitigating

evidence. Coming back to back, the instructions conveyed

the message that the jury should weigh the finite aggrava

tors against the potentially infinite mitigators. That the

trial judge told the jury to “pay careful attention” to the

listed mitigating factors, ibid., moreover, did not compel

the jury to give them sole consideration. For this to be the

case, the jury would have had to fail to take the judge at

his word. The judge did not advise the jury to pay exclu

sive attention to the listed mitigating circumstances, and

he had told the jury that these circumstances were simply

examples.

It is implausible that the jury supposed that past deeds

pointing to a constructive future could not “extenuat[e] the

gravity of the crime,” as required by factor (k), much less

that such evidence could not be considered at all. Boyde

concludes that in jury deliberations “commonsense under

standing of the instructions in the light of all that has

taken place at the trial [is] likely to prevail over technical

14 AYERS v. BELMONTES

Opinion of the Court

hairsplitting.” 494 U. S., at 381. Here, far from encourag

ing the jury to ignore the defense’s central evidence, the

instructions supported giving it due weight.

In concluding otherwise, the Court of Appeals cited

queries from some of the jurors as evidence of confusion.

Although the jury’s initial question is not in the record, it

appeared to ask the judge about the consequences of fail

ing to reach a unanimous verdict. Cf. 414 F. 3d, at 1135.

In response, the judge reread portions of the instructions

and stated that “all 12 jurors must agree, if you can.” App.

190. Before the judge sent the jury back for further delib

eration, the following exchange took place:

“JUROR HERN: The statement about the aggrava

tion and mitigation of the circumstances, now, that

was the listing?

“THE COURT: That was the listing, yes, ma’am.

“JUROR HERN: Of those certain factors we were to

decide one or the other and then balance the sheet?

“THE COURT: That is right. It is a balancing proc

ess. Mr. Meyer?

“JUROR MEYER: A specific question, would this be

an either/or situation, not a one, if you cannot the

other?

“THE COURT: No. It is not that.

“JUROR MEYER: It is an either/or situation?

“THE COURT: Exactly. If you can make that ei

ther/or decision. If you cannot, then I will discharge

you.

“JUROR HAILSTONE: Could I ask a question? I

don’t know if it is permissible. Is it possible that he

could have psychiatric treatment during this time?

“THE COURT: That is something you cannot con

sider in making your decision.” Id., at 191.

The Court of Appeals decided Juror Hern’s questions

Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 15

Opinion of the Court

indicated she thought (incorrectly) that only listed miti

gating factors were on the table—an error, in the Court of

Appeals’ view, that should have prompted a clarifying

instruction confirming that all the mitigating evidence

was relevant. 414 F. 3d, at 1136. The Court of Appeals

further supposed the response to Juror Hailstone’s ques

tion compounded the problem, since psychiatric treatment

presumably would be necessary only in aid of future reha

bilitation. Id., at 1137.

The Court of Appeals’ analysis is flawed. To begin with,

attributing to Juror Hern a dilemma over the scope of

mitigation is only one way to interpret her questions, and,

as the California Supreme Court observed on direct re

view, it is not necessarily the correct one, see Belmontes,

45 Cal. 3d, at 804, 755 P. 2d, at 344. It is at least as likely

that the juror was simply asking for clarification about

California’s overall balancing process, which requires

juries to consider and balance enumerated factors (such as

age and criminal history) that are labeled neither as miti

gating nor as aggravating. As Juror Hern surmised (but

sought to clarify), the jury itself must determine the side

of the balance on which each listed factor falls. See Cal.

Penal Code Ann. §190.3 (providing that, “[i]n determining

the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into account” any

relevant listed factors); see generally Tuilaepa v. Califor

nia, 512 U. S. 967, 978–979 (1994) (noting that the §190.3

sentencing factors “do not instruct the sentencer how to

weigh any of the facts it finds in deciding upon the ulti

mate sentence”).

Even assuming the Court of Appeals correctly inter

preted Juror Hern’s questions, the court’s conclusion that

this juror likely ignored forward-looking evidence presup

poses what it purports to establish, namely, that forward-

looking evidence could not fall within factor (k). As dis

cussed earlier, nothing barred the jury from viewing re

spondent’s future prospects as “extenuat[ing] the gravity

16 AYERS v. BELMONTES

Opinion of the Court

of the crime,” so nothing barred it from considering such

evidence under the rubric of the “listing.” As for Juror

Hailstone’s psychiatric-care question, this inquiry shows

that, if anything, the jurors were considering respondent’s

potential. The trial court’s response, far from implying a

broad prohibition on forward-looking inferences, was

readily explicable by the absence of any evidence in the

record regarding psychiatric care.

In view of our analysis and disposition in this case it is

unnecessary to address an argument for reversing the

Court of Appeals based on the Court’s holding in Johnson

v. Texas, 509 U. S. 350 (1993), a subject raised by Judge

O’Scannlain in his separate opinion in the Court of Ap

peals. See 414 F. 3d, at 1141–42 (opinion concurring in

part and dissenting in part).

IV

In this case, as in Boyde and as in Payton, the jury

heard mitigating evidence, the trial court directed the jury

to consider all the evidence presented, and the parties

addressed the mitigating evidence in their closing argu

ments. This Court’s cases establish, as a general rule,

that a jury in such circumstances is not reasonably likely

to believe itself barred from considering the defense’s

evidence as a factor “extenuat[ing] the gravity of the

crime.” The factor (k) instruction is consistent with the

constitutional right to present mitigating evidence in

capital sentencing proceedings.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and

the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

SCALIA, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 05–493

_________________

ROBERT L. AYERS, JR., ACTING WARDEN, PETI-

TIONER v. FERNANDO BELMONTES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[November 13, 2006]

JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins,

concurring.

I adhere to my view that limiting a jury’s discretion to

consider all mitigating evidence does not violate the

Eighth Amendment. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639,

673 (1990) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring

in judgment). Even accepting the Court’s jurisprudence to

the contrary, however, this is arguably an easy case, given

our reiteration in Johnson v. Texas, 509 U. S. 350, 372

(1993), that a jury need only “be able to consider in some

manner all of a defendant’s relevant mitigating evidence,”

and need not “be able to give effect to mitigating evidence

in every conceivable manner in which the evidence might

be relevant.” But since petitioner has not relied on John

son, as Judge O’Scannlain did below, see Belmontes v.

Brown, 414 F. 3d 1094, 1141–1142 (CA9 2005) (opinion

concurring in part and dissenting in part), I am content to

join in full the Court’s opinion, which correctly applies

Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370 (1990).

Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 1

STEVENS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 05–493

_________________

ROBERT L. AYERS, JR., ACTING WARDEN, PETI-

TIONER v. FERNANDO BELMONTES

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[November 13, 2006]

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE SOUTER, JUSTICE

GINSBURG, and JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting.

In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978), the Court set

aside Ohio’s death penalty statute as unconstitutional

because it unduly restricted the mitigating evidence that a

jury could consider in deciding whether to impose the

death penalty. In his opinion announcing the judgment,

Chief Justice Burger wrote:

“There is no perfect procedure for deciding in which

cases governmental authority should be used to im

pose death. But a statute that prevents the sentencer

in all capital cases from giving independent mitigat

ing weight to aspects of the defendant’s character and

record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in

mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty will

be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less

severe penalty. When the choice is between life and

death, that risk is unacceptable and incompatible

with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments.” Id., at 605 (plurality opinion).

The respondent here, Fernando Belmontes, was sen

tenced to death in 1982, a scant four years after Lockett.

See People v. Belmontes, 45 Cal. 3d 744, 755 P. 2d 310

(1988). Yet at the time of his sentencing, there remained

2 AYERS v. BELMONTES

STEVENS, J., dissenting

significant residual confusion as to whether the Constitu

tion obligated States to permit juries to consider evidence

that, while not extenuating the defendant’s culpability for

the crime, might nevertheless call for a sentence less than

death. Cf. People v. Easley, 34 Cal. 3d 858, 875–880, 671

P. 2d 813, 823–827 (1983) (noting arguments on both

sides).

The California death penalty statute in effect in 1982

quite plainly rested on the assumption that California

could preclude the consideration of such evidence. The

statute commanded that the jury “shall impose” a death

sentence if aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigat

ing circumstances, and limited the jury’s inquiry to 11

discrete categories of evidence. See Cal. Penal Code

§190.3 (West 1988). Other than factors relating to the

defendant’s age and prior criminal record, every one of

those categories relate to the severity of the crime of which

the defendant was convicted.1 And while the eleventh

——————

1 Thosecategories are: “(a) The circumstances of the crime of which

the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the exis

tence of any special circumstances found to be true . . . .

“(b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant

which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the

express or implied threat to use force or violence.

“(c) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.

“(d) Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant

was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.

“(e) Whether or not the victim was a participant in the defendant’s

homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act.

“(f) Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances

which the defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or

extenuation for his conduct.

“(g) Whether or not defendant acted under extreme duress or under

the substantial domination of another person.

“(h) Whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the

defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his

conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental

disease or defect, or the affects of intoxication.

“(i) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.

Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 3

STEVENS, J., dissenting

catch-all “factor (k)” authorized consideration of “[a]ny

other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the

crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime,”

§190.3(k), factor (k)’s restrictive language sent the unmis

takable message that California juries could properly give

no mitigating weight to evidence that did not extenuate

the severity of the crime.

Just a year after respondent’s sentencing the California

Supreme Court evinced considerable discomfort with

factor (k). In People v. Easley, after discussing the possi

ble unconstitutionality of the penalty phase instructions,

the court inserted a critical footnote effectively amending

factor (k) and expanding the evidence that a California

jury could properly consider in deciding whether to impose

a death sentence:

“In order to avoid potential misunderstanding in the

future, trial courts—in instructing on [factor (k)]—

should inform the jury that it may consider as a miti

gating factor ‘any other circumstance which extenu

ates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a

legal excuse for the crime’ and any other ‘aspect of

[the] defendant’s character or record . . . that the de

fendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than

death.’ ” 34 Cal. 3d, at 878, n. 10, 671 P. 2d, at 826, n.

——————

“(j) Whether or not the defendant was an accomplice to the offense

and his participation in the commission of the offense was relatively

minor.

“(k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the

crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.” Cal. Penal

Code Ann. §190.3 (West 1988).

The 1988 version of §190.3 also provided that “[a]fter having heard

and received all of the evidence, . . . the trier of fact shall consider, take

into account and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circum

stances referred to in this section,” and “shall determine whether the

penalty shall be death or confinement in state prison for a term of life

without the possibility of parole.”

4 AYERS v. BELMONTES

STEVENS, J., dissenting

10 (emphasis added).2

Although Easley came too late to help respondent, the

California Supreme Court’s evident concern that capital

juries must be permitted to consider evidence beyond that

which “extenuates the gravity of the crime” proved pre

scient. In Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U. S. 1 (1986)—

decided two years before the California Supreme Court

affirmed respondent’s conviction and therefore fully appli

cable here, see Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314, 322–

323 (1987)—we expressly rejected the argument, pre

sented in Justice Powell’s separate opinion, that the

States retained the authority to determine what mitigat

ing evidence is relevant “as long as they do not foreclose

consideration of factors that may tend to reduce the de

fendant’s culpability for his crime,” see Skipper, 476 U. S.,

at 11 (opinion concurring in judgment). Apart from the

traditional sentencing factors such as “[e]vidence concern

ing the degree of the defendant’s participation in the

crime, or his age and emotional history,” Justice Powell

would have held that States could properly exclude evi

dence during a capital sentencing proceeding. Id., at 13.

The majority, however, took a more expansive view.

Although it recognized that the probative force of Skip

per’s excluded evidence “would not relate specifically to

petitioner’s culpability for the crime he committed, [there

was] no question but that such inferences would be ‘miti

gating’ in the sense that they might serve ‘as a basis for a

sentence less than death.’ ” Id., at 4–5 (quoting Lockett,

——————

2 The

California Legislature also responded to the confusion by

amending factor (k) to include “any sympathetic or other aspect of the

defendant’s character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for

a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for

which he is on trial.” Cal. Jury Instr., Crim., No. 8.85(k) (2005) (brack

ets omitted). That amendment confirms the view that the category of

evidence that may provide the basis for a sentence other than death is

much broader that the category described in factor (k).

Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 5

STEVENS, J., dissenting

438 U. S., at 604; emphasis added). After Skipper, then,

the law was clear: A capital jury must be allowed to con

sider a broader category of mitigating evidence than nor

mally relevant in noncapital proceedings.

Respondent was sentenced, however, before Easley

rewrote factor (k) and before Skipper resolved the confu

sion over whether States had the constitutional latitude to

restrict evidence that did not “tend to reduce the defen

dant’s culpability for his crime,” 476 U. S., at 11 (Powell,

J., concurring in judgment). As the following review of the

record will underscore, that confusion pervaded every

aspect of respondent’s sentencing hearing. It addled the

trial judge, the prosecutor, defense counsel, and—

inevitably—the jurors themselves.

I

At the sentencing hearing, after the prosecution put on

its case—which consisted mainly of evidence of respon

dent’s previous conduct, see Belmontes, 45 Cal. 3d, at 795,

755 P. 2d, at 338–339—respondent countered with testi

mony from his grandfather and his mother. That testi

mony focused almost entirely on respondent’s background:

His father drank to excess and savagely beat his wife; his

parents were divorced when he was 9 or 10 years old; his

mother remarried, but again divorced when respondent

was 14 or 15 years old; at this point respondent became

difficult to control, and, in 1979, he was sent to the Cali

fornia Youth Authority (Youth Authority); after his re

lease, respondent did not live with his mother, although

he kept in touch with her by telephone and was very close

with his 15-year-old sister. See generally App. 5–22.

Next, the jury heard testimony from Robert Martinez

and his wife Darlene, both of whom testified that they

were close friends with respondent but admitted that they

had seen him only once after he was released from the

Youth Authority. Id., at 26–27, 35. Robert further testi

6 AYERS v. BELMONTES

STEVENS, J., dissenting

fied that respondent was the best man at his wedding and

that, prior to his wedding, the two of them would spend a

lot of time together, working on Martinez’s car, drinking

beer, and smoking marijuana. Id., at 25, 28. The focus of

Darlene’s testimony was that she was a born-again Chris

tian, and that, when respondent visited Darlene and her

husband after his release from the Youth Authority, he

told her that he was also a born-again Christian. Id., at

35–36.

Respondent then testified on his own behalf. When

asked about his childhood, respondent answered that he

“can’t use it as a crutch to say I am in a situation right

now, I’m here now because of that.” Id., at 40. He went on

to describe his relationships with his father and grandfa

ther and to relate his experience at the Youth Authority.

Id., at 41–45. Respondent testified that, while at the

Youth Authority, he became involved in a Christian pro

gram and developed a relationship with his sponsors in

that program, Beverly and Fred Haro. Id., at 46–48.

Upon his release, however, respondent started having

problems and abandoned his religious commitment, some

thing he had not yet regained fully at the time of the

sentencing hearing. Id., at 53–54. Respondent then de

scribed his life in prison and stated that, were he given a

life sentence, he would attempt to make a positive contri

bution to society. Id., at 55–58. On cross-examination,

most of the prosecutor’s questions focused on the sincerity

of respondent’s religious commitment. Id., at 58–65.

The following day, respondent presented testimony from

Reverend Dale Barrett and Don Miller, both ministers

who worked at the Youth Authority location where re

spondent was held. Reverend Barrett described the Youth

Authority’s M–2 program through which respondent was

matched with the Haros. Id., at 74–76. He then testified

about respondent’s involvement with the church and the

M–2 program, and how his interactions with respondent

Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 7

STEVENS, J., dissenting

led him to believe that he was “salvageable.” Id., at 76–

82. Miller similarly testified about respondent’s participa

tion in the program and his belief that respondent would

be adept at speaking with other prisoners about accepting

religion. Id., at 92, 95–96; see also id., at 96 (testifying

that respondent would “[d]efinitely . . . be used in the

prison system for this sort of activity”).

Finally, the jury heard testimony from respondent’s

sponsors in the M–2 program, Fred and Beverly Haro.

The Haros described meeting respondent and their experi

ences with him. See generally id., at 99–104; 110–112.

They also testified about how close they had grown to

respondent and about respondent’s embrace of religion.

Id., at 101–102; 112–113.

Taken as a whole, the sentencing testimony supports

three conclusions: first, excepting questions concerning the

sincerity of respondent’s religious convictions, there was

no significant dispute about the credibility of the wit

nesses; second, little if any of the testimony extenuated

the severity of respondent’s crime; and third, the testi

mony afforded the jury a principled basis for imposing a

sentence other than death.

II

The prosecutor began his closing argument at the pen

alty phase by describing “th[e] listing of aggravating and

mitigating circumstances” and instructing the jury that it

must “weigh one against the other.” App. 148. While he

observed that “there is a proper place for sympathy and

passion,” ibid., the prosecutor emphasized that the jury

could only consider “the kind of sympathy the instruction

tells you to consider [i.e., sympathy that] naturally arises

or properly arises from the factors in aggravation and

mitigation.” Id., at 149 (emphasis added). He repeated to

the jury that its duty was to “simpl[y] weig[h]” certain

factors that the judge “will tell you that you may take into

8 AYERS v. BELMONTES

STEVENS, J., dissenting

account,” id., at 150–151, and he went through those listed

factors one by one, carefully discussing the evidence that

supported each factor, id., at 151–157.

When the prosecutor turned to factor (k), he directly

addressed the theory “that the defendant’s religious ex

perience is within that catchall that relates to the defen

dant at the time he committed the crime, extenuates the

gravity of the crime.” Id., at 154. The prosecutor ex

pressed doubt that the jury could consider the evidence at

all, stating “I’m not sure it really fits in there. I’m not

sure it really fits in any of them. But I think it appears to

be a proper subject of consideration.” Ibid. And again,

after discussing the evidence supporting respondent’s

religious experience, the prosecutor questioned: “[I]s a

religious awakening a basis for determining penalty?

That’s really the issue, how much does that weigh, or does

it weigh on one side or the other.” Id., at 155. Ultimately,

the prosecutor concluded: “I suppose you can say it would

be appropriate because—in this fashion: The defendant

may be of value to the community later. . . . And I think

that value to the community is something that you have to

weigh in. There’s something to that.” Ibid. But immedi

ately thereafter, the prosecutor told the jury:

“On the other hand, the fact that someone has relig

ion as opposed to someone doesn’t should be no

grounds for either giving or withholding life. . . . So if

he says he has religion, does he deserve the other

penalty, life? I don’t think that that should be an in

fluencing factor at all in that respect. I don’t think the

law contemplates that and I don’t think it’s right.”

Ibid. (emphasis added).

In conclusion, the prosecutor described the circumstances

of the crime and asserted that “[a] dreadful crime requires

a dreadful penalty . . . .” Id., at 160.

Following the prosecutor’s closing argument, the trial

Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 9

STEVENS, J., dissenting

judge allowed respondent to address the jury directly.

Respondent again stated that he could not use his child

hood as a crutch to explain his mistakes, and he said that

his Christianity, too, could not be used as a crutch. Id., at

162. Respondent then asked to keep his life, explaining

that he understood that he had to pay for the victim’s

death, but that he wanted the opportunity to try to im

prove himself in the future. Id., at 163.

Respondent’s attorney, John Schick, then addressed the

jury. He made no effort to persuade the jurors that the

mitigating evidence somehow extenuated the severity of

the crime. On the contrary, he said “I’m not going to

insult you by telling you I think [the mitigating evidence]

excuses in any way what happened here. That is not the

reason I asked these people to come in.” Id., at 166. In

stead, he argued that respondent might be able to make a

positive contribution in a prison environment. He spoke

about the way that respondent improved after he met

Beverly and Fred Haro and about the way that respon

dent’s religion shaped him, observing that religion plays a

“very, very vital function . . . in anybody’s life.” Ibid. But

Schick took care to emphasize that religion “does not

excuse” the murder; rather, the point of that mitigating

evidence was to let the jury “know something about the

man.” Id., at 167, 166. He admitted that respondent

“cannot make it on the outside,” id., at 167, recognized

that respondent needed to be punished, and asked that the

jury impose life in prison, a punishment “that has mean

ing, that has teeth in it . . . .” Id., at 169. Critically,

Schick contended that life in prison was an appropriate

sentence because respondent could, if given the chance,

“contribute something in whatever way he can.” Id., at

170.

In sum, both counsel agreed that none of the mitigating

evidence could detract from the gravity of the crime, and

defense counsel even insisted that it would “insult” the

10 AYERS v. BELMONTES

STEVENS, J., dissenting

jury to suggest that the mitigating evidence “excuses in

any way what happened.” Id., at 166.

III

At a conference on jury instructions with the two coun

sel, the trial judge plainly indicated that he believed that

factor (k) circumscribed the mitigating evidence the jury

could consider. The judge lifted the principal jury instruc

tions verbatim from 7 of the 11 traditional sentencing

factors set forth in the statute, App. 184, but he refused

defense counsel’s request to give the jury a separate list of

potential mitigating factors, id., at 142. Among those

requested were two that specifically instructed the jury to

consider respondent’s ability to perform constructive work

in prison and to live in confinement without acts of vio

lence. See Brief for Respondent 5, n. 1. Those instructions

would have been entirely proper—indeed, probably man

dated—under our holding in Skipper. But the prosecutor,

not having the benefit of Skipper, argued to the judge that

“none [of the proposed mitigating instructions] here . . .

relates to circumstances concerning the crime. I can’t

conceal the fact that I think that is the determinative

factor in this case.” App. 142. Agreeing, the judge refused

to include the mitigating instructions, making the aston

ishing statement that the instructions already “seem to be

a little over-laden with the factors in mitigation rather

than in aggravation.” Ibid.

Of particular importance, the judge modified defense

counsel’s request that the jury be told that the instruc

tions did not contain an exhaustive list of mitigating

factors. Id., at 141. While he did give such an instruction,

ante, at 12, he refused to include the following requested

reference to nonstatutory factors: “ ‘You may also consider

any other circumstances [relating to the case or the defen

dant, Mr. Belmontes,] as reasons for not imposing the

death sentence.’ ” Brief for Respondent 25–26; contra App.

Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 11

STEVENS, J., dissenting

186. The judge thus expressly declined to invite the jury

to weigh “potentially infinite mitigators,” contrary to the

Court’s assumption today, see ante, at 13. A more accu

rate summary of his rulings is that the jury could weigh

nonstatutory circumstances—but only if they extenuated

the severity of respondent’s offense.

IV

The next morning, the trial judge gave the jurors their

instructions. He opened with the unyielding admonition

that “[y]ou must accept and follow the rules of law as I

state them to you,” App. 175, and explained that he was

required to read the instructions aloud even though they

would have a written copy available during their delibera

tions, ibid.

After reading a set of boilerplate instructions, id., at

176–183, the judge turned to the subject of “determining

which penalty is to be imposed on the defendant,” id., at

183. He told the jury to “consider all of the evidence . . .

except as you may be hereafter instructed,” ibid. (emphasis

added), and then stated: “You shall consider, take into

account and be guided by the following factors, if applica

ble.” Id., at 183–184. He then proceeded to repeat verba

tim 7 of the 11 factors set forth in the statute. Id., at 184.

Except for the reference to the “age of the defendant at the

time of the crime,” ibid., every one of those factors related

to the severity of the crime itself. See n. 1, supra. The

last of them, the factor (k) instruction, focused the jury’s

attention on any circumstance that “extenuates the grav

ity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the

crime.” Ibid. No factor permitted the jury to consider

“any other ‘aspect of [the] defendant’s character or record

. . . that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence

less than death.’ ” Easley, 34 Cal. 3d, at 878, n. 10, 671

P. 2d, at 826, n. 10 (citing Lockett, 438 U. S., at 604).

Emphasizing the importance of the listing of aggravat

12 AYERS v. BELMONTES

STEVENS, J., dissenting

ing and mitigating circumstances, the judge next in

structed the jury that it “shall consider, take into account

and be guided by the applicable factors of aggravating and

mitigating circumstances upon which you have been in

structed.” App. 185 (emphasis added). In other words, in

reaching its decision, the jury was to consider each of the

“applicable factors”—here, the seven factors the judge just

finished reading—and no others.

As the Court points out, ante, at 13, the judge did tell

the jury that “the mitigating circumstances which I have

read for your consideration are given to you merely as

examples of some of the factors that you may take into

account as reasons for deciding not to impose . . . a death

sentence . . . .” App. 186. But immediately afterwards, he

instructed the jury to “pay careful attention to each of

these factors. Any one of them standing alone may support

a decision that death is not the appropriate punishment in

this case.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Since none of “these

factors” (save for the age of the defendant) encompassed

any mitigating circumstance unrelated to the severity of

the crime, the most natural reading of the instruction is

that any mitigating factor that lessens the severity of the

offense may support a sentence other than death. On this

view, any other mitigating circumstance is simply irrele

vant to (in the prosecutor’s words) the “simple weighing”

the jury was tasked with performing. Id., at 150.

V

Questions asked by at least six different jurors during

almost two full days of deliberation gave the judge an

ample opportunity to clarify that the testimony offered on

behalf of respondent, if credited by the jury, provided a

permissible basis for imposing a sentence other than

death. Far from eliminating their obvious confusion, his

responses cemented the impression that the jurors’ lone

duty was to weigh specified, limited statutory factors

Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 13

STEVENS, J., dissenting

against each other.

After a lunch break, the judge reconvened the jury to

answer a question that does not appear in the record; in

response, the judge merely reread instructions telling the

jury that it “must agree, if [it] can” and that it “shall con

sider, take into account and be guided by the applicable

factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon

which you have been instructed.” App. 185, 188–189 (em

phasis added). Because all of those factors were tradi

tional sentencing factors, and because none of them per

mitted consideration of Skipper-type mitigating evidence,

the judge’s response was the functional equivalent of yet

another admonition to disregard most of respondent’s

evidence.

After a colloquy between the judge and four different

jurors (Hailstone, Wilson, Norton, and Huckabay) about

the likelihood of reaching a unanimous verdict,3 other

jurors asked the judge a series of questions reflecting a

concern about whether it was proper to consider aggravat

ing or mitigating circumstances other than those specifi

——————

3 “JUROR HAILSTONE: If we can’t, Judge, what happens?

“THE COURT: I can’t tell you that.

“JUROR WILSON: That is what we wanted to know.

“THE COURT: Okay. I know what will happen, but I can’t tell you

what will happen.

“MR. SCHICK: Maybe we should inquire whether the jury could

reach a verdict.

“THE COURT: Do you think, Mr. Norton, you will be able to make a

decision in this matter?

“JUROR HAILSTONE: Not the way it is going.

“JUROR NORTON: That is tough, yes.

“THE COURT: Do you think if I allow you to continue to discuss the

matter and for you to go over the instructions again with one another,

that the possibility of making a decision is there?

“JUROR NORTON: I believe there is a possibility.

“JUROR HUCKABAY: We did need more time.

“THE COURT: I think so. I think you need more time.” App. 190–

191.

14 AYERS v. BELMONTES

STEVENS, J., dissenting

cally listed in his instructions:

“JUROR HERN: The statement about the aggrava

tion and mitigation of the circumstances, now, that

was the listing?

“THE COURT: That was the listing, yes, ma’am.

“JUROR HERN: Of those certain factors we were to

decide one or the other and then balance the sheet?

“THE COURT: That is right. It is a balancing proc

ess. Mr. Meyer?

“JUROR MEYER: A specific question, would this be

an either/or situation, not a one, if you cannot the

other?

“THE COURT: No. It is not that.

“JUROR MEYER: It is an either/or situation?

“THE COURT: Exactly. If you can make that ei

ther/or decision. If you cannot, then I will discharge

you.

“JUROR HAILSTONE: Could I ask a question? I

don’t know if it is permissible. Is it possible that he

could have psychiatric treatment during this time?

“THE COURT: That is something you cannot consider

in making your decision.” App. 191.

The judge’s responses strongly suggest that the “list

ing”—the listed statutory factors—was all that the jury

could properly consider when “balanc[ing] the sheet.” See

n. 1, supra. But it is difficult, if not impossible, to see how

evidence relating to future conduct even arguably “ex

tenuate[d] the gravity of the crime”4 under factor (k), and

——————

4 Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U. S. 1, 4 (1986) (plurality opinion),

recognized that a defendant’s potential good behavior in the future

would not relate to his “culpability for the crime he committed.” Even the

concurrence agreed: “Almost by definition,” it reasoned, a prisoner’s

good behavior “neither excuses the defendant’s crime nor reduces his

responsibility for its commission.” Id., at 12 (Powell, J., concurring in

judgment).

Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 15

STEVENS, J., dissenting

none of those listed factors gave the jury the chance to

consider whether the respondent might redeem himself in

prison. Cf. Brown v. Payton, 544 U. S. 133, 157 (2005)

(SOUTER, J., dissenting) (“[I]t would be more than a

stretch to say that the seriousness of the crime itself is

affected by a defendant’s subsequent experience”). And

rather than inviting an open-ended review of mitigating

factors that would include consideration of the defendant’s

possible future behavior in prison, the judge’s answers

emphasized the constraints on the “either/or” decision the

jurors had to make.5

The arguments of counsel, the actual instructions to the

jury, and this colloquy all support the conclusion that the

jurors understood their task was to run through the listed

statutory factors and weigh them against each other to

determine whether respondent should be sentenced to

death. Very little of respondent’s evidence, however, even

arguably “extenuate[d] the gravity of the crime.” In my

judgment, it is for that reason much more likely than not

that the jury believed that the law forbade it from giving

that evidence any weight at all. The Court of Appeals

therefore correctly set aside respondent’s death sentence.

See Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370, 380 (1990) (plural

ity opinion) (requiring that a defendant show only that

“there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied

the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the

consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence”).

——————

5 When Juror Hailstone asked the judge about a particular piece of

forward-looking evidence—the possibility that respondent would get

psychiatric treatment in prison—the judge told the jury that it could

not consider that evidence in making its decision. The judge’s answer,

while legally correct, lent further support to the conclusion that re

spondent’s future conduct in a structured prison environment was not

relevant because it did not fall within any of the listed factors.

16 AYERS v. BELMONTES

STEVENS, J., dissenting

VI

Nothing in the Court’s opinion in Boyde upsets my view

that respondent’s death sentence cannot stand. Over the

dissent of four Justices, the Court in Boyde both adopted a

new “legal standard for reviewing jury instructions

claimed to restrict impermissibly a jury’s consideration of

relevant evidence,” 494 U. S., at 378, and approved a

blatantly atextual interpretation of the unadorned factor

(k) instruction, id., at 382, and n. 5. Applying its new

standard and its dubious reading of factor (k), the Court

held that there was “not a reasonable likelihood that

Boyde’s jurors interpreted the trial court’s instructions to

prevent consideration of mitigating evidence of back

ground and character.” Id., at 381.

The Court rejected Boyde’s argument that factor (k)

made it impossible for the jury to consider testimony that

Boyde had won a prize for dance choreography while in

prison, which Boyde argued was Skipper-type evidence

relating to whether “he could lead a useful life behind

bars,” 494 U. S., at 382, n. 5. But the Court did not hold or

suggest that factor (k) allowed for the consideration of

Skipper-type evidence. Instead, the Court found that the

evidence of his dance choreography talents was presented

as part of his “overall strategy to portray himself as less

culpable than other defendants due to his disadvantaged

background and his character strengths,” ibid. (emphasis

added), and therefore fell within the ambit of factor (k).

Thus, although the Boyde opinion does not state so explic

itly, it assumes that the factor (k) instruction would not

permit the jury to consider Skipper-type “evidence of

postcrime good prison behavior to show that [a defendant]

would not pose a danger to the prison community if sen

tenced to life imprisonment rather than death.” Ibid.; see

also Skipper, 476 U. S., at 4 (recognizing that inferences

regarding a defendant’s “probable future conduct if sen

tenced to life in prison . . . would not relate specifically to

Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 17

STEVENS, J., dissenting

[the defendant’s] culpability for the crime he committed”);

Payton, 544 U. S., at 164 (SOUTER, J., dissenting) (“Boyde

did not purport to hold that factor (k) naturally called

for consideration of postcrime changes of fundamental

views”).

Here, respondent contends that there is a reasonable

likelihood that the judge’s instructions prevented the jury

from considering precrime, forward-looking mitigation

evidence regarding the possibility that he would lead a

constructive life in a prison setting. Not only does the

Court’s opinion in Boyde fail to support the improbable

argument that respondent’s mitigating evidence falls

within factor (k)’s purview, but its reasoning is entirely

consistent with the Court of Appeals’ contrary conclusion.

Similarly, the Court’s recent decision in Payton has

little bearing here. In Payton, we granted certiorari to

decide whether the Ninth Circuit’s decision affirming the

District Court’s grant of habeas relief “was contrary to the

limits on federal habeas review imposed by 28 U. S. C.

§2254(d).” 544 U. S., at 136. In concluding that it was,

the Court relied heavily on the deferential standard of

habeas review established by the Antiterrorism and Effec

tive Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214.

See 544 U. S., at 141. And JUSTICE BREYER specifically

stated that he only joined the five-Justice majority be

cause “this is a case in which Congress’ instruction to

defer to the reasonable conclusions of state-court judges

makes a critical difference,” id., at 148 (concurring opin

ion), explaining that, were he a California state judge, he

“would likely hold that Payton’s penalty-phase proceed

ings violated the Eighth Amendment [because] there

might well have been a reasonable likelihood that Payton’s

jury interpreted factor (k) in a way that prevented it from

considering constitutionally relevant mitigating evi

dence—namely, evidence of his postcrime religious conver

sion,” ibid. (citation, alteration, and internal quotation

18 AYERS v. BELMONTES

STEVENS, J., dissenting

marks omitted). The fact that Payton was a case about

deference under AEDPA, rather than about a proper

understanding of the scope of factor (k), is cause enough to

conclude that it does not mandate any specific outcome

here.

Indeed, given that respondent’s trial occurred the same

year and involved the same jury instructions as Payton’s,

compare 544 U. S., at 156 (“ ‘[Y]ou shall consider all of the

evidence which has been received during any part of the

trial in this case, except as you may be hereafter in

structed’ ”) (SOUTER, J., dissenting), with App. 183 (same),

and because AEDPA does not apply to respondent’s case,

there are persuasive reasons for concluding that JUSTICE

SOUTER’s powerful reasoning in Payton, rather than the

majority’s deferential review of a California court’s opin

ion, should guide our decision. In his dissenting opinion,

JUSTICE SOUTER pointed out that Payton’s trial had oc

curred both before the California Supreme Court had

directed trial judges to supplement the factor (k) instruc

tion and before the legislature had amended it. See 544

U. S., at 158. Without those changes, he correctly con

cluded, “any claim that factor (k) called for consideration

of a defendant’s personal development in the wake of his

crime was simply at odds with common attitudes and the

English language.” Id., at 158–159.

Moreover, Payton did not deal with a record that dis

closes actual confusion among jurors, as this record does.

See supra, at 12–15. Nor did it involve a defense attorney

who, bolstering the prosecutor’s claim that factor (k) did

not allow the jury to consider respondent’s religious con

version, refused to “insult” the jury “by telling you I think

[the mitigating evidence] excuses in any way what hap

pened here,” App. 166. Therefore, even ignoring its sig

nificantly different procedural posture, Payton, like Boyde,

falls far short of compelling the result that the Court

reaches today.

Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 19

STEVENS, J., dissenting

VII

Instead of accepting that lay jurors would almost cer

tainly give the words “circumstance which extenuates the

gravity of the crime” their ordinary meaning, the Court

insists that they would have disregarded their instructions

and considered evidence that had nothing whatsoever to

do with the crime. This conclusion seems to me to rest on

an assumption that the jury had an uncanny ability to

predict that future opinions would interpret factor (k) to

mean something that neither the judge nor the lawyers

thought it meant. Surely the more natural inference is that

the jury followed its instructions. See Greer v. Miller, 483

U. S. 756, 766, n. 8 (1987) (plurality opinion) (describing our

“presumption” that juries follow instructions).

The Court’s highly technical parsing of factor (k) de

pends on linguistic distinctions which would only occur to

trained lawyers. See, e.g., ante, at 11 (calling attention to

the “dichotomy within factor (k) . . . between a legal excuse

and an extenuating circumstance”). And even the lawyers

are confused. The prosecutor in Payton believed that

“factor (k) d[oes] not permit consideration of postcrime

rehabilitation evidence.” Ante, at 5. While the majority

now blithely characterizes this view as “incorrec[t],” ibid.,

it is the natural reading of factor (k), and one that jurors

would have been likely to accept. Similarly, present-day

counsel for the State of California expressed confusion at

oral argument as to whether it would have been constitu

tional for the trial judge to instruct the jury that it could not

consider any mitigating evidence unless it extenuated the

gravity of the crime, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 8–9 (retreating

from the statement that “[i]t would appear not to be” consti

tutional). The Court cannot seriously insist that a group of

12 laypersons had such command of constitutional law that,

anticipating Skipper, they took into account evidence out

side the ambit of their jury instructions.

The Court also apparently believes that when the prose

20 AYERS v. BELMONTES

STEVENS, J., dissenting

cutor in this case suggested that factor (k) meant exactly

what it said, supra, at 8, the jury would have taken that

as merely a comment on respondent’s credibility, ante, at

9. But this rests on a clear misreading of the record.

Although the prosecutor did argue that respondent lacked

sincere religious convictions, he also suggested quite

powerfully that the law did not permit the jury to consider

those convictions, however sincerely held. See App. 155 (“I

don’t think the law contemplates that and I don’t think it’s

right” (emphasis added)). Nor is there any support for the

Court’s surprising and inherently contradictory view that

while the prosecutor here “commented that the law did not

contemplate jury consideration of respondent’s religious

conversion,” ante, at 10, “[n]othing the prosecutor said

would have convinced the jury that it was forbidden from

even considering respondent’s religious conversion,” ibid.

(emphasis added).

Admittedly, as the Court points out, there is a distinc

tion between limiting the jury’s consideration “to circum

stances of the crime” that extenuate its severity, and

limiting that consideration to “any other circumstance that

might excuse the crime,” see ante, at 7. It is highly

unlikely, however, that jurors would note that subtle

distinction, and even more unlikely that they would con

sider it significant. Both interpretations of the phrase

focus the jury’s attention on the crime, and neither in

cludes the evidence at issue in Skipper, which “[a]lmost by

definition . . . neither excuses the defendant’s crime nor

reduces his responsibility for its commission.” 476 U. S.,

at 12 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). Read however

generously, the factor (k) limitation remains unconstitu

tional.

The Court makes a similarly unpersuasive argument

based on the dubious premise that a juror would under

stand “remorse” to be a species of postcrime evidence that

serves to lessen or excuse the crime itself. Even if that

Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2006) 21

STEVENS, J., dissenting

were true, it would not follow that jurors could somehow

divine that respondent’s evidence of a capacity to redeem

himself would both “extenuate his offense and render him

less deserving of a death sentence.” Ante, at 7.6

VIII

Unless the jurors who imposed the death sentence

somehow guessed at the breadth of the rule first an

nounced in Lockett, that sentence was the product of an

unconstitutional proceeding. Ironically, both Chief Justice

Burger (who wrote the plurality opinion in Lockett) and

Justice Powell (who joined it) understood the Lockett rule

to extend only to evidence “that lessens the defendant’s

culpability for the crime.” Skipper, 476 U. S., at 12 (Pow

ell, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist, J., concur

ring in judgment). Given that the authors of Lockett

themselves disagreed as to its scope, I am not as sanguine

as the Court that the lay members of the jury somehow

knew, notwithstanding clear jury instructions, that the

testimony presented at the sentencing phase of respon

dent’s trial could be part of the “simple weighing” the jury

was supposed to undertake.

When the trial judge told the jurors to consider all the

evidence “except as you may be hereinafter instructed,”

App. 183, he directed them to limit their consideration to

the traditional sentencing factors set forth in the statute.

When the prosecutor told the jurors that “I don’t think the

law contemplates” that respondent’s religion lessened the

——————

6 In response to the majority’s suggestion that this case may be in

consistent with Johnson v. Texas, 509 U. S. 350 (1993), ante, at 16, I

note only that Johnson addressed a very different question, namely,

whether a jury considering future dangerousness could give adequate

weight to a capital defendant’s youth. Whatever connection may exist

between a defendant’s youth and his future dangerousness, there is no

connection whatsoever between respondent’s evidence that he was

capable of redemption and a “circumstance which extenuates the

gravity of the crime,” Cal. Penal Code §190.3(k) (West 1988).

22 AYERS v. BELMONTES

STEVENS, J., dissenting

seriousness of respondent’s offense, id., at 155, he rein

forced the impression that the jury should confine its

deliberations to the listing. And once defense counsel

agreed with the prosecutor, saying that “I’m not going to

insult you by telling you I think [the mitigating evidence]

excuses in any way what happened here,” id., at 166,

surely at least some of the jurors would have doubted the

propriety of speculating about respondent’s future conduct

in prison as a basis for imposing a sentence less than

death.

The Court today heaps speculation on speculation to

reach the strange conclusion, out of step with our case law,

that a properly instructed jury disregarded its instructions

and considered evidence that fell outside the narrow con

fines of factor (k). Holding to the contrary, the Court

insists, would reduce two days of sentencing testimony to

“a virtual charade,” ante, at 5 (internal quotation marks

omitted)—but in so concluding the Court necessarily finds

that the judge’s instructions were themselves such a “cha

rade” that the jury paid them no heed. I simply cannot

believe that the jurors took it upon themselves to consider

testimony they were all but told they were forbidden from

considering; in my view, they must at the very least have

been confused as to whether the evidence could appropri

ately be considered. That confusion has created a risk of

error sufficient to warrant relief for a man who has spent

more than half his life on death row. Cf. Lackey v. Texas,

514 U. S. 1045 (1995) (STEVENS, J., respecting denial of

certiorari). The incremental value to California of carry

ing out a death sentence at this late date is far outweighed

by the interest in maintaining confidence in the fairness of

any proceeding that results in a State’s decision to take

the life of one of its citizens. See Gardner v. Florida, 430

U. S. 349, 358 (1977) (plurality opinion).

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.